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ABSTRACT
A growing literature in international relations theory explores how domestic institutions
filter and mediate international signals. The study of intelligence-policy relations fits
naturally into this mold, because intelligence agencies are specifically designed to collect
and interpret information about the international environment. This study provides a
general framework for theorizing about intelligence-policy relations by exploring how
leaders respond to new intelligence estimates.
In addition to providing a deductive characterization of the intelligence-policy problem,
the dissertation presents a model of politicization, defined as the manipulation of
estimates to reflect policy preferences. When leaders commit themselves to controversial
policies, they have strong domestic political incentives to put pressure on intelligence
agencies to publicly support their decisions. Intelligence agencies control secret
information and presumably have access to sources that are unavailable elsewhere. For
this reason, the use of intelligence for policy advocacy is a uniquely persuasive kind of
policy oversell.
The dissertation tests the model in a series of pair-wise comparisons. The first pair of
cases explains why the Johnson administration first ignored and later politicized
intelligence on Vietnam. The second pair explains why, despite their differences, the
Nixon and Ford administrations both ended up politicizing intelligence on the Soviet
strategic threat. The last pair of cases compares the U.S. and British responses to
intelligence before the recent war in Iraq. The results of the study show that domestic
variables identified in the oversell model strongly affect the likelihood of politicization.
Organizational and individual-level explanations are less satisfying.
Thesis Supervisor: Harvey M. Sapolsky
Title: Professor of Political Science
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This study is about the relationship between state leaders and intelligence
agencies. Specifically, it explains variation in how policymakers respond to intelligence
estimates about real and imagined threats to national security interests. Understanding
how leaders incorporate intelligence into the decision-making process at pivotal moments
is an important step towards a theory of intelligence-policy relations. More broadly, it
adds to a growing body of research in international relations theory that explores how
domestic institutions filter and mediate international signals.' Because intelligence
agencies are specifically designed to collect and interpret information about the
international security environment, understanding the causes of intelligence-policy
breakdowns provides an important window into the domestic sources of misperception in
international politics.
Most of the literature on intelligence has to do with collection, covert action, and
counterintelligence. Spy vs. spy intrigue dominates both the popular imagination and the
academic study of intelligence. There is no lack of research on covert operations,
espionage and the more technologically exotic forms of intelligence collection. 2 Nor is
Examples include Randall L Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of
Underbalancing," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 159-201; Jack L. Snyder, Myths of
Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and
Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American
Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). For a review, see Gideon Rose,
"Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp.
144-172.
2 For an overview of intelligence agencies and collection assets in the United States, see Jeffrey T.
Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 5 th edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008). For a
history of the modern evolution of espionage, see Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). For recent overviews of technical
intelligence in practice, see Matthew Aid and Cees Wiebes, eds., Secrets ofSignals Intelligence during the
Cold War and Beyond (London: Frank Cass, 2001); Patrick Radden Keefe, Chatter: Dispatches from the
there any lack of attention to the problem of protecting secrets from foreign spies, and in
knowing the difference between genuine sources and double-agents. 3 The subject of
analysis has received less frequent attention, but scholars have isolated some of the main
barriers to accurate political and military assessments. 4 Far less theoretical work has
been devoted to connection between intelligence officials and policymakers.5 This is
unfortunate, because even the best intelligence is irrelevant if it is disbelieved by decision
makers. Harry Howe Ransom understood the problem four decades ago, when he wrote
that "assuming the intelligence product is of high quality, getting it accepted as reliable
Secret World of Global Eavesdropping (New York: Random House, 2005); David T. Lindgren, Trust But
Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000); and John
Macartney, "John, How Should We Explain MASINT?" in Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline,
Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges (Lanham, MD: Rowan
& Littlefield, 2006), pp. 169-178. The best history of covert operations in the United States is John Prados,
Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2006). For differing views on
the practical problems associated with cover action, see Andre le Gallo, "Covert Action: A Vital Option in
U.S. National Security Policy," International Journal ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 18, No.
2 (Summer 2005), pp. 354-359; Gregory F. Treverton, "Covert Action and Open Society," Foreign Affairs
Vol. 65, No. 5 (Summer 1987), pp. 996-1007; and Jennifer D. Kibbe, "Covert Action and the Pentagon,"
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 2007), pp. 57-74.
3 The historiography surrounding mole-hunts and deception operations is extensive. For a multi-volume
overview of the history of U.S. counterintelligence, see Frank J. Rafalko, ed., A Counterintelligence Reader
(Washington, D.C., National Counterintelligence Center, 2004). Recent attempts to theorize about
counterintelligence include Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards?: U.S. Covert Action and
Counterintelligence, new edition (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000); John MacGaffin,
"Clandestine Human Intelligence: Spies, Counterspies, and Covert Action," in Jennifer E. Sims and Burton
Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), pp.
79-95; and Frederick Wittering, "Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad," International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2000), pp. 265-300.
4 The classic treatment on the psychological barriers to accuracy is Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999). The related
research on surprise attack, discussed below, also deals with the analytical problem of discerning important
data from a huge amount of meaningless information. See also Rob Johnston, Analytical Culture in the
U.S. Intelligence Community. An Ethnographic Study (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of
Intelligence, 2005); Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis, A Target-Centric Approach, 2 nd edition
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007); and Richard L. Russell, Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the
CIA Gets it Wrong and What Needs to be Done to Get it Right (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), pp. 119-148.
5 Important exceptions include Michael Handel, ed., Leaders and Intelligence (London, Frank Cass, 1989);
Arthur S. Hulnick, "The Intelligence-Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach,"
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 1986), pp. 212-233; Stephen J. Cimbala, ed.
Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers,
1987), esp. chapters 1-4; Amos Kovacs, "Using Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 12,
No. 4 (October 1997), pp. 145-164; Thomas L. Hughes, The Fate ofFacts in a World ofMen (New York:
Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 233, 1976); and Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in
Peace and War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 283-361.
and useful remains a basic problem." 6 Despite Ransom's insight, surprisingly little has
been done to identify the conditions under which intelligence is likely to be accepted, or
to identify the sources of intelligence-policy failure.
In the ideal, intelligence contributes to a rational state action by providing unique
kinds of information to policymakers, and by helping organize an enormous amount of
data from secret and open sources. By virtue of their control over secret information,
intelligence agencies are ideally suited to provide comprehensive strategic analyses for
policymakers. "The intelligence community," writes Richard Betts, "is the logical set of
institutions to provide what one may call the library function for national security: it
keeps track of all sources, secret or not, and mobilizes them in coherent form whenever
nonexpert policymakers call for them."' Both parties have a vested interest in the quality
of relations. Policymakers need intelligence to provide information, mitigate ambiguity,
and reduce the amount of uncertainty in the decision-making process. Intelligence
agencies seek to inform policymakers' judgment, and require policy guidance so that they
know where to train their collection assets.
In reality, however, the relationship is characterized by friction; policymakers and
intelligence officials often look at one another with suspicion and even outright hostility. 8
In extreme cases intelligence can become almost entirely irrelevant to the decision-
making process because leaders lose faith in its ability to provide useful information and
6 Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1965), p. 162.
7 Richard K. Betts, Enemies ofIntelligence: Knowledge & Power in American National Security (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 5.
8 Hans Heymann, "Intelligence/Policy Relationships," in Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James
M. Keagle, eds., Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 57-66. See
also Hughes, Fate ofFacts; Abram N. Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World oflntelligence
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 131-144; and Michael Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence," in
Handel, ed., Leaders and Intelligence.
insight. In other cases intelligence agencies become so disillusioned with policymakers
that they stop trying to actively support the policy process. Healthy intelligence-policy
relations help states make reasoned judgments, but the relationship is prone to
dysfunction.
Some amount of friction is natural. One reason is that the policy and intelligence
communities attract different kinds of individuals. Policymakers tend to be self-confident
and action-oriented. They come into office with strongly held worldviews and the belief
that certain truths exist about international politics. They also believe that intelligence
agencies can (and should) provide solid and unequivocal predictions about future events.
Intelligence analysts, on the other hand, are less confident about their ability to divine
certain truths from an inherently ambiguous international environment. They see
uncertainty and change as normal, and are usually unwilling to offer point predictions
about the future. Instead of offering unequivocal forecasts, they attempt to identify the
factors that will make events more or less likely. And because intelligence analysis is
somewhat akin to academic social science, analysts are comfortable speaking in abstract
and theoretical terms that are unfamiliar to their policy bosses. One scholar has called
this the "tribal tongues" phenomenon. As long as the intelligence tribe and the policy
tribe speak different languages, they will find it difficult to interact. 9
Other kinds of friction are more variable. Sharp deviations from normal
intelligence-policy relations are what I call the pathologies of intelligence-policy
relations. Chapter 2 outlines these pathologies, which frame the dependent variable in
9 Mark M. Lowenthal, "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Producers, Intelligence Consumers" (1992), in Loch
K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, eds. Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World (Los Angeles,
Roxbury Press, 2004), pp. 234-241. See also Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an
Age of nformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 179-185.
my analysis. The first is neglect, in which policymakers ignore intelligence or cherry-
pick for supporting analyses. Neglect is a serious problem because it makes intelligence
superfluous to the policy process, and because it removes a significant check on
policymakers' preexisting beliefs. The second pathology is the opposite: excessive
harmony. In cases of excessive harmony, intelligence officials are unwilling to challenge
policy beliefs, and policymakers are unwilling to criticize intelligence conclusions. This
can lead to shared strategic tunnel-vision. The third pathology is politicization, defined
as the attempt to manipulate intelligence so that it reflects policy preferences. Direct
politicization occurs when leaders intervene to change specific analytical conclusions,
offering rewards to malleable analysts and threatening punishment for noncompliance.
Indirect politicization is more subtle, involving tacit signals to the intelligence
community about the desired direction of estimates.
In addition to describing these pathologies, this study develops and tests a model
of politicization in modern democracies. Politicization is the most significant problem in
intelligence-policy relations for several reasons. First, the manipulation of intelligence
leads to flawed estimates because policymakers encourage analysts to indulge in certain
assumptions, to deliver unambiguous findings even when the data is unclear, and to
ignore contrary evidence. Second, the act of pressuring intelligence constrains its ability
to provide nuance and alter its analysis as circumstances warrant. Because policy
pressure causes analysts to become wedded to certain predetermined conclusions, the act
of politicization can inhibit learning even as new information becomes available. Finally,
episodes of politicization have effects on the relationship that last for years after the fact.
Lingering hostility and mutual mistrust is often the result of policy meddling.
I also choose to focus on the problem of politicization because it presents an
intriguing theoretical puzzle. Extant political science offers good explanations for the
causes of neglect and excessive harmony. Political psychologists have long been aware
of the powerful effects of existing beliefs on the ability to interpret new information.
When individuals hold strong world views they find it difficult to absorb contrary
information. Instead, they will subconsciously mold the information so that it conforms
to their existing beliefs, or they will ignore it entirely. For this reason, policymakers tend
to disregard intelligence when it clashes with their own expectations and beliefs. 10 On
the other hand, leaders and intelligence officials may fall into excessive harmony because
they both have vested interests in the same policy outcome and fall victim to wishful
thinking. Excessive harmony may also occur because of groupthink, a pathology of
small-group decision making describing the psychological desire to reach agreement,
even if consensus means ruling out reasonable alternatives. 1
The causes of politicization are less clear. Why would leaders ever try to force
intelligence to change its conclusions, especially when they can simply ignore it? Why
would leaders risk domestic scandal by "cooking the books" when they have no legal or
procedural obligation to pay attention to intelligence in the first place? Moreover, high-
ranking policymakers come into power with their own informal networks that provide
information and advice. If they are unsatisfied with intelligence, why not just trust their
own sources?
10 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), pp. 117-202. See also Philip E. Tetlock and Charles B. McGuire, Jr., "Cognitive
Perspectives on Foreign Policy," in G. John Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays,
5 th ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), pp. 484-501.
" On wishful thinking, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 356-381. On groupthink, see Irving
R. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd edition (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 1982).
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the key debates that dominate the
existing literature on intelligence-policy relations. I then describe three hypotheses on
politicization that are inferred from the literature, and introduce a new explanation based
on domestic politics. Finally, I discuss the methodology and case selection in this study.
The Political Science of Intelligence-Policy Relations
Unlike civil-military relations, the subject of intelligence-policy relations has not
received sustained scholarly attention. The bulk of the literature is contained in
professional memoirs, whose authors offer general principles about the appropriate
behavior of both intelligence professionals and policymakers. As a result, the literature
tends towards exhortation rather than analysis. There is little in the way of abstract
theorizing on the nature of ideal intelligence-policy relations and the causes of
dysfunction. With a few important exceptions, political scientists have not spent much
time on the subject. Moreover, the best theoretical treatments focus on why leaders
ignore intelligence, which is only one of the major pathologies of intelligence-policy
relations.
Two basic debates dominate the literature. The first revolves around the question
of surprise attack. Since Roberta Wohlstetter's path breaking work on Pearl Harbor,
scholars have debated the causes of intelligence failure and the degree to which
intelligence agencies can predict and prevent future attacks. 12 Wohlstetter introduced the
signal-to-noise metaphor to describe the fundamental problem for warning intelligence.
Indications of an attack are usually present in the data available to intelligence analysts,
12 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1962).
but they are overwhelmed by a mountain of meaningless background information. As
long as genuine indicators (the signal) remain weak relative to the other information (the
noise), analysts will not be able to anticipate attacks. Richard Betts took the argument
further by arguing that even when intelligence analysts properly identify the danger signs,
they still have to convince policymakers of the reality of the threat. This is difficult
because of policymakers' belief in their own ability to conduct analysis, and because of
human beings' psychological inability to absorb discomfiting information. 13 It is also
difficult because multiple interpretations are possible from the same evidence. Scholars
have used variations on these arguments to explain why policymakers have ignored
intelligence warnings even when the indicators of attack were very strong.14
Critics of this argument have labeled it the "no-fault" school of intelligence
because it seems to forgive the intelligence community of responsibility for failures.
Scholars like Eliot Cohen and Ariel Levite contend that more aggressive collection
efforts, better analytical methods, and changes to organizational processes can lead to
more accurate warnings for policymakers.' 5 This suggests a different reason why
policymakers ignore intelligence: the product is not useful. If intelligence analysts do not
provide timely and relevant estimates, then policymakers should not waste their time
3 Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World
Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61-89.
14 Examples include Harvey de Weerd, "Strategic Surprise in the Korean War," Orbis, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Fall
1962), pp. 435-452; Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973); Ephraim
Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim 's Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Steve
Chan, "The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning," American Political
Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 138-146; Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence
Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 348-380;
Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise
Attacks," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 381-395; and Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack:
Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1982).
15 Eliot Cohen, "The 'No Fault' School of Intelligence," in Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for
the 1990s: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action (Lexington, MA: Lexington Press,
1989), pp. 71-81; and Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1987).
dealing with them. If this is correct, then the quality of intelligence-policy relations
ultimately depends on the quality of intelligence.
The second debate, which is more relevant to the problem of politicization, has to
do with the appropriate distance between intelligence and policy. The orthodox view in
the formative years of the U.S. intelligence community was that intelligence officials
should remain distant from policymakers lest their views become biased by policy
needs.' 6 According to this view, intelligence professionals should avoid becoming
wrapped up in the excitement of the policymaking process, and should cultivate a
reputation for neutral detachment. Similarly, intelligence agencies ought to be
organizationally insulated from policymaking bodies so that they are not subject to policy
pressure. The problem, however, is that too much distance risks making intelligence
irrelevant to the decision-making process. For intelligence to inform policy judgments, it
must be close enough to understand the kinds of analysis that policymakers need, and
close enough to respond rapidly when events change. Perfect insulation from the policy
process will guarantee objectivity, but it also means total isolation.17
The debate about proximity is as old as the U.S. intelligence community itself.
Indeed, the parameters of the debate were clear only a few years after the National
Security Act created the CIA in 1947.18 But there have been few efforts to abstract these
16 Hughes, Fate ofFacts, p. 5. See also Shulsky, Silent Warfare, p. 137
17 Robert M. Gates, "Guarding Against Politicization," March 16, 1992, text reprinted in Studies in
Intelligence (Spring 1992), pp. 5-13, http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/unclass 992.pdf. See also Treverton,
Reshaping National Intelligence; and Anne Armstrong, "Bridging the Gap: Intelligence and Policy,"
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1989).
18 Sherman Kent addresses both logics in his early classic, Strategic Intelligence and American Foreign
Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949). For critiques, see Roger Hilsman, Jr., "Intelligence
and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs," World Politics (1953), pp. 1-45; and Willmoore Kendall, "The
Function of Intelligence," World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 1949), pp. 542-552. For a summary of the
early debate, see Jack Davis, "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 36, No. 5
(1992), pp. 91-103.
claims in such a way to make empirical testing possible. Stephen Marrin's work is a
recent exception. Marrin starts by identifying the basic tension in intelligence-policy
relations, condensing the dilemma into what he calls the proximity hypothesis:
"(I)ntelligence agencies that are close to policymakers tend to produce analysis that is
useful for improving decision-making but potentially distorted due to the incorporation of
policy biases and preferences, while intelligence agencies that are distant from
policymakers tend to produce 'objective' analysis containing little distortion, but of little
use in improving policymaker judgment." 19 Marrin measures proximity by the degree of
formal and symbolic autonomy from the policy process; by the geographic separation
between intelligence agencies and the policy center; and by the frequency of interaction
between senior intelligence and policy officials. Some agencies enjoy a substantial
amount of separation. In other cases intelligence is closely integrated in the policy
process and no effort is made to real or symbolic distance. If the basic logic of the
proximity hypothesis holds, then the more distant agencies should be less vulnerable to
politicization.
Although this framework is a useful way of thinking about the possible effects of
proximity, it does not identify the causal mechanism that would lead to politicization.
The proximity hypothesis suggests that close and regular interaction leads to biased
estimates through a sort of subconscious osmosis. Intelligence analysts may not intend to
slant their products to favor policy beliefs, but they come to identify and sympathize with
policymakers and lose the ability to remain neutral and objective. Even if this is the case,
it still does not explain why policymakers would consciously choose to manipulate the
19 Stephen Marrin, "Does Proximity Between Intelligence Producers and Consumers Matter? The Case of
Iraqi WMD Intelligence," paper presented to the International Studies Association Conference, Honolulu,
HI, March 1-5, 2005, pp. 4-5.
analytical process. I build on Marrin's discussion below to draw out some testable
hypotheses on politicization, with specific focus on the policymakers' incentive structure.
Explaining Politicization
I infer three main hypotheses on politicization from the literature on intelligence-
policy relations. Two of the hypothesis are based on Marrin's discussion of proximity;
the third is based on how leaders exploit bureaucratic dependence to manipulate
intelligence products.
Personal Proximity. The first explanation holds that the likelihood of
politicization increases when intelligence officials interact closely with policymakers.
When intelligence officials maintain appropriate professional distance between
themselves and their policy counterparts, they are less likely to face to the kind of policy
pressures that lead to biased estimates. When they veer too close, on the other hand,
policymakers are more likely to cajole them into providing intelligence to please.
Policymakers can do this by exploiting the intelligence officials' ambition and eagerness
to take part in the policy process. One former chair of the British Joint Intelligence
committee has warned about the dangers of getting wrapped up in the "magic circle" of
high-level policymakers, where the excitement of crisis diplomacy makes objectivity
impossible.2 In a similar vein, policymakers can enlist intelligence chiefs into the
execution of policy decisions. This effectively changes the role of the intelligence officer
from impartial analyst to an individual with a personal interest in policy success.21
20 Rodric Braithwaite, "Defending British Spies: The Uses and Abuses of Intelligence," The World Today,
Vol. 60, No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 13-16, at 15.
21 In October 1998, for example, DCI George Tenet became directly involved in Israeli-Palestinian peace
talks. Acting to facilitate a security understanding between the two sides, the CIA implicitly put its own
We should expect to see two kinds of evidence to support the personal proximity
hypothesis. First, episodes of politicization should occur when leaders and key
intelligence officials work closely together. Conversely, politicization should be rare in
circumstances where intelligence officials maintain their distance and interact
infrequently with policymakers. This correlation should appear in the historical record,
whether the proximity effect occurs as a result of conscious manipulation or through
osmosis. Second, leaders should recognize that their intelligence chiefs are malleable and
try to cultivate them as supporters. Enough has been revealed in the historical record to
make judgments along these lines, especially in past cases where expansive archival
records contain clues about policy motives and behavior.
Organizational Proximity. A related hypothesis is that the politicization is likely
when intelligence agencies are too "close" to the policy process. Unlike the personal
proximity hypothesis, which focuses on professional judgment, the organizational
proximity hypotheses is based on bureaucratic design. Leaders are more likely to
politicize agencies that are bureaucratically intermingled with policymaking bodies.
Conversely, intelligence agencies that enjoy a significant degree of insulation from the
policy process are less likely to face pressure to change their estimates. As with the
personal proximity hypothesis, this explanation is based on the simple fact that
policymakers have more opportunity to exert influence over the product. Organizational
proximity makes indirect politicization especially likely because policymakers can keep
up a steady stream of signals to intelligence officials about what they expect to see in
prestige on the line, leading some commentators to question whether he could remain objective. Shai
Feldman, "Israel and the Cut-Off Treaty," Strategic Assessment, Vol. 1, No. 4 (January 1999);
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/vln4p2_n.html.
estimates. Bringing the estimative process closer to the policymaking process creates the
conditions necessary for politicization.
Differences in organizational proximity exist between states and within them.
British intelligence agencies are closer to the policy process than their American
counterparts. In the United Kingdom, the line separating "intelligence" from "policy" is
sometimes indistinct. Intra-state differences in proximity are also apparent. In the
United States, the military intelligence services are directly subordinate to their
consumers and interact closely with them. Other intelligence agencies enjoy more
distance. The CIA, for instance, enjoys the symbolic separation of having its
headquarters outside of Washington, D.C.. In addition, the CIA cultivates professional
norms of objectivity and neutrality that reinforce the functional separation from the
policy process.22
Organizational Dependence. The third explanation is based on the idea that
leaders are able to manipulate intelligence by holding the bureaucratic incentives of
intelligence agencies at risk. Organization theorists posit that bureaucracies seek wealth,
autonomy, and prestige, and that these institutional interests color their advice to
policymakers. 23 If intelligence agencies rely on policymakers to achieve their goals, then
they are vulnerable to manipulation. Policymakers should be able to recognize their
ability to use bureaucratic incentives over dependent agencies as leverage to influence the
22 Martin, "Does Proximity Between Intelligence Producers and Consumers Matter ?"; Stephen Marrin, "At
Arm's Length or At the Elbow? Explaining the Distance between Analysis and Decisionmakers,"
International Journal ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2007), pp. 401-414; and
Philip H.J. Davies, "Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions," Harvard
International Review, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 62-66.
23 Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," World Politics Vol. 63, No. 3
(September 1969), pp. 689-718.; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and
Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 34-60; and Jack
Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 30-33, 212-214.
content of intelligence estimates. On the other hand, if intelligence agencies do not need
policymakers for patronage or bureaucratic protection, then they will not so easily bow to
pressure. In these cases, policymakers will be less inclined to attempt to politicize
estimates because of the low probability of success.
Organizational dependence can take several forms. In extreme cases,
policymakers can exert control by threatening to cut off resources or eviscerate the
autonomy of the agency in question. Occasionally policymakers have clear legal or
procedural mechanisms that they can use to hold bureaucratic resources at risk. In other
cases, policymakers can influence the relative prestige of the agency by giving it more or
less opportunity to participate in the policymaking process, or by restricting its ability to
operate independently.
Some writers have used the logic of organizational dependence to explain why
some intelligence agencies routinely miscalculate enemy threats. George Allen, a
legendary intelligence official during the Vietnam War, argues that military intelligence
analysts were encouraged to deliver estimates that supported the military's perceived
interests. Instead of producing balanced assessments of the counterinsurgency campaign
in the early 1960s, they were ordered to produce "Headway Reports" which conveyed
only indications of progress and carefully avoided any bad news. The not-so-subtle
implication was that their career prospects rested on their willingness to toe the line. 24
Similarly, John Prados and Lawrence Freedman have argued that bureaucratic incentives
caused Air Force intelligence to give higher estimates of the Soviet strategic threat than
24 During his time at the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Allen was warned that his
briefings to policymakers should not suggest any shortcomings in the military effort. In his memoirs, he
criticized the DIA for deciding to become "politically correct" in its reporting. George W. Allen, None So
Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), pp.
143-144, and 158-163.
other intelligence agencies during the Cold War. Because the Air Force needed these
estimates to justify greater investment in the U.S. missile and bomber fleet, analysts were
under pressure to support the service's institutional interests, and compliance was
rewarded with promotion. "In intelligence as in other arenas of bureaucratic politics,"
Prados concludes, "the rewards appeared to have gone to those who support the interests
of their organizations." 25
In both cases, bureaucratic interests constrained analytical freedom and made it
difficult for military intelligence to remain objective. The same logic should apply at
higher levels. If intelligence agencies clearly rely on policymakers' largesse, then they
will have obvious incentives to deliver favorable estimates. Policymakers should be able
to recognize the opportunity to manipulate intelligence by exploiting its dependent
position.
The Oversell Model
Existing explanations of politicization focus on professional choices and
organizational design, and proposed solutions are found at the individual and bureaucratic
levels of analysis. Advocates of the personal proximity hypothesis believe that the best
way to solve the problem of politicization is by convincing intelligence officials to keep
their distance from the policy fray, and by educating policymakers about the capabilities
and limits of intelligence. Advocates of the organizational proximity and organizational
dependence hypotheses look for ways to decouple institutional interests from the content
of estimates. If politicization happens because intelligence agencies are too close to
25 John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence and Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986), p. 50; and Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 65-80.
policymakers, then the solution is to insulate them with additional layers of bureaucratic
protection. Similarly, if intelligence agencies need to satisfy policymakers in order to
protect organizational interests, then the solution is to legislate institutional procedures
for reducing their vulnerability.
Instead of looking at individual or bureaucratic level factors, this study presents a
model of politicization based on domestic politics. I argue that domestic political
pressures create incentives for policymakers to oversell the amount and quality of
information on security threats, regardless of the nature of personal relationships or
organizational design. Policymakers mobilize domestic support for controversial
decisions by creating the image of a consensus within the national security establishment.
Symbolic demonstrations of support, including joint appearances with senior diplomats
and military officers, helps persuade domestic groups on the wisdom of policy.
Intelligence agencies are particularly important to the consensus because of their control
over secret information. Politicization is likely if threaten to break away.
Intelligence is a uniquely effective public relations vehicle because it carries an
aura of secrecy, which conveys the message that policymakers are privy to special
information that is not available to anyone else. And because this information is
necessarily classified, policymakers can use the intelligence imprimatur to invoke the
national interest without having to be specific. The problem, however, is that intelligence
is inherently ambiguous. Precise estimates of foreign capabilities are difficult because
the targets of intelligence conceal their activities and use extravagant denial and
deception techniques to confuse intelligence collectors.26 Estimates of foreign intentions
26 Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, eds., Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century
Challenge (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002).
are even more difficult, because they usually require high-level human sources that can
report on internal discussions. It is not easy to convince a foreign national to spy on his
own government, especially given the danger of being discovered and prosecuted.
Intelligence services also worry that their human sources are actually double-agents
working on behalf of the target state, meaning that even genuine information is received
with caution. Finally, foreign intentions are liable to change. Even the presence of well-
placed sources cannot ensure foreknowledge of future policy decisions.2 7 For these
reasons, intelligence estimates attach caveats to their conclusions and are loathe to make
point predictions about future events.
Cautious and conditional estimates are of little use to policymakers who need to
rally domestic support for their plans. Elected leaders cannot afford to be forthright
about gaps in the existing intelligence picture when they are trying to make a convincing
argument about the need for action, and they certainly cannot provide realistic
discussions about ambiguous data and uncertain future developments. As a result,
policymakers have large incentives to misrepresent intelligence in public, even if that
means pressuring intelligence to change its conclusions. Intelligence works best as a
public relations vehicle when it is stripped of any indications of uncertainty or doubt, and
intelligence products are most persuasive when they appear to represent the collective
wisdom of the intelligence community. Signs of internal disagreement are
counterproductive, so they are also removed.
27 Israeli intelligence cultivated a high-level source in the Egyptian government before the Yom Kippur
War, who contributed to Israel's belief that Egypt would only attack in concert with Syria, and only after it
acquired long-range bombers. This was an accurate portrayal of Egyptian strategy at least until the
summer, and it may have caused Israeli leaders to respond slowly to indications that it was becoming more
aggressive that fall. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy ofFailure in War
(New York: Vintage, 1990), pp. 106-10; and Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of
Yom Kippur and its Sources (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), pp. 47-49.
Attempts to manipulate intelligence occur under two conditions. Both are
necessary for politicization to occur; neither is sufficient. First, leaders who make public
commitments are tempted to use intelligence to backstop the logic of action. Public
commitments bind policymakers to specific positions, and make leaders less receptive to
contrary intelligence estimates. Leaders invoke audience costs when they go public,
meaning that that they risk appearing irresolute if they rescind their commitments later.
According to one longtime practitioner, "intelligence... receives a cool reception when its
messages are uncongenial and do not necessarily support particular policies being
advocated at the time."28 Second, the emergence of a critical constituency creates
incentives to bring intelligence more visibly in support of policy plans. I define a critical
constituency as any domestic group with the ability to damage the policy objective or
political future of the policymaker. Leaders have no reasons to use intelligence if their
public commitments are met with approval at home.
To summarize, politicization occurs when leaders make controversial public
commitments in the face of at least one critical constituency. The absence of either
condition makes politicization unlikely.
The oversell model also holds that the type of politicization is a function of the
magnitude and intensity of the potential political costs. Direct politicization is likely
when the values on each independent variable are very high. Credible threats to key
policy initiatives or to policy careers create large incentives to use intelligence for the
purpose of public advocacy. When policymakers issue strong public commitments in the
face of substantial domestic opposition, they have an interest in forcefully bringing
28 Harold P. Ford, Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimating,
revised edition (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), p. 177.
intelligence into the policy consensus. When commitments are less strong, or when
critical constituencies are manageable, indirect politicization is more likely.
The oversell model operates regardless of individual or bureaucratic level factors.
Policymakers who are generally receptive to intelligence will politicize estimates when
domestic pressure is high. The nature of the personal relationship between intelligence
officials and policymakers is unimportant. Politicization can occur whether intelligence
officials are very close or very distant from their policy counterparts. Similarly, the
degree or organizational proximity or dependence does not determine whether or not the
oversell model is operative. Sufficient domestic political pressure will cause
policymakers to manipulate estimates regardless of the organizational design of the
intelligence community.
Methodology and Case Selection
To test the model, this study examines six case studies in three pair-wise
comparisons. It includes two cases from the Vietnam War, two cases surrounding
estimates of the Soviet strategic threat from the 1970s, and two cases of intelligence-
policy relations before the recent war in Iraq. The subject lends itself to qualitative
analysis, because there are not enough cases of intelligence-policy breakdowns to justify
a large-N study. In addition, it is not easy to code the dependent variable in any given
case without significant research. Episodes of politicization are particularly contentious
because they are also accusations of policy misbehavior. Thus there is an obligation
demonstrate the fact of politicization before explaining why it occurred. 29
29 1 ask four basic questions in each case:
The case selection offers several benefits. First, the cases represent almost all of
the major incidents of politicization in the United States over the last four decades.
Successful theories offer wide explanatory scope. If the oversell model explains most or
all of the cases in this study, then we can be confident about its generalizability.
Moreover, the inclusion of one case from outside the United States provides an
opportunity to see whether the causal mechanisms in the model operate across borders.
The architecture of British intelligence and the political culture in Whitehall are
fundamentally different from the United States. For this reason, theories of politicization
based on organizational design are easily testable against the oversell model.
Second, the small number of cases offers the chance to use process-tracing to
offer fine-grained explanation. Process tracing allows researchers to isolate the important
inflection points in any large decision, and show how the changes in key variables
produce different outcomes. As a result, even if multiple theories make the same general
prediction, we can assess which ones do a better job explaining the details and timing of
1. Is there a paper trail demonstrating that policymakers pressured intelligence to deliver certain
findings? This is the most compelling evidence ofpoliticization, but it is also the most unusual. The
archives will occasionally reveal telling documents suggesting politicization, but smoking gun evidence is
rare. Policymakers have good reason to cover their tracks because revelation of meddling would be
politically devastating. If no strong documentation exists, I turn to the next three questions. Affirmative
answers to all of them indicate that politicization has occurred.
2. Are accusations ofpoliticization corroborated? Individual analysts may be overly sensitive to
feedback from policymakers or their own superiors. For this reason, isolated complaints from intelligence
officers do not count as evidence of politicization. On the other hand, repeated accusations of policy
pressure from multiple sources suggest that manipulation has occurred.
3. Do intelligence officers diverge from normal best practices in the estimative process? The
sudden abandonment of routine methods is a strong indication that policymakers are pressuring intelligence
agencies to come to certain findings. This is not to say that standard operating procedures are always
optimal; intelligence agencies ought to refine their techniques over time. But sharp changes to existing
analytical methods, especially during the production of a specific estimate, do not reflect efforts to improve
the long-term quality of the process.
4. Do intelligence products go out of their way to eliminate uncertainty or views that are
inconsistent with policy preferences? Intelligence cannot effectively serve policymakers if it is unwilling
to provide firm judgments. Intelligence, after all, is meant to guide policy by reducing the bounds of
uncertainty. But there is an important difference between making a judgment based on ambiguous
information and consciously pretending that ambiguity does not exist. Estimates that cover up profound
differences of opinion are suspicious, as are estimates that conceal important gaps in knowledge.
events. As long as there is a sufficient historical record of the decision-making process,
careful analysis can illustrate the causal mechanisms at work. A great deal of archival
material is now available on the first four cases. Much less is known about events before
the war in Iraq, but enough is available to make a reasonable judgment about intelligence
and policy behavior in Washington and London.
Third, the cases provide an opportunity to test the oversell model using both the
method of difference and method of agreement. The method of difference looks at
similar cases with different values on the dependent variable. Conversely, the method of
agreement looks at cases in which the dependent variable is the same. 30 The first pair-
wise comparison asks why the Johnson administration reacted differently to Vietnam
estimates in 1964 and 1967. Although both estimates challenged the logic of U.S.
strategy, the administration ignored the former and politicized the later. The second pair
uses the method of agreement to examine why the Nixon and Ford administrations, which
had very different attitudes towards intelligence, both ended up politicizing estimates of
the Soviet Union. The method of agreement is also useful in the last pair, because it
provides an opportunity to explain why British and American policymakers, who
appeared very different on the surface, both manipulated estimates on Iraq.
Fourth, the sample provides critical cases for all three explanations. Critical
cases are those with extreme values on the independent variables. Instead of seeking out
representative cases, researchers look for cases that make successful predictions
especially likely or unlikely.3 1 Most-likely cases carry high values on the independent
30 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997), pp. 23-24.
31 Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby,
eds., Handbook of Political Science (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79-137.
variables, and hypotheses ought to be able to explain these cases if they are at all
plausible. 32 Least-likely cases carry low values on the independent variables relative to
other explanations. As Stephen Biddle explains, "For such cases, we would expect weak
theories to be overwhelmed by confounding effects; if we nevertheless observe
successful prediction, this surprise would warrant a greater gain of confidence than would
a single confirmation under less extreme conditions." 33 The study starts with an easy test
of the oversell model, and proceeds to test it in cases where competing explanations are
more likely to succeed.
Finally, the sample provides opportunities to explore some of the more
idiosyncratic explanations for politicization. For instance, it may be possible that the
personal attributes of key officials makes politicization more likely. Policymakers who
are disposed to cajoling their subordinates, or who have a special psychological need for
support on important policy decisions, may be more likely to browbeat intelligence
officials. Unique personal characteristics are difficult to generalize, but they are worth
examining because they figure so prominently in historical accounts on intelligence-
policy relations.
The Johnson Administration and Vietnam, 1964-1967. The first pair-wise
comparison evaluates the policy response to estimates on the Vietnam war. In both 1964
and 1967, U.S. intelligence agencies threw cold water on the logic of U.S. strategy in
Vietnam. In the first case, the Office of National Estimates (ONE) provided two
estimates that cut against the prevailing domino theory and bluntly challenged the
32 Stephen Van Evera calls these "hoop tests" because the theory should be able to pass through the first
hoop if it has any chance of explaining harder cases. Van Evera, Guide to Methods, p. 31.
33 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 79.
rationale for U.S. intervention. In the second case, the CIA challenged the military's
estimate of the order of battle in Vietnam, suggesting that the enemy was much larger and
resilient than previously thought. If this was correct, then the administration's
counterinsurgency strategy seemed destined to fail.
Although both estimates implicitly undermined the logic of U.S. policy, the
Johnson administration responded very differently in each case. The first set of
estimates, which were disseminated widely in the White House, caused barely a ripple.
Policymakers continued to use the logic of the domino theory to publicly justify the slow
escalation of the war in the summer of 1964, making no attempt to understand the
intelligence position or pressure ONE to change its conclusions. In 1967, however, the
White House came down very hard on CIA officials and forced them to accept the
military's lower estimate of the order of battle. The actual data was extremely
ambiguous, and both the CIA and the military made plausible claims based on different
rules about how to classify and count the enemy. Rather than accept a compromise,
however, the White House leaned on intelligence to stifle its dissenting view and sign on
to the lower estimate.
Explaining this change in behavior is a good plausibility probe for the oversell
model. The values on both independent variables were extremely low in 1964 and
extremely high in 1967. In the first case the administration assiduously avoided a firm
commitment about its policy in Vietnam, which gave it significant freedom of action. In
addition, no critical constituencies yet existed on the issue to threaten the policy
preferences of the administration. Both variables were dramatically different in 1967.
The administration had firmly committed to a strategy of attrition in Vietnam, and was
desperate to maintain public and congressional support for an increasingly bloody war.
At the same time, a number of critical constituencies had emerged, including the public,
the Congress, and the burgeoning antiwar movement.
The Vietnam cases also present an opportunity to test the personal proximity
hypothesis. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in 1964 was John McCone, a
conservative Republican with a cold and distant relationship from the president and key
administration officials. The DCI in 1967 was Richard Helms, a career intelligence
professional who earned the respect of the president and a regular seat at high-level
policy discussions. On the surface this hypothesis offers an equally compelling
explanation for why politicization occurred. The evidence, however, shows that the
oversell model provides a more satisfying explanation for the pattern of administration
behavior. Both explanations can account for the general outcome, but the oversell model
does a better job accounting for the nature and timing of politicization.
I also use the Vietnam case to test an argument linking politicization to political
psychology. In brief, the argument is that President Johnson required emotional support
for his difficult decision to pursue the attrition strategy in Vietnam. Leaders under
conditions of stress do not want to feel isolated when faced with difficult and costly
decisions. The CIA's dissent on the order of battle threatened to shatter the illusion of
support, and thus the administration had reasons to push back against the agency and
restore the president's confidence that he was acting with the backing of the whole
national security establishment.
The Soviet Estimate, 1969 and 1976. The second pair of cases deal with
estimates on the size and purposes of the Soviet strategic arsenal. In the first case, the
Nixon administration clashed with the intelligence community about the estimated
capabilities of the Soviet SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile, and about the Soviets'
intention to seek a first strike capability. In the second case, the Ford administration
bowed to right-wing pressure by allowing a group of well-known hardliners (Team B) to
formally challenge the intelligence community's estimate of the Soviet strategic threat.
In both cases policymakers pressured the intelligence community to produce more
ominous estimates.
The SS-9 episode is a hard case for the oversell model, because the domestic level
variables it identifies are relatively weak compared to individual and bureaucratic level
factors. The personal proximity and organizational proximity hypotheses strongly predict
that the administration should have ignored intelligence throughout 1969. President
Nixon harbored deep and abiding suspicion of the intelligence community, especially the
CIA. He viewed intelligence professionals as arrogant exemplars of the northeast liberal
establishment, and was personally hostile to Director of Central Intelligence Richard
Helms. The president also believed that he could perform his own strategic analyses with
help from his National Security Advisor, and without help from the intelligence
community. The administration's thinly veiled disdain for intelligence created a situation
in which the formal estimative agencies drifted far from the policy process. Because the
variables in the personal proximity and organizational proximity hypotheses are so
strong, we will gain greater confidence in the explanatory power of the oversell model if
it nonetheless accounts for the outcome.
The Team B episode is an excellent opportunity to explore the power of public
commitments on intelligence-policy relations. In the first year of his administration,
President Ford was an outspoken advocate of d6tente and arms control with the Soviet
Union, and his commitments were generally consistent with standing intelligence
estimates. Hardliners on the Soviet threat tried to convince the president to subject the
intelligence community to greater scrutiny, but he resisted these proposals as unnecessary
and dangerous. Under pressure from the right wing of the Republican Party, however,
Ford changed course and publicly abandoned detente in early 1976. The sudden shift in
policy created a rift with the intelligence community, which continued to offer a more
sanguine view of the Soviet Union. Putting aside his reservations about the possible
consequences, Ford authorized the creation of Team B in May. In so doing he indirectly
politicized intelligence by sending a signal that the administration took the hardliners
critique seriously and expected the community to shift to the right.
The pair-wise comparison of the SS-9 episode and Team B is a useful test for the
organizational dependence hypothesis. The hypothesis predicts that politicization should
be much more intense in 1976, when the intelligence community was reeling from a
series of congressional investigations about unlawful espionage in the United States and
unethical actions abroad. Never before had intelligence agencies required so much
bureaucratic protection from the White House. If the organizational dependence
hypothesis is valid, then administration officials should have seized on this vulnerability
to shape intelligence in ways that were consistent with their policy preferences.
The organizational proximity hypothesis likewise predicts that politicization
should be stronger in the second case. A major intelligence reorganization in the early
1970s eliminated an important layer of organizational independence from the White
House, and brought policymakers closer to the estimative process. The ONE was
replaced with the National Intelligence Council in 1973, a move designed to limit the
power of the CIA over the estimative process and bring senior intelligence officers in
closer contact with policymakers. This reorganization gave policymakers more
opportunity to interact with intelligence and more chances to weigh in on the content of
analysis. If the organizational proximity hypothesis is correct, then we should see more
consistent attempts from policymakers to ensure support from the intelligence community
in the later case.
U.S. and British Estimates of Iraq, 2002-2003. The last pair of cases is a
comparison of U.S. and British responses to estimates of Iraq before the war in 2003. In
both cases policymakers pressured intelligence agencies to deliver certain and
unambiguous estimates of Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capability. They encouraged analysts to indulge in worst-case assumptions of the threat,
even though the existing data was limited, ambiguous, and unreliable. They also
pressured top intelligence officials to hype the growing danger of Iraq by publishing their
results in unclassified dossiers, and by appearing in public to demonstrate their support
for policy plans. As a result, intelligence estimates became more ominous in the second
half of 2002, despite the lack of new information to support such a change.
The oversell model predicts a mixture of indirect and direct politicization in each
case. In the United States, policymakers faced a mostly permissive domestic political
environment, especially in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. While
domestic pressure was low, the administration's commitment to a war against Iraq was
fairly high by mid-2002. In the United Kingdom these variables were reversed.
Opposition to a war in Iraq was strong and abiding, and policymakers faced a number of
critical constituencies in 2002-2003. Unlike the Bush administration, however, the
British government did not make a firm commitment to military action as until the
immediate pre-war period. The oversell model predicts that the intensity of political
pressure on intelligence should peak when the two independent variables converge. As
critics arose in the United States, politicization should have become more direct. As the
British government made a clearer commitment to military action, it should have tried
harder to manipulate the intelligence community to support its case. In each case, direct
politicization should occur at the moment at which public commitments combined with
the emergence of critical constituencies.
The Iraq cases also offer a natural test the organizational proximity model,
because the British intelligence community is much more intertwined with the policy
process. For this reason, politicization should have been more intense in the United
Kingdom than in the United States. On the other hand, the Iraq pair is much harder for
the oversell model, because of moderate values on the independent variables in each case.
If it explains policy behavior more completely, then we can have more confidence in the
influence of domestic politics on intelligence-policy relations.
The organizational dependence hypothesis makes the opposite prediction, because
British intelligence was not nearly as beholden to policymakers in the run-up to the war.
The U.S. intelligence community faced tremendous public and congressional scrutiny
after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Critics argued that the intelligence community
required a major overhaul and that intelligence leaders should be personally accountable
for the failure to prevent the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the
face of such criticism, intelligence leaders had good reason to seek protection from the
White House. For this reason, the organizational dependence hypothesis predicts that
politicization should be more direct in the United States.
Overview of the Dissertation
The study proceeds as follows. The next chapter details the pathologies of
neglect, excessive harmony, and politicization, and includes a more comprehensive
review of the literature on intelligence-policy relations. The description of politicization
also establishes the dependent variable for the empirical chapters. Chapter 3 outlines the
oversell model of politicization. It describes the key independent variables in the model
and the causal mechanism that connects domestic political pressures to the incentives to
manipulate intelligence. It also explains why the use of intelligence in public is a
particularly persuasive form of policy oversell. The case studies are covered in Chapters
4-7. The final chapter summarizes the results of the study and discusses the implications
for intelligence, foreign policy decision-making, and international security.
Chapter 2
Pathologies of Intelligence-Policy Relations
The existing literature on intelligence-policy relations relies on ambiguous
concepts that are alternately confusing, all-encompassing, or contradictory.
"Politicization" in particular seems to have as many definitions as there are authors that
have used the term. Part of the problem is that the literature is still dominated by
memoirs, which rest on anecdotes and personal impressions. In addition, while
intelligence officials have been increasingly forthcoming, policymakers' memoirs are
noticeably silent on their relations with intelligence agencies. A spate of recent volumes
that touch on the subject are driven by the ongoing efforts to reform the U.S. intelligence
community in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the war in Iraq. These
analyses offer important insights but have been published hastily in order to keep up with
the rapid organizational changes that are now underway. 1 As a result, the contemporary
study of intelligence-policy relations is still characterized by rules of thumb instead of
specified variables and testable hypotheses.
1 Notable intelligence memoirs include George W. Allen, None So Blind: A Personal Account of the
Intelligence Failure in Vietnam (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2001); Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam
Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998);
William Colby, with Richard Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1978); Richard Helms, with William Hood, A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence
Agency (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003); Russell Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades
with the CIA (New York: Berkley Books, 1989); Stansfield Turner, Secrecy andDemocracy: The CIA in
Transition (New York: HarperCollins, 1985); Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Inside
Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); and John
A. Gentry, Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation; An Intelligence Assessment (Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 1993). Recent books that touch on contemporary intelligence-policy
relations include William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2003); Bob Graham with Jeff Nussbaum, Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI,
Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2004); and James
Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse ofAmerica 's Intelligence Agencies (New York:
Doubleday, 2004).
The following discussion chapter establishes the dependent variable in this study
and creates a framework for comparative analyses of intelligence-policy relations.
Because most of the existing literature has been written from an intelligence perspective,
it tends to focus on the organization and behavior of intelligence agencies. This study
attacks the problem from a different angle, defining the dependent variable in terms of
policy responses to new intelligence products. Policymakers have three basic options
when dealing with estimates, and their choices define the scope and character of
intelligence-policy relations. They may accept intelligence in good faith, even if it is the
bearer of bad news. In other cases, they may search ignore intelligence unless it is
consistent with their existing beliefs. Finally, they may politicize intelligence by
pressuring agencies to bring their positions in line with policy preferences.
The policy-centric approach offers two important benefits. First, it provides a
framework for isolating case studies. The interaction between the intelligence and policy
communities takes place continually; just as high-level policymakers deal with senior
intelligence advisors, policy staffers and intelligence analysts communicate formally and
informally at lower levels. The complexity of this interaction makes it extremely difficult
to measure the overall quality of the relationship. On the other hand, there are moments
in which policymakers have to deal with specific intelligence products, and their response
provides a window into the quality of intelligence-policy relationship more broadly.
Second, the policy-centric approach isolates the role of intelligence in the foreign policy
process. Intelligence reports have no a priori value; they only matter inasmuch as
policymakers see fit.2 While the process of collection and analysis is certainly important,
2 Martha Feldman's ethnographic study of the Department of Energy found that policy analysts generated a
stockpile of arguments for policymakers. Their reports did have not immediate value, but could be called
the policy response is critical. Even the best intelligence is irrelevant in the absence of a
receptive consumer, and this basic asymmetry gives policymakers disproportionate
influence over the quality of intelligence-policy relations. As Mark Lowenthal puts it,
"Policymakers can exist and function without the intelligence community, but the
opposite is not true." 3
Just as leaders can accept or ignore intelligence, they can also manipulate its
conclusions. The historical record appears to confirm the notion that leaders who set out
to politicize intelligence usually succeed. Each case of politicization in this study was
met with some resistance from intelligence agencies, but those agencies ultimately bowed
to pressure and changed their estimates to suit policy preferences. For this reason,
focusing on policymakers' incentives is the most profitable way of approaching the
problem and determining the conditions that give rise to politicization.
The first section of this chapter describes ideal intelligence-policy relations in
order to set a baseline against which pathologies can be observed. The next section
explains why the ideal is so difficult to achieve. Momentary triumphs, or fleeting
episodes of mutual satisfaction between policymakers and intelligence agencies, are
usually overcome by what I call "normal friction." Latent tension exists even during
periods of good relations, because of different beliefs about the nature of intelligence as
well as functional differences between intelligence work and policymaking. The last
section describes the ways in which normal friction becomes pathological, and outlines
the three major problems that can occur when policymakers receive new intelligence
upon later. Martha S. Feldman, Order Without Design: Information Production and Policymaking
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989).
3 Lowenthal, Intelligence, p. 150.
products. I pay specific attention to politicization, which is the dependent variable in this
study. The concept is discussed in detail as prelude to the cases presented later.
The Ideal Type
There are two key elements of ideal intelligence-policy relations. First,
intelligence must feel free to work objectively. Freedom from political pressure is crucial
if analysts are to remain honest and unbiased. Policymakers may have incentives to
manipulate intelligence, especially if they believe that support from intelligence officials
is necessary to carry out their plans. Estimates have potentially severe consequences for
the policymaker when they implicitly judge the wisdom or folly of policy decisions.4 For
this reason, analysts guard their intellectual integrity against possible encroachment. This
does not mean that intelligence should be completely separated from policy, because this
would make it difficult for intelligence to inform the policy process. But the freedom to
work objectively is paramount. This position is commonly associated with Sherman
Kent, who directed the U.S. Office of National Estimates from 1953-1967.5
Second, policymakers need intelligence to answer the right questions. If
intelligence demands analytical freedom, then policy demands relevant analysis.
4 Harry Howe Ransom, "The Politicization of Intelligence" (1987), in Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz,
eds. Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company,
2004), pp. 171-182.
5 Thomas Hughes called this the "theology" of intelligence. Abram Shulsky argues similarly that the
insistence on independence "tends to dominate in both academic and political discussions of intelligence."
But it is doubtful that the Kentian position was ever so dominant in the intelligence community. Kent
himself was well aware of the dangers of overly independent analysts. While championing analytical
objectivity, he was very clear that intelligence needs to seek policy guidance. Kent concluded, "...of the
two dangers - that of intelligence being too far from the users and that of being too close - the greater
danger is the one of being too far." Thus the belief in a "theology" is exaggerated. Analysts care about
independence, but do not dogmatically insist on isolation. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence and
American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 195; Thomas L. Hughes,
The Fate of Facts in a World of Men (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 233,
1976), p. 5; and Abram N. Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (Washington,
D.C.: Brassey's, 1991), p. 137.
Policymakers must feel that the intelligence community is providing answers to timely
questions, not churning out analyses for the sake of scholarship. The call for policy
relevance is closely associated with former DCI Robert Gates, who argued forcefully that
analysts must offer forthright answers to important questions. 6 In a speech to CIA
employees, Gates warned that "If we ignore policymaker interests, then our products
become irrelevant in the formulation of our government's foreign policy." 7 Gregory
Treverton similarly argues that intelligence should calibrate its analysis to practical
policy questions, and stresses that even good analysts will have little impact if they do not
work closely with their policy counterparts. "Questions that go unasked by policy," he
observes, "are not likely to be answered by intelligence. If intelligence does provide the
answers without being asked, those answers are not likely to be heard by policy." 8 Amos
Kovacs lists a number of prerequisites for what he calls usable intelligence: "timeliness,
suitable level of detail and aggregation, mode of presentation and in particular the
perceived reliability and accuracy of the information." 9 Put another way, intelligence
must be relevant as well as user-friendly. It must be tailored to the practical needs of the
policymaker.
Analytical objectivity and policy relevance are usually considered opposing
values, since it is hard to imagine that intelligence can remain objective when closely
6 It should be noted that Kent held essentially the same view: "...intelligence is not knowledge for
knowledge's sake alone...intelligence is knowledge for the practical matter of taking action." The
simplified Kent/Gates dichotomy does not do justice to either of their philosophies of intelligence. Kent,
Strategic Intelligence, p. 180.
7 Gates, "Guarding Against Politicization."
8 Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence, p. 192. For similar arguments, see Ransom, Central
Intelligence and National Security, p. 161; Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, pp.
41-42; and Richard K. Betts, "Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits," in Betts and Thomas G.
Mahnken, eds, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel (London: Frank
Cass, 2003), pp. 59-79, at 59-64.
9 Kovacs, "Using Intelligence," p. 149.
guided by policy priorities. But this is misleading, since ideal relations are defined by
both objectivity and relevance. 10 If analysts were perfectly independent, they would also
be too far removed from policy dilemmas." Likewise, intelligence analysts cannot be
too close to policy decisions without inevitably losing some of their objectivity. The
caricatured dispute between straw-man Kentians and Gatesians fails to capture the
inevitable tension that comes as a result of feedback between intelligence and policy.
Indeed, intelligence agencies are peculiar precisely because they compete for policy
attention but struggle to defend themselves against policy pressure.
Note that the intelligence-policy ideal is not defined by the execution of
successful policies. Political outcomes rest on a host of factors that have little to do with
intelligence-policy interaction, and some policymakers make decisions while ignoring
their intelligence advisors altogether.12 Brilliant or lucky leaders succeed even though
the intelligence-policy relationship is badly dysfunctional. The converse is also true:
blunders can happen even when relations are excellent. Uncertainty inheres in
international politics, and sometimes intelligence agencies and policymakers simply
miscalculate.
0o Kent makes this point in Strategic Intelligence, p. 180. For a useful critique of Kent, see Kendall, "The
Function of Intelligence." Kendall believed that Kent's view of guidance was too narrow because he
restricted his conception of policy guidance to the interaction between intelligence analysts and unelected
policy planners. According to Kendall, what emerges is a stylized and unrealistic portrait of intelligence-
policy interaction. Instead of supporting actual policymakers, analysts become "mere research assistants to
the George Kennans." The debate is summarized in Davis, "Kent-Kendall Debate." See also Betts,
"Politicization of Intelligence," pp. 60-61.
1 Brad Westerfeld aptly describes policy concerns that intelligence analysts reside in "ivory bunkers." H.
Bradford Westerfield, "Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers' 'Pandering'" (1997), in
Johnson and Wirtz, eds. Strategic Intelligence, pp. 198-218, at 200-201.
12 When asked by a subordinate why President Johnson did not adjust his policy in response to new
intelligence, DCI Richard Helms explained: "How do I know how he made up his mind? How does any
president make decisions? Maybe Lynda Bird was in favor of it. Maybe one of his old friends urged him.
Maybe he was something he read. Don't ask me to explain the workings of a president's mind." Smith,
Unknown CIA, p. 219.
Normal Friction
Ideal relations are elusive; friction is the norm. Achieving the right balance
between objectivity and relevance is difficult because intelligence estimates can threaten
the domestic position of the policymaker. Leaders often have little personal incentive to
accept intelligence reports when they implicitly question the wisdom of policy decisions.
Meanwhile, intelligence services cultivate professional norms of objectivity and
independence from political pressure. Thus when policymakers challenge them to
respond to policy relevant questions, intelligence officers react with suspicion and
dismay.
Friction also arises because intelligence and policy officials have different beliefs
about the nature of intelligence. Intelligence officials believe that their analysis is unique
because it combines secret and open source information. There is no substitute for a
reliable source positioned in a foreign government or a clear overhead image of enemy
forces on the move. This information offers a rare glimpse into the capabilities and
intentions of adversaries and allies. But intelligence provides more than just raw data to
policymakers. Good analysis translates murky or confusing information into a usable
product, and it serves as a critical check on the assumptions that guide policy decisions.
This helps policymakers by narrowing uncertainty so that they can clarify the menu of
plausible responses to international dilemmas.
Intelligence agencies have bureaucratic reasons to stress the uniqueness of their
product. If intelligence is recognized as unique and critical for national security, then
intelligence agencies are likely to enjoy regular access to policymakers, generous
funding, and considerable autonomy. Policymakers sometimes find intelligence to be
extremely useful, especially with respect to new collection technologies. President
Eisenhower, fore example, enthusiastically advocated the development of early high-
altitude reconnaissance planes and first-generation imagery satellites in the 1950s,
understanding the possible benefits of such intelligence for arms control and US-Soviet
relations. 3 But this was a particularly dramatic case in which technological innovation
provided new information with immediate consequences for grand strategy. Intelligence
products are usually more mundane. The U-2 and the Corona satellites were genuine
breakthroughs; there are not many comparable achievements that cause leaders to accept
the uniqueness of the intelligence product. As a result, policymakers do not necessarily
view intelligence as unique or indispensable.
This is especially important with respect to strategic analysis. Given their own
knowledge, connections, and experience, policymakers are not automatically inclined to
respect the conclusions of intelligence agencies. They sometimes give pride of place to
their own sources, and are always free to reach their own conclusions. Moreover,
policymakers occasionally request access to the raw data itself, bypassing the formal
analytical process entirely. This practice is upsetting to intelligence officials, who argue
that information is often misleading without professional interpretation. Policymakers
who are not trained as analysts may not be able to understand new information or judge
the veracity of the source; they may subconsciously attach their own biases or
preferences to it; or they may cherry-pick for intelligence that justifies policy decisions,
even if the weight of intelligence does not. As one longtime CIA official concludes,
13 Philip Taubman, Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story ofAmerica's Space
Espionage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). Eisenhower authorized a number of covert overflights
of the Soviet Union and East Europe, even though he was well aware of the diplomatic risks involved. See
Curtis Peebles, Shadow Flights: America's Secret Air War Against the Soviet Union (Novato, CA: Presidio
Press, 2002).
Unlike economic and statistical data derived from hard fact, intelligence
materials are based on reports of varying levels of certainty and reliability.
Some reports will bear no more than the weight of a wispy guess; others
can support an army tank or a national policy. Only someone who works
with this material every day has the knowledge to see this clearly and use
the data wisely.
For all of these reasons, "intelligence data in the hands of amateurs is dangerous." 14
Intelligence agencies also believe that it is vital to control and protect secrets -
even from policymakers. They view secret intelligence as private information, and feel
professionally obligated to keep it that way. Intelligence officials worry that revealing
information will threaten the sources and methods used to acquire it. This applies to
technical as well as human assets. The more that satellite imagery is disseminated, for
example, the more likely it is that the capabilities and characteristics the satellite will
become known. Intelligence officials are especially concerned about controlling
information about human sources because espionage involves considerable personal risk.
As more information about a spy is revealed to policymakers, the greater the chance that
his cover will be blown.
Intelligence agencies also have bureaucratic incentives to keep a close hold on
information. The more they reveal about the sources and substance of intelligence, the
less policymakers will require formal analysis. Some critics suggest that intelligence
agencies fixate on secrecy for a more cynical reason: they do not want policymakers to
discover just how little useful information they actually have. 15 Moreover, secrecy is the
default position when competing with other bureaucracies for resources and influence. In
the words of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Power in a culture of secrecy frequently derives
14 Smith, Unknown CIA, p. 217.
15 Reuel Mark Gerecht, "A New Clandestine Service: The Case for Creative Destruction," in Peter
Berkowitz, ed., The Future ofAmerican Intelligence (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2005).
from withholding secrets."' 6 As a result, intelligence agencies have both professional
and bureaucratic incentives to guard the data they have acquired, even though this
generates considerable friction with their consumers.
Intelligence officials and policymakers also differ with respect to the costs of
intelligence. Intelligence officials see the process of collection as painstaking, time-
consuming, and expensive. Human intelligence often means convincing foreign citizens
to commit treason, a process that cannot be accomplished overnight.17 Imagery satellites
and other technical collection assets are extremely resource intensive. In the United
States, these platforms consume the majority of the annual intelligence budget, and years
are required to upgrade or replace them.' 8 Moreover, it is hard to hide collection, so
additional resources must be devoted to protecting human and technical sources.
Analysis is also expensive because of the substantial investment needed to hire and train
new analysts. Government intelligence work differs from equivalent positions in the
private sector. New employees must be cleared to receive classified material; they must
be able to rapidly summarize large amounts of raw data; and they must learn to produce a
cogent product that is both useful to policymakers and free of political bias.
While intelligence officials emphasize these costs, policymakers are more likely
to see intelligence analysis as a free good. This is partly because of the expansion of the
modern media. Round-the-clock news services provide a steady stream of information
16 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The Culture of Secrecy," The Public Interest 128 (Summer 1997), pp. 55-72.
17 For a creative discussion of the psychology of spying for a foreign government, see Frederick P. Hitz,
The Great Game: The Myth and Reality of Espionage (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), pp. 28-37. See
also Stan A. Taylor and Daniel Snow, "Cold War Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got Caught,"
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 12, No. 2 (April 1997), pp. 101-125.
18 Although the US intelligence budget is classified, public sources estimate that the CIA receives less than
10% of the total, and the majority of funds are allocated to technical collection platforms operated by the
Department of Defense. Stephen Daggett, "The U.S. Intelligence Budget: A Basic Overview,"
Congressional Research Service, September 24, 2004; http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21945.pdf.
from around the world, along with commentary from a coterie of pundits, former
government officials, military officers and intelligence analysts. One scholar has recently
referred to the intelligence community as "CNN with secrets", but the added value of
intelligence is not immediately clear, especially when intelligence services fail to predict
important events.19 For example, the CIA was unable to anticipate the fall of the Berlin
Wall, and its assets could not keep policymakers of unfolding developments. "So it
would be CNN rather than the CIA that would keep Washington informed of the fast-
moving events in Berlin," recalls one frustrated Agency official.
In fact, the fall of the Berlin Wall was the first shot in an unspoken
competition between CNN and the CIA that would continue throughout
the closing years of the Cold War. With historic events occurring daily...
CIA officers in the field, firsts in Eastern Europe and later in the Soviet
Union, would begin to feel a subtle pressure to remain relevant by staying
on top of events. Headquarters repeatedly told case officers not to try to
match everything on the news and instead to focus on stealing secrets that
the President couldn't find about anywhere else. But it was hard for case
officers to ignore the daily sweep of history taking place all around
them.20
The expansion of the media in the last two decades has exacerbated the problem for the
U.S. intelligence community. Intelligence officials may justifiably view their work as
time consuming and expensive, but policymakers may see it as redundant.
A final dispute has to do with the relative stability of intelligence. For a number
of reasons, the marginal value of new information may decrease over time. Sources may
begin to dry up or provide meaningless information. Worse, the same sources may
19 Amy B. Zegart, "'CNN with Secrets': 9/11, the CIA, and the Organizational Roots of Failure,"
International Journal of ntelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 18-49.
Cable news networks do not have the same incentives to verify their sources. As profit-driven enterprises
they benefit from breaking news, not from caution and meticulousness. The media report on events quickly
and save corrections for later. Analysts have to be much more circumspect. See Lowenthal, Intelligence,
pp. 146, 151.
20 Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: the Inside Story of the CIA 's Final Showdown with the
Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 390.
deliver purposely deceptive intelligence. Intelligence officers are perpetually concerned
that human assets may turn out to be double-agents, or that the targets of overhead
reconnaissance will learn how to spoof imagery satellites. 2 1 Moreover, public revelations
of clandestine activity can undermine intelligence because they reveal to the adversary
that his operational security and communications have been penetrated. 22 And even
when intelligence is abundant and reliable, translating information into estimates about
foreign intentions is notoriously difficult. These estimates deal with intangible rather
than quantifiable data. Instead of calculating foreign capabilities, they attempt to pry into
the minds of foreign leaders. Accurate estimates can quickly become obsolete for the
simple reason that intentions are subject to change.23
Intelligence agencies have obvious reasons to emphasize the uniqueness and
importance of their contribution, and they need to convince policymakers that their
sources are useful and reliable. But they cannot promise too much; exaggerating the
reliability of sources and the precision of estimates puts them at risk of losing credibility
when sources turn out to be unreliable and estimates turn out to be wrong. To avoid this
21 Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards. U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence (Washington,
DC: Brassey's, 1995), pp. 184-240; and Donald C.F. Daniel, "Denial and Deception," in Jennifer E. Sims
and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
2005), pp. 134-146.
22 James B. Bruce, "Laws And Leaks Of Classified Intelligence: Costs And Consequences Of Permissive
Neglect," comments delivered for a panel discussion, "Safeguarding National Security: Dealing with
Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information," Meeting of the National Security Committee,
American Bar Association, Arlington, VA, November 22, 2002;
http://www.cicentre.com/Documents/DOC Classified Leaks.htm.
23 Scholars describe these kinds of estimates as mysteries, because they cannot be positively determined
even when all of the relevant data is available. Puzzles, on the other hand, are theoretically solvable.
Puzzles usually deal with foreign capabilities (which can be counted), while mysteries deal with foreign
intentions (which cannot). Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence, pp. 11-13. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. uses
a similar distinction in "Peering into the Future," Foreign Affairs," Vol. 77, No. 4 (July/August 1994), pp.
82-93.
fate, intelligence agencies use a host of conditional qualifiers in their estimates. 24
Making unequivocal predictions about future events is a dangerous business, even with
perfect information. 25 It is difficult to predict future events at home, much less try to do
the same for foreign actors that jealously guard their secrets.26 Analysts are also aware
about the frustrating unpredictability of their sources, especially human assets. Despite
these concerns, caveats and conditional estimates are frustrating to decision makers who
have no choice but to act under conditions of uncertainty. Intelligence officials can offer
reasonable arguments against making point predictions, but policymakers may suspect
that this is nothing more than bureaucratic hedging. 27
As I describe in the next chapter, conditional intelligence estimates may also get
in the way of policy implementation. This is because policymakers need to rally support
for their plans, whether or not the intelligence picture is complete. Policymakers need to
cultivate support during the policymaking process and during implementation. If
intelligence pursues scientific rationality (the search for objective truth), it may
undermine policymakers' pursuit of legal rationality (the search for evidence that makes
24 Sherman Kent, "Words of Estimative Probability," Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 8, No. 4, (Fall 1964), pp.
49-65.
25 Jonathan Kirshner, "Rational Explanations for War?" Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000),
pp. 143-150.
26 As Yehoshafat Harkabi writes, "We are living among our own people with no problems of accession to
knowledge and still are stunned by domestic political developments. But if Intelligence does not
successfully forecast a political denouement in a foreign country, brows are wrinkled: how is that possible?
What inefficiency!" Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," The Jerusalem
Quarterly, No. 30 (Winter 1984), pp. 125-131, at 129.
27 Mark M. Lowenthal, "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Producers, Intelligence Consumers" (1992), in
Johnson and Wirtz, eds. Strategic Intelligence, pp. 234-241. See also Anne Armstrong, "Bridging the Gap:
Intelligence and Policy," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1989), pp. 23-34; Gates, "Guarding
Against Politicization"; James A. Barry, Jack Davis, David D. Gries, and Joseph Sullivan, "Bridging the
Intelligence-Policy Divide," Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 37, No. 5 (1994), pp. 1-8; Hughes, Fate ofFacts,
pp. 42-43; Michael I. Handel, "The Politics of Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 2,
No. 4 (Oct. 1987), pp. 5-46, at 20; and Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence, pp. 180-186.
the case).28 On the other hand, when policymakers have not committed to specific
policies, they are more likely to tolerate ambiguous information and conditional
estimates. Because they have not begun the process of mobilizing support for their plans,
they are more willing to tolerate gaps in the intelligence picture.
Differing perceptions of the characteristics of intelligence make friction
inevitable. Intelligence agencies like to focus on their unique contribution, but
policymakers believe that they have alternative sources that are equal to the task, if not
superior. Intelligence agencies stress the time it takes to cultivate sources and deliver
useful analyses, while policymakers sometimes view intelligence as a free good.
Intelligence agencies view private information as essential; policymakers view private
information with suspicion. Finally, intelligence agencies need to convince policymakers
that their sources are stable without promising too much. Policymakers may view this
behavior as bureaucratic hedging, especially if they need intelligence to help mobilize
support for policy decisions.
Functional Incompatibility
In addition to different perspectives on intelligence, the literature contains a host
of generic explanations for why policymakers do not easily accept estimates.
Policymakers complain that intelligence focuses on minutiae while losing sight of the
broader strategic context. 29 Meanwhile, intelligence analysts complain that decision
makers are unwilling to examine the crucial attributes of each case, instead falling back
28 1 thank Jon Lindsay for suggesting this analogy.
29 Kent, Strategic Intelligence, pp. 203-204; and Armstrong, "Bridging the Gap."
on false analogies. 30 Policymakers favor current intelligence over long-term forecasting,
raw data over speculation, and short reports over long ones. Analysts complain that this
is more akin to journalism than to professional intelligence work, and they are reluctant
to sacrifice their core competency for to suit policymaker preferences. 31 These
differences speak to a basic functional incompatibility in the intelligence-policy
relationship. Intelligence analysis is a quasi-scholarly pursuit that idealizes sober and
objective judgment, and above all a thorough examination of all relevant information.
Policymakers have other concerns. Time-starved officials cannot assess every
perspective on every issue, especially new leaders who are eager to demonstrate vigor
and purpose. 32 These differences produce background tension most of the time;
occasionally it boils over.
Functional incompatibility between intelligence and policy makes friction
inevitable. Lacking experience with the intelligence, many policymakers harbor false
conceptions about what it can and cannot do. 33 New leaders have to deal with an array of
bureaucratic and substantive issues, leaving little time for on the job training about the
30 Hughes, Fate of Facts, pp. 18-19.
31 Kent, Strategic Intelligence, pp. 196-197.
32 Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp. 142-143. Arthur Schlesinger argues that effective first-term presidents need
to outline a clear and compelling ideology. This "vision of an ideal America" is not consistent with
uncertainty and conservatism. The most vivid example was the Kennedy administration. A young
president, Kennedy wanted to quickly demonstrate his seriousness on foreign policy. To do so he hired a
cadre of aggressive, intellectual aides, most of whom shared his enthusiasm for low intensity conflict as a
way of thwarting Soviet and communist expansion. In this climate the Kennedy White House had little
time for cautionary tales from the CIA about the dangers of investing U.S. forces in low intensity conflicts
in places like Vietnam. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency, rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1989), p. 438. On JFK, see George C. Herring, America's Longest War. The United States and
Vietnam, 1950-1975, 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), pp. 90-92; and David Halberstam, The Best and
the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972).
33 The first President Bush is the only modem exception, serving as DCI during the Ford Administration.
Harkabi, "Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," p. 127; Arthur S. Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy
Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach" in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May
1986), pp. 212-233, at 215.
nature of intelligence work.34 They also mistakenly believe that future events can be
accurately predicted in advance, thus setting unrealistic expectations for analysts.
Policymakers are severely disappointed when they find out that intelligence agencies are
not omniscient. They may decide to trust their own instincts rather than accepting
intelligence estimates at face value. 35
Pathologies of Intelligence-Policy Relations
Having explained why some tension is inevitable, I now turn to the pathologies of
intelligence-policy relations, defined as breakdowns that exceed the normal bounds of
friction. (See Appendix A for a summary list.) The three major pathologies are
excessive harmony, neglect, and politicization.
Excessive Harmony
It is not always easy for policymakers to accept intelligence in good faith, because
estimates can challenge the wisdom of policy preferences and threaten the domestic
position of the policymaker. Functional incompatibility also causes policymakers to be
wary of intelligence. Nonetheless, there have been periods of good relations in which
policymakers respect the opinions of their intelligence advisors without resorting to
politicization. Sometimes intelligence and policy officials have even become too close.
In these cases policymakers have been too satisfied with the intelligence they receive, and
intelligence officers have been too confident in their conclusions. I call this the
34 Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence," p. 17.35 Hulnick, "Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer," p. 224.
pathology of excessive harmony. Though rare, it can lead to strategic tunnel vision and
military disaster.
Excessive harmony can occur because new policymakers are overly reverential of
legendary intelligence chiefs.36 Similarly, intelligence officials may be too deferential to
charismatic policymakers. In addition, intelligence cannot continue to be objective when
it acquires a vested interest in the success of specific policies. When this occurs analysis
becomes subjective exercise in self-evaluation. Rather than face up to the bad news,
intelligence officials engage the same kind wishful thinking that leads to policy failure.37
Perhaps the best example of excessive harmony came in 1973, when Syria and
Egypt unexpectedly attacked Israel. Before the war, Israeli policymakers had great faith
in its military intelligence service, which had cultivated a well-placed Egyptian source.
Based on intelligence from this source, Israeli strategists drew a picture of Egyptian
intentions that became known as the Concept, which assumed that Egypt would not
attack without the ability to strike Israeli targets with long-range bombers and SCUD
missiles, and that Syria would not attack without support from Egypt. This analysis
became accepted wisdom, and prevented Israel from mobilizing more quickly when
36 President Kennedy considered DCI Allen Dulles a "master spy" and put too much faith in him during the
build up to the Bay of Pigs. When some military observers began to cast doubt on the wisdom of the
mission, Kennedy looked to him for advice. Dulles recalled a successful earlier covert operation in his
pitch to the president: "I stood right here at Ike's desk," he said, "and told him I was certain our
Guatemalan operation would succeed, and Mr. President, the prospects for this plan are even better than
they were for that one." He was wrong. The invasion floundered from the start, failed to inspire a public
uprising, and left over twelve hundred exiles dead or captured. Basic assumptions went unchallenged by
the intelligence community, and policymakers never asked for a more thorough analysis. Even though
success depended on the level of anti-Castro resentment on the island, the CIA never looked seriously at
the issue. John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II
(New York: William Morrow, 1986), pp. 194-210, quoted at 199.
37 On the perils of self-evaluation, see Aaron Wildavsky, "The Self-Evaluating Organization," Public
Administration Review, Vol. 32, No. 5 (1972), pp. 509-520. See also Harkabi, "Intelligence-Policymaker
Tangle," p. 129
indications of an impending attack emerged. 38 Front-line commanders issued warnings
as early as September 24, but Israel did not take preliminary steps towards mobilization
until October 5, one day before the war began. The Concept continued to influence
strategic calculations even after the fighting started. According to Ephraim Kahana,
"when the war began at 1.55 p.m. on 6 October the feeling was that it was going to be
just one or two days of battle at most, not an all-out conflagration." 39 Post-war
investigations concluded that policymakers and intelligence analysts had become wedded
to the Concept, and failed to challenge one another as the danger signs accumulated. 40
It is counterintuitive to think about harmony as some kind of pathology, but the
effects of shared tunnel vision are disastrous. Intelligence-policy relations require a
certain amount tension to be effective. If intelligence officials are enamored of
policymakers, they will be less willing to offer candid judgments that go against policy
beliefs. If policymakers accept intelligence reports uncritically, their decisions may rest
on shoddy logic and misperceptions.
Neglect
Policymakers are not obligated to make decisions that are consistent with the
views of the intelligence community. They are free to focus on analyses that support
their predispositions, or to trust their own instincts and ignore intelligence completely.
38 Accumulating signs of war included an unprecedented buildup of Syrian tank forces on the Golan
Heights, the forward deployment of Syrian fighter aircraft and SAM batteries, the cancellation of Egyptian
officer examinations, and the distribution of live ammunition to Egyptian forces. Eliot A. Cohen and John
Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy ofFailure in War (New York: Vintage, 1990), pp. 106-107.
39 Ephraim Kahana, "Early Warning Versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, 1973" (2002), in
Johnson and Wirtz, eds., Strategic Intelligence, pp. 153-65, at 161.
40 The Agranat Commission conducted the official Israeli investigation into the Yom Kippur War. Some
1500 pages of its final report remain classified, but the conclusions are summarized in Kahana, "Early
Warning Versus Concept"; and Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, pp. 112-117. The most
comprehensive analysis of intelligence before the war is Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep.
Policymakers are also prone to reading their own beliefs into the analyses they receive,
especially if they are especially interested in the issue at hand.4 1 Understandably, this
breeds discontent among intelligence officers. And despite all of the attention paid to
politicization, policy makers often ignore intelligence rather than try to shape it. As one
intelligence veteran concluded, "Let this, then, be the first axiom: fighting commanders,
technical experts and politicians are liable to ignore, despise, or undernote
intelligence."42
Explanations for why policymakers ignore intelligence lie at a several levels of
analysis. Like all individuals, policymakers are psychologically biased towards their own
predispositions. This tendency is exacerbated under the highly ambiguous conditions that
characterize intelligence work. Policymakers' personal investment in success compounds
this psychological need, making it especially difficult to reconcile discomfiting
intelligence with existing beliefs.43 Cognitive biases interact with self-interest to sharply
restrict the limits of what information leaders will accept. As Thomas Hughes has
observed, "Interested policymakers quickly learn that intelligence can be used the way a
drunk uses a lamp post - for support rather than illumination." 44 Moreover,
41 Loch K. Johnson, "Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 22, No. 1
(January 2003), pp. 1-28, at 25.
42 Quoted in Handel, "Politics of Intelligence," p. 24. Italics in original.
43 On the need to maintain cognitive consistency and the effects this has on policy, see Jervis, Perception and
Misperception, pp. 117-202.
44 Hughes, Fate ofFacts, p. 24. Joseph Stalin willfully ignored evidence that Hitler was preparing to attack
the Soviet Union in 1941, both because he did not want to appear provocative and because was suspicious
that British warnings were prevarications designed to bring Moscow into the war against Germany. But
Stalin also had a personal stake in wishful thinking, because he had engineered the Soviet-German non-
aggression treaty two years earlier. Preparing to meet the German advance would mean acknowledging Nazi
duplicity and admitting his earlier naivety. Military leaders are equally prone to self-delusion. During the
autumn of 1941, Rommel became so obsessed with his offensive plans that he refused to acknowledge
mounting evidence that the British were preparing an offensive of their own. Instead of changing course,
Rommel convinced himself that it was impossible. On Stalin, see Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons
for Defense Planning (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1982), pp. 34-42. On Rommell, see Handel, "Leaders
and Intelligence," pp. 9-11.
policymakers tend to be confident about their own ability to understand changing events.
They do not rise in government by accident, and professional success reinforces existing
self-images and worldviews. Hans Heymann describes prominent leaders as "decisive,
aggressive, and self-assured rather than reflective, introspective, and self-doubting." 45
Their contacts with senior foreign officials also provide insights that are unavailable to
the average analyst.46 For these reasons, they are confident in their own political
judgment.
Another reason why policymakers ignore intelligence has to do with
organizational diversity. The expansion of modem intelligence practically guarantees
that decision makers will be able to pick among a variety of estimates on any given issue.
Different agencies provide their own views to policymakers, both formally and
informally. In the United States, attempts to coordinate estimates lead to acrimonious
inter-agency disputes, and consensus is often achieved by watering down conclusions and
providing room for dissenting views in footnotes. This allows policymakers to indulge
their personal biases and justify their actions by choosing selectively. Moreover, the
ambiguity that characterizes international politics legitimizes different interpretations of
the same information. This makes it possible to cherry pick supporting estimates without
45 Hans Heymann, "Intelligence/Policy Relationships," in Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James
M. Keagle, eds., Intelligence: Policy andProcess (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 57-66," at 60-61.
46 The content of Kissinger's back-channel diplomacy with China, for example, was unknown outside a small
circle of his advisors. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 303-304. See also
Lowenthal, "Tribal Tongues," pp. 234-241, at 238-239; Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence," pp. 10, 15;
Hulnick, "Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer," p. 229; and Shulsky, Silent Warfare, pp. 139-140.
appearing to do so.47 Formal intelligence reports lend an air of authority to policy
decisions, even if they represent a minority view or are of dubious quality. 48
At the domestic level of analysis, policymakers may ignore intelligence agencies
that they consider to be ideological opponents. For example, conservative politicians in
the United States have long complained that the CIA is basically a liberal institution,
more interested in providing analyses that support liberal foreign policies than with
providing relevant and useful information. Suspicions about political bias within the
intelligence community is likely to cause policymakers to trust their own sources and rely
on their own instincts.
In some cases intelligence officers isolate themselves, especially when
policymakers try to intervene in intelligence matters. Self-isolation occurs most often
when analysts perceive criticism as an attempt to politicize intelligence. Rather than
responding to policy critiques, they circle the wagons in order to avoid political pressure.
At other times, analysts become convinced that policymakers do not read their work, and
make no effort to cultivate relationships with the policy community. Such
disillusionment is what Sherman Kent called the "sickness of irresponsibility." 49 As
47 Handel, "Politics of Intelligence," p. 15. See also Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision"; Hughes, Fate of
Facts, pp. 23, 27; and Philip H.J. Davies, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the
United States," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (October 2004), pp. 495-520.
48 This is not to say that all intelligence products are created equal. Certain reports may carry additional
weight, especially if they are highly anticipated. Harold Ford argues that National Intelligence Estimates
(NIEs) are unique because they are supposed to represent the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence
community. NIEs examine "every scrap of evidence" in order to set forth "the most authoritative analytic
product prepared by the Intelligence Community." Other observers discount the importance of NIEs on the
policy process and in the public debate. For differing views, see Harold P. Ford, Estimative Intelligence: The
Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimating, revised ed. (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1993), pp. 31-32, and Lowenthal, "Tribal Tongues," pp. 238-239.
49 Kent, Strategic Intelligence, pp. 183, 205-206. See also Hughes, Fate ofFacts, p. 48; and John A. Gentry,
"Intelligence Analyst/Manager Relations at the CIA," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 10, No. 4
(October 1995), pp. 133-146, at 141.
analysts isolate themselves from the policy process, policymakers become less willing to
rely on intelligence.
Patterns of self-isolation vary according to rank. High-level intelligence officials
face a delicate trade-off between access and objectivity. They would like steady and
reliable access to policymakers, and they understand that providing unpleasant
intelligence can damage their standing.5 ° For this reason, they require both professional
acumen and political finesse to succeed." If they lack the ability to balance between
access and objectivity, they may consciously distance themselves from policymakers for
the sake of organizational independence. At lower levels, fears of politicization may lead
to a bunker mentality among analysts and managers. Instead of seeking out policymakers
and policy staffers, analysts can retreat to the home office and produce reports of little
day-to-day utility. Devotion to objectivity sometimes leads analysts to be overly
sensitive to the prospect of politicization. When this occurs, they become unwilling to
interact with policymakers on a routine basis. Insufficient feedback between intelligence
and policy communities leads to mutual dissatisfaction. As wary analysts look out for
political meddling, policymakers increasingly view intelligence products as irrelevant.
There are many examples of neglect. President Nixon ignored the CIA partly
because he perceived it as a bastion for Northeastern liberals who were mostly interested
in sabotaging his foreign policy. 52 The president and National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger were also supremely confident in their ability to dissect world events, and
thought of intelligence agencies mainly as obstacles. Convinced that the community was
50 Lowenthal, Intelligence, p. 217.
5' Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence," pp. 6, 9; Handel, "Politics of Intelligence," p. 36.
52 Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 350-351; and Helms, A Look over My Shoulder, pp. 382-
383.
too self-interested to make any bold predictions, they attacked it for bureaucratic
"immobilism." 53 Kissinger became the president's de facto intelligence chief, using
information from personal contacts to advise Nixon on foreign policy. He wanted
intelligence agencies to offer a range of possibilities surrounding different issues, but
discouraged them from making judgments about which ones were more plausible.
Kissinger did not want the intelligence community to debate issues internally or attempt
to come to an analytic consensus. 54 Meanwhile, Nixon stopped reading his daily
intelligence summary, and rarely met with the DCI. 55
Foreign leaders also ignore intelligence, sometimes with disastrous results.
Before the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, senior Israeli military and political leaders ignored
the Director of Military Intelligence and the Mossad. Intelligence analysts challenged the
prevailing assumptions of Israeli victory and the reliability of allied Lebanese militia.
According to Shlomo Gazit, however, dissent "was never allowed to be presented to the
cabinet." After Israel authorized the militia to enter two refugee camps in West Beirut,
they went on a massacre, and the war became a diplomatic catastrophe. Gazit lays the
blame squarely on top policymakers: "The two main decision makers, Minister of
Defense Sharon and Prime Minister Begin, did their best to exclude General Saguy, the
Director of Military Intelligence... from the cabinet meetings and did not give him a
chance to present his evaluation." 56
53 Harkabi, "Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," p. 126.
54 Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, pp. 46-54.
55 Johnson, "Bricks and Mortar," p. 20; Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, pp. 375-392; Gaddis, Strategies of
Containment, pp. 301-305; Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, p. 352; and Smith, Unknown CIA, pp.
239-240.
56 Shlomo Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-maker," in Handel, ed. Leaders and Intelligence,
pp. 261-287, at 283.
In sum, policymakers ignore intelligence that is psychologically discomfiting, and
they exploit the organizational diversity of modem intelligence communities by searching
out analyses that support their predispositions. They are also more likely to bypass
intelligence agencies they believe are ideologically biased against them. It is impossible
to quantify the degree of neglect at any given time, because this means searching for non-
events. But the incentives to bypass intelligence are real, as are the frustrations of
analysts whose work is ignored. 57
Politicization
Politicization is the manipulation of intelligence to reflect policy preferences.58
This means reversing the rational decision-making process, which uses information
objectively in order to calibrate means and ends. Intelligence ought to factor in near the
beginning of this cycle, providing analysis before the fact of policy making. Politicized
intelligence occurs after the fact, serving as a post hoc rationalization for decisions
already made. As one long time intelligence official put it, policymakers "are not
necessarily receptive to intelligence, for what they often look for is not so much data on
the basis of which to shape policy but rather support for pre-formed political and
57 Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1965), p. 44; and Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85,
No. 2 (March/April 2006), pp. 15-28.
58 This is similar to Richard Betts's definition of politicization as "the shaping of analytical conclusions to
conform to policy predispositions." The difference between this definition and the one used here is that
Betts focuses on the actions of intelligence analysts rather than policymakers. He divides politicization into
three categories. First, "deliberate corruption" occurs when analysts consciously change their conclusions
to meet policy expectations. Second, analysts can unconsciously slant analysis to reflect their own biases.
Third, the analytic process can be designed to make biases explicit and competitive. For Betts's views, see
Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA 's Analysis of the Soviet Union
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), p. 184; and Betts, Enemies ofIntelligence,
pp. 76-91.
ideological conceptions." 59 If support is not forthcoming, they may decide to pressure
intelligence change its views.
Among the pathologies of intelligence-policy relations, politicization receives the
lion's share of public scrutiny. One reason is that meddling is most likely to occur over
estimates about the behavior of foreign powers. Estimative questions are inherently
controversial: witness the decades-long battles over Soviet strategic intentions. 60 Other
types of intelligence are less contentious. 61 Politicization conjures images of
ideologically driven decision-makers twisting arms in the intelligence community to
rationalize ill-fated policies that are not in the national interest. In its worst form,
politicization is both corrupt and irrational. It is corrupt in that policymakers squander
human and financial resources for political gain, and irrational because it reverses the
proper procedure for making decisions. 62
But this pathology is more complex. Rarely do we find clear examples of direct
manipulation of intelligence analysts by policymakers who need them to deliver products
that support preferred policies. In fact, there are at least eight different types of
politicization. (The discussion below focuses on three main types of politicization.
Appendix B outlines some other varieties.) In addition, intelligence officers are also
59 Harkabi, "Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," p. 125.
60 Richard K. Betts, "Policy Makers and Intelligence Analysts: Love, Hate, or Indifference?" Intelligence
and National Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1988), pp 184-189; and Ransom, "Politicization of
Intelligence," pp. 178-179. On U.S. efforts to divine Soviet intentions, see John Prados, The Soviet
Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1982); and Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat.
61 Arthur Hulnick identifies four other types of intelligence. Warning intelligence provides advance notice of
attack; current intelligence reports on the daily events; basic intelligence keeps track of national and
international statistics (e.g. comparative GDP); and raw intelligence constitutes any form of unfiltered data.
Hulnick, "Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer."
62 Kent, Strategic Intelligence, passim. The fear of politicization echoes the more general arguments against
self-evaluation, which is inherently biased. See Wildavsky, "The Self-Evaluating Organization"; and Stephen
Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by States and Societies," (ms. 2002);
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/vanevera/why_states-believe-foolish ideas.pdf.
guilty of politicization if they manipulate products to try to influence policy decisions.
Intelligence managers and intelligence analysts are not stoic truth-seekers; they have
preferred policies of their own. Managers may try to coerce their subordinates to change
their views, and analysts may produce products in order to support or sabotage existing
policies. This study focuses on policy behavior because of policymakers'
disproportionate influence over intelligence-policy relations, but there is no doubt that
intelligence officials can also contribute to the problem of politicization. 63
Direct Manipulation. The most blatant kind of politicization, direct manipulation
involves active efforts to shape analysis so that it fits preferred policies. Policymakers
can directly manipulate intelligence by pressuring agencies to deliver specific findings, or
by stacking agencies with pliant analysts and managers.
Examples of outright arm-twisting are hard to find. Even in clear cases of direct
manipulation, policymakers reject accusations that they have acted improperly. They
will admit to openly challenging intelligence, but they argue that aggressive feedback is
necessary to ensure that analysts do not fall victim to the kind of intellectual sclerosis that
prevents them from recognizing important changes in world events. Policymakers also
defend their actions as necessary to ensure that intelligence is relevant to legitimate
policy concerns. Another reason is that there are usually competing explanations for
episodes of supposed politicization. Consider the controversy surrounding the estimate
of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in 2002-2003. Critics have used circumstantial
63 An early 1990s CIA task force found that both policymakers and intelligence officers can be guilty of
politicization. It defined politicization as "deliberately distorting analysis or judgments to favor a preferred
line of thinking irrespective of evidence. Most consider 'classic' politicization to be only that which occurs if
products are forced to conform to policymakers' views. A number believe politicization also results from
management pressures to define and drive certain lines of analysis and substantive viewpoints. Still others
believe that changes in tone or emphasis made during the normal review or coordination process, and limited
means for expressing alternative viewpoints, also constitutes forms of politicization." Quoted in Gates,
"Guarding Against Politicization," p. 5.
evidence to accuse the White House of pressuring the CIA increase its estimates of Iraqi
capabilities. 64 Historian John Prados finds that the language of CIA estimates became
much more ominous after 2001, despite the fact that the Agency did not have much new
substantive information concerning Iraqi capabilities. Prados concludes that pressure
from policymakers must have caused the change in tone. 65 This may have been the case,
but the evidence fits a variety of other explanations. After UN inspectors left Iraq in
1998, analysts were forced to speculate about Iraqi capabilities by looking at Hussein's
past behavior. His past ambitions led some to conclude that he would try to produce
weapons of mass destruction, especially because he was free of international
watchdogs.66 (I address this case in detail in Chapter 7.)
Perhaps arm-twisting occurs more than is suggested by the historical record.
Policymakers certainly have good reason to cover their tracks, since revelation of such
meddling could lead to a political scandal. But there are logical reasons to expect that
coercion occurs less often than other kinds of politicization, not the least of which is the
political risk involved. Instead of trying to cajole uncooperative advisors, policymakers
may decide that the best way to get support is to hand-pick intelligence officers. In the
United States, such manipulation-by-appointment is best exemplified by the president's
nomination of the DCI, or more recently, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).6 7
64 Examples include Walter Pincus, "Tenet Defends Iraq Intelligence," Washington Post, May 31, 2003, p.
Al; Ray McGovern, "The Best Intelligence? CIA," Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, November 22, 2002, p.
19A; and Paul Krugman, "Dead Parrot Society," New York Times, October 25, 2002, p. A35.
65 John Prados, "Iraq: A necessary war?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 59, No. 3 (May/June 2003)
pp. 26-33.
66 Dennis Gormley, "The Limits of Intelligence: Iraq's Lessons," Survival, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2004), pp. 7-28.
67 Handel, "Politics of Intelligence," p. 36.
Choosing a like minded intelligence chief helps to ensure that intelligence products will
be colored to meet policy requirements.68
Manipulation-by-appointment can also occur at lower levels. Single high-level
appointments can have a trickle down effect if intelligence chiefs replace uncooperative
lower-level officers. Personnel decisions also stifle dissent if it becomes clear that
cooperation is a prerequisite for promotion, pay raises, or influence. Alternately,
policymakers can create special analytical units to provide tailored reports. This seems to
have been the purpose of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, created before the war
in Iraq to explore links between Saddam Hussein's government and transnational terrorist
groups. The White House also cultivated iconoclastic analysts within the CIA who
shared the view that Saddam Hussein represented a grave and gathering danger.69
Manipulation-by-appointment appears more common than simple arm-twisting.
Policymakers face serious consequences for public revelations of meddling, creating a
strong disincentive for clumsy intimidation tactics. In addition, policymakers usually
need not put themselves at political risk through obvious efforts to shape intelligence.
Instead, they can indirectly manipulate the tone of intelligence products. "You don't have
to issue an edict, or twist arms, or be overt," according to former Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill. "(When) you operate in a certain way -- by saying this is how I want to justify
68 Policymakers are not the only ones to use this tactic. During World War II, the British military
attempted to staff the Joint Intelligence Council (JIC) with officers committed to hawkish estimates of the
Soviet threat. They worried that the Foreign Office did not properly appreciate the character of the Soviet
Union, and would not support military spending after the war. The attempt to stack the JIC failed, but the
division soon became a moot point. Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe eased the Foreign Office away from
its earlier hopes, and it began to move closer to the military view. Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand:
Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence (New York: Overlook Press, 2001), pp. 43-63.
69 Seymour Hersch, "Selective Intelligence," The New Yorker, May 12, 2003, p. 4 4 ; and David Barstow,
William J. Broad, and Jeff Gerth, "The Nuclear Card," New York Times, Oct. 3, 2004, p. 1.
what I've already decided to do, and I don't care how you pull it off-- you guarantee that
you'll get faulty, one-sided information." 70
Indirect Manipulation. Politicization via indirect manipulation involves subtle
efforts to shape intelligence. Tacit signals sent to the intelligence agencies indicate the
desired course of intelligence findings, suggesting rewards for compliance and
punishment for non-cooperation. 71 These implicit promises and threats provide
incentives to deliver "intelligence to please". In other words, intelligence tells policy
what it wants to hear without having to be asked. 72
It is important to highlight the difference between utter neglect and the selective
use of intelligence. Policymakers may ignore intelligence completely or choose
selectively, searching out the intelligence community for a answers consistent with their
prior beliefs. This sort of cherry picking can be a form of politicization or a symptom of
neglect. Policymakers may be selective in order to let intelligence analysts know what is
acceptable and what is not; this is politicization. On the other hand, policymakers may
cherry pick simply because they need at least one supporting analysis to justify their
decisions. In these cases, they do not ignore intelligence in order to apply pressure.
Policy simply rejects intelligence products until it finds the right answer.73
Accusations of indirect manipulation depend on the perspective of the accuser.
Policymakers may encourage certain findings under the guise of promoting competitive
analysis. Michael Handel observes that "Almost every leader has been guilty of such
70 Quoted in Ron Suskind, "Without a Doubt," New York Times Magazine, October 17, 2004, p. 44.
71 Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence."
72 Gentry, "Intelligence Analyst/Manager Relations."
73 Heymann, "Intelligence/Policy Relationships," p. 59.
behavior at one time or another." 74 To the analyst, this probably looks like rank
politicization. But it is entirely appropriate from the policy perspective, since
policymakers believe that it is their responsibility to solicit multiple opinions before
making decisions. For the detached observer of intelligence-policy relations it is difficult
to distinguish between sincere attempts at encouraging analytical competition and simple
pretexts for manipulation.75 Changes to the analytical process create a similar dynamic.
During the 1980s, some CIA analysts complained that Deputy Director Robert Gates was
indirectly manipulating intelligence by closely editing analyses and sending them back
for review. Gates claimed that he was simply demanding more rigorous analysis because
existing methods were sloppy and unhelpful to policymakers. But analysts suspected that
he was more interested in content than process, and would only forward hawkish
estimates for policymakers' review. According to one CIA veteran, Gates created a
climate that restricted the bounds of acceptable analysis. By setting this tone throughout
the Directorate of Intelligence, analysts began to try and predict what would be
acceptable to policymakers and what was out of bounds. 76
This case illustrates why measuring indirect politicization is difficult. Gates's
supporters have argued that he was genuinely interested in improving analytic tradecraft
74 Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence," p. 9; and Hughes, Fate ofFacts, p. 20.
75 "Intelligence to please" goes back at least to the nineteenth century. During the early days of the Civil
War, Allan Pinkerton was in charge of intelligence for General George McClellan's Army of the Potomac.
Pinkerton, who founded the famous investigative agency that bears his name, fostered McClellan's
notoriously cautious approach. McClellan's army easily outsized the main Confederate force on the Virginia
peninsula, but he was fearful and unwilling to pursue the Confederates. Pinkerton did little to dissuade him
of this false belief; on the contrary, he provided McClellan an ever-increasing estimate of the size of the
Confederate main force. One possible reason was Pinkerton's considerable political ambition. By providing
intelligence to please, he may have believed that he could rise in Washington on McClellan's coattails. On
the other hand, Pinkerton's method for calculating the Confederate order of battle was itself badly flawed,
meaning that his errors may not have been intended to curry favor with McClellan. See Andrew, For the
President's Eyes Only, pp. 15-18; and Edwin C. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of
Military Intelligence in the Civil War (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), pp. 102-106, 113-114.
76 Gentry, "Intelligence Analyst/Manager Relations."
and making intelligence more relevant to policymaking, while analysts viewed his actions
with deep suspicion. 77 It also suggests a basic paradox: efforts to improve intelligence-
policy relations sometimes make things worse. Ideal intelligence-policy relations balance
the need for objectivity with the demands of policy relevance. This is only possible when
intelligence officers and policymakers interact on a regular basis. Unfortunately, such
interaction may kindle fears of political pressure, meaning that sincere efforts to improve
relations end up increasing the perception of politicization. Finally, the Gates case
demonstrates the importance of mid- and lower-level officials, where the actual
production of estimates takes place. Policymakers signal their preferences to limit the
range of acceptable analyses; policy staffers and intelligence managers interpret those
signals and modify the product accordingly.
Intelligence Subverts Policy. A third kind of politicization occurs when
intelligence agencies produce estimates that are specifically designed to undermine policy
decisions. Intelligence officials can try to sabotage policies by leaking their conclusions.
Because intelligence carries a unique air of authority, well-placed leaks undermine public
support and provide fuel for political opponents. Therefore, policymakers respond with
suspicion when intelligence acts as the bearer of bad news, because they fear that
classified estimates will soon make the front page.7 8 Rather than accepting estimates at
face value, policymakers sometimes suspect that their intelligence subordinates have
77 Jack Davis argues that Gates tried to reverse "insular, flabby, and incoherent argumentation" in the DI.
According to Davis, his close editing inspired analysts and managers to be more rigorous because "career
advancement and ego were at stake." See Davis's introduction to Richard S. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999);
www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/art3.html.
78 Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence," p. 9; Harkabi, "Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," p. 126; Hughes,
Fate ofFacts, pp. 19-21.
other motives. The fear of subversion, no less than subversion itself, contributes to
intelligence-policy dysfunction.79
Although this study focuses on policymaker behavior, it is clear that both parties
may be guilty of politicization. Intelligence clearly oversteps when it tries to sabotage
policy decisions. The intelligence community exists fundamentally to support the policy
process, not to fight it.80 At the same time, policymakers often overreact to honest
estimates that do not support their plans. They may wrongly suspect that analysts
conspire with political rivals to produce embarrassing intelligence.8 1 Under these
circumstances they may ignore intelligence as a matter of self-protection:
Some...officials may have been enemies of the policy and can be expected to use
any negative intelligence information or assessment to question and try to
overturn it. This difficulty is only exacerbated when intelligence is routinely
shared not only with the official's colleagues and bureaucratic rivals, but also
with his political opponents (for example, the opposition party in Congress).
From this perspective...it is not at all irrational for a policymaker to wish to
ensure that intelligence provides the "right" answer. 82
Of course, attempts to get the "right" answer set off warning bells among analysts,
creating a subversion-manipulation feedback loop:
79 Arthur Schlesinger argues that policymakers fear leaks not because policies will be undermined, but
because they will be embarrassed in public. Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency, pp. 447-449.
80 Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp. 3-4.
81 Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp. 146-147, 216.
82 Shulsky, Silent Warfare, p. 138.
Figure 1. Subversion-Manipulation Feedback
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This kind of feedback characterized Richard Nixon's tumultuous history with the
CIA. Nixon blamed the Agency for his electoral defeat in 1960, when Democrats
accused the Eisenhower administration of allowing the Soviet Union to outpace the
United States in strategic missile production. Eisenhower knew that no such "missile
gap" existed, but he would not go public with this information and risk revealing his
sources. Nixon suspected that the CIA had quietly nurtured the missile gap myth because
it supported the Kennedy campaign. By the time he took office, Nixon held the CIA in
contempt, believing it to be a bastion of liberals who were inherently hostile to his
administration. His feelings were no secret within the Agency, and some analysts did
little to hide their own disdain. 83 As time passed, they became increasingly concerned
about manipulation from above, while Nixon continued to fear subversion from below.84
A spillover effect is also possible: if policymakers believe that intelligence
officers are tying to submarine a preferred policy, they will become suspicious of
intelligence in general.8 5 For example, in 2004 the CIA provided a pessimistic estimate
about the prospects for defeating the insurgency in Iraq. This sobering assessment clearly
cut against optimistic White House declarations that progress was being made. When it
leaked, a White House spokesman derided the authors as "pessimists and naysayers."
President Bush brushed the estimate aside, arguing that the CIA was "just guessing." 86
Public supporters of the administration went further. The Wall Street Journal joined a
chorus of conservative voices claiming that the leak was just one example of a wider CIA
"insurgency" against the president. 87 A similarly heated public controversy followed the
publication of key judgments from an NIE on Iran's nuclear program in December 2007.
The estimate concluded that Iran shelved its weapons program in 2003, although it was
continuing to pursue uranium enrichment. Critics of the Bush administration argued that
these findings cut against the president's statements on Iran and expressed relief that the
estimate slowed the march to war. Critics of the intelligence community accused it of
83 According to Robert Gates, the walls at CIA headquarters were "festooned" with anti-Nixon propaganda.
From the Shadows, p. 30.
84 Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 353-356, 367-368.
85 Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence," p. 9.
86 Dana Priest and Thomas E. Ricks, "Growing Pessimism on Iraq," Washington Post, September 29, 2004, p.
1.
87 "The CIA's Insurgency," September 29, 2004, p. 18 . See also David Brooks, "The C.I.A. versus Bush,"
New York Times, November 13, 2004, p. 15; and Robert Novak, "Is CIA at War with Bush?" Chicago Sun-
Times, September 27, 2004, p. 49.
improperly injecting itself into the policy process, and of a series of a potentially serious
analytical mistakes. 88
Subversion, whether real or imagined, is an intractable problem. Intelligence is
structurally weak because policymakers are not obligated to heed its advice. Whereas
intelligence agencies have a one primary consumer, policymakers enjoy a range of public
and private sector providers. Worse, intelligence is often made scapegoat after policy
failures. Starting from this position of weakness, intelligence agencies may leak as a
form of self-protection. There is little else it can do to deflect blame for policy disasters.
Subversion is therefore motivated both by principled opposition to policies and by simple
bureaucratic interest. Policymakers are also aware of the basic imbalance in intelligence-
policy relations, as well as the damage caused by leaks. The examples described above
suggest that they especially fear collusion between intelligence and political rivals to
undermine existing policies or preferred policy choices. Such fears, even if completely
unfounded, lead them to expect subversion and overreact to objective intelligence
products that contradict their preferences and beliefs.
Summary
This chapter has identified three recurring pathologies of intelligence-policy
relations: excessive harmony, neglect, and politicization. Excessive harmony occurs
when policymakers accept intelligence uncritically; neglect occurs when policymakers
ignore intelligence; and politicization occurs when intelligence is manipulated to reflect
88 For a useful summary, see Tony Karon, "Spinning the NIE Iran Report," Time Magazine, December 5,
2007. See also Mark Mazzetti, "U.S. Finds Iran Halted Its Nuclear Arms Effort in 2003," New York Times,
December 4, 2001, p. Al; "James G. Zumwalt, "NIE in the Sky?" Washington Times, December 18, 2007,
p. 12; and Henry A. Kissinger, "Misreading the Iran Report," Washington Post, December 13, 2007, p.
A35;
policy preferences. While this study does not explain all of these outcomes, I have
presented this typology in the hopes of establishing terms of reference for students of
intelligence and foreign policy. In addition, I have sought to clearly distinguish
politicization from other kinds of dysfunction in order to identify useful cases to explore
in depth.
Of the pathologies of intelligence-policy relations, politicization is the most
puzzling. We can easily explain why policymakers accept intelligence or ignore it, but
not why they pressure intelligence to change its conclusions. Statesmen have rational
incentives to accept intelligence estimates. International events are extremely complex,
and policymakers need help making sense of incoming information. No individual can
handle the massive volume of data that informs policy judgments, especially because data
are usually ambiguous and open to interpretation. Intelligence agencies monitor specific
issues over long time periods so that they can place new details in context. When
intelligence agencies perform well they help policymakers make rational decisions under
conditions of great uncertainty.
But intelligence agencies do not always perform well, and policymakers may
decide that they are inaccurate, ineffective, and unhelpful. In these cases leaders can
ignore official intelligence estimates and rely on other sources. Policymakers are not
required to read formal intelligence products, and have no legal obligation to waste their
time on bad analysis. The psychology of decision-making also explains why leaders
ignore intelligence. Individuals' expectations have a powerful effect on their ability to
accurately perceive information. Assumptions and strongly-held worldviews limit their
ability to absorb data that are inconsistent with basic assumptions. If intelligence
provides dissonant or discomfiting information, it may be ignored. Finally, policymakers
may bypass intelligence agencies that they believe are ideologically biased or are aligned
with rival political parties.
None of this explains politicization. If leaders are free to ignore intelligence that
they do not like, why would they ever pressure intelligence to change its findings? Why
would they bother?
Chapter 3
The Oversell Model of Politicization
This chapter presents a model of politicization in modem democracies. It outlines
the conditions that make politicization likely and describes the causal mechanism that
connects domestic political pressure to the manipulation of intelligence. In brief, the
model shows that politicization is more likely when policymakers have committed
themselves to highly controversial issues. Public commitments make policymakers
vulnerable to political costs if their plans fail, and they have strong incentives to pressure
intelligence to deliver supporting estimates. Policymakers justify their decisions by
creating an image of consensus support among national security organizations.
Intelligence agencies rate highly among this group because they enjoy unique access to
secret information and because they have a reputation for objectivity and independence.
Skeptical domestic audiences are more likely to defer to policymakers if they believe that
decisions are made on the basis of sound intelligence. In addition, backing away from
commitments can lead to severe political costs, and policymakers would rather stay the
course than risk a reputation for unsteady leadership. As with initial efforts to rally
support for policy decisions, policymakers try to sustain public approval during
implementation by pointing to a robust consensus. Contrary intelligence has the opposite
effect, causing public wariness and discontent to rise when its support is most needed.
Politicization is likely in these circumstances.
The antecedent condition in the model is the perceived degree of dissent from
intelligence agencies, especially if there is suspicion that intelligence officials are
ideologically opposed to policy decisions. When leaders are confident that they have
achieved consensus support for their plans, they have no need to politicize intelligence.
But they are not always sure about solidarity, especially on particularly contentious
issues, and they know that internal disputes may become public. Open disagreement
between policymakers and intelligence agencies makes it more difficult to convince
skeptical audiences of the wisdom of policy decisions. Of course, dissenting intelligence
is only problematic in the presence of substantial opposition to policy initiatives. In
uncontroversial and low-profile cases, where no critical constituency can credibly
threaten to undermine policy interests, dissent is manageable.
The oversell model is therefore built on two independent variables: the existence
of a public policy commitment and the emergence of at least one critical constituency.
Both are necessary for politicization to occur. When publicly committed leaders face
organized domestic opposition, they have strong incentives to force intelligence to deliver
conclusions that justify their position. They cannot simply ignore intelligence when it
does not support policy preferences.
The chapter begins by developing the concept of critical constituencies. There are
several these groups, each able to impose different kinds of political costs. The
emergence of at least one puts in motion the causal mechanism leading to politicization,
because it gives policymakers a reason to manufacture the image of consensus in the
national security establishment. The second section explains why public commitments
contribute to politicization. After policymakers declare a position, they cannot accept
contrary intelligence without risking unacceptable political costs. The third section
explains why consensus support for policy decisions helps policymakers avoid these
costs, and why intelligence agencies play a particularly important role in the process.
Because of the unique aura of secret information, intelligence agencies provide a sense of
authoritativeness to policy decisions. The last section offers a set of testable hypotheses
derived from the model.
Critical Constituencies
Politicization is inherently linked to domestic politics; the word itself suggests
that intelligence is manipulated out of political necessity. In some cases intelligence is
used to boost public support for costly policy decisions, but the link is not always so
clear. Public opinion is not the only kind of domestic pressure that policymakers face,
nor is the public the only audience that matters.
A critical constituency is any domestic group with the power to undermine the
success of a policy or the career of a policymaker. It is critical in both senses of the
word, because it is simultaneously skeptical about policy decisions and essential to policy
success. Critical constituencies are akin to the concept of "veto players" used by Robert
Putnam to describe the domestic actors that make international cooperation difficult by
refusing to ratify negotiated agreements.' Although the two ideas are similar, I prefer the
term critical constituencies for two reasons. First, it more accurately reflects the
policymakers' need to persuade domestic audiences. The game theoretic language of
Putnam's model implies that preferences are more or less fixed, and that the substance of
1 Veto players may include the voting public as well as interest groups and influential legislators.
Successful negotiations depend on creating domestic coalitions on both sides that will ratify agreements
reached in principle. Agreements that are likely to be ratified are those that successfully satisfy the
interests of different domestic constituencies. Unsatisfied veto players can sabotage the process by
rejecting the terms of the deal and abandoning the domestic coalition. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer
1988), pp. 427-460. See also Geoge Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990); and Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political
Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
the agreement determines whether or not negotiators can count on domestic ratification. 2
But the ratification process, as with the foreign policy process in general, involves a
constant effort to convince domestic constituencies of the wisdom of policy decisions.
Domestic preferences are not fixed, as evidenced by shifts in public support for key
policies over time. Second, the word "veto" suggests that domestic audiences only
matter when it comes time to ratify treaties. In fact, critical constituencies can impose
costs both before and after international agreements are reached. They can also impose
costs that have little to do with international bargaining.
Different groups impose different costs (see Table 1). The public, of course, can
vote the policymaker out of office. It also imposes indirect costs by influencing
representatives in the legislature. In so doing it can restrict the policymaker's freedom of
action, because the legislature controls financial resources and occasionally has the right
to obstruct foreign policy decisions. The policymaker's political party is also a critical
constituency. Modem parties perform a number of important tasks: they raise money and
recruit activists, they conduct campaigns, they monitor public opinion, and they devise
strategies for public officials. Party support is not always guaranteed, however, and a
dissatisfied party can impose substantial costs on the policymaker by throwing its support
behind another candidate or by restricting access to funds and organizational resources.
Moreover, dissatisfied members can penalize policymakers if they split the party and
reduce its overall influence. Republican dissolution in 1992 and Democratic infighting in
2 Putnam relaxes this assumption later, noting that international bargaining under conditions of uncertainty
can lead to an unpredictable domestic backlash. In general, however, he argues that ratification depends on
locating agreements within the "win-set" of acceptable outcomes to relevant domestic groups. Putnam,
"Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," pp. 437438, 442-48, and 454-456.
2000 both contributed to electoral defeats. In short, an unhappy party can threaten the
political career of the policymaker.3
A third group is the single-issue constituency, which can exert outsize influence
because of its steadfast commitment to a cause. A single-issue constituency can cut
across ideological lines, meaning that it can level "bipartisan" pressure against leaders.
Olsonian logic underscores its power: small groups that are exposed to concentrated costs
will work passionately to avoid them. When the costs and benefits of a given issue are
concentrated on a small constituency, it will effectively mobilize resources to achieve
political goals. Committed single-issue constituencies lobby policymakers directly and
cultivate friendly media outlets to spread their message. On the other hand, collective
action is increasingly difficult to achieve when the costs and benefits of political
mobilization are diffuse.4
Finally, the legislature can undermine specific policies or dilute a leader's broader
policy objectives. The power of the legislature varies from case to case, and the same
legislature may go through cycles of activism and acquiescence. 5 In the United States,
3 Despite the rise of parallel political organizations and the decline of traditional party machines, parties
still provide the context for political competition in modem democracies. For a general discussion of party
organization and resources, see Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1996), pp. 105-112 and 289-308. For an evaluation of the contemporary relationship
between parties and policymakers in the United States, see John C. Green, "Still Functional After All These
Years," in Paul Webb, David M. Farrell, and Ian Holliday, eds., Political Parties in Advanced Industrial
Democracies (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 310-344.
4 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1965). Scholars have used Olsonian logic to explain the influence of domestic
and foreign lobbies over foreign policy. Examples include Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy
and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution ofInfluence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994);
Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics (Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1995); and Mitchell Bard, "The Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups on American Middle
East Policy," in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., The Domestic Sources ofAmerican
Foreign Policy (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 57-69.
5 Congressional activism in foreign policy increased after the collapse of the Cold War consensus, but the
willingness to impose costs on the President has fluctuated. For a discussion of Congress in the wake of
Vietnam, see Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). For arguments that Congress has recently abrogated foreign
Congress has several ways of influencing foreign policy. It enjoys power over the
budget, it can embarrass policymakers through committee hearings and other public
forums, and it can refuse to ratify negotiated treaties. As with other critical
constituencies, Congress can impose substantial political costs. 6
Table 1. Critical Constituencies
Constituency Type of Costs
Critical constituencies do not isolate themselves from one another because it is
difficult for one group acting alone to exert high levels of domestic pressure. Instead,
they create formal and informal alliances to increase their collective influence. Pooling
resources in this way increases their ability to impose political costs. The public exerts
policymaking to the President, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., War and the American Presidency (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2004); and Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing
Presidential Power After Watergate (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005).
6 William G. Howell and Jon Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential
War Powers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
Public at large Electoral defeat, reduced support for individual policies or a
wider policy program
Political party Restricted funds and organization, primary defeat
Legislature Restricted budgets, reduced support for new legislation, veto
of international agreements
Single-issue Reduced party and governmental cohesion, reduced public
constituency support for policy
some of its leverage through elected representatives. Single-issue constituencies also find
important allies in the legislature and within political parties. All of them try to use the
media to build support for or against policy decisions.7
Although they are very different, these groups can all impose serious political
costs. The failure to parry domestic opposition threatens the implementation of specific
policies, the future of a broader policy agenda, and the political career of the
policymaker. Leaders are penalized when they fail to achieve needed support for new
policy initiatives, or when they are forced to change course during the implementation
period. Policymakers seek to avoid these costs by rallying support from the members of
the national security and foreign policy establishment, including intelligence agencies.
The appearance of unanimity helps overcome or at least delay opposition to policy
choices. For this reason, the existence of latent political costs has strong implications for
how policymakers manage national security organizations. If there is no visible
consensus that can satisfy critical constituencies, policymakers have strong incentives to
create one.
Two factors are associated with the rise of critical constituencies: attentiveness
and controversy.
Attentiveness. Politicization is more likely when the public at large and other
critical constituencies are attentive to the issue at hand. Policymakers have little reason
to pressure intelligence agencies to change their estimates on low-profile questions. For
example, basic intelligence refers to background research conducted for reference
purposes. Policymakers have no reason to politicize this kind of intelligence because
7 I do not treat the media as a critical constituency because it does not ultimately have the power to
undermine policies or policymakers. It can influence outcomes, but cannot independently vote a leader out
of office, or veto an international agreement, or withhold budgetary support for new policy initiatives.
most of it deals with obscure reporting; these research papers almost never become the
focus of public attention. On the other hand, highly visible issues can have far reaching
implications for foreign policy and national security. Estimative intelligence predicts the
future intentions and behavior of potential adversaries. Policymakers have a vested
interested in these products because they implicitly evaluate the wisdom of foreign
policy. One long time intelligence official has warned that with respect to estimative
intelligence, "Unwary analysts may find that they are under pressure to deliver judgments
that support policy, feed the ideological biases of policy consumers, or mask some
contentious issues." 8
Political leaders closely monitor the level of interest in foreign affairs and position
themselves accordingly. 9 Policymakers seek to discover which issues are more or less
salient, because the relationship between policy decisions and public approval varies
according to whether or not issues are considered important. 10 Polling agencies routinely
consult for elected officials to help them gauge popular sentiment about current policies
and policy options. Given the growing interest in poll results, it is reasonable to infer that
observable changes in attentiveness force policymakers to reassess their own views as
well as the level of agreement on policy among their principal advisors.
8 Hulnick, "Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer," p. 228.
9 John H. Aldrich and John L. Sullivan, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates
'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?'," American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (March 1989), pp
123-141.
10 Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1991); and George C. Edwards III, William Mitchell, and Reed Welch,
"Explaining Presidential Approval: The Significance of Issue Salience," American Journal of Political
Science, Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 1995), pp. 108-134. Edwards et al. demonstrate that public approval of
the president is tied to their appraisal of his performance with respect to particularly salient issues. Overall
impressions can thus remain positive even if the president scores badly on a number of lesser issues.
There remains some controversy among scholars about policymakers'
responsiveness to public opinion on foreign policy." Most scholars agree that the
relationship is reciprocal: public sentiment has some effect on foreign policy choices, and
policymakers try to shape domestic opinion in order to mobilize support for their ideas.
With respect to politicization, however, the point is not about whether policymakers act
in lockstep with shifting public opinion, but about how they rally support for decisions
already made. Politicization is increasingly likely as policymakers become more
committed to specific positions. Instead of changing policies to satisfy public dissent,
they will justify existing plans by pointing to support from intelligence agencies and
other officials in the national security establishment. The ultimate level of congruence
between public support and policy outcomes may depend on leaders' ability to shape
public opinion. 12
Policymakers and strategists have long voiced concerns about fluctuating public
attention to foreign dilemmas. Although they usually claim to make judgments only
according to the national interest, policymakers have developed sophisticated methods of
monitoring public sentiment on foreign policy issues. 13 Polling operations were
" Brandice Canes-Wrone and Kenneth W. Shotts find little congruence between public preferences and
foreign policy decisions. Policymakers, they contend, are far more responsive to "doorstep issues" that
affect constituents on a daily basis and that presumably influence their electoral preferences. Others have
challenged this conclusion on empirical grounds. Alan D. Monroe argues that policymakers have become
less responsive to public opinion on domestic issues over time while remaining consistently in agreement
with opinion on foreign affairs. Brandice Canes-Wrone and Kenneth W. Shotts, "The Conditional Nature
of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion," American Journal of Political Science, Vo. 48, No. 4
(October 2004), pp. 689-706; and Alan D. Monroe, "Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993," Public
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 62 (1998), pp. 6-28.
12 On the effects of public opinion, see Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion
on Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 77 (1983), pp. 175-190. For discussions of how
leaders manage public opinion, see Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Presidents as Opinion
Leaders: Some New Evidence," Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 12 (1984), pp. 649-661. For an argument
about the reciprocal nature of opinion and policy, see James A. Stimson, Public Opinion andAmerica:
Moods, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).
13 Several examples are presented in Powlick and Katz, "Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus," p. 46.
institutionalized in the White House during the Nixon administration and have become
standard practice in the United States and in other democracies. 14 The Reagan
administration made extensive use of polling to determine public responses to different
policy options. 15 President Clinton's national security advisor attended weekly meetings
devoted to public sentiment and campaign tactics.'1 6 And until recently the chief political
advisor to President George W. Bush also served as a senior policy aide. Policymakers
also use private consultants to gauge opinion and develop public relations strategies to
dovetail with the policy process.17
While the ultimate influence on policy outcomes is still disputed, there is no doubt
that leaders are sensitive to shifts in public opinion. At a minimum, pragmatic
policymakers anticipate the range of acceptable policies and exclude some options from
consideration. Thus the public limits the menu of policy options even if it does not
ultimately determine the outcome. 8 Moreover, policymakers are sensitive to public
opinion during both the policy making and implementation phase. Even the hypothetical
leader who thinks exclusively in terms of the national interest needs to cultivate and
maintain public support after his decisions are put into practice.19
14 Lawarence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "The Nixon Administration and the Pollsters," Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 110 (1995), pp. 519-538; Lawrence R. Jacobs, "The Recoil Effect: Public Opinion
and Policymaking in the U.S. and Britain," Comparative Politics, Vol. 24 (1992), pp. 199-217; George C.
Edwards, III, The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1983).
15 Ronald H. Hinkley, People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security
(New York: Lexington Books, 1982).
16 Richard L. Berke, "The President's Brain Trust Brings Politics to the Table," New York Times, July 21,
1996, p. Al.
17 Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy.
18 Powlick and Katz, "Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus," p. 44. For examples, see Leonard Kusnitz,
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1984); and Douglas C. Foyle, Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
19 Powlick and Katz, "Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus," p. 44.
Public attentiveness varies according to objective and subjective data. Opinion
research sometimes reveals demonstrable changes in public awareness of key foreign
policy issues. In early 1964, for example, a Gallup poll showed that only 37 percent of
Americans paid more than fleeting attention to Vietnam. By end of 1965, however, few
Americans were unaware of the conflict.20 The oversell model predicts that such rapid
and unambiguous changes in public attentiveness should cause policymakers to reassess
the degree of support from intelligence agencies. If support is missing or incomplete,
policymakers will have strong incentives to pressure intelligence to reconsider its
conclusions. The model also predicts that policymakers will respond to obvious rises in
attentiveness by stressing the support of top intelligence officials in public statements.
Obviously, this task is more difficult if such support is lacking. The pressure to
overcome internal division in the face of public scrutiny creates substantial pressures to
politicize intelligence.
In cases like Vietnam, public attentiveness changes suddenly and dramatically. In
most cases change occurs slowly. Public opinion on foreign policy issues has proven
remarkably stable since polling began in earnest in the 1930s. 21 Anthony Downes
observed that public ambivalence is the norm on most issues, despite occasional moments
of "alarmed discovery" that create a drumbeat for policy action. 22 Aggregate opinion on
foreign policy usually moves gradually, however, and these alarms are exceptions to the
20 Dallek, Flawed Giant, p. 106.
21 Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans'
Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
22 Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology: the 'Issue-Attention Cycle'," The Public Interest, Vol. 28
(Summer 1972), pp. 38-50. See also Eugene R. Wittkopf, Faces oflnternationalism, Public Opinion and
American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990).
rule. Slow-moving changes in public attentiveness give policymakers time to fortify
public approval for their actions. 23
Subjective perceptions also influence how policymakers evaluate changes in
public sentiment. Consider a hypothetical example in which individuals are asked
whether they are aware of an ongoing foreign policy dispute. The same question is asked
to a representative sample over a three year time period. In the first year, 20% of
respondents state that they are aware of the problem and understand the implications for
U.S. foreign policy. Over the next two years the number rises to 25% and 30%,
respectively. Even if policymakers are watching these numbers closely, it is not
immediately clear how they should view the results. One policymaker might be
concerned about a ten point swing in a relatively short time. But another might note that
the number of attentive respondents is still a minority. In these cases the influence of the
attentiveness variable will be strongly conditioned by other factors.
Thanks to decades of polling data, the level of public attentiveness is fairly easy
to measure. The same is not true for other critical constituencies, and determining
variation among these groups requires more careful historical judgment. Single-issue
constituencies, by definition, are committed to specific policy problems. They remain
fixed upon single issues and try to determine whether policymakers share their position.
If not, they can mobilize substantial resources against policy initiatives. I assume that the
most dedicated members always pay close attention to the issue at hand. Observable
23 The lag effect works both ways. Just as policymakers do not immediately perceive shifts in
attentiveness, there is also a lag between changing events and public responses. Samuel Kernell,
"Explaining Presidential Popularity: How Ad Hoc Theorizing, Misplaced Emphasis, and Insufficient Care
in Measuring One's Variables Refuted Common Sense and Led Conventional Wisdom Down the Path of
Anomalies," American Political Science Review (1978), pp. 506-522.
changes in attentiveness include the emergence of prominent new members and a spike in
lobbying efforts.
Political parties focus on issues that are important for satisfying donors and
mobilizing voters on election day. They are also conscious of issues that opposition
parties use to draw voters away. Policymakers may lose support if they fail to convince
the party that they can manage both kinds of issues. As with single-issue constituencies,
it is difficult to measure changes in attentiveness, because it is reasonable to assume that
parties usually pay close attention to their leading members. On the other hand, there are
a few important indicators that policymakers have come under new scrutiny from their
own party. The rise of popular intra-party challengers, for example, suggests that leaders
are on the verge of losing substantial chunks of party support.
Legislative attentiveness is the most difficult variable to measure, because
legislative bodies are large and complex. In the United States, congressional
attentiveness probably varies for a number of reasons. Issues that are particularly salient
to the public are likely to generate congressional attention. Election-year politics also
lead congressmen to focus on issues that they hope will pay off at the polls. In addition,
Congress periodically uses certain issues in an attempt to restore legislative authority.
Signs of increased attentiveness include highly publicized legislative proposals and
committee hearings surrounding a single issue.
Controversy. An attentive audience is not necessarily opposed to policy
preferences, and politicization only becomes necessary when high-profile issues are also
contested. A general level of approval or ambivalence relieves policymakers from
having to continually justify their actions. But vocal opposition can undermine policy
decisions, especially if policies require long periods of implementation. Under these
conditions policymakers need to monitor critical constituencies and nurture public
support. Intelligence is crucial here because it forms the basis for action. If intelligence
agencies directly or indirectly challenge policy decisions, public relations are likely to
flounder. As with the attentiveness variable, controversy affects policymakers'
calculations during both the policymaking and implementation phases. The level of
controversy affects the prospects for domestic approval of policy decisions, and it also
affects the anticipated costs of changing course later.
There are several ways to measure the degree of controversy surrounding a given
issue. None are perfect in isolation, but together they provide a strong qualitative and
quantitative indication of the domestic pressures that affect how policymakers deal with
intelligence. Newspaper reports and editorials give some flavor of the issues that raise
public concern. Media content analyses are also reasonable indicators of trends in public
opinion.24 Poll data is more specific, especially if the similar questions are repeated over
time in order to provide some variation on public attitudes. The rise of influential
opinion leaders also suggests greater public attention to certain issues. 2 5 Finally, quotes
from leaders offer telling insights on how they perceive the political consequences of
their actions. These statements may not reflect an accurate or objective measure of
24 Content analyses are also useful as measures of elite perceptions of salience. Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A.
Segal apply a variation of this technique to measure which cases are most salient for Supreme Court
justices: "whether the New York Times carried a front-page story about the case." Epstein and Segal,
"Measuring Issue Salience," American Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January 2000), pp. 66-
83. For an application of content analysis with respect to mass opinion, see Jeffrey Legro, "Whence
American Internationalism," International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 253-289.
25 Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).
public pressure, but they shed light on the critical interplay between public sentiment and
policymakers' perceptions of their own freedom of action.26
Some issues are controversial for other critical constituencies even though they
are not publicly salient. Single-issue constituencies, for example, may focus on relatively
esoteric policy dilemmas. Similarly, legislative controversies may not resonate with the
wider public, especially if they deal with procedural disputes. Intra-party controversies
may have more to do with intra-party politics than with relevant policy issues.
Nonetheless, all of these critical constituencies can threaten to impose substantial costs
on the policymaker.
It is easier to observe rising controversy than rising attentiveness. Controversial
issues inspire single-issue constituencies to invest their resources in efforts to defeat
policy initiatives (or efforts to replace the policymaker). Alternately, the emergence of
new single-issue groups is a sign that an issue has become particularly sensitive.
Controversies manifest in the legislature through heated floor speeches and equally
26 The combination of attentiveness and controversy is similar to Kelly Greenhill's discussion of "negative
salience" in the context of crisis management. Greenhill argues that issues become negatively salient when
they have "permeated the public consciousness" and when the policy response has left "a sizable fraction of
the public unsatisfied with the manner and/or quality of the government's response." Negatively salient
issues can produce "policy panics" when catalytic events force policymakers to adjust their positions in
response to sudden public anxiety. Vivid and shocking news reports, for example, expose the public to
horrific events and arouse a sudden demand for a governmental response. Policy panics can also occur as a
result of sustained media attention to particular issues, especially when political elites generate a steady
stream of op-eds and television reports that highlight specific problems. In either case, policymakers are
forced to reconsider their preferred policy as a result of domestic pressure.
The differences between Greenhill's model and my own are more semantic than substantial,
although there is one distinction worth noting. Greenhill argues that policy panics create pressures to
reconsider options and possibly change direction. In a perfect world, these would be productive moments
for intelligence-policy relations because leaders would need to search out new information and analyses.
But the oversell model of politicization argues the opposite: faced with mounting public anxiety,
policymakers will try to cajole intelligence officials to support existing policies. One reason is that there is
a selection effect involved: leaders usually have committed themselves on issues that are prone to
intelligence-policy friction. Ironically, this means that there are more serious costs for reassessing policy
just when intelligence is most needed. And as the costs of policy change increase, so do the incentives to
manipulate intelligence. Kelly M. Greenhill, "People Pressure: Strategic Engineered Migration as an
Instrument of Statecraft and the Rise of the Human Rights Regime," (Ph.D. diss., MIT, 2003), pp. 95-101.
See also Edwards, et al., "Explaining Presidential Approval."
acerbic media appearances. Political parties are not immune from controversy either,
despite their efforts to remain unified and present a cohesive message on divisive issues.
Internal turmoil is evident when party leaders are unable to convey a unified position in
public, when party conventions become contentious, and when unsatisfied voters begin to
defect in large numbers.
The Consequences of Commitment
The first independent variable in the oversell model is based on public and group
preferences. The second variable has to do with policymaker behavior. Politicization is
more likely when leaders publicly commit to specific decisions, because committing
incurs the possibility of substantial political costs. Once leaders have clearly signaled
their intentions, the consequences of policy failure are non-trivial: decreased support for
other policy decisions, decreased confidence in general, and lowered hopes for re-
election. 27 As a result, policy positions become more inflexible after unequivocal
declarations of intent. When leaders invite the possibility of these costs by making public
commitments, they work harder to ensure continued support from critical constituencies
and become less willing to change the direction of policy.28
Public commitments help mobilize critical constituencies with a stake in the
outcome, because they frame the debate over the direction of policy. This makes it easier
27 See Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Wiley, 1960); and William Quandt, "The
Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 101 (November
1986), pp. 826-837.
28 Kenneth A. Schultz, "Looking for Audience Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 1
(February 2001), pp. 32-60. Schultz compares British resoluteness in the 1898 Fashoda crisis with its
willingness to back down during a conflict with Iran over the nationalization of oil resources a half century
later. Schultz finds that policymakers in the first crisis anticipated substantial public backlash if they
compromised with France over control of the Upper Nile valley. In the later case, however, Labour Party
leaders understood that the public was not bent on a military confrontation in the Middle East. Hence the
Prime Minister could back away from earlier commitments without substantial penalty.
critical constituencies to act against what they believe are dubious decisions. At this
point policymakers attempt to justify their plans by creating the appearance of an official
consensus among members of the national security community. But what happens if
intelligence does not justify policy commitments? What happens if intelligence officers
are unwilling to advocate on behalf of policymakers, either because their conclusions
differ or because they believe that publicly supporting policy decisions is inconsistent
with professional norms of independence and objectivity? Uncooperative intelligence
agencies force policymakers into a bind. If they accept intelligence in good faith and
change policy accordingly, they run the risk of appearing weak-kneed during the
implementation phase. If they reject contradictory intelligence, on the other hand, they
risk appearing irrational. Politicization offers a way out of this dilemma. Pressuring
intelligence to support public commitments allows policymakers to justify decisions
already made without feeding the skepticism of critical constituencies.
In summary, the oversell models holds that politicization is more likely after
leaders make controversial public commitments. Public commitments focus the attention
of critical constituencies, giving rise to the possibility of severe political costs. To avoid
paying these costs, policymakers rely on intelligence agencies to justify the logic of
action. Policymakers have strong incentives to ensure that intelligence products support
their decisions, especially the success of policy decisions is tied to continuing support
from domestic groups. Figure 1 contains a diagram of the oversell model.
Figure 1. The Oversell Model
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Why Intelligence Matters
The discussion to this point has focused almost entirely on the demand for
intelligence. Policymakers attempt to placate critical constituencies so that they do not
suffer unacceptable political costs. The risk of incurring these costs increases after
policymakers commit to controversial issues, and the demand for policy justification rises
a result. What about the supply side? How does the appearance of an official consensus
work to placate critical constituencies? More specifically, why is intelligence particularly
useful for policymakers as an instrument to mobilize support? What do intelligence
agencies provide that is different from other organizations?
The causal mechanism in the model is the need to bring intelligence into the
policy consensus in order to overcome critical costs. Creating the image of consensus
support helps to reduce doubt over policy decisions. Critical constituencies may be wary
of policy decisions because they suspect that the policymaker has parochial interests and
is not revealing the truth about what he knows. But their skepticism is mollified when
multiple speakers make the same point, especially if they are career public servants
without an obvious political reason to deceive or misrepresent. 29 Arguments against
policy decisions are difficult to sustain in the face of apparently unanimous approval
from officials across the national security establishment.
Policymakers reinforce the power of consensus through explicit declarations and
symbolic demonstrations. With regard to intelligence, explicit declarations include
selectively releasing intelligence products in order to show that their decisions are based
on the best available information. Adlai Stevenson's use of overhead imagery during the
Cuban Missile Crisis is a case in point. Stevenson was able to reveal Soviet duplicity at
the United Nations by presenting U-2 photographs that put the lie to Moscow's claim that
it was not placing ballistic missiles on the island. Symbolic demonstrations of consensus
include joint appearances between policymakers and intelligence officials. When
Secretary of State Colin Powell offered evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction at
the United Nations, for example, the Director of Central Intelligence was seated directly
behind him.
Observers tend to associate policy success with the belief that leaders maintain
tight control over the policymaking process. Conversely, failures are associated
internecine fighting and disorganization. Thus policymakers are more likely succeed
when they cultivate an image of what Matthew Robert Kerbel calls "organizational
efficiency." Policymakers demonstrate organizational efficiency by ensuring that
messages are clear and official statements are consistent. An important element of the
29 Arthur Lupia and Matthew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They
Need to Know? (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 61-62.
policymaker's public relations strategy involves the careful coordination of such
statements so that they have maximum impact. Domestic groups may not agree with
policy decisions, but they respect and even defer to policymakers when their advisors and
staffs are highly coordinated. The fact that the ability to stay on message is associated
with policy successes is not surprising; the persuasive power of consensus support adds
to the leader's natural advantages from the bully-pulpit. 30
Consensus as oversell. Democratically elected policymakers work constantly to
mobilize coalitions in support of their plans. The expansion of liberal democracy, as
Theodore Lowi famously argued, makes the task of foreign policy more difficult because
it makes coalition-building all the more important. In the presence of expanding
institutions, large numbers of interest groups, and increasingly skeptical voters, it is
impossible to have "a proper conspiracy among leaders in pursuit of the national interests
of the United States." 31 In this environment it is foolish to publicly admit that no policy
is perfect, that every policy involves value trade-offs, or that total success is an illusion.
Because of the need to mobilize so many disparate players, the policymaking process can
become an exercise in hyperbole. Threats are oversold, as are policy solutions.
Creating the image of consensus is a way of overselling policy decisions. Modem
democracies maintain sprawling military and intelligence organizations, all of which
30 Matthew Robert Kerbel, Beyond Persuasion: Organizational Efficiency and Presidential Power (Albany,
NY: SUNY Press, 1991), pp. 87-104. The concept of "maximum impact" is developed in George C.
Edwards, III, The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp.
70-71.
31 Theodore J. Lowi, The End ofLiberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 2 nd ed. (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1979), p. 142. For a similar argument, see Thomas E. Cronin and Michael E.
Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency, 2 nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004),
pp. 104-105. For a more recent application of the logic of policy oversell, see Thomas J. Christensen,
Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conlfict, 194 7-1958
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 13-22. Christensen correctly points out that non-
democratic leaders also have incentives to oversell threats in order to manage domestic politics. But the
logic of politicization is profoundly different in non-democracies, where intelligence agencies do not enjoy
reputations for objectivity and independence.
have their own bureaucratic incentives. Moreover, these organizations are usually led by
prominent senior officials with strongly held world views. Because the chances of
achieving genuine unity are unlikely among such a diverse group, the appearance of
consensus is a powerful method of persuasion. Policymakers are tempted to gloss over
internal disputes and, if necessary, put pressure on recalcitrant advisors. Pressure to "get
on the team" is especially high when the consensus is fragile. 32
The need to oversell increases because of frustration over previous policy failures.
In a perfect world, unfulfilled promises might cause policymakers to ratchet down their
rhetoric and spell out more realistic goals. Instead, policymakers inflate their promises
and generate new expectations for success. In terms of the variables in the oversell
model, commitments become more rigid in periods of rising attentiveness and
controversy. Oversell begets oversell:
When experiments must be sold as sure things and specialized sure things
must be sold as cure-alls, frustration and failure are inevitable. An
experiment may be partially successful; but after oversell partial success
must be accepted as failure. Failure leads to distrust and frustration, which
lead to more oversell and to further verbal excesses, as superlatives
become ordinary through use. Since international politics is special in the
amount of risk involved, these responses become especially intense. 33
32 The process of overselling by consensus can also occur in the legislature. During Senate deliberations
over the treaty establishing the United Nations, advocates like Sen. John Connally compelled their
colleagues to speak out in favor of passage. Cultivating consensus proved to be a powerful means of
justifying the treaty, so much so that the appearance of unanimous consent ended up creating unrealistic
expectations about with the UN was able to do. The American public was not particularly enthusiastic
about U.S. participation in international institutions in the immediate postwar period. But the sustained
drumbeat of bipartisan calls for unity in the face of the new communist threat, as well as the apparent
consensus support for an internationalist foreign policy from national security officials, led to a startling
reversal in public opinion. Lowi, End ofLiberalism, pp. 139-140. See also Christensen, Useful
Adversaries, pp. 32-36.
33 Lowi, End ofLiberalism, p. 143.
As the rhetoric intensifies, so too does the necessity to forge and maintain the appearance
of consensus. Extravagant claims look hollow if they are unsupported by the agencies
that inform and advise policy decisions.
Intelligence is especially useful in justifying policy because intelligence agencies
deal in secret information. Their ability to collect data from a variety of sources allows
policymakers to claim that their decisions are based on all of the relevant information at
hand. In addition, secret information lends a unique aura to intelligence products.
Critical constituencies are more willing to accept controversial decisions if they believe
that policymakers have special knowledge about the issue. "Public intelligence," Glenn
Hastedt observes, "takes on an oracle quality in which it appears to be revealing some
divine truth that theretofore has been hidden from view. It gives the impression that great
dangers await unless some now self-evident action is taken." 34 Intelligence allows
policymakers to claim that they know something critical that they are not at liberty to
reveal. This is difficult to rebut. In other cases, policymakers disclose pieces of
intelligence data in order to justify their decisions. The intelligence may be persuasive by
itself, but it also suggests that there is a good deal more that remains classified. 35
34 Glenn Hastedt, "Public Intelligence: Leaks as Policy Instruments - The Case of the Iraq War,"
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 419-439," p. 427.
35 Secrecy is not necessarily cost-free. Critics argue that intelligence agencies cover institutional
weaknesses by insisting on control over information. Secrecy also contributes to misguided analysis
because it prevents different intelligence officials from checking and verifying the reliability of sources.
Finally, the demands of secrecy make it hard to ensure that intelligence agencies are responding to relevant
policy concerns, sharing data with one another, and exploiting open-sources. I return to the issue of secrecy
in the last chapter of this study. For various critiques, see Reuel Marc Gerecht, "A New Clandestine
Service: The Case for Creative Destruction," in Gary J. Schmitt, ed., The Future ofAmerican Intelligence
(Washington, DC: Hoover Institution Press, 2005), pp. 103-138; Report of the Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 2005); The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004); and Robert D. Steele, On Intelligence:
Spies and Secrecy in an Open World (OSS International Press, 2001).
New research in political communication has shed light on how leaders use
private information as a tool of persuasion. Arthur Lupia and Matthew McCubbins, for
instance, have found that citizens can make reasoned judgments even if they do not
understand issues in detail. Instead of trying to master complex issues, they rely on
policymakers who they perceive as being knowledgeable and trustworthy. A reputation
for knowledge, defined as the ability to accurately predict the consequences of action, is
particularly important for policymakers who need to convince skeptical audiences that
their decisions are in the national interest. 36 The selective use of public intelligence
sends a signal that policymakers have access to special information and, as a
consequence, are in the best position to make decisions on how to act. Suggestive
references to private information (classified intelligence) substitute for comprehensive
and meaningful information. As a result, releasing intelligence justifies specific policy
decisions and simultaneously improves the reputation of the decision maker. This
process can occur whether or not the underlying intelligence is correct.3 7
Selectively revealing intelligence is attractive to policymakers because it allows
them to summon the national interest without having to be specific. 38 Critics of policy
decisions often make excellent arguments, only to be rebutted by claims that the most
convincing data is necessarily classified. The fact that intelligence is classified suggests
36 Lupia and McCubbins focus on how leaders persuade citizens, but the logic is applicable to other
domestic audiences. Lupia and McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma, pp. 43-59. See also Arthur Lupia,
Samuel L. Popkin, and Matthew McCubbins, eds., The Elements ofReason: Cognition, Choice, and the
Bounds of Rationality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
37 For a warning about the "worship of secret intelligence," see Barry R. Posen, "Correspondence:
Rethinking Net Assessment," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 144-160, at 157-
159.
38 Arnold Wolfers famously noted that the concept of the national interest is emotionally powerful but
analytically meaningless. Policymakers can effectively appeal to the national interest to justify any
decision, no matter what interests are actually involved. Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an
Ambiguous Symbol," in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 147-165.
that it is critically important, but that is also must be kept out of the public arena. "The
advantage of intelligence as a promotional device," Lawrence Freedman writes, "lies in
the authority derived from a secretive process that supposedly can draw on special and
increasingly intrusive sources of information that cannot be revealed lest they be closed
off by the targets." 39 In the name of secrecy, policymakers can release intelligence
findings without having to provide supporting data or analysis. Policy declarations that
rely on intelligence do not reveal the caveats that are common to intelligence products,
nor any differences of opinion among analysts. Conditional conclusions become
statements of unequivocal fact.
The use of intelligence also makes policymakers appear trustworthy. In the
United States, for example, intelligence agencies have cultivated professional norms of
objectivity and a public image of separation from domestic politics. It is no accident that
the entrance to the CIA carries the biblical slogan, "And ye shall know the truth, and the
truth shall make you free." 40 The intelligence seal of approval carries extra weight
precisely because it is apolitical; intelligence estimates are supposed to be independent
from electoral politics and partisan wrangling. Some policymakers have contributed to
this image of objectivity by choosing intelligence chiefs with different backgrounds and
political views. President Kennedy appointed John McCone, a conservative Republican,
as Director of Central Intelligence. President George W. Bush allowed George Tenet to
stay on as DCI, despite the fact that Tenet was a Clinton appointee. Not all leaders have
followed this pattern, but enough have done so to preserve the idea that intelligence-
policy relations exist outside the world of domestic politics. As long as there is some
39 Lawrence Freedman, "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat," Survival, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 7-
50, at 36.
40 Lowenthal, Intelligence, p. 7.
perception that intelligence is politically unbiased, the more useful important it will be to
the consensus.41
Finally, formal intelligence is persuasive because it is official. Symbols of
authority and expertise have a powerful influence on individuals, regardless of the
substance of what they say.42 Because intelligence analysts are in the business of
political and military estimates, and because they have access to secret information, their
reports carry a unique air of authority. Most citizens do not understand the methods used
to gather and analyze information, nor are they aware of the actual content of intelligence
products. Nevertheless, they pay closer attention to intelligence than to other sources of
analysis. Consider the fallout from two leaked intelligence analyses in 2006. The first, a
military intelligence assessment of Iraq's Anbar Province, concluded that U.S. forces had
little control over a wide swath of territory to the west of Baghdad. The second, a
National Intelligence Estimate representing the collective wisdom of the intelligence
community, concluded that the war in Iraq had become a vehicle for terrorist recruiting.
Neither of these conclusions were novel at the time; both had been in the public sphere
for months. But the fact that official intelligence agencies agreed with these arguments
41 Lupia and McCubbins argue that policymakers are more persuasive when their arguments are subject to
verification, defined as the condition in which the quality of a policy decision is revealed before listeners
have to make a judgment. Given the inherent ambiguity of foreign affairs, it is rare that the quality of any
decision will be revealed so quickly. As a result, support from intelligence agencies is a useful substitute
for verification. Lupia and McCubbins, Democratic Dilemma, pp. 53-55.
42 Stanley Milgram's classic experiments with authority and obedience provided a stark and troubling
demonstration of this proposition. Milgram showed that individuals could be made to do things that they
otherwise would consider immoral, like causing pain to apparently innocent strangers, under the direction
of authority figures. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York:
HarperCollins, 1974).
was front page news. Democrats immediately used the reports to criticize the
administration, and the White House tried to downplay their significance.43
Intelligence is thus a powerful tool for policymakers who seek to persuade. Its
imprimatur is unique because of the aura surrounding espionage and other forms of secret
intelligence. The use of intelligence, however, creates two important paradoxes. The
first is that the norm of independence will erode as policymakers increasingly call on
intelligence to help justify their decisions in public. Intelligence is useful because it
carries an air of detached objectivity, but this image cannot last if policymakers regularly
use public intelligence to advocate for policy choices. Consequently, the persuasive
power of intelligence will decline the more it is used. The second paradox is that
consensus-building ends up causing friction between policymakers and intelligence
agencies. Intelligence officers may feel that policymakers are violating their professional
norms by cajoling them to bias their findings. They may also interpret policy pushback
as an attack on their competence and ability. Bringing intelligence into the policy
consensus may be possible in the short term, but the process of politicization will make it
harder to rally intelligence support in the future.
Hypotheses
The oversell model yields four general hypotheses about the causes of
politicization and the conditions that lead to different types of politicization (see Table 3).
43 Thomas E. Ricks, "Situation Called Dire in West Iraq," Washington Post, September 11, 2006, p. Al;
Ann Scott Tyson, "Anbar Called Secondary to U.S. Efforts in Baghdad," Washington Post, September 16,
2006, p. A17; Greg Miller, "Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Fuels Terror," Los Angeles Times, September 24,
2006, p. 1; Philip Shenon and Mark Mazzetti, "Study of Iraq War and Terror Stirs Strong Political
Response," New York Times, September 25, 2006, p. 10.
The following section describes them and specifies a number of testable predictions that
flow from the model. It also describes the kind of evidence that would falsify each claim.
H1. Politicization is more likely after policymakers have publicly committed to
specific positions.
Pubic commitments make politicization more likely for two reasons. First, they
reduce policy flexibility, because a clear statement of intent puts the policymaker's
reputation at stake. Contrary intelligence is unwelcome in these situations because it
places the policymaker in an unenviable position: either disregard intelligence and risk
looking irrational, or change course and risk looking irresolute. Second, public
commitments are usually followed by coordinated campaigns to justify new policies.
This activity includes sending out members of the national security and foreign policy
establishment to defend the decision in public. Because secret intelligence is particularly
persuasive, leaders have strong incentives to ensure its support.
If Hypothesis 1 is correct, then individual leaders should become less tolerant of
contrary intelligence and dissent after making public commitments. A pattern should
emerge across cases: examples of politicization follow public policy pronouncements.
But leaders' behavior towards intelligence should change even if intelligence has not
delivered an estimate on the issue at hand. In these cases policymakers will look for
indications of dissent and try to preempt intelligence products by shaping the findings
ahead of time. Hypothesis 1 also predicts that the type of politicization should be related
to the specificity of the commitment. More specific and binding commitments should
lead to direct politicization because policymakers give up the opportunity to manipulate
intelligence slowly and indirectly. On the other hand, less specific commitments give
policymakers the time to cultivate support from intelligence agencies through indirect
politicization.
Evidence that politicization precedes commitments would partially disconfirm
Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, policymakers may start to apply indirect pressure in
advance of public statements in order to ensure that intelligence will support the
consensus. More damning evidence would be cases in which policymakers politicized
intelligence without making any strong public commitment. In these cases policymakers
might have reasons to want intelligence to support their plans, but those reasons would
not have anything to do with the model.
H2. Politicization requires the activation of at least one critical constituency.
The emergence of a critical constituency creates potentially unacceptable costs to
the policymaker. Likewise, the absence of any critical constituency removes the need to
forge a consensus behind policy decisions. The causal mechanism does not kick in when
there is no need to justify actions to skeptics. In addition, policymakers worry less about
leaks because there is no credible opposition group that can exploit the existence of
internal disputes in order to chip away at policy objectives. As a result, policymakers can
be much more tolerant of differing views from intelligence agencies.
If Hypothesis 2 is correct, then politicization will occur after the emergence of a
critical constituency. Politicization in the absence of organized opposition is not
consistent with the oversell model. Moreover, critical constituencies should be visible
enough so that policymakers become aware of the costs that they can impose.
Hypothesis 2 also predicts that the magnitude of potential costs will affect the type of
politicization. Policymakers will be more likely to use direct politicization as potential
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costs rise. Direct politicization is politically dangerous because of the fallout from
revelations of policy meddling. Thus direct politicization should be reserved for cases in
which the domestic costs are potentially very high (e.g. the failure of a major policy
initiative).
Hypothesis 2 would be falsified if the historical record reveals a pattern of
politicization in the absence of a clearly defined critical constituency.
H3. High-profile issues that generate wide attention are more prone to politicization
than low-profile issues.
High-profile issues create incentives to politicize if intelligence conclusions are
not in sync with policy preferences. Increasing levels of attentiveness mean that
diverging intelligence views are more likely to be noticed, and policymakers will have a
more difficult time maintaining a consensus. Such differences are unimportant if few
people are paying attention.
This hypothesis makes two predictions. First, any issue is more likely to be
politicized after it has become the focus of sustained attention. Policymakers will tolerate
disputes with intelligence over low-profile policy dilemmas. However, politicization will
become increasingly likely if the same issue begins to receive more attention. Increasing
levels of attentiveness make consensus more important, either to maintain or create
support for policy decisions among critical constituencies. This change should occur
even if other factors remain the same (e.g. the organizational structure of the intelligence
community). In addition, the pattern should hold across cases where levels of
attentiveness vary.
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Second, high levels of attentiveness should be associated with direct
politicization. The greater the pressure to forge a consensus, the greater the incentive to
accelerate the process. Direct politicization works more rapidly than indirect
politicization, which requires the policymaker to send subtle signals about what kinds of
intelligence are required. There is one exception, however. Manipulation-by-
appointment is a special form of direct politicization, in which policymakers stack
intelligence agencies with pliant officials in order to guarantee that future intelligence
products will support policy preferences. This is unlikely to occur when public
attentiveness is high, because it will appear as a transparent effort by policymakers to
manipulate intelligence.
Disconfirming evidence would include prominent cases of politicization
surrounding low-profile issues, or cases of politicization that precede sharp rises in
attentiveness. A failure to discover any correlation between high-attentiveness and direct
politicization would also cast doubt on this hypothesis.
H4. Controversial issues are more prone to politicization than uncontroversial
issues.
Controversy breeds politicization because it increases the risk of having to pay
political costs. High controversy leads critical constituencies to step up their efforts to
thwart policy decisions and perhaps force the policymaker out of office. In addition, it is
more difficult to sustain support for contentious policies during the implementation
phase, even if policymakers successfully overcome initial domestic hurdles. For this
reason, leaders have strong incentives to create the image of official consensus during
both phases of the policy process. And like the attentiveness variable, high controversy
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tends to shorten timelines. Policymakers cannot afford to let issues fester if their policies
come under increasing pressure and dissent grows. To do so would cause existing
support to erode and provide ammunition to political opponents.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that policymakers are more likely to politicize intelligence
after issues become controversial. Moreover, high-profile issues are prone to
politicization if and only if they are also controversial. Policymakers have less need to
maintain a solid consensus if policies are broadly supported. Popularity allows leaders to
tolerate internal disagreements without much fear of domestic retribution. Finally, high-
levels of controversy are likely to lead to direct politicization. As with rising levels of
attentiveness, policymakers do not have the luxury to rely on time-consuming, indirect
methods of manipulating intelligence. They are more likely to act swiftly to mitigate the
effects of controversy, sustain the consensus, and avoid having to pay critical costs.
As with the last hypothesis, disconfirming evidence would include prominent
cases of politicization surrounding uncontroversial issues, or a lack of any empirical
relationship between controversy and direct politicization.
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Table 3. Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis Predictions Disconfirming data
H1. Public 1. Politicization will occur after 1. Policymakers politicize
commitment leaders make public commitments, intelligence before they commit to
but not before. specific policies, or in the absence of
any public commitments.
2. More specific commitments will
lead to more direct efforts to 2. The level of specificity is not
politicize intelligence, associated with the type of
politicization.
H2. Activation of 1. Politicization will occur after the 1. Politicization occurs before the
a critical emergence of a critical emergence of a critical constituency.
constituency constituency, but not before.
2. The magnitude of the political cost
2. Visible demonstrations of a is not associated with the type of
group's power to levy costs will politicization.
lead to politicization.
3. The greater the potential cost, the
more likely policymakers will rely
on direct politicization.
H3. Attentiveness 1. Politicization occurs after 1. Direct politicization occurs on
and type of domestic constituencies become issues that are out of the spotlight.
politicization highly attentive to specific issues,
but not before. 2. There is no empirical relationship
between the level of attentiveness
2. High levels of attentiveness are and the type of politicization.
associated with direct politicization,
but not with manipulation-by-
appointment.
1. Moderate levels of controversy 1. Direct politicization occurs on
H4. Controversy are associated with indirect moderately controversial issues.
and type of politicization or manipulation by
politicization appointment. 2. There is no empirical relationship
between the level of controversy and
2. High levels of controversy are the type of politicization.
associated with direct politicization.
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Summary
Politicization is likely when leaders have publicly committed to controversial
policies. Leaders invoke the possibility of domestic punishment in these cases. Going
public raises the specter of political costs because it activates domestic opposition and
reduces policy flexibility. Efforts to back away from public commitments create the
appearance of irresolute leadership. Lining up a consensus of national security agencies
in support of policy decisions is a powerful way to convince skeptical domestic audiences
of the wisdom of policy decisions. Intelligence agencies are especially important because
their access to secret information offers a special sense of authoritativeness to their
judgments. If intelligence agencies threaten to break from the public consensus, then
policymakers have strong incentives to force their cooperation.
The incentives to manipulate intelligence also depend on whether one or more
critical constituencies have emerged against policy decisions. Critical constituencies are
domestic groups that can plausibly threaten the success of policy or the career of the
policymaker. They include the voting public, the legislator, political parties, and single-
issue constituencies. These groups can impose a number of costs, from undermining
specific policy initiatives to voting elected officials out of office. Policymakers monitor
critical constituencies for signs of opposition and try to shore up domestic support in
order to avoid paying domestic penalties. Politicization occurs because policymakers
believe that intelligence agencies are unwilling to help. The combination of critical costs
and uncooperative intelligence is the basic recipe for politicization. On the other hand,
when anticipated costs are low, then policymakers can accept or ignore intelligence at
their leisure.
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Several empirical hypotheses follow from the oversell model of politicization.
The first pair of hypotheses deals with the occurrence of politicization:
H1. Politicization is more likely after policymakers have publicly committed to
specific positions.
H2. Politicization requires the activation of at least one critical audience that can
impose substantial political costs.
The next pair specifies the conditions leading to different types of politicization:
H3. High-profile issues that generate wide attention are more prone to direct
politicization than low-profile issues.
H4. Controversial issues are more prone to direct politicization than
uncontroversial issues.
Each of these hypotheses is falsifiable. The general null hypothesis is:
Ho. Domestic political pressures do not cause politicization. The risk of incurring
domestic political costs does not affect how leaders interact with intelligence
agencies.
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Chapter 4
The Johnson Administration, the CIA, and Vietnam
Intelligence-policy relations varied enormously during the Vietnam War. In 1964
President Lyndon Johnson requested an analysis of the logic of American intervention,
and then ignored its conclusions. The Board of National Estimates (BNE) wrote that the
prevailing domino theory was intellectually bankrupt and that the American position in
Asia did not depend on the defense of South Vietnam. A concurrent analysis from BNE
went further, arguing that global strategic trends favored a conservative foreign policy.
The fissures in the communist world showed no sign of abating, and the Western alliance
was proving to be remarkably robust. These trends meant that the United States did not
need to undertake risky ventures in order to shore up containment, especially in areas of
no obvious strategic value. Both analyses threw cold water on U.S. strategy in Vietnam,
and both were ignored. In 1967, however, the Johnson administration actively pressured
the CIA to revise its estimate of the size of the enemy in Vietnam. The Agency
calculated that the existing order of battle (OB) grossly underrated enemy strength,
meaning that the war of attrition was not going well for the United States. This was
unacceptable to the White House, which pressured the CIA to stifle its dissent and sign
on to the official estimate. In only three years, the defining characteristic of intelligence-
policy relations had changed from neglect to politicization. This chapter explains why.
Drawing on the oversell model, it argues that extraordinary changes in domestic politics
created strong incentives for policymakers to manufacture an image of consensus support
for their Vietnam policy. When the CIA threatened this consensus, the administration
pressured Agency officials to toe the line.
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The oversell model predicts that politicization will occur when two factors
converge. First, leaders must make public policy commitments. Taking this kind of
stand creates substantial political costs for changing course later, giving committed
policymakers strong incentives to stay the course. Second, the issue at stake must gain
the attention of one or more critical constituencies. Trivial matters are unlikely to rouse
strong feelings one way or the other, and policymakers can be far more flexible in their
approach to intelligence. When issues become controversial, however, policymakers
oversell their plans by presenting an image of consensus within the national security
establishment. In terms of intelligence-policy relations, this means pressuring
intelligence agencies to provide analyses that support existing policy commitments.
Both factors came into play in the period between the delivery of the BNE memos
and the OB controversy. The White House was far more committed to success in
Vietnam in 1967 than it had been three years earlier. While Johnson was committed to
the protection of South Vietnam, he had not set the United States on a firm course of
military escalation before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August 1964. The White
House was serious about preventing the spread of communism in East Asia, but it had not
determined the size and substance of the U.S. response. At the same time, the public
remained broadly ignorant and ambivalent about U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, and no
other critical constituency posed a serious problem for the administration. Congress
adhered to the principle that the president deserved considerable leeway in foreign policy,
especially regarding efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Democrats also gave the
president considerable flexibility, because they did not want to risk splitting the party in
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an election year. And while there was some public opposition to American intervention,
no serious antiwar movement existed to threaten the president or his policy objectives.
The risk of incurring serious political costs had risen substantially by 1967. By
this time Johnson was firmly committed to winning in Vietnam and had sunk
considerable effort into the war. Vietnam had become a critical public issue; debate was
heated and virulent. Changing direction would have infuriated pro-war Republicans and
split the Democratic Party. The media magnified the potential costs because it was much
more skeptical of the war effort and more willing to challenge the White House. It
provided a loud and sustained voice to critics and made it more difficult for the president
to parry their arguments. The risk was also higher because reducing the U.S. presence in
Vietnam would have constituted a radical admission that Johnson's earlier policy was a
strategic disaster. His freedom of action so constrained, the president sought to justify a
strategy of attrition by manufacturing consensus support from the national security
establishment. The White House launched an intensive public relations campaign to
convince domestic skeptics that enemy strength was eroding, and that victory was in
sight. Accepting or ignoring contrary intelligence reports was impossible in these
circumstances.
This chapter has three sections. The first evaluates the White House-CIA
relationship up to June 1964, and explains why policymakers were free to accept or
ignore intelligence without fear of domestic consequences. The second deals with the
1967 order of battle controversy, showing how the variables in the oversell model
combined to give policymakers strong incentives to manipulate intelligence. The last
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section shows why the model is superior to plausible explanations based on the personal
proximity hypothesis and individual psychology.
1964: The Domino Theory
During the early 1960s the United States stepped up efforts to assist the South
Vietnamese government against guerillas intent on unifying the country under communist
rule. The guerillas enjoyed nationalist prestige from their efforts to oust the French from
Indochina, as well as material support from Hanoi. The task of governing South Vietnam
was complicated by substantial religious hostility between ruling Catholics and
Buddhists, who made up the majority of the population. Ham-fisted and repressive
efforts to marginalize the Buddhists exacerbated the situation and made it more difficult
to maintain political stability. Indeed, while the North Vietnamese government
consolidated power, the harsh tactics employed by the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in Saigon
slowly undermined its legitimacy. American planners became increasingly concerned
about unification, fearing that the loss of South Vietnam would represent a dangerous
expansion of communist ideology and Soviet influence over world politics.
The insurgency in South Vietnam had thus become a small part of a larger zero-
sum game, in which Soviet gains necessarily meant proportional U.S. losses. American
fears were captured in the metaphor of falling dominoes: the failure to support pro-
American regimes would cause more countries to "go communist" and increase Soviet
power. By the early 1960s two versions of the domino theory had emerged, both of which
were used to justify U.S. intervention in the Third World. The first version, called the
territorial domino theory, held that success in local conflicts would encourage
communists in neighboring countries to revolt against non-communist governments.
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Fledging regimes needed American support in order to withstand internal and external
pressures. Failing to aid non-communist governments would put them at risk, eventually
resulting in the steady geographic expansion of communism. The loss of South Vietnam
would put at risk the neutral governments of Laos and Cambodia, which would then put
pressure on Thailand, Malaysia, and so on. A cascade of losses would create new
opportunities for the Soviet Union and China to exert regional influence and, ipso facto,
weaken U.S. power.
The second version had more to do with credibility than geography. In this
conception of the domino theory, the failure to stand up to communist insurgencies in the
third world would reduce faith among allies that the United States was committed to their
protection. The allies understood that Vietnam was not strategically vital territory, and
that its neighbors were not essential for the defense of Western Europe. But Vietnam was
a test of U.S. willpower, and U.S. intervention was a demonstration of resolve.
According to this argument, if the United States was willing to fight for Vietnam, then
surely it would fight for Western Europe. Washington was also concerned about its
reputation with the Soviet Union. The failure to appear resolute would encourage
Moscow to expand its reach in other areas of the world. Credibility was essential with
allies and enemies alike, and was to be established by drawing the line in a peripheral
country. This has been called the psychological domino theory.1
1 The phrase "psychological domino theory" was introduced by Jonathan Schell in 1976. Fredrik Logevall
uses that phrase interchangeably with "doctrine of credibility." More recently, Daryl Press has written
about the "past actions" theory of credibility, which holds that a state's credibility is a function of its
demonstrated willingness to make good on threats and promises in previous confrontations. Jonathan
Schell, The Time ofIllusion (New York: Vintage Books, 1975); Frederik Logevall, Choosing War. The
Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1999), p. 31; and Daryl Press, "The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats During the 'Appeasement'
Crises of the 1930s," International Security, Vol. No. 3 (Winter 2004-2005), pp. 136-169.
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In his history of Vietnam decision making, Frederik Logevall argues that the
territorial domino theory had been supplanted by concerns over credibility by the early
1960s. According to this argument, strategists in the Kennedy and Johnson
administration had moved beyond the simplistic metaphor of falling dominoes to
something more sophisticated but harder to measure. In November 1961, for example,
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk reported that
"the loss of South Vietnam would... undermine the credibility of American commitments
elsewhere." 2 While there is no doubt that Washington cared about maintaining
credibility, the record does not support the claim that this concern had replaced the
traditional fear of the geographic expansion of communism. Policymakers continually
relied on the logic of the territorial domino theory in public and in their internal
deliberations. 3
Examples abound. In July 1963 Kennedy told reporters, "We are not going to
withdraw from (this) effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw would mean a collapse not
only of South Vietnam, but of Southeast Asia." 4 When asked again in September about
the reality of the domino theory, he simply repeated, "I believe it. I believe it." 5
President Johnson shared these sentiments upon taking office, as did his chief advisors.
In a memo to the president in January 1964, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy
rattled off the consequences of failure, which included "neutrality in Thailand, and
increased influence for Hanoi and Peking... Collapse of the anti-Communist position in
Laos...Heavy pressure on Malaya and Malaysia...A shift toward neutrality in Japan and
2 Logevall, Choosing War, p. 31.
3 The Pentagon Papers, New York Times edition (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), pp. 254-255.
4 Logevall, Choosing War, p. 38.
5 Logevall, Choosing War, p. 52.
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the Philippines... (and) blows to U.S. prestige in South Korea and Taiwan which would
require compensating increases in American commitment there - or else further retreat." 6
Walt W. Rostow, who would later succeed Bundy as NSA, also alerted Johnson to the
"spread of neutralist thought in Thailand as well as Cambodia." 7 JCS chairman Maxwell
Taylor warned McNamara in January that losing Vietnam would have terrible effects on
the rest of the region, damaging morale and the ability to resist communism in "Burma,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of the
Philippines."8 McNamara took this to heart, telling the House Armed Services
Committee a few days later that "the survival of an independent government in South
Vietnam is so important to the security of all of Southeast Asia and to the Free World that
I can conceive of no alternative other than to take all necessary measures within our
capability to prevent a Communist victory." 9 The U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam,
Henry Cabot Lodge, echoed this argument in a February cable to Washington. "It starts a
line of thinking which runs: 'It was Laos last year; this year it will be Cambodia; and next
year it will be us.' Obviously such thinking does not make for bravery and for hard
fighting."' l
By the early summer the territorial domino theory had become doctrinaire. In
June 1964 the State Department issued the following guidance: "Our point of departure is
and must be that we cannot accept the overrunning of Southeast Asia by Hanoi and
6 Logevall, Choosing War, pp. 76-77.
7 Logevall, Choosing War, pp. 92-93.
8 Taylor to McNamara, "Vietnam and Southeast Asia," January 22, 1964, in Pentagon Papers, pp. 274-277.
See also David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 295-296.
9 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 296.
10 Logevall, Choosing War, p. 116.
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Peiping."" And in a draft speech for Johnson in July, McGeorge Bundy wrote that if
South Vietnam was lost, "The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced
by a great flanking movement...(losing) would set in motion a crumbling process that
could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom." 12
Both variants of the domino theory influenced strategy in the early part of the
decade. In fact, they were mutually reinforcing. The fear of territorial dominoes falling
reinforced the fear that the United States would lose credibility with other allies. The
"loss" of China in 1949 was bad enough; losing Vietnam would have further weakened
perceptions of American resolve. By this logic, American credibility writ large would
erode in direct proportion to the number of states that it allowed to come under
communist control. This partly explains why the Kennedy administration was willing to
tolerate a neutral Laos, despite lingering suspicions that neutralism was only a prelude to
communism, but not Vietnam. It also explains why the Johnson administration was not
open to any negotiated settlement that might have suggested a lack of American resolve,
despite grave doubts about the ability to stabilize the government in Saigon and prevail in
the war. In a telling conversation between the President and Senator Richard Russell,
Johnson revealed his concerns that Vietnam might end up resembling the bloody Korean
stalemate. But in the same breath he declared, "If you start running from the
Communists they just chase you right into the kitchen."' 3
The White House also recognized the domino theory's power to persuade. On
May 26 Bundy drew up talking points for the President's meeting with Republican
" Logevell, Choosing War, p. 148.
12 McGeorge Bundy, Draft speech for the president, July 9, 1964, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Files
of McGeorge Bundy, Box 3.
13 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 319.
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Senators, which also included briefings by Rusk, McNamara, and DCI John McCone. He
urged Johnson to "emphasize in opening the meeting that while in one sense these are
small scale problems involving small scale countries, and while each country and even
each province has a separate set of tricky questions... nevertheless what is at stake
overall is whether the Communists will take over Southeast Asia - by a process of
subversion and terror and general nibbling." The "larger framework" of the war, Bundy
wrote, was "the future of Southeast Asia." 14 This rhetorical flourish would be repeated in
public and private throughout the summer. On May 28 Johnson told Sen. Russell that
losing of South Vietnam would cause other Asian states to fall."5 On June 2 the president
justified American policy by alluding to the domino thesis. "We are concerned," he
declared, "for a whole great geographic area, not simply for specific complex problems in
specific countries...the issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole." He repeated
these words, verbatim, on June 23 and August 5.16
The domino theory influenced policy decisions as much as it colored White
House rhetoric. During his first full year in office Johnson took an increasingly tough
line against local communists and fellow travelers. He was unwilling to court the
Indonesian leader Sukarno; he appointed the reliably conservative Tom Mann to head the
Latin America desk at the State Department; and he tacitly approved of the Brazilian
coup in March that deposed the democratically elected but leftist government. 17
Concerns about communist expansion into the third world clearly had an affect on policy
14 "Memorandum for the President: Talking Points at 4:30 Meeting with Republican Senators, May 26,
1964," LBJ Papers, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 4, Box 1.
Emphasis in original.
15 Kaiser, American Tragedy, pl. 320.16 Public Papers of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson (Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office, 1965), pp. 733-734, 803-804, and 930-932.
'7 Kaiser, American Tragedy, pp. 312-313.
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in the crucial period between the Kennedy assassination and the major escalation of the
Vietnam War in 1965. The fear of falling dominoes motivated the president more than
any other strategic assumption. As a result, any criticism of the domino theory was also a
direct challenge to US foreign policy.
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288, which defined the Johnson
administration's position on Vietnam and set the course for escalation, was written with the
domino theory firmly in mind. The document was largely derived from a report written by
McNamara after a trip to Vietnam in March, and was supplemented by a report by
Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy. Bundy explicitly relied on domino logic.
Losing Vietnam, he wrote, would lead to "the 'accommodation' of Burma, fall of Malaysia
and probably Indonesia, and increased threats to Thailand, the Philippines, India, Australia,
and New Zealand, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan."1 8 The final version of NSAM 288 was
equally clear about why it was so important to prevent a communist victory:
We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam... Unless we can
achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will
probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U.S.
and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of
forces not now explicitly communist but likely then to become so
(Indonesia taking over Malaysia).
But that was not all. A communist victory in South Vietnam would foreshadow the spread
of communism throughout Asia.
Thailand might hold for a period with our help, but would be under grave
pressure. Even the Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to
India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan,
Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased.
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Although this was not the first time that domino logic had been used to justify U.S.
actions, NSAM 288 codified the domino thesis as the foundation of White House policy
on Vietnam.19 It was the most unambiguous statement of American objectives in the
Johnson administration, offering sweeping support for the South Vietnamese government
that led to an immediate increase in military and economic aid. Although the exact
nature of intervention was still open to interpretation, it tacitly removed diplomatic
solutions from the table and sharply narrowed the debate over U.S. policy.2 0 The
president himself argued in the NSC that the course outlined in NSAM 288 was the "only
realistic alternative" in Vietnam. He explicitly ruled out withdrawal or neutralization,
and argued that graduated overt pressure would have "the maximum effectiveness with
the minimum loss."21
NSAM 288 was not optimistic about the situation on the ground. McNamara
described in some detail the weakness of the Khanh regime and the apathy of the civilian
population. The South Vietnamese army (ARVN) suffered from high desertion rates and
low morale. The Vietcong (VC) controlled large areas of the countryside and the Khanh
government in Saigon had little popular appeal. While McNamara was not fatalistic, he
stressed the need to act more aggressively in order to shore up the government and turn
the tide in the war. To this end, NSAM 288 called for MACV and ARVN to retaliate
19 In 1961 Johnson had warned that communist advances in Asia could make "the vast Pacific...a Red Sea."
Quoted in Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and
Policy (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1973), p. 461.
20 For arguments about the critical nature of NSAM 288, see Robert L. Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor:
The Politics ofAmerican Military Policy in Viet-Nam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975), pp. 35-43; Logevall, Choosing War, p. 129; George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United
States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), pp. 138-139; The Pentagon Papers,
Gravel edition (Boston, MA: Beacon Press), Vol. 3, p. 50; and David Halberstam, The Best and the
Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 353-355.
21 "Summary Record of the National Security Council Meeting No. 524, March 17, 1964, 12:00 Noon -
Report of Secretary McNamara's trip to Vietnam," LBJ Papers, National Security File, NSC Meeting File,
Box 1, Set III, Tab 5.
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against North Vietnamese actions by mining its harbors and bombing selected targets,
and to prepare for a program of "graduated overt pressure" against the north, which
included air strikes military and industrial sites. These actions carried the risk of Chinese
intervention, a point not lost on McNamara. NSAM 288 also ordered US representatives
to "make it emphatically clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support for
as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control." Given the manifest weakness
of the Khanh regime and the apparent strength of the VC, it was likely that a larger
American presence would be needed to make good on that promise. The White House
was laying the foundation for escalation, both in the scope of the fighting and the degree
of US involvement. The logical impetus for this decision was the continuing belief in the
domino theory.
But this was not yet public. Because the president had not made a specific
commitment about U.S. intervention, he retained considerable policy flexibility. As
discussed in detail below, the domestic political environment also afforded him
considerable freedom of maneuver. No critical constituency would have vigorously
opposed any of his basic policy options: maintaining the status quo, increasing the scope
and pace of operations, or scaling back the US presence and seeking a negotiated
settlement.
Two estimates. NSAM 288 made clear that the Saigon government was in fairly
desperate shape. The successors to Ngo Dinh Diem were not equipped to deal with the
continuing ethnic and religious tensions in the country. Nor were they able to make the
government more efficient and less corrupt. The White House recognized that success
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ultimately required a stable and functioning government, but it harbored no illusions
about the tortured politics of South Vietnam. While NSAM 288 called for a larger
American effort to shore up the regime, the president expressed serious doubts about the
prospects for victory and the wisdom of staying in the fight. He also feared that Vietnam
might endanger his ambitious domestic agenda. "What the hell is Vietnam worth to me?"
he pleaded to Bundy. "What is it worth to this country?" 22 These doubts were overcome
by a strongly held anti-communism and the advice of key staffers, almost all of whom
agreed about the need to make a stand, despite their concerns about the fledgling
government in Saigon.23 Backing down was difficult to contemplate as long as the
domino theory held sway.
Johnson's reservations about the war appear to have caused him to reconsider
direction of policy. Events also forced the issue. On June 5 a Navy reconnaissance plane
was shot down over Laos, leading to an emergency meeting to discuss the U.S. response.
Johnson's advisors unanimously recommended that fighters accompany subsequent
reconnaissance missions. Moreover, all agreed that the escorts should have the order to
return fire. Johnson understood the potential for escalation if a dogfight took place,
pointedly asking his advisors, "(W)hat comes next?" According to CIA director John
McCone, "This question - the most important question raised in the meeting - remained
unanswered." Johnson had once again posed a fundamental question underlying the
22 Quoted in Logevall, Choosing War, p. 145.
23 Bundy was especially important in this regard, reassuring the president there was "of course no division
within the Government that enlarged aid to Vietnam is necessary." "Memorandum to the President: Joint
Meeting of the Bipartisan Leaders and the National Security Council at 12:00 noon today," May 15, 1964,
LBJ Papers, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Box 2, Chron File, May 1-15, 1964.
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piecemeal evolution of US strategy in the spring of 1964. But neither the president nor
his advisors were eager to answer it.24
Stuck between his anticommunist convictions and his doubts about the prospects
for success, the president set out to reassess his options. He also appears to have
undergone some soul searching about the logic of intervention. In late May Johnson
asked McCone for an analysis of the domino theory. Because this was the theoretical
foundation for US involvement, the request was anything but trivial. McCone tasked the
job to the Board of National Estimates, the premier analytical body in the intelligence
community at the time. The memo was signed by BNE Chairman Sherman Kent, a
veteran analyst who cut a prestigious figure in the CIA. On June 9 he delivered the BNE
response to McCone, who in turn circulated it to key policymakers.
The Board concluded that the territorial domino theory was wrong. It began by
stating explicitly the basic assumption it was supposed to address. "The 'domino
effect'," it wrote, "appears to mean that when one nation falls to communism the impact
is such as to weaken the resistance of other countries and facilitate, if not cause, their fall
to communism." The Board then confronted the fundamental logic of NSAM 288:
We do not believe that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos would be
followed by the rapid, successive communization of the other states of the
Far East...With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no
nation in the area would quickly succumb to communism as a result of the
fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread
of communism would not be inexorable, and any spread which did occur
would take time-time in which the total situation might change in any of a
number of ways unfavorable to the Communist cause.
McNamara's dire warnings looked less worrisome under the scrutiny of the BNE. The loss
of Vietnam would not threaten the U.S. position in the region because American strength
24 "Memorandum for the Record: Meeting of the Executive Committee with the President," June 6, 1964,
LBJ Papers, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, Box 1.
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rested on its network of offshore military bases; the Asian mainland was far less important
to U.S. grand strategy. "US military power in the Far East is based on the chain of islands
from the Philippines to Japan, not on the Asian mainland. As long as the US can
effectively operate from these bases, it will probably still be able to deter (Beijing) and
Hanoi from overt military aggression." 25
The Board did not recommend a withdrawal from Vietnam. Although it criticized
the territorial domino theory, it judged that Vietnam had become a credibility test for the
United States, which needed to protect its prestige with allies. Losing Vietnam would
reduce credibility in other parts of the world, especially since the United States had
guaranteed the defense of non-communist Southeast Asia. BNE also suggested that the
loss of South Vietnam might boost Chinese confidence and "encourage and strengthen the
more activist revolutionary movements in various parts of the underdeveloped world." The
BNE did not make a policy recommendation, but its conclusions about American
credibility justified the slowly evolving decision to escalate the war.
However, the Board was not finished. On June 8, a BNE analyst named Willard
Matthias delivered a wide ranging analysis of "Trends in the World Situation." 26 The
paper summarized a series of changes in the strategic balance over the previous decade
that had made nuclear deterrence stable and lessened the strategic value of the third
25 "Memorandum From the Board of National Estimates to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone),"
in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vietnam 1964, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 484-487.
26 "Trends in the World Situation," June 8, 1964, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Agency File 11-2,
CIA. In his memoirs, Matthias refers to the analysis as the "estimate that changed the world," noting that it
made headlines when it was leaked to the press in late August. In fact, the estimate had no obvious impact,
and the Johnson Administration had little problem dealing with its revelation. The day after the Chicago
Tribune announced that it had secured a copy, the State Department made copies available to the rest of the
press corps. The story died shortly thereafter. Moreover, U.S. newspapers were far less interested in the
memo than their international counterparts. Willard C. Matthias, America's Strategic Blunders:
Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2001), pp. 195-216.
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world. Communist states were drifting apart because of doctrinal differences and
because of the centrifugal forces of nationalism. The Soviet Union and China had little
chance of increasing influence in Southeast Asia because regional leaders were not
interested in taking orders from outside powers. Matthias thus took dead aim at the
domino theory, even though he did not use the term. His memo went further than the
BNE estimate because it challenged both variants on the theory. A communist victory in
South Vietnam would not mean the inexorable spread of communism in Southeast Asia,
nor would it reduce American credibility with allies in other parts of the world.
Matthias argued that the Soviet Union and the United States had reached the point
of diminishing returns from the strategic arms race. Because of their destructive power,
nuclear weapons were unsatisfying for anything besides mutual deterrence. As a result,
both sides were continuing to arms race for the sake of maintaining the balance alone. In
addition, the early signs of Soviet adventurism had been moderated by the events of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, when President Kennedy proved to be surprisingly steadfast. This
humbling experience was likely to carry over for some time, reducing the chance that the
Soviet Union would challenge the United States. The chance of a great power
confrontation was low. Moreover, Matthias wrote, the basic character of bipolarity was
changing. The strict ideological division between the communist and non-communist
alliances was no longer valid, because the community of communist states was breaking
apart. The Sino-Soviet split put to rest the previous fears of a monolithic communist
empire held together by a universal ideology and directed from Moscow. Dissatisfaction
in East Europe, the availability of Castroism as an alternative in Latin America, and
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North Vietnam's uneasy relationship with Beijing all spoke to the breakdown in relations
among communist states.
Economic problems in the Soviet Union and China also made aggressive
expansion unlikely. Where the Soviet Union had once been an inspiration to other
revolutionary movements, its failure to manage agricultural policy put it in the
humiliating position of having to negotiate wheat purchases and long term credit from
western countries. China's problems were far worse, and the regime was forced by
necessity to turn its attention inward. In both cases, the increasing size and complexity of
domestic economies were too much for central planners. Moscow sought better relations
with Washington partly because of its economic difficulties, causing other communist
countries to question its commitment to Marxist principles. The Soviet claim to doctrinal
supremacy was fading, and although it still held considerable influence, its authority by
1964 was "greatly diminished." These ideological fissures were compounded by rising
nationalism, Matthias wrote, and communist leaders were increasingly forced to
"conform their doctrinal positions and their policies to the historic national policies of
their states." 27 This was especially the case in Southeast Asia, where local leaders were
developing independent power bases and were less willing to take orders. The
centrifugal forces of history and nationalism weakened the ties of ideology. 28
These forces were contrary to the domino theory, which presupposed control from
the center. While domino theorists held that the emergence of communism around the
world was proof of Moscow's growing influence, Matthias argued the opposite. Instead
of expecting the Soviet Union to cultivate regional communist parties and exploit
27 "Trends in the World Situation," pp. 11-12.
28 For a later argument along these lines, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins ofAlliances (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1987).
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regional rebellions to expand its power, he predicted that regional leaders would instigate
crises that would eventually draw in the external powers. In one remarkably prescient
passage, he wrote that "Once outside powers do become involved, whether accidentally
or by design, crises can develop which will engage their prestige to a degree
incommensurate with the intrinsic or strategic value of the area itself."29 In the West,
meanwhile, leftist parties were becoming more moderate. Revolutionary politics had
become less attractive as welfare policies were enacted. Rising prosperity, especially as a
result of the European Common Market, also took the air out of calls for radical change.
The Soviet bloc was losing ideological unity and discipline, while the West was settling
into a more robust status quo.
Matthias found that European leaders were baffled by Washington's fixation on
Southeast Asia, and concerned that it might be drawn into costly and extended disputes in
the third world. While they agreed about the importance of containing Soviet power,
they held vastly different ideas about what containment meant. NATO allies thought in
terms of deterring Soviet moves into Europe, and described other conflicts as peripheral.
As a result, they worried that "the US makes too much of Latin American, African, and
far Eastern problems, that it overdramatizes them and makes them more significant than
they really are, and that steps should be taken to minimize, to quiet, or to neutralize
them." 30 While the Johnson Administration worried that Vietnam was a test of
credibility, the allies thought of Vietnam as a dangerous sideshow.
All of these conclusions cut against the domino theory and the rationale for
intervening in Vietnam. Unlike the first BNE memo, Matthias did not leave
29 "Trends in the World Situation," p. 43.
30 "Trends in the World Situation," pp. 22-23.
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policymakers an obvious way out. Neither variant of the domino theory held up under
close inspection. Territorial dominoes were unlikely to fall, and nationalist forces were
making it increasingly difficult for Soviet Union to control its clients. Credibility with
the allies was not at stake, and NATO members were not impressed by Washington's
commitment to a corrupt regime in a distant country. The U.S. deterrent was already
large and credible, and inherent problems confronting in the communist world was likely
to erode its relative power over time. To put a cap on the argument, Matthias reported
that the political and military situation in South Vietnam was already dire. He did not
mince words: "There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation
remains very fragile." The best that Washington could hope for was a "prolonged
stalemate," and only then after a significant increase in material support. In sum, the
United States had no pressing interest in Vietnam, and little chance of success.31
Despite these conclusions, neither of the BNE memos had any impact. The
historical record strongly suggests that they were simply ignored and left out of policy
deliberations. DCI John McCone, who kept copious notes of his meetings with
policymakers, makes no mention of the BNE or the Matthias memos in subsequent
discussions with Johnson and the NSC. McGeorge Bundy similarly failed to mention the
analyses, despite the large volume of memos he sent to Johnson on all topics dealing with
national security. Other archival records, secondary source histories, and memoirs are
strikingly silent. 32 Instead of revisiting the assumptions upon which policy was based,
31 "Trends in the World Situation," pp. 35-36.
32 McNamara's memoir is one exception. In it he cites the first BNE memo, quoting its conclusion about
the effects of losing in Vietnam on U.S. credibility. This conclusion "seemed to confirm my and others'
fear - misplaced in retrospect, but no less real and true at the time - that the West's containment policy lay
at serious risk in Vietnam." It is noteworthy, however, that he leaves out any discussion of the part of the
memo that explicitly argues against the territorial domino theory. His description thus leaves readers with a
misleading and incomplete understanding of its conclusions. McNamara ignores the Matthias memo
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the administration fixated on the practical difficulty of standing firm in Vietnam without
becoming mired in a military stalemate, and on the political difficulty of appearing to
stand firm against communism without making Vietnam a key issue on the presidential
campaign. Instead of dealing with the basic logical problems of intervention, the
president focused on minutiae, cajoling his advisors to reach agreement on specific plans
for Vietnam.33 There is also nothing to indicate that top advisors paused to consider the
broader strategic implications of the BNE memos. They focused on day-to-day
problems: morale in South Vietnam, the stability of the Khanh regime in Saigon, and
questions about whether dramatic military actions might improve the situation. They
remained convinced of the necessity of U.S. intervention, despite the fact that the most
prestigious analytical outfit in the intelligence community was suggesting otherwise.
Explaining neglect. The oversell model predicts that politicization is likely
when leaders make public policy commitments in the presence of at least one critical
constituency. Neither condition attained in 1964. President Johnson carefully avoided
making a firm commitment to U.S. intervention in Vietnam, and the domestic political
environment was very favorable. Thus the White House had no incentive to politicize the
Board of National Estimates, even though its analyses directly challenged the direction of
administration policy.
entirely. See Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Random
House, 1995), pp. 124-125.
33 On May 24 Johnson expressed impatience with his advisors on their inability to settle on a course of
action. A month later he again complained that "many ideas and recommendations.., had not been carried
out by actions." "Memorandum for the Record: Discussion at Dinner at the White House on Sunday night,
May 24," May 25, 1964, LBJ Papers, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, Box 1;
"Memorandum for the Record: Discussion on Southeast Asia- 6:00 PM - 25 June 1964," June 26, 1964,
LBJ Papers, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, Box 1.
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Commitment. In 1964 President Johnson carefully avoided making specific
commitments regarding strategy towards Vietnam. He voiced pro forma statements of
support for the Khanh government and offered generic pledges to prevent the expansion
of communism, but never explicitly outlined how the United States intended to shore up
the Saigon regime, stop the infiltration of North Vietnamese men and materiel, and quell
the insurgency in the South. Upon taking office, Johnson was inwardly convinced of the
need to preserve a non-communist South Vietnam, but also fearful about the prospects for
success and wary about committing additional US capabilities to the war. The increasing
pace of VC attacks made the issue more pressing. On December 20, 1963, McNamara
warned the President that the "situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless
reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a
Communist-controlled state." 34 The military and CIA began to outline a range of plans
to change the state of play, from minor propaganda to strategic bombing. The president
viewed these recommendations in January, but only approved small-scale and plausibly
deniable operations, while reserving judgment on bombing and other overt missions.
Johnson sought a "third way" between withdrawal and escalation, and anxiously withheld
his views for as long as possible in order to avoid having his hands tied.35 He warned his
advisors against leaking specific details of policy discussions, preferring to issue anodyne
statements that rejected both a negotiated settlement and an increase in the size of the US
presence.36 The policy documents that began to lay the groundwork for escalation later,
including NSAM 288, were classified. Deliberations about U.S. strategy remained
private.
34 Quoted in Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 292.
35 Logevall, Choosing War, p. 114; and Kaiser, American Tragedy, pp. 290-294.
36 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 304.
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To be sure, the White House anticipated the need to cultivate public and
congressional support for the war. Recognizing that it would need to mobilize support
once it made a firmer commitment, officials spent a good part of the spring and summer
developing a pubic relations campaign on the Hill and in public. But the administration
made little effort to forge a consensus behind US foreign policy in Vietnam before the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution in early August. It chose instead to chart a middle course,
understanding that this would suffice as long as Vietnam was only a passing public
interest. The formal public relations effort did not begin until late June, weeks after the
BNE delivered its memos to the White House. 37
While the White House kept its options open, Republican presidential candidate
Barry Goldwater tried to bait Johnson into taking a firmer stance on the war. He berated
the administration for pledging to contain the communists instead of going all out for
victory. Indecisiveness would lead to stalemate at best, and Goldwater reminded voters
that the responsibility for failure would be "placed squarely in the laps of those twin
commanders of chaos, Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert S. McNamara." 38 Republican
congressmen picked up this theme, hammering Johnson for what they called a policy of
"uncertainty and confusion." 39 But the GOP gained very little from these attacks. If
anything, the public viewed Johnson as a moderate alternative to his rival. Because of
Goldwater's overheated rhetoric - he once suggested the use of nuclear weapons as a
37 Preparatory work started in the spring, when officials started circulating draft congressional resolutions
authorizing the use of force in Vietnam. The domestic public relations campaign formally began in late
June, after the delivery of the BNE and Matthias memos. Asst. Secretary of State for Public Affairs Robert
Manning oversaw the campaign, which was codified in NSAM 308. Manning and his team "worked the
home front" in a "massive" campaign to shape domestic opinion to shore up commitment. For an early
draft of a congressional resolution, see "Draft Resolution for On the public relations campaign, see
Logevall, Choosing War, p. 155.
38 Terry Dietz, Republicans and Vietnam, 1961-1968 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 64.
39 Dietz, Republicans and Vietnam, pp. 59-67.
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defoliant in Vietnam - Johnson's reluctance to offer a specific strategy appeared sober
and judicious. In practice this ensured that the public understanding of American policy
in Vietnam would not be any more sophisticated than it had been when he first took
office. It also helped foster the myth that the president was simply continuing the policy
of his predecessors. When challenged on the war, Johnson simply pointed to statements
made by Eisenhower and Kennedy about the need to stand up for a non-Communist
South Vietnam.40 This created the illusion of policy continuity, despite the fact that the
administration was debating various escalatory steps behind closed doors. "We are
where we were Nov. 22," Johnson scribbled to a press aid. 41
Although NSAM 288 laid the groundwork for escalation, the president was
genuinely ambivalent about the war. The stream of pessimistic reports on the Khanh
regime certainly contributed to his misgivings. The government had not been able to
shake the legacy of the Diem years, and by late May it was far from certain that any
viable leader existed in the South. At the same time, the communist party was able to
40 For a representative example, see McGeorge Bundy, "Draft speech for the president," LBJ Papers,
National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Box 3. Johnson's declarations of continuity were
misleading because they covered up the actions that had been taken in the spring, such as the acceptance of
NSAM 288. But in another sense he was correct, because Kennedy's position on Vietnam had also been
ambiguous. Kennedy spoke strongly about containing communism and preserving a non-communist South
Vietnam, but vacillated on the size and purpose of American forces in country. When Sen. Mike Mansfield
argued for "vigorous diplomacy" instead of military escalation, Kennedy reportedly told aides that he
agreed. Near the end of 1963 he began to suggest drawing down troop levels, removing 1000 by the end of
1964 with the goal of withdrawing entirely by the end of 1965. These decisions, however, were predicated
on the emergence of a stable government in Saigon that could wage the war on its own. Thus Kennedy was
of two minds on Vietnam. On the one hand, he sought to reduce the American commitment in a country of
little strategic value. On the other, predicating withdrawal on the emergence of a stable regime made
withdrawal basically impossible. Kennedy was uninterested in perpetuating the war, but he was unwilling
to accept the consequences of failure. Johnson faced the same dilemma in 1964, and came to the same
muddled conclusion. On Kennedy, see Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 284; and Logevall, Choosing War, p.
38.
41 Cater to Johnson, June 29, 1964, LBJ Papers, Handwriting File, May 1964-August 1964, Box 3. Some
reporters shared the frustration about the ambiguous White House position, complaining to press aid
Douglass Cater in June that officials would "talk-tough" when they were off the record but soften their tone
in formal press events. Johnson responded to their frustration by canceling background briefings
altogether, in order to appear that the administration was not being inconsistent.
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capitalize on its nationalist credentials. To many South Vietnamese, Hanoi provided a
plausible alternative to their own ineffectual and corrupt leaders. They were also war-
weary and probably willing to accept a negotiated settlement instead of continuing the
fight.42 For all of these reasons, the chances for winning a people's war outright
appeared to be slim. Perhaps the United States could forestall the unification of Vietnam
under communist rule by sustaining a large military presence in country, but Johnson was
unnerved by the prospect of another Korea.
The president also received conflicting reports about the communist force in
South Vietnam. Estimates of the size and strength of the enemy were clouded by the
ongoing feud between Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and the commander of military
forces, Paul Harkins. Given these political and military uncertainties, it is no wonder that
the president avoided a public commitment. At one point McNamara candidly told
Johnson that "it would be wise for you to say as little as possible...the frank answer is
that we don't know what's going on out there." 43
Johnson typically waited as long as possible before making policy commitments.
This pragmatic strategy, which he developed as a congressman, allowed him to gauge the
range of support that he could expect to receive for different decisions. Johnson also
preferred to wait for his advisors to hammer out their differences before settling on a
policy decision.44 In the first half of 1964, however, his advisors were far from
agreement. Curtis LeMay and the Joint Chiefs pushed for dramatic action, going so far
as to suggest nuclear strikes on China if necessary. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy
42 Logevall, Choosing War, pp. 89ff.
43 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 204.
44 David M. Barrett, Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and his Vietnam Advisers (Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas Press, 1993), pp. 172-194.
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were less hawkish, offering a range of smaller-scale operations against the North.
McCone was extremely cautious about escalation, as was Michael Forrestal of the NSC,
who presciently warned that if the United States escalated the ground war, the Army
would seek to wage conventional operations against an unconventional opponent. 45 The
president did not make a strong commitment on Vietnam policy in part because his
advisors were so far apart. The one point upon which they all agreed was that the
domestic status quo was manageable. Public support was practically guaranteed for the
immediate future, meaning that there was no need to make a more direct announcement
of U.S. intentions. 46
Finally, the White House did not want to take a clear public stand on Vietnam in
front of the November election. Johnson's conscious consideration of electoral politics
was revealed in notes from a meeting with the JCS on March 4:
(LBJ) did not want to start a war before November...He repeated again
that the Congress and the country did not want war - that war at this time
would have a tremendous effect on the approaching Presidential political
campaign and might perhaps keep the Democrats from winning in
November. He said that he though it would be much better to keep out of
any war until December; that would be after the election and whoever was
going to be President could then go to Congress for a supporting and joint
resolution, and the people of the United States to explain to them why we
had to risk the chances of another war by expanding our operations in
Southeast Asia. The political situation in December would be stabilized. 47
45 Kaiser, American Tragedy, pp. 308-309. The Army lived up to Forrestal's prediction, preferring
aggressive seek-and-destroy missions over the more tedious work of securing the population against
guerillas. Ironically, the Army's own doctrinal manuals stressed that population security and good
governance to achieve popular support were prerequisite to success in counterinsurgency. These doctrine
statements had little influence on the Army's actual performance. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The
Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Austin Long, "Doctrine of
Eternal Recurrence: The Development of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1969 and 2003-2006,"
unpublished ms., 2007.
46 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 322.
47 Kaiser, American Tragedy, pp. 304-305.
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The president repeated this argument later in the day to McGeorge Bundy, arguing that as
an "inherited trustee" of the government he was in no position to substantially change the
war effort before the election. He ordered Bundy to work on more limited options in the
meantime: "Let's see if we can't find enough things to do...to keep them off base...take
a few selected targets to upset them a little bit, without getting another Korean operation
started." 48 The notion that he was a trustee occupied Johnson's thoughts throughout the
summer. At the end of July he turned down a JCS recommendation for expanded action
against North Vietnam, referring to his own position as an unelected president. Johnson
declared that it would be "a hell of a poor time to carry on an adventure." 49
But while the president felt that it was not a good time to escalate the conflict, that
did not mean that it was a good time to leave. He believed that the political damage done
to Harry Truman after the communist victory in China would be "chickenshit" compared
to the consequences of losing Vietnam.so Johnson settled for an ambiguous public
position, all the while exploring various options for expanding the war.
For all of these reasons, he had no desire to make a strong public commitment
about U.S. strategy in Vietnam. The convenient domestic politics of 1964 made it
possible for Johnson to indulge his ambivalence and delay action indefinitely. And in the
absence of a firm public commitment, President Johnson had no need to rally opinion by
presenting an image of consensus. He was free to tolerate disagreement and encourage
deliberation. Thus when he queried the CIA about the logic of the domino thesis, he had
48 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 305.
49 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 331.
50 Quoted in Logevall, Choosing War, p. 77. The president also told Sen. Mike Mansfield that he did not
want Vietnam to become "another China." Mansfield warned him not to let it become another Korea.
Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 295.
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no need or reason to force it to accept a different view. The incentives to politicize
intelligence were low.
Critical constituencies. Johnson enjoyed considerable policy flexibility in 1964
because no critical constituencies had emerged to challenge his position. The public was
largely uninformed and unconcerned about the war. While voters still tended to support
efforts to contain communism, they were wary of Goldwater's outspoken calls for
escalation. Congress was acquiescent on foreign policy as a matter of principle,
believing that effective statecraft required executive flexibility. Some Democrats were
concerned about Vietnam, but no prominent party official was willing to challenge the
president in front of the November elections. Finally, there was not yet a viable antiwar
movement that could pose a serious political threat to the administration.
The war in Vietnam was a minor issue in spring 1964. Most Americans had a
limited understanding of the war and the degree of U.S. involvement. In April, for
instance, 21 percent of respondents to a Gallup poll said they paid very little attention to
Vietnam, and 42 percent admitted that they paid no attention at all. Similar results
followed a Gallup poll a few months later. At the same time that the White House was
receiving critical estimates from BNE, a majority of Americans paid no mind to
Vietnam.5' In public opinion surveys it ranked far below other foreign and domestic
concerns. No more than 7 percent of Americans considered the war to be the most
51 Surveys by the Gallup Organization, April 24-29 and June 4-9, 1964. Retrieved August 25, 2006 from
the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut;
www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/poll.html. All subsequent references to Gallup Surveys are drawn from the
Roper Center databank, except as noted. See also Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson andHis
Times, 1961-1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 106.
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important problem faced by the United States. 5 To the extent that Americans thought
about foreign affairs, they were principally concerned with vague ideas about
"communist infiltration" and "international problems." For most voters, Vietnam was
irrelevant.
President Johnson was concerned about the 1964 campaign, of course, but he had
reason to be confident about his chances in November. Throughout the spring his
approval ratings remained remarkably high (see Table 1). His ambiguous position on
Vietnam had no apparent effect on public opinion, and did not threaten his prospects for
reelection.
Table 1. Presidential Approval Ratings, 1964
Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Johnson is handling his job as
president?
Date Approve Disapprove No opinion
January 77 5 18
February 74 9 18
March 78 9 13
April 75 11 14
May 74 13 13
June 74 12 14
Source: Gallup surveys, January-June 1964.
While polling organizations tracked public opinion writ large, the White House
kept careful records of all incoming correspondence. The mail room organized all letters,
telegrams, and cards by issue and sent a weekly report to the president. These reports
vividly demonstrate the low priority that the public assigned to Vietnam during early
52 For a sense of the public priorities in spring 1964, see responses to the question, "What do you think is
the most important problem facing this country today?" Gallup surveys, March 27-April 2 and April 24-
29.
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1964. Correspondence on the war amounted to a tiny proportion of all the letters
received, garnering far less attention to domestic issues like civil rights, the minimum
wage, and the Supreme Court's deliberation over prayer in school. For the week of April
30, for example, only 100 letters out of 38,970 dealt with Vietnam. This pattern
continued in the critical period before and after the BNE memos were delivered.
Table 2. White House Correspondence, May-June 1964
Week ending Vietnam correspondence
Source: LBJ Papers, White House Administration
Total (rounded)
(EX WH 5-1, 9/1/68).
Johnson's middle position on Vietnam made sense in terms of public opinion.
Because Vietnam was a minor issue, Johnson estimated that it would reject a substantial
escalation without a long public relations campaign. As he put it in March, "we haven't
got any mothers that will go with us in the war." 53 Nonetheless, most voters continued to
support strong efforts to contain communism, and those that followed the war tended to
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May 7 165 108,000
May 14 200 60,000
May 21 186 46,000
May 27 248 43,000
June 4 465 69,000
June 11 188 50,000
June 18 317 85,000
June 25 192 32,000
53 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 305.
be hawkish. 54 As a result, Johnson was no more interested in a precipitous withdrawal
than he was an immediate escalation. "They'd impeach a president who'd run out,
wouldn't they?" he asked Sen. Russell in late May. 55
Table 3. Public Attentiveness and Vietnam, June 1964
Question: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?
Issue Percent
Racial discrimination, civil rights, immigration 47
Peace, war, cold war 8
Communism, communist infiltration 8
Vietnam 7
International problems, general 6
Unemployment 6
High cost of living 3
Russia 2
Cuba 2
Foreign aid 1
National defense, future security 1
Automation 1
Poverty 1
Education 1
Juvenile delinquency 1
Miscellaneous others 13
Don't know 5
Source: Gallup Survey, June 25-30, 1964.
multiple responses.
Note: the total was over 100% because of
Public attention was focused on other issues in 1964. The election campaign and
the push for civil rights legislation were more important to Americans than the war in
Vietnam. Events like the kidnapping of civil rights workers in Mississippi further
distracted attention from events in Southeast Asia (see Table 3). Under these conditions
Johnson could afford to stake the middle ground on Vietnam, despite the serious logical
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54 Dallek, Flawed Giant, p. 101.
55 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 320.
gaps in his position. Public apathy and ignorance prevented these problems from
becoming electoral liabilities. The campaign strategy did not require skillful political
maneuvering, because most voters had little knowledge or interest in the war.
For its part, Congress was not eager to challenge the president on Vietnam. It
accepted basic Cold War premises about the need to contain the Soviet Union, and gave
the president wide latitude on foreign policy. 56 Most congressmen did not take a strong
stand on the war in either direction. The small number of antiwar critics, including
Wayne Morse, Frank Church, and Ernest Gruening, carried little sway in the Senate. The
White House closely monitored the reaction of other officials to their floor speeches and
was satisfied at the muted response. 5 Other congressmen with more specific concerns
were not eager to challenge the president. Sen. Richard Russell warned Johnson that
Vietnam might be worse than Korea, because it involved committing to a guerilla war on
unfavorable terrain. But he did not urge a withdrawal of U.S. forces, instead suggesting
that the White House continue working to build a viable South Vietnamese government
that would eventually ask the United States to leave the country. Russell's fears were
prescient, but in 1964 he was unwilling to pressure the president to change course. The
Cold War consensus left Johnson with considerable maneuverability on foreign policy;
Congressional ambivalence provided additional freedom of action.
In the immediate wake of Kennedy's assassination Congress imposed an informal
moratorium on normal partisan bickering, and Johnson catapulted into office with a
strong mandate for enacting Kennedy's policy program. Days after the assassination,
columnist James Reston noted that "President Kennedy apparently had to die to create a
56 Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two-Presidencies Thesis," Transaction 4 (1966), pp. 7-14.
57 Logevall, Choosing War, pp. 136, 169-170.
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sympathetic atmosphere for his program."58 The moratorium lasted a little over a month;
it was unlikely to survive in an election year.5 9 Nevertheless, the inclination to support
the president remained strong and congressional opposition to domestic and foreign
policy initiatives was comparatively tame. For a time in early 1964, the same
Republicans who had railed against Kennedy's program were now reluctant to get in the
way of Johnson.
The Democratic Party was similarly complaisant. Although there was some
dissent among the party rank-and-file, the nascent opposition was never able to impose
serious constraints on administration foreign policy. 60 Senator Fulbright, later a leading
opponent of the war, offered public support to Johnson despite his strong personal
reservations. 61 Sen. Mike Mansfield, a scholar of East Asian politics before coming to
the Senate, had long been concerned about the US presence in Vietnam and had advised
Kennedy to be cautious. Perhaps sensing the long-term problem of maintaining party
unity, Johnson had McNamara and Rusk prepare special responses to Mansfield's
concerns. 62 This was apparently satisfactory, and Mansfield did not publicly break with
the president. The private efforts to maintain party support were helped enormously by
the fact of the November election; Democrats had no desire to squabble publicly in an
even-numbered year. "Hell, Wayne," a colleague told Morse, "you can't get in a fight
with the president at a time when the flags are waving and we're about to go to a national
convention." 63
58 Kaiser, American Tragedy, pp. 284-285.
59 Dietz, Republicans and Vietnam, pp. 58-59.
60 Robert David Johnson, "The Origins of Dissent: Senate Liberals and Vietnam: 1959-1964," Pacific
Historical Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 (May 1996), pp. 249-275.
61 Logevall, Choosing War, p. 139.
62 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 285.
63 Logevall, Choosing War, p. 205.
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Finally, no single-issue constituency had emerged on Vietnam. Skeptics from
inside and outside the government were already concerned about the war, to be sure, but
they were unable to offer a viable alternative. The idea of neutralization, for example,
was championed by foreign leaders and accepted by some American officials, but the
mechanics of neutralization were never specified. Because the meaning of the term was
not clear, Johnson continued to harbor the belief that a neutral Vietnam was at best a
prelude to a communist takeover. 64 The antiwar movement, which would become large
and vocal later in the war, did not begin to coalesce until more than a year after the BNE
memos were delivered. 65 In 1964 the movement was in its infancy. College students
who later became the "shock troops of the movement" were still ambivalent. 66 Few
opposed the general direction of U.S. foreign policy and the broad outlines of
containment. A small number of scholars argued that the war was not in the national
interest, but they had little impact outside the academy. 67 And opponents of the war had
yet to capitalize on media disillusionment with the White House. A handful of
newspapers and columnists were critical of Johnson's Far East policy, but most editors
agreed on the need to defend South Vietnam. 68
Politicization occurs when leaders make public commitments in the presence of at
least one critical constituency. Neither condition was present in June 1964. Johnson had
not made a strong, specific commitment about US policy in Vietnam. His ambiguous
position avoided splitting the Democratic Party. It also allowed Johnson to slowly gain
64 Logevall, Choosing War, pp. 29-30.
65 Rhrodri Jeffreys-Jones, Peace Now! American Society and the Ending of the Vietnam War (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 43-92.66 Herring, America's Longest War, p. 206.
67 Logevall, Choosing War, p. 168.
68 Logevall, Choosing War, p. 57.
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Congressional approval for his foreign and domestic plans, and it made him appear wise
and reasonable in the face of Goldwater's bluster. Meanwhile, no groups had emerged
that threatened his political standing on account of his Vietnam policy. The president
enjoyed substantial freedom of action, and was able to delay without fear of serious
political consequences. The White House had no reason to pressure intelligence to
change its analysis, and it could accept or reject estimates at its leisure. 69 Although the
BNE and Matthias memos directly challenged logic of US intervention in Vietnam, both
were ignored.
1967: The Order of Battle
The Johnson administration possessed no coherent theory of victory in early 1964.
It toyed with a number of responses to the deteriorating political and military situation in
South Vietnam without settling out a clear strategic path. Options for everything from
small-scale covert action to the use of nuclear weapons crossed the president's desk. But
the president had not committed to any of them, nor had he gone public with specific
plans.
By 1967, however, the United States' had committed to a strategy of attrition.
The previous winter President Johnson endorsed the MACV strategy of eroding enemy
forces at a rate higher than their ability to put new troops in place. The point at which the
69 BNE memos regularly circulated in the NSC, even though not all of them received a hearing. BNE
analysis of bombing options, for example, entered into NSC deliberations on July 29. See "Memorandum
for the Record: National Security Council Meeting - 12:15 p.m. - 28 July 1964," July 29, 1964, LBJ
Papers, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, Box 1. Despite the fact that McCone was
being nudged out of policy circles (and out of the Agency), the White House was not averse to accepting
intelligence from the Board. In his memoirs McNamara referred to BNE analysts as "the government's
most senior, most experienced group of intelligence analysts, who had no policymaking responsibilities and
no prior policy decisions to defend." He singled Kent out as "one of the toughest geopolitical minds I ever
encountered" and claimed that "the reports prepared under his direction influenced me greatly."
McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 124.
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attrition exceeded recruitment later became known as the crossover point. Reaching the
crossover point would signal the beginning of the end for the NVA and VC. Although
the war would go on for a time, the increasing weakness of communist forces would
provide an opening for South Vietnam to achieve lasting stability. As guerrillas became
less potent in the countryside, the government could expand control over territory and roll
back North Vietnamese forces. American troops would become unnecessary as the
ARVN became more self-confident in the field, and the United States would be able to
focus on supporting the government in Saigon. Johnson was counting on this strategy not
only to win the war but to extricate himself personally so that he could refocus on his
domestic agenda. "I have a lot riding on you," he told MACV commander Gen. William
Westmoreland.70
More was at stake than progress on the battlefield. In 1967 the White House used
the image of a crossover point to convince Americans that it was winning the war, despite
the apparent stalemate. President Johnson publicly committed to the attrition strategy,
and the administration conducted a massive public relations campaign to shore up
domestic support. This was no easy task, because public and congressional skepticism
had grown substantially since 1964. Public ambivalence had been replaced by public
unease, and apathy had been overtaken by controversy. Congress was no longer willing
to allow the president wide latitude on foreign policy; the Cold War consensus was over.
Dissident Democrats publicly berated the president over Vietnam, no longer willing to
sacrifice principle for party unanimity. And the antiwar opposition, once a loose network
of scholars and editorial writers, was now large and well-organized. All of these
70 Sam Adams, War ofNumbers: an Intelligence Memoir (South Royalton, VT: Steelforth Press, 1994), pp.
51-52.
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domestic groups represented serious threats to the president. Johnson knew that he
needed to make the case that the United States was not stuck in Vietnam, that there was
no stalemate, and that it had a clear plan for victory. He feared that Vietnam could
undermine his ambitious policy goals and submarine any hopes of reelection in 1968.
But the crossover point was a double-edged sword. Although it offered a
plausible theory of victory, it also meant that U.S. losses would continue to rise. Attrition
strategies are costly and time-consuming, and it was not clear how long Congress and the
public would tolerate the war. The administration needed to convince them that the
theory was correct and that it was worth the cost. To this end it arranged for a coterie of
administration and MACV officials to explain the implications of the crossover point
and, critically, provide evidence that the ratio of enemy casualties to enemy recruitment
was moving in the right direction. It was not enough to provide numbers of enemy dead
and wounded; the body count needed to compare favorably to trends in available
manpower. In the summer and autumn the White House tried to forge an official
consensus behind the idea that the crossover point was at hand. It called on NSC, State
Department, and military officials to make the point that the war of attrition was being
won.
At the same time, however, the CIA challenged the existing order of battle,
arguing that real enemy end strength in South Vietnam was perhaps twice the military
estimate. The CIA was not yet part of the consensus, and its estimate cast doubt
administration claims of progress. The White House responded by pressuring CIA
director Richard Helms and other intelligence officers to accept the MACV number, and
to erase the CIA dissent from the final estimate. For several months CIA officials fought
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with MACV over the OB, but Helms eventually ordered them to stand down. The White
House pressured the Agency to sign off on the estimate, and proceeded to use the
favorable military numbers to sell the crossover point strategy in public. By the end of
the year, it appeared that all of the relevant national security agencies, including the CIA,
agreed that the enemy's end strength was withering.
But the struggle to forge a consensus exposed deep fissures between the military
and intelligence. In the end, pressure from above was required to break the deadlock
over the estimate of enemy forces.
MACV and CIA split on substantive and methodological grounds. Both accepted
the basic count of NVA regulars, but differed on how to count the VC. MACV argued
that non-military supporting groups should be excluded from the OB because they did not
serve any combat function. These groups included civilians who offered part-time aid
and assistance to the VC. Political cadres in the so-called Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI)
played a role in maintaining local party discipline but were not active fighters. Similarly,
the self-defense and secret self-defense forces (SD/SSD) were made up of lightly armed
and untrained women and children. MACV also wanted to disregard the so-called
Assault Youth, who were highly indoctrinated into communist ideology. Col. Gains
Hawkins, who led the MACV OB section but later disputed its results, argued that Army
doctrine got in the way of an accurate count of these groups. Because the Army was
focused on seeking out regulars, it did not have the same respect for individuals that
covertly took part in and supported the guerilla war.71 Amb. Bunker put the matter
differently, complaining that the CIA wanted to include categories "which are not
organized military units at all but rather a shadowy, mostly unarmed part-time hamlet
71 Hiam, Who the Hell are We Fighting?, p. 94.
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defense element of women, children, and old men." 72 But the CIA argued that they were
critical to the enemy war effort. Sam Adams, the Agency analyst who spearheaded the
effort to recalculate the order of battle, estimated that part-time irregulars laid booby traps
that accounted for a fifth of all American casualties. 73 Most importantly, they provided a
ready supply of troops to replace Vietcong losses.
The military estimate relied on a combination of after-action reports and defector
interviews. It spent less time on captured documents, which it believed to be misleading
and deceptive. Adams, however, argued that captured documents helped explain a basic
puzzle. MACV argued that the VC had been fighting with a fixed reserve force for
several years, and that defection and desertion rates were climbing. How then was it able
to fight on? If the MACV estimates had been correct in years past, then the crossover
point should have already come. Adams found the answer by combing through captured
documents, which indicated that the reserve pool was much larger than MACV had
assumed. He was particularly struck by reports from Binh Dinh province indicating that
MACV had grossly underestimated enemy end strength. If the numbers from Binh Dinh
were representative of the rest of the country, then the enemy was perhaps twice as large
as previously thought, which would explain its resiliency. MACV replied that such
extrapolations were sloppy and unreliable. 74
Part of the underlying tension in the dispute was the fact that CIA was treading on
the traditional purview of the military. To MACV officers, a civilian intelligence agency
72 Bunker to Rostow, August 29, 1967, LBJ Papers, Country File: Vietnam, Box 258.
73 Adams, War ofNumbers, p. 105.
74 James J. Wirtz, "Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy During the Vietnam War,"
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 239-263. Adams describes his logic and
his arguments with MACV in Adams, War ofNumbers, pp. 41-109. For a sympathetic account, see C.
Michael Hiam, Who the Hell are We Fighting? The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence
Wars (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2006), pp. 105-128
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had no business constructing the enemy order of battle in an ongoing war. This was a job
for the military, which had the best intelligence on the size and movement of the enemy.
MACV, however, had not kept a good count of the enemy OB for several years. No
comprehensive count had been attempted since 1962, and Adams noticed that the number
of local and main forces were left unchanged from month to month: 18,553 Vietcong
administrative services troops, 39,175 political cadres in the VCI, and 103,573
guerillas. 75 To Adams and others at CIA, the military had given up its claims to primacy
over the order of battle because of this neglect. Robert McNamara also lost faith in
MACV and commissioned the CIA to provide him a separate estimate in April. The
Agency reported a figure greater than 500,000.76
Fourteen Three. The effort to sort out the official OB began in June 1967, when
the Office of National Estimates completed the first draft of Special National Intelligence
Estimate (SNIE) 14.3-67, "Capabilities for the Vietnam Communists For Fighting in
South Vietnam." From the start, Helms expressed concern that the dispute would spin
out of control, warning that the "Vietnam numbers game" would be played "with ever
increasing heat and political overtones." 77
The first draft of SNIE 14.3-67, what Adams would call "fourteen three" in his
memoirs, essentially adopted the position of the CIA. Total communist strength in South
Vietnam was put in the range of 460,000-570,000, which was slightly lower than
75 Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968 (Washington, DC:
Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), p. 89. MACV continued this neglect even after the OB
controversy ended. In November 1967, CIA's Saigon Station observed that MACV was still "officially
carrying the ridiculous figure of 112,760 irregulars, unchanged for over a year and a half." Ford, CIA and
the Vietnam Policymakers, p. 100.
76 Hiam, Who the Hell are We Fighting?, p. 105.
77 Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, p. 92. When the estimate was finally briefed to the Cabinet in
November, Helms again warned that the "findings must be closely held...We can't let the press in on this.
We must still be careful in talking about the number of people in the game." Larry Berman, Lyndon
Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), p. 110.
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Adams's estimate but consistent with his conclusion that part-time combatants from the
SD/SSD should be included alongside VC main and local forces. On June 23,
representatives from MACV, DIA, CIA, and the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) gathered at CIA headquarters to try to reach a
compromise. The Defense Intelligence Agency, whose estimates mirrored MACV, stood
fast to its figure of 296,000. Convinced that the military estimate was far too low, the
CIA also refused to budge from its position. The conference did nothing to reconcile the
two estimates, and the competing agencies did not reconvene until the beginning of
August.78
In order to break the impasse, George Carver, the Agency's Special Assistant for
Vietnam Affairs (SAVA) suggested splitting the estimate into two halves. The first half
constituted the "military" components of the Vietcong, while the second included part-
time militia members and political cadres (see Table 4). This decision appeared to satisfy
representatives from both sides. CIA was able to include part-time and local militia,
while MACV was able to clearly separate them from the heart of the VC order of battle.
Adams was willing to let MACV do as it pleased, so long as the total number reflected
his estimate of overall enemy end strength. Even Gen. Philip Davidson, the head of
MACV intelligence who later excoriated the Agency for challenging the OB, accepted
the idea. Both sides submitted estimates along for the split estimate, and the total count
ranged from 431,000 (MACV) to 491,000 (CIA). For a brief time it looked as if the
controversy was over. 79
78 Hiam, Who the Hell are We Fighting?, p. 107; Adams, War ofNumbers; Wirtz, "Intelligence to Please?"
79 Hiam, Who the Hell are We Fighting? p. 108.
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Table 4. The Split Estimate
MACV CIA
"Military"
NVA, VC main and local 121,000 121,000
Administrative services 40,000 60,00
Guerillas 60,000 100,000
Subtotal 221,000 281,000
"Other"
SD/SSD 120,000 120,000
VCI 90,000 90,000
Subtotal 210,000 210,000
Grand total 431,000 491,000
Source: Hiam, Who the Hell are We Fighting? p. 111.
The split estimate was a reasonable compromise, given the genuine differences
over methodology and the inherent difficulties involved in arriving at an accurate count.
MACV's argument that lightly armed and untrained civilians did not belong in a military
order of battle was certainly defensible, as was the CIA contention that such groups must
be counted in the context of a "people's war." The count was highly uncertain in any
case, and incoming information was hard to come by. Despite improvements in
techniques for extracting information from defectors and informants, estimators still
grappled with the intractable problem of identifying civilians who were also part-time
combatants. Given these problems, a wider estimate would give policymakers a real
sense of the uncertainties involved, as well as an understanding of the logic of including
and excluding different categories in the OB. But it soon became apparent that officials
in Washington would not settle for less than a unanimous finding. Rusk noted later that
any apparent disputes would reduce the power of the new and widen the credibility gap.
"Therefore, we must be doubly sure that we are fully prepared in Washington and Saigon
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to back up every statement," he wrote to Bunker. "Before these figures are used any
more widely, we feel that it is absolutely essential that Washington and Saigon are in
agreement on Order of Battle figures and recruitment."8 0 Gen. Westmoreland and the
JCS also demanded a common estimate. Realizing that a split estimate would not satisfy
the White House, Helms ordered Carver to "Work it out!"8 1
In practice, working it out meant one last conference in Saigon. Carver led a
delegation of intelligence officials, who met with Davidson and MACV officials on
September 7. The tenor of the conference was immediately clear. Earlier hopes for a
mutually acceptable agreement were replaced by mutual accusations of bad faith. Where
MACV had recently been agreeable to a compromise, it now refused to sign on to any
estimate that included local guerilla forces, meaning that the count of enemy end strength
would not exceed 298,000. While there was some disagreement among officials from the
intelligence community, the military representatives put up a united front against any
proposition that the order of battle would increase from its present position. After three
days a disgusted Carver sent a cable to Helms, complaining that MACV was
"stonewalling, obviously under orders," and that Westmoreland had "given instructions
tantamount to direct order that VC strength total will not exceed 300,000 ceiling." His
next cable also protested the military's intransigence. 82 Carver clearly resented the
treatment he received at the Saigon conference from MACV officers and Robert Komer,
a Johnson aide who directed the pacification campaign in Vietnam. Nonetheless, he met
privately with Davidson on September 14 and worked out the terms of an agreement.
The compromise, such as it was, basically accepted the MACV arguments about what
so Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War, p. 85.
81 Hiam, Who the Hell are We Fighting?, p. 112.
82 Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, pp. 93-95.
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categories to include in the OB. This ensured that the total figure of VC end strength
would not exceed 300,000.
Carver's abrupt reversal followed the receipt of a cable from Helms. While the
contents of the message remain classified, some observers concluded that he ordered
Carver to back down and accept the MACV estimate. Komer was characteristically
blunt: "Why did George Carver cave in and compromise with MACV on the O/B
question? Because that's what Helms told him to do." 83 Clearly Helms wanted the
controversy to be over, given his simultaneous battle with the Joint Chiefs over the
effects of strategic bombing in North Vietnam. Helms's own explanation of events is
suggestive:
I have no recollection of having cabled George in Saigon, ordering him to
strike a bargain. He already knew my basic views: that because of broader
considerations we had to come up with agreed figures, that we had to get
this O/B question off the board, and that it didn't mean a damn what
particular figures we agreed to. 84
Although he does not admit to bowing to pressure, the circumstances at the time left little
doubt about the message he was sending to Carver. Because of MACV's inflexibility,
getting the matter "off the board" meant accepting the MACV estimate. Carver later
accepted responsibility for the outcome, but given his obvious anger during the
proceedings, it is highly unlikely that he would have decided to acquiesce on his own.85
The compromise in Saigon ensured that the official count of enemy forces in
South Vietnam would not rise above the existing number. The final version of SNIE
83 Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, p. 100.
84 Hiam, Who the Hell Are We Fighting?, p. 119.
85 For different accounts of the Saigon conference, see Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Era Policymakers, pp.
93-101; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Knopf,
1979), pp. 186-187; Allen, None So Blind, pp. 251-252; Adams, War ofNumbers, pp. 110-120; and Russell
Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (New York: Berkley Books, 1989), p.
226.
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14.3.67 actually went further, reducing the estimate of enemy end strength to a range of
223,000-248,000. The estimate included a general discussion of the self-defense and
special self-defense forces, the VCI, and the assault youth, but it made no effort to
estimate their size. Nonetheless, the estimate did include these forces in the calculation
of enemy casualties, meaning that total VC losses in South Vietnam (170,000)
approached the lower bound of the estimated size of the enemy (218,000). This
suggested that the crossover point had already been passed, and that the enemy was not
long for the fight. SNIE 14.3-67 concluded that the VC would be able to fight on for at
least another year, but time and arithmetic were not on its side.86
Absent from the SNIE was any footnote of dissent from the CIA. Such footnotes
were standard practice in National Intelligence Estimates, serving to ensure that
policymakers were made aware of serious differences of opinion. The footnote
mechanism acted as a release valve for agencies that fundamentally disagreed with
portions of the product. In the absence of such a mechanism, the estimative process
could quickly descend into prosaic exercises in consensus-building, where consensus was
achieved through watering down any controversial judgments. The fact that no footnote
appeared in SNIE 14.3-67 was extremely surprising, given the ferocity of the debate over
the OB that raged throughout the summer. It was one thing to accept MACV's bottom
line, but quite another to do so without recording the alternative view.
The absence of a footnote is also noteworthy because the CIA had had been
leaning towards Adams's logic for almost a year. A late 1966 memorandum reported an
overall OB of 270,000 based on MACV reporting, but CIA officials were clearly
86 Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67, "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists,"
November 13, 1967, pp. 20-23; www.dni.gov/nic/PDF GIF_declass_support/Vietnam/SNIE_14.3-67.pdf
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unsatisfied with the quality of the intelligence it received from military sources. The
memo suggestively added that "Recently acquired documentary evidence, now being
studied in detail, suggests that our holdings on the numerical strength of these irregulars
(now carried at around 110,000) may require dramatic upward revision." 87 During 1967
analysts were increasingly convinced that such a revision was needed. Adams was not a
lone voice in the CIA, and several senior analysts working on Vietnam began to
promulgate his views.
These officials soon came under pressure to accept the MACV position. 88 George
Allen, who had worked on Indochina since the early 1950s, faced ongoing pressure in his
role as the CIA representative to the administration's Vietnam Information Group (VIG).
The interagency working group, led by Rostow, was nominally tasked to identify and
prioritize public relations issues, collect information about the war, and assist public
affairs officials in the State and Defense Departments. In reality, the VIG existed to
bolster public support for administration policy, no matter what information came from
the field. Allen understood the need for public relations, but soured on the project after
being chided for suggesting that administration claims were not supported by
intelligence. Rostow and other members of the working group went so far as to question
his loyalty when he challenged elements of White House strategy. Not surprisingly,
Allen counted the meetings "among the most distasteful and depressing sessions of my
entire career." 89 In Saigon, meanwhile, Carver bore the brunt of White House pressure as
87 CIA Memorandum, "The Vietnamese Communists' Will to Persist in Their Present Strategy in
Vietnam," August 26, 1966; http//www.dni.gov/PDF_GIF_declass support/Memo_26-Aug-66.pdf
88 As was Adams, who was variously derided by MACV officers as a zealot who substituted "voodoo
intelligence" for real military analysis. Hiam, Who the Hell are We Fighting?, p. 116.
89 Allen, None So Blind, pp. 236-237. On the Vietnam Information Group, see George C. Herring, LBJ and
Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994), pp. 140-148.
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the OB controversy neared the end. Robert Komer berated him about "the paramount
importance of saying nothing that would detract from the image of progress." Komer
mocked the CIA analysis as sloppy and complained that its order of battle "would
produce a politically unacceptable total." 90 Even the DCI came under pressure. In his
memoirs, Helms complained about White House staffers who "frequently challenged our
work with infuriating suggestions that we 'get on the team' - that is, trim our reporting to
fit policy." 91
Some scholars contend that the order of battle episode was not a case of
politicization. James Wirtz, for instance, argues that the CIA's revised estimate was
based on shoddy methods and was largely wrong. Nevertheless, the White House
permitted the CIA to make its case to MACV before proceeding, hoping that a suitable
compromise would emerge. Wirtz argues that if anything, the White House was too
forbearing with the CIA. The order of battle was traditionally the purview of the
military, after all, which had better sources and more experience with OB data. If the
administration was really determined to politicize intelligence, it would not have gone
through the long and frustrating series of conferences designed to reconcile the MACV
and CIA estimates. 9 2
The pattern of events does not support this interpretation. Had the administration
merely sought to refine the SNIE, it would have been more tolerant of the split estimate.
90 Komer was not intrinsically hostile to the CIA or the intelligence community. He was previously an
analyst in the Office of National Estimates, and worked closely with CIA in his role as director of the
pacification campaign in Vietnam. On Komer's role during the OB episode, see Ford, CIA and the Vietnam
Policymakers, 94; and Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War, pp. 81-82. On his otherwise positive view of the
CIA, see Komer to Helms, January 18, 1967, LBJ Papers, NSF Komer Files, Box 5.
91 Richard Helms, with William Hood, A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency
(New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), p. 328.
92 Wirtz, "Intelligence to Please?' Thomas Cubbage finds that other Agency analysts did not fully support
Adams's analysis. See Thomas L. Cubbage, II, "Westmoreland vs. CBS: Was Intelligence Corrupted by
Policy Demands?" Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 1988), pp. 118-180, at 136-137.
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Had it sought a compromise position, it would have been satisfied with the OB range
provided after the second meeting between MACV and CIA officials in August (431,000-
491,000). But the White House was not interested in a compromise, nor was it willing to
tolerate a written estimate that exposed the serious differences of opinion. Instead, the
episode involved the direct manipulation of intelligence to reflect policy preferences.
High-level policymakers tried to influence the estimate so that it appeared to support the
ongoing public relations effort. One of Rostow's aides admitted that the White House
"really leaned on the OB" to help stem the tide of domestic discontent. When George
Allen questioned the official numbers, Rostow told him, "I'm sorry you won't support
your president." 93 Even some MACV officers complained that their work was being
distorted. Colonel Gains Hawkins, the MACV intelligence officer directly responsible
for the order of battle, told Adams that he believed the CIA was basically correct but was
constrained by the "command position" that no estimate could rise about the 300,000
threshold.94 Finally, the CIA eschewed standard practices by not footnoting its dissent.
The estimate practically begged for a footnote, given the uncertainties involved and the
wide gulf that separated CIA and MACV analyses. But while the estimate did make note
of these uncertainties, it gave no indication that the CIA disagreed with the decision to
exclude the SD/SSD and other "non-military" categories from the final product.
It is unclear what role Johnson played in pressuring the CIA to change its
conclusions. Despite accusations of a military cover-up that hid the real estimate of
enemy strength from policymakers, the president certainly knew about the controversy
93 Adams, War ofNumbers, pp. 217-218.
94 According to Adams, Hawkins tried to cleverly cast doubt on the MACV bargaining position by
providing opportunities for Adams to poke holes in the argument. Adams, War ofNumbers, pp. 102-103.
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over the order of battle. 95 Ambassador Bunker cabled Rostow about the ongoing dispute
on August 29, and promised to bring up the matter with Johnson in his weekly update.96
Other principals have confirmed the documentary record showing that the president was
well-informed; Helms later wrote that the president could have described each side's
arguments from memory.97
There is no evidence that Johnson himself applied pressure to the DCI or any
other intelligence official to accept the military position. This was accomplished by his
subordinates. On the other hand, Johnson probably influenced Helms judgment by
seeking only good news from the field. On September 6 he requested that Helms submit
a report on all that the United States had accomplished in Vietnam. The President
apparently was not interested in hearing about failures and unmet goals; he only wanted a
list of positive achievements. Helms sent back his response on September 9, the same
day that the OB conference began in Saigon. 98 The request for news of positive trends,
which happened to precisely coincide with the final effort to resolve the order of battle
dispute, may have represented a tacit signal to the DCI about the president's wishes.
Explaining politicization. On March 20, 1967, the president asked Gen.
Westmoreland, "Are they bringing in as many as they're losing?" Westmoreland told
95 Adams initially accused MACV of conspiring to make sure that Johnson never saw the CIA estimate.
This claim become the subject of a lawsuit in the early 1980s, when Westmoreland sued CBS for libel after
producing a story on the OB affair. For coverage of the trial, see Renata Adler, Reckless Disregard:
Westmoreland v. CBS et al.; Sharon v. Time (New York: Random House, 1986); and Cubbage,
"Westmoreland vs. CBS."
96 Bunker to Rostow, August 29, 1967, LBJ Papers, Vietnam Country File, Box 258.
97 Helms, A Look over My Shoulder, p. 328. See also Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War, pp. 111-113.
98 Richard Helms, Memorandum for the President, "A Record of Achievements in Vietnam," 9 September
1967, LBJ Papers, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Box 6.
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him no, but promised that the crossover point would come in one or two months time. 99
In May, the head of MACV intelligence, Maj. Gen. Joseph McChristian, estimated the
total enemy size at about 500,000. According to McChristian, Westmoreland told him
that if he cabled Washington with his estimate, it would "create a political bombshell."
Also in May, Hawkins and another MACV officer briefed Westmoreland on two large
studies of the SD/SSD and VCI. Taken together they suggested that the CIA estimate
was basically right. Westmoreland replied, "What am I going to tell Congress? What is
the press going to do with this? What am I going to tell the President?" The studies
never made it out of MACV. 00 Gen. Creighton Abrams sent a cable explaining the
rationale for excluding the SD and SSD:
...if SD and SSD are included in the overall enemy strength, the figure
will total 420,000 to 431,000... This is in sharp contrast to the current
overall strength figure of about 299,000 given to the press here...We have
been projecting an image of success over the recent months...when we
release the figure of 420,000-431,000 the newsmen will immediately seize
on the point that the enemy force has increased about 120-120,000. All
available caveats and explanations will not prevent the press from drawing
an erroneous and gloomy conclusion as to the meaning of the increase. 101
Unlike earlier periods of the war, officials in Washington and Saigon could not count on
a forgiving press or supportive public. The order of battle had become politically
charged by the late summer, and officials were trying desperately to manufacture the
image of consensus agreement that enemy end strength was in decline. The following
discussion explains why the appearance of dissent was so problematic.
Commitment. In the spring of 1964, public proclamations about U.S. policy were
laced with high-sounding rhetoric but were consistently short on details. The White
99 Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War, p. 33.
100 Hiam, Who the Hell are We Fighting?, p. 101.
101 Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Era Policymakers, p. 85.
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House did all it could to avoid being specific during the election season, deflecting
criticism from hawkish Republicans without aggravating skeptics in its own party. The
ambiguous middle ground proved to be effective in terms of electoral politics, although it
ended up slowly leading the Untied States into a deeper commitment in Indochina.
Nonetheless, the lack of a strong public commitment to any specific policy allowed the
White House considerable policy flexibility. Without having staked itself to a certain
course, it was free to maneuver without invoking unmanageable political costs.
In 1967, on the other hand, the administration had publicly committed to winning
a war of attrition. In order to maintain public support for the war, it argued that
communist forces were approaching the point at which the rate of casualties would
exceed their ability to replenish forces. This "crossover point" would not signal the end
of the war, but it would mean the beginning of the end. If the Vietcong was unable to
reinforce dwindling units, then the South Vietnamese population would increasingly turn
to Saigon. Under these conditions the VC would not be able to rely on support from
peasants in the countryside, making it more difficult to operate against a large American
force. These were the messages that the White House had carefully cultivated during the
spring and summer.
Robert Komer was a particularly strong proponent of the crossover point thesis.
In late 1966 he predicted that the crossover point was at hand. "I suspect that we have
reached the point," he wrote to the president, "where we are killing, defecting, or
otherwise attriting more VC/NVA strength than the enemy can build up."' 0 2 The
following spring he reported to Johnson with enthusiasm,
102 Komer to Rostow, November 29, 1966, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer,
1966-1967, Box 5, Folder 10: Walt Rostow.
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... Hanoi can keep sending down northerners, but well over two-thirds of
the enemy forces are southern VC. Can the VC replace their losses? Ask
Westy, because I think even he and Buz Wheeler admit that, regardless of
whether Hanoi can replace its own losses down South, the southern VC
are eroding. This is why we don 'tface an endless war!103
Komer was so optimistic that he predicted that U.S. forces could "break the back" of the
VC in one year's time, and began to make the case in public. In late March he told a
French reporter that the United States was winning the war by combining the attrition
strategy with massive civil and military projects in South Vietnam. He also began to feed
stories to the columnist Joseph Alsop about the increasing difficulties faced by the
guerillas. 104
The administration expanded the PR campaign further in the late autumn,
instructing top officials to use the order of battle numbers to demonstrate progress and
shore up support for the attrition campaign. This coordinated public relations effort also
represented a deeper public commitment, not only to success in Vietnam, but to a specific
theory of victory. Showing that the crossover point was in reach meant drawing on
intelligence about the order of battle to show that the number of enemy fighters was
declining. Unfortunately, the numbers were ambiguous. Both MACV and the CIA could
make plausible arguments about why different categories of fighters should be included
in the final count, and even then it was not easy to estimate the true size of each category.
The White House finessed the problem by concentrating on the numbers upon which
103 Komer to Johnson, April 27, 1967, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer,
1966-1967, Box 2, Memos to the President, Jan.- May 1967.
104 Komer to Johnson, April 29, 1967, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer,
1966-1967, Box 2, Memos to the President, Jan. - May 1967; Komer to Christian, March 20, 1967, LBJ
Papers, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, 1966-1967, Box 4, Folder 7: Moyers/Christian;
and Komer to Christian, April 19, 1967, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer,
1966-1967, Box 4, Folder 7: Moyers/Christian.
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there was little disagreement: NVA regulars and full time VC. By limiting the OB to
those categories it could demonstrate a substantial reduction in the size and power of the
North Vietnamese force. The administration could not accept the CIA's desire to include
local defense forces for the same reason. Allowing the CIA to amend the estimate would
undermine previous claims that the crossover point was in reach, and sabotage the public
relations campaign.
SNIE 14.3.67 was finally complete in early November. With the estimate in
hand, MACV and the administration accelerated their long-planned public relations
campaign. To overcome the incredulous press in Saigon, Bunker was determined to
demonstrate "that we are making steady, though not spectacular, progress, and that we
are definitely moving ahead." Before the estimate was complete, he pre-planned a
serious of background briefings and dinners for reporters to show that the new
intelligence was, above all, "objective and realistic." 10 5 On November 11 officials in
Saigon told reporters that enemy strength and morale was in sharp decline, citing several
hundred captured documents. 106 MACV held a larger press conference on November 24
to release the estimate and explain why the official OB had changed, focusing again on
improvements in the quality of intelligence. Where past data was "inconclusive," new
information acquired from search and destroy missions, prisoner and defector interviews,
and reports from the local populace "enabled us to make a better estimate of the enemy's
total military strength figures." The briefing emphasized that the estimate represented the
l05 Bunker to Rostow, September 28, 1967, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Country File: Vietnam, Box
258.
106 "U.S. Aides Say Foe's Strength and Morale are Declining Fast," New York Times, November 11, p. 4.
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combined wisdom of military and intelligence officials. It made no mention of the
controversy that surrounded the case, nor of the serious reservations of the CIA. 107
Meanwhile, Westmoreland and Bunker traveled back to Washington for a series
of press events designed to reverse the negative trend in public opinion. The campaign
began as soon as Westmoreland stepped off the airplane, where he told reporters that he
had never been more optimistic about the prospects for success in Vietnam.' 08 On Meet
the Press he confidently asserted that U.S. and ARVN forces were "winning the war of
attrition," and that as a result U.S. troops might be able to start withdrawing from
Vietnam within two years. Westmoreland criticized the press for erroneously reporting
that the war had descended into stalemate, citing the intelligence in SNIE 14.3-67 to
demonstrate that VC and NVA forces in the South were facing substantial manpower
problems.' 09 Ambassador Bunker echoed these claims, telling reporters that the United
States was making "steady progress" in part because of the reduced enemy strength and
declining enemy recruitment.110
The estimate also demonstrated consensus to other domestic groups. The White
House assuaged both Congress and the Democratic Party about progress in the war by
presenting an image of agreement among top military and intelligence officials. Based in
part on the declining size of the enemy, Westmoreland gave a "cautiously optimistic"
briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, which was chaired by leading
Democrat Sen. Richard Russell."' He repeated his prediction that the United States
107 MACV Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Country File: Vietnam,
Box 156.
108 "War Gains Called very Encouraging by Westmoreland," New York Times, November 15, 1967, p.1.
109 "War of Attrition Called Effective by Westmoreland," New York Times, November 20, 1967, p. 1.
10 "Bunker Sees the President; Predicts Saigon Gain in '68," New York Times, November 13, 1967, p. 1.
See also "Bunker Reports Gains," New York Times, November 15, 1967, p. 6.
111 "Johnson is Briefed by Westmoreland," New York Times, November 17, 1967, p. 3.
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could begin to withdraw within two years to the House Armed Service Committee.112
Helms sent SNIE 14.3-67 to every member of Congress as part of his New Year's
intelligence digest.1 13 At the same time, the New York Times reported that the CIA was
helping to catalog measurements of progress for the president which would be used in
public speeches and messages to Congress.
Several aspects of the administration's Vietnam strategy relied on evidence of a
coming crossover point. First, the White House argued that the war was a test of will, not
just a straightforward military confrontation. Administration officials feared that bad
news from intelligence agencies would reinforce the perception of stalemate and
undermine public faith in the war effort. On the other hand, intelligence that enemy
strength was declining could be used to boost morale at home. Although the crossover
point itself was an abstraction - nobody could accurately pinpoint the moment that the
NVA and VC casualty rated outstripped the ability to put new fighters in place - the idea
of a crossover point created the impression that the worst of the war was over and that
victory was inevitable. When asked in August to assess the ground war, the president
revealed that "more and more...we think that because of the losses he has suffered,
because of the position in which he finds himself-he is less anxious to engage our
troops in combat." As a result, Johnson was able to confidently declare that his strategy
was working and that there was no need to change direction. Positive trends in the order
112 New York Times, "War of Attrition Called Effective."
113 Adams, War ofNumbers, 134.
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of battle also sent a signal to North Vietnamese leaders that they could not outlast the
United States, and that it was futile to continue fighting a losing war. 114
Second, the OB estimate justified administration arguments in favor of bombing
the North, which had become enormously controversial in 1967. Critics charged that the
bombing campaign was immoral and ineffective. The White House countered that the
bombing of supply depots, logistics hubs, and transportation routes made it more difficult
to infiltrate men and material to South Vietnam. It played an important role in eroding
communist capabilities in the south and, it was hoped, would compel Hanoi to negotiate
for peace. Order of battle figures showing a decline in enemy strength demonstrated that
North Vietnam could not continue to re-supply forces in the south to match the rate of
attrition. The enemy "has failed in achieving his objectives," Westmoreland announced
in July:
Despite the fact that North Vietnam has now apparently fully mobilized,
sending her best troops and leadership to the South, developed a very large
air defense system, and having her physical infrastructure progressively
destroyed by our offensive strategy, our air war, she has nothing to show
for it.'' 5
The crossover point was almost at hand partly because of the bombing campaign.
Communist forces, fully extended in South Vietnam and suffering tremendous losses,
would not be able to rebuild fighting strength as long as the bombardment continued.
Finally, the OB estimate supported administration claims that its pacification
campaign was working. While MACV sought to destroy enemy military forces,
114 Press conference, August 18, 1967. Full text is available from the UC Santa Barbara American
Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu. All subsequent references to presidential press conferences
are from the UCSB web site.
115 Press Conference, July 13, 1967. Westmoreland moderated his claims later in the press conference: "No
doubt they could send additional troops to the South and they may do so. But they will do so at great risk.
As long as we continue our air interdiction program, I believe they will be hard pressed to properly support
them."
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pacification was intended to win the support of the Vietnamese people by providing
security and a better standard of living. The so-called "other war" was essential to
undermining VC hopes of catalyzing an uprising against the Saigon regime, and it offered
the only long term hope of ending the war on terms acceptable to the United States.
Indeed, the long-stated goal of preserving a non-communist South Vietnam depended on
creating a government that could survive on its own, and stability depended on the
government's ability to provide welfare and security. Pacification was difficult to
measure, but an overall decline in the strength of communist forces in South Vietnam
was a sign that the country was becoming more secure. Komer added to the public
relations offensive by issuing a number of background briefings to reporters on progress
in securing the countryside.116 The war was being won by the steady expansion of
territory outside the control of VC forces, whose numbers were dwindling." 7 The CIA
threw cold water on such optimism by including part-time defense forces in the order of
battle. The inclusion of these groups might the door to speculation about the real strength
of the Vietcong and cast doubt on the effectiveness of pacification.
Critical constituencies. As described above, no critical constituencies had
emerged that could undermine the president in 1964. Congress stayed true to the
principle that the president should have a free hand in foreign policy, the Democratic
Party tacitly agreed to stifle its concerns during the election season, and no sizable
antiwar coalition had formed. Most importantly, the public at large was uninformed and
116 Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1998), p. 135.
117 Robert Komer was ever optimistic about the pacification campaign, even joking with the President about
his reputation as a "rosy-eyed optimist." For representative examples, see Komer to Johnson, January 23
and February 11, 1967, LBJ papers, National Security File, Komer Files, Box 2. Komer's overall
assessment of the war is in Rostow to Johnson, July 7, 1967, LBJ Papers, Files of W.W. Rostow, Box 7.
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apathetic. Very few Americans understood the details of the conflict, and the issue was
not a pressing concern in any case.
During the OB controversy all of these groups were actively engaged on the issue.
All were attentive to the administration's theory of victory in Vietnam, and the attrition
strategy had become one of the most controversial aspects of the war. Grinding down the
enemy might be possible, but it would also lead to increasing American casualties in an
increasingly unpopular war. The attrition strategy also carried a hint of amorality
because it demanded that the body count be the crucial measure of effectiveness against
enemy forcers. MACV's clinical language exacerbated both problems. Words like
"metrics" and "end strength" were cold and detached; to antiwar protestors they revealed
the bloodless detachment of a strategy that relied on cluster bombs and napalm. 118
As a result of these concerns, the mood on Capital Hill began to shift away from
support for the war. This was deeply troubling to Johnson, who maintained a "twenty-
four hour a day obsession" with Congress.1 19 The Senate began to shed some of its
previous institutional norms against interfering in foreign policy, demanding more
authority over what had traditionally been the purview of the president. The president's
attempt to mollify critics was not enough for congressmen who saw capriciousness and
bad faith in the executive. Vietnam was not just the result of bad decisions by the
Johnson administration. Rather, it demonstrated that too much power was concentrated
in the White House. Sen. Fulbright proposed a resolution in November that would force
the president to gain congressional approval before committing troops in battle.
118 Herring, America's Longest War, p. 207.
119 Barrett, Uncertain Warriors, p. 69.
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Although the resolution went nowhere, it presaged the War Powers Act several years
later. 120 The informal norm of executive prerogative in foreign policy was eroding.
Congress could also obstruct foreign policy directly, as it demonstrated when it
cut the president's foreign assistance request by one-third in the autumn. But the biggest
threat had to do with Johnson's ambitious plan to create a "Great Society" by expanding
health care, education, and other social programs. This was the centerpiece of the
Johnson administration, and the president did not want to allow Vietnam spending to cut
into his domestic priorities. His solution was to consciously mislead Congress about the
price of Vietnam under the cover of a booming economy. Before 1967 the White House
sought to finance the war through supplementals, all the while counting on adroit fiscal
policies to generate enough revenue to fund both foreign and domestic initiatives.
Johnson's economic advisors, not privy to the Vietnam decision-making process, were
given a false impression about the size and duration of American involvement in the war.
As a result, they overestimated their own ability to control the inflationary pressures
caused by military spending. (They may also have overestimated their ability to
influence the president, who rejected calls for tax increases in 1965 and 1966.) The
effects of a rapidly overheating economy were impossible to hide by fiscal year 1967,
right about the time that Great Society programs started to draw on the budget. When
economic reality began to emerge, outraged congressmen demanded cuts in domestic
spending to offset the spiraling costs of the war. Congress put a lien on the Great
120 "Johnson Retorts to Critics of War; Scores Rowdyism," New York Times, November 18, 1967, p. 1.
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Society, and president had to convince them that the war was being won if he had any
hope of saving it.121
Vietnam proved to be a congressional watershed. The drawn out conflict
effectively ended the so-called Cold War consensus that had unified Congress behind the
grand strategy of containment and given the president a relatively free hand in foreign
affairs. 122 As casualties mounted and costs rose, Senators from both sides of the aisle
publicly questioned the war effort. Before 1967 Republicans had advocated a policy of
firm resistance to communism in Vietnam. But fissures in the party emerged. Some
Republicans argued that escalation was needed to end the war more quickly, while other
long-time hawks reconsidered their position on the war and their support for the
president. Sen. Thurston B. Morton, for example, resignedly concluded that the United
States was "planted into a corner out there."1 23 Republican opposition began to coalesce
in the spring, when a group of disgruntled Senate Republicans completed a white paper
sharply critical of White House strategy. 124 Conservatives were unsettled by the fiscal
consequences of the war, and wanted commensurate cuts in domestic spending to pay for
it.
121 Jeffrey W. Helsing, Johnson 's War/Johnson's Great Society: The Guns and Butter Trap (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2000). See also Berman, Lyndon Johnson 's War, p. 60.
122 Wildavsky, "The Two-Presidencies Thesis". Wildavsky conceded later that he had overstated his
argument about the presidential primacy with respect to foreign policy. Instead of pointing to fundamental
differences between foreign and domestic affairs, the real reason for presidential flexibility up to 1966 was
the broad agreement between congressmen and presidents about the basic necessity of aggressively
containing the Soviet Union. See Aaron Wildavsky, with Duane Oldfield, "The Two Presidencies Thesis
Revisited at a Time of Political Dissensus," (1989), in Wildavsky, The Beleagured Presidency (London:
Transaction Publishers, 1991), pp. 47-65. For a related argument about presidential prerogative under
conditions of high threat, see Richard M. Pious, The American Presidency (New York: Basic Books, 1979),
pp. 51-65.
123 Herring, America's Longest War, p. 213.
124 Dietz, Republicans and Vietnam, pp. 113-129, at 117. See also Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (Garden City,
NY, 1971), pp. 83-92.
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Democratic doves also wanted assurance that the U.S. presence in Vietnam was
not indefinite, although they called for negotiation rather than escalation as the means to
end the conflict. Some Democrats were careful not to press the issue to far, lest they be
accused of not supporting American soldiers in the field. 125 Others were in full revolt.
Senator Fulbright became particularly strident as the war seemed to settle into a
stalemate, warning Johnson at one point that "Vietnam is ruining our domestic and our
foreign policy." 126 Fulbright led a wave of outspoken criticism from the president's own
party, publishing a best-seller in January that warned that the United States was failing in
Vietnam because it was seduced by the "arrogance of power."' 27 Democratic voters also
protested American strategy, urging the White House to scale back the bombing of North
Vietnam and accelerate efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. Most rank-and-file
Democrats were unwilling to desert the president for rear of shepherding a more hawkish
replacement. "We have no alternative," one activist said. "We don't want Ronnie
Reagan, we want Lyndon Johnson."' 28 But administration officials must have been
dismayed after a Gallup survey in February 1967 showed that Americans believed, by a
two to one margin, that Robert Kennedy would do a better job on Vietnam than Johnson
if he was elected the following November. 129 Democrats were not willing to sacrifice
Lyndon Johnson for Ronald Reagan, but they were more than willing to survey the field
for a replacement from within the party.
125 Barrett, Uncertain Warriors, pp. 64-65.
126 Notes on a Meeting between the President and Senate Committee Chairman, July 27, 1967, LBJ Papers,
Tom Johson Meeting Notes File.
127 J. William Fulfright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Random House, 1967).
128 "Young Democrats Ask Bombing Halt," New York Times, November 19, 1967, p. 1.129 Gallup survey, February 16-21, 1967.
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The antiwar movement coalesced in 1967, when a number of social groups joined
in protest. When Martin Luther King, Jr. came out against Vietnam in April, he brought
along African-Americans who had mostly supported the war, undermining the racial
consensus that Johnson had carefully cultivated in support of his domestic program. The
burgeoning women's movement also adopted the cause of Vietnam. Another Mother for
Peace, organized in March, was able to attract over 100,000 members by year's end with
its memorable slogan: "War is not healthy for children and other living things." No
longer operating on the fringe, the antiwar movement became a disparate but vocal
coalition of traditional pacifists who viewed all war as morally wrong, leftists who
believed that the war exploited vulnerable lower classes in America and victimized the
poor in Vietnam, and foreign policy realists who argued that Vietnam was not a vital
national interest. The voices of the movement were equally diverse, including civil rights
advocates, religious leaders, athletes and musicians. 130 The rise of the antiwar movement
made the administration's task more difficult and more urgent. 131
Finally, the public was no longer apathetic. Casualties mounted, draft calls
exceeded 30,000 each month, and the president recommended a 10% surtax in August to
deal with the costs of the war. Not surprisingly, support for the war dropped
precipitously. At the same moment that the CIA was challenging MACV over the enemy
130 The disparate coalition of protestors were all on display while the administration was executing its
public relations offensive in 1967. Antiwar activists, professors, religious leaders, and retired military
officers simultaneously competed with the White House for media attention. Consider the following
sample of reports from the week in which the administration released the SNIE: "With Johnson in the Front
Pew, Minister Questions War Policy," New York Times, November 12, 1967, p. 1; "Rabbi Links War in
Vietnam with Urban Blight," New York Times, November 12, 1967, p. 6; "Galbraith Tells Labor Leaders
War Can't Be Won," New York Times, November 12, 1967, p. 6; "Gavin Sees Troops in Vietnam in 70s,"
New York Times, November 13, 1967, p. 1; and "War Foes Clash with Police here as Rusk Speaks," New
York Times, November 15, 1967, p. 1.
131 A useful overview of the antiwar movement is Melvin Small, Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the
Battle for America's Hearts and Minds (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2002). For in-depth treatments, see
Charles DeBenedetti with Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam
Era (Syracuse, NY: 1990); and Jeffrys-Jones, Peace Now!.
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order of battle, poll results showed for the first time that a majority of Americans felt that
intervening had been a mistake. 132 While the administration stressed the crossover point
in Vietnam, a different crossover was occurring at home.
Now central to American political debate, the war consistently ranked as the one
of the most important issues facing the United States. A majority of respondents in a
January poll called it the most important problem facing the United States. Vietnam
continued to occupy public attention even as urban rioting and civil strife made headlines
that summer. Just before Gen. Westmoreland returned to Washington to publicize the
new order of battle figures, 48 percent of Americans told pollsters that Vietnam the most
important policy problem. Where they had been uninformed and apathetic in 1964, now
they paid close attention. 133
The White House mailroom also recorded the shift in public opinion. In 1964
Vietnam had not attracted much attention, generating far less correspondence than other
issues. But during the OB episode Vietnam was far and away the dominant concern.
During the spring, summer and autumn of 1967, the White House received 126,648
letters, postcards, and telegrams on Vietnam. This represented 16.9% of all incoming
correspondence. Moreover, the level of controversy over the war had risen in lockstep
with the level of public attentiveness. In the mountain of letters on Vietnam collated by
mail room workers, dissent outnumbered support by three to one. 134
In addition to general antiwar sentiment, the public was increasingly skeptical
about the details of U.S. strategy. The White House was simultaneously trying to coerce
132 Herring, America 's Longest War, p. 211.
133 See Gallup surveys, August 3-8, and October 27 - November 1, 1967.
134 Weekly mailroom summaries for the duration of the Johnson administration are contained in the LBJ
Papers, White House Administration (EX WH 5-1, 9/1/68), Box 11.
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a settlement through strategic bombing, erode enemy capabilities through a war of
attrition on the ground, and pacify the countryside. None of these strategies, alone or in
combination, did much to satisfy public opinion. One problem was that, unlike
conventional wars in which success was measured by territory captured and held, the
guerilla fighting in Vietnam offered no similar benchmarks. Another problem was that
the different approaches seemed immoral. Strategic bombing was attacked as inhumane
because it inevitably led to civilian deaths, and pacification efforts were linked to
assassinations and other atrocities.
The president therefore faced an uphill battle to win back public opinion. During
the summer White House officials became increasingly frustrated about reports that the
war had descended into stalemate. Johnson sneered at what he called the "stalemate
creature," and Westmoreland called it a "complete fiction." ' 35 But despite their best
efforts to portray an image of confidence, officials remained concerned about the widely
held perception that the U.S. forces were bogged down. These fears were well founded.
At the beginning of the year 41 percent of Americans believed that the United States was
"standing still" in Vietnam, while another 10 percent believed that it was losing
ground. 136 Only 6 percent believed that the United States should continue its present
policy in the war. 137 Most believed that the best course of action was not to continue
with the attrition strategy, but to take immediate steps to place the burden onto the South
Vietnamese.' 3 8 Changing these views would not be easy, especially because the
administration lacked credibility: almost two-thirds of survey respondents in March told
135 Press Conference, July 13, 1967. For various White House attempts to convince the press and public
that there was no stalemate, see Berman, Lyndon Johnson 's War, pp. 55-59
136 Gallup Survey, January 7-12, 1967.
137 Gallup Survey, April 19-24, 1967.
138 See Gallup Surveys, March 30-April 4, and August 24-29, 1967.
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Gallup pollsters that they believed the administration was "not telling the truth" when it
came to Vietnam.139
The president was well aware of the shift against the war. On July 18 he read
aloud from a letter to the White House complaining about the lack of a clear strategy for
victory in Vietnam. Johnson wanted warn his staff that the letter was "symptomatic of
what we will be facing on the Hill and around the country in coming months." 140 He
urged cabinet members and military officers to aggressively respond to perceptions of a
stalemate, and MACV put together a set of prepared answers in anticipation of reporters'
questions. 141 Rostow reiterated this request in late September:
We must somehow get hard evidence out of Saigon on steady if slow
progress in population control, pacification, VC manpower problems,
economic progress in the countryside, ARVN improvement, etc. All are
happening. Little comes through despite what we know to be most serious
efforts out our way. President's judgment is that this is at present stage a
critically important dimension of fighting the war.142
In October an exasperated Johnson told a group of advisors that the war was almost lost
in the court of public opinion, and worried that antiwar protestors were more interested
changing presidents than changing policies. 143 The attrition strategy did not offer the
hopes of a dramatic victory that would reverse this trend. Even the crossover point was
an abstraction; nobody really knew how long the communists would be able to replace
their losses in the field. Meanwhile, bad news continued to pour in from Vietnam.
139 Gallup Survey, March 9-14, 1967.
140 Notes from the President's Meeting with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Walt Rostow,
McGeorge Bundy, George Christian, July 18, 1967, LBJ Papers, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes File.
141 Notes from Tuesday Lunch Group, July 12, 1967, LBJ Papers, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes File; and
Meeting with Col. Robin Olds, Col. James U. Cross, and Tom Johnson, October 2, 1967, LBJ Papers, Tom
Johnson Meeting Notes File. On the MACV effort, see Rostow to Johnson, November 11, 1967, LBJ
Papers, Files of W.W. Rostow, Box 4.
142 Quoted in Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War, pp. 84-85.
143 Notes from the President's Meeting with McNamara, Rusk, Helms, Rostow, Christian, and Wheeler,
October 23, 1967, LBJ Papers, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes File.
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Televised coverage of the war added a visceral element to the daily casualty figures.
"We are losing support in this country," Johnson concluded. "The people just do not
understand the war."1 4 4
The administration also understood the political costs it would pay if it failed to
make a persuasive case in support of the attrition strategy in Vietnam. Where Johnson
had enjoyed consistently high approval ratings in 1964, he now faced a downward slide,
due in large part to the rising costs of the war. The White House had sent nearly half a
million troops to Vietnam by 1967, and more than ten thousand had died in combat.
Vietnam was also exacting an economic toll as massive increases in defense spending
caused inflation to spike. The human and economic costs of the war were eroding
support for White House strategy, and for the president himself. Approval for the
president was steadily declining in the months leading up to the climax of the order of
battle controversy.
Table 6. Presidential Approval Ratings, 1967
Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Johnson is handling his job as
president?
Date Approve Disapprove No opinion
April 49 37 15
May 45 40 16
June 44 39 16
July 47 39 14
August 40 47 13
September 38 48 14
Source: Gallup surveys, April-September 1967.
144 Notes form the President's meeting with McNamara, Katzenbach, Helms, Rostow, Christian. LBJ
Papers, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes File. See also Barrett, Uncertain Warriors, pp. 69-72.
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Johnson's commitment to the attrition strategy in Vietnam sharply constricted his
freedom of action. Congress was no longer willing to give the president a free hand in
foreign policy, and threatened to undermine his ambitious domestic plans. Democratic
leaders had broken with the president over Vietnam, and serious challengers for the party
nominee had already emerged. The antiwar movement had become vocal and persistent,
forcing the administration to work harder to convince the public that the war was being
won. Finally, the public was increasingly skeptical about the purposes of the war and the
strategy for victory. Given the administration's lack of credibility, it could not hope to
overcome public discontent on its own. Instead, it manufactured a counterfeit consensus
in order to convince Americans that the national security establishment stood firmly
behind the strategy of attrition. The White House politicized intelligence when the CIA
challenged the consensus. 145
Competing Explanations
This section evaluates two competing explanations for the change in intelligence-
policy relations during the Vietnam War. The first deals with the personalities of the key
actors involved. President Johnson had a much closer professional relationship with
Richard Helms than with John McCone. This may have made it easy to ignore McCone
and harder to ignore Helms. The second explanation is based on the psychology of
decision making under conditions of high stress. According to this argument,
psychological pressure in the White House led to acrimonious intelligence-policy
relations. Johnson was more desperate to settle the war by 1967, and his advisors were
145 Although reporters were skeptical about the November PR blitz, Johnson enjoyed temporary increases
in public approval of his handling of the war. Berman, Lyndon Johnson 's War, pp. 118-119.
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alternately fretting about the situation on the ground and trying boost his morale. Perhaps
the stress of the war caused the administration to lash out at intelligence officials that did
not support an optimistic view.
Personal Proximity. The personal proximity hypothesis offers a plausible
alternative explanation for the variation in policy responses to intelligence during the
war. The hypothesis predicts that politicization is more likely when intelligence officials
interact closely with their policy counterparts. Frequent contact gives policymakers more
opportunity to manipulate the content and tone of estimates. Close professional
relationships make it hard for intelligence officials to resist these efforts, especially if
their respect for policymakers makes them reluctant to deliver bad news. Intelligence
officials that enjoy some distance from their policymaking counterparts are more
sensitive to politicization and less likely to bend to pressure. They have no emotional
attachment to policymakers and do not associate policy success with intelligence
success. 146
Relative proximity is difficult to measure, but the differences in the
administration's relationship with McCone and Helms are stark. McCone's relationship
with Johnson was cold and distant by June 1964; their differences led the DCI to leave
government service shortly thereafter. Helms, on the other hand, was quite close to the
president, and had gained a seat in regular discussions among Johnson's inner circle. By
any measure Helms was much closer to the administration. Does this explain why he
146 For two intelligence perspectives on the importance of personality and personal style, see Helms, A Look
Over My Shoulder, 293-299, and 377-384; and Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in
Transition (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), 128-134. For a historical review of how policymakers'
personalities and beliefs shaped their interactions with intelligence agencies, see Christopher Andrew, For
the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush
(New York: Harper Collins, 1995).
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buckled to White House pressure at the end of the OB controversy? More importantly,
did policymakers realize that Helms that was especially vulnerable to pressure because of
his special relationship with the president?
When he took over from Kennedy, Johnson consulted McCone regularly and
promised him easy access to the Oval Office. The day after the Kennedy assassination,
Johnson reminded McCone about the "long background of association and friendship
with me personally, his respect for the Agency, (and) the fact that on a number of issues
that had arisen since I took office as DCI he and I had seen eye to eye." For these
reasons, McCone believed that the president "had complete confidence in me and
expressed the wish that I continue in the future exactly as I have in the past." The
president asked for personal briefings for "the next few days... (and) asked that any
matters of urgent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night."' 47
LBJ went further on November 29, asking McCone to think of himself as a policy advisor
as well as the head of the intelligence community. Johnson asked specifically for
McCone's analysis of the situation in Vietnam and recommendations for future action. 48
He also was eager to listen to McCone's beliefs about the appropriate role of the DCI.
McCone was unhappy with the "cloak and dagger" image of the position because it
caused foreign dignitaries to view him with suspicion. Where the previous DCI, Allen
Dulles, had cultivated the image of a gentleman spy, McCone believed that the director
ought to focus on the CIA's broader mandate: "...to take all intelligence, including
147 "Memorandum for the Record: Discussion with President Johnson, November 2 3rd, about 9:15 a.m."
LBJ Papers, Meeting Notes File, Box I, Set II.
148 "Memorandum for the Record: Discussion with President Johnson, 28 November 1963, 10:00 a.m.,"
November 29, 1963, LBJ Papers, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, Box 1; and
"Memorandum for the Record: Meeting at his residence with President 10:00 a.m. - Thursday - November
28," November 29, 1963, LBJ Papers, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, Box 1
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clandestine and technical intelligence, and meld it into a proper and thoughtful analysis
estimate of any given situation."' 4 9
The honeymoon period was brief, however, and Johnson quickly became
uninterested in McCone's counsel. In late April the DCI began worrying that he was
losing access, complaining that "the President was not getting sufficient and adequate
intelligence briefings; that I was not seeing very much of him, and this disturbed me." In
an effort to appease McCone, Johnson said "he was available any time that I wanted to
see him. All I had to do was call up. I said this has not been the case on several
'attempts."' 50 McCone saw less of the president that year, however, meeting with
Johnson only five times after June. Rather than forging a close relationship and
integrating intelligence into the policymaking process, the president pushed McCone
away. Almost a year after taking office, Johnson admitted that did not really understand
the activities and purposes of the CIA. 151
The president and the DCI were politically and personally incompatible. McCone
was a committed Republican, a holdover from the Kennedy Administration who was
originally appointed to curry favor with conservatives who worried that the young
president was not committed to a strong national defense. Johnson was an progressive
Democrat who was committed to expanding social programs. His anticommunist
149 "Memorandum for the Record: Discussion with the President on Saturday, December 7, 12:00,"
December 9, 1963, LBJ Papers, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, Box 1;
"Memorandum for the Record: Discussions with President Johnson at the Johnson Ranch on Friday,
December 27th, December 29, 1963, LBJ Papers, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President,
Box 1.
150 McCone also complained to White House aide Jack Valenti that reporters were writing publicly about
his distance from the president. Valenti to Johnson, July 22, 1964, LBJ Papers, White House Central File,
Name File: John A. McCone, Box 225; and "Memorandum for the Record: Discussion with President
Johnson - Wednesday afternoon - 29 Apr. 4:45 in his office," April 30, 1964, LBJ Papers, John McCone
Memoranda, Meetings with the President, Box 1.
151 McCone, Addendum to Memorandum for the Record, LBJ Papers, John McCone Memos file, Box 1.
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credentials were long established, and he certainly did not need John McCone to
convince the right that he was serious about containment. Moreover, the president did
not like McCone's style. According to Russell Jack Smith, Helms's deputy in the late
sixties, Johnson would usually rather read new intelligence than sit through oral briefings.
When he did interact with intelligence advisors, he preferred a relaxed and informal
conversational style. For this reason, McCone's "crisp, concise sentences, spoken in his
usual brisk manner, fell on deaf Johnsonian ears."' 52
Helms enjoyed a far better relationship with the president. Instead of seeking to
become a policy advisor, Helms carefully cultivated an image of strict policy neutrality.
This appears to have worked on Johnson, who appreciated his ability to refrain from
pushing his own preferences during top-level meetings. In addition, Helms sought to
tailor analysis to fit the president's modus operandi. McCone obliviously stuck to crisp
and brisk briefings, but Helms was happy to indulge Johnson's preference for written
products while remaining available to answer informal questions. The president
appreciated the "tough edge to Helms's style," which, according to one historian, helped
ease friction between the CIA and the White House during the Vietnam years.153 Helms
likewise appreciated the president's style, referring to him later as a "first-rate boss." 54
Thus while McCone quickly lost access to the White House, Helms became a regular
participant in the president's Tuesday Lunches, the informal policy planning sessions that
took the place of infrequent and unproductive NSC meetings. His access was virtually
152 Smith, Unknown CIA, p. 191.
153 David S. Robarge, "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," Studies in
Intelligence, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2005); www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol49no 1l/html files/arab israeliwar 1 .html.
154 Transcript, Richard Helms Oral History Interview I, by Paige Mulhollan, April 4, 1969, LBJ Library,
Oral Histories Collection, p. 5.
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guaranteed after the CIA provided a remarkably accurate forecast of the Six Day war in
May 1967.'55
Although Helms enjoyed a better relationship with Johnson, this does not explain
why politicization occurred during his tenure. McCone was desperate to gain access to
the president, a fact not lost on White House aides. 156 They also had reason to suspect
that McCone would soften his position in order to bolster the Agency's standing with the
president. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which the CIA had failed to predict
that the Soviet Union would place ballistic missiles in Cuba, McCone had desperately
tried to restore the Agency's image. Perhaps to deflect lingering criticism from the White
House over its failure, he delivered an unsolicited and uncharacteristically positive NIE
on Vietnam in the spring of 1963. This might have been good news to the administration,
but a clear break from McCone's standard pessimism about the stability of the regime
and the strength of the South Vietnamese army. (In this case the White House did not
attempt to politicize intelligence; McCone forced the Office of National Estimates to
revise its original without being asked. His motives remain unclear. 157) Had it wanted to
155 Under pressure from Israel to provide rhetorical and material support in front of the imminent conflict,
Johnson asked Helms whether Israel's dire predictions were realistic. The CIA quickly assessed that
Israel's position was strong, and that it would win the war in 7-10 days. Armed with this analysis, Johnson
parried Israel's requests, and Helms won a seat at the table. The DCI was a regular visitor to the White
House thereafter. Robarge, "Getting it Right."
156 Bundy to Johnson, May 1, 1964, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. 4, Box 1; and Valenti to Johnson, July 22, 1964, LBJ Papers, White House Central File,
Name File, "John A. McCone," Box 225.
157 McCone was unhappy with the first draft of NIE 53-63, "Prospects in Vietnam," and ordered the ONE
to circulate it among "those who know Vietnam best." These included MACV commander Paul Harkins,
Ambassador Nolting, CINCPAC Harry Felt, Army Chief of Staff Earle Wheeler, Michael Forrestal of the
NSC staff, and Roger Hilsman of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Unlike the
OB controversy, where some military officers agreed with the CIA position, criticism of the draft came
from all quarters. Without exception, the reviewers felt that the ONE was too critical of ARVN
performance and too pessimistic about the prospects for defeating the VC. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam
Policymakers, pp. 8-18.
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influence intelligence, the administration could have used his desire to get back into the
good graces of the president.
In addition, if the proximity hypothesis explained the differences in
administration behavior towards intelligence, then the president should have routinely
tried to manipulate discomfiting intelligence analyses after Helms became DCI. This was
not the case. On September 11, shortly after the resolution of the order of battle
controversy, Helms sent an eyes only memo to the president analyzing the possible
consequences of losing in Vietnam. Although Helms argued that withdrawal would
destabilize Southeast Asia, he concluded that "the risks are probably more limited and
controllable than most previous arguments have indicated."' 58 Helms understood the
political implications of his analysis and did not want to enter into another bruising
bureaucratic fight with MACV. In his cover letter, Helms bluntly warned that the
"attached paper is sensitive, particularly if its existence were to leak" (italics in original).
As he wrote in his memoirs, "The mere rumor that such a document existed would in
itself have been political dynamite." 159 But the existence of the memo was not leaked,
and Helms' commitment to secrecy meant the president could accept the analysis without
worrying about the domestic political fallout. The close and continuing interaction
between Helms and Johnson did not lead to politicization. On the contrary, faith in
Helms's professionalism reassured the president that his advice would not become the
subject of another public controversy.
158 Helms to Johnson, "Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam," September 11, 1967,
reprinted in John K. Allen, Jr., John Carver, and Tom Elmore, eds., Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948-
1975 (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2005), pp. 393-426, quoted at p. 426. See also
McNamara, In Retrospect, pp. 292-293.
159 Both quotes are in Lloyd C. Gardner, "Introduction," in Allen, et al., Estimative Products on Vietnam.
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Psychology. The stress of the war took a physical and psychological toll on the
president and his advisors. Pressure mounted as the war consumed more lives and
money, and Johnson became increasingly desperate for a way out. The idea of a coming
crossover point held a glimmer of hope for the administration that the war was moving in
the right direction, and that the United States could extricate itself from Vietnam. If the
intelligence community agreed that the trends were moving in the right direction, then the
administration could have confidence in its strategy.
Psychologists offer a number of explanations for why decision makers seek the
support of their advisors. Various strands of cognitive dissonance theory suggest that
leaders will fit information to match their preferences and beliefs. 160 To this end they
will embrace advisors who support their views and denigrate those that do not. With
respect to intelligence-policy relations, this suggests that neglect should be more common
than politicization, because leaders can simply ignore dissonant information. But the
need for cognitive consistency may cause leaders to put indirect or direct pressure on
intelligence officials in order to remove lingering doubts about the wisdom of their
decisions. A more sympathetic argument is that individuals have an emotional need to be
perceived as moral and rational when faced with difficult decisions. Individuals do not
like to feel alone and isolated in these cases. Rather, they need to believe that they are
acting on the basis of the best available information, and that their advisors all agree with
the decision. 161 Politicization may also be a manifestation of groupthink, or the tendency
for decision-making bodies to sacrifice rational debate in favor of consensus. When
160 Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985), pp. 29-34.
161 Philip E. Tetlock and Charles B. McGuire, Jr., "Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy," in G. John
Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, 5 th ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005),
pp. 484-501, at 493.
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groupthink occurs, dissenting advisors face pressure to come into line with the
policymaker's preferences. 162
Do any of these hypotheses explain the emergence of politicization in 1967? It is
true that the CIA's dissent on the order of battle removed an emotional crutch for the
administration during a period of extremely high stress. During the summer Johnson had
become convinced that progress was being made in Vietnam. Optimistic reports from the
field on pacification and the steady erosion of the enemy made it appear as if victory was
within reach, and may have eased the stress on policymakers. But when the CIA
questioned the order of battle, it seemed to undermine the logic of U.S. policy.
There is no doubt that the Johnson administration operated under conditions of
high stress as the war went on. 163 In addition, the president was clearly frustrated when
his advisors could not agree on important policy decisions. The ongoing debate over the
efficacy of strategic bombing led to a characteristic outburst from the president in 1967.
During a meeting he asked his advisors about the efficacy of bombing the Phuc Yen Air
Field near Hanoi. Johnson stated that his preference was to bomb the base, but was
unwilling to go forward without support. "My instinct is to take it out" he said, "But you
divide, 2-2, and throw it in my lap." 164 This anecdote certainly suggests that Johnson
sought psychological backing for his decisions.
162 Irving Janis described groupthink in the context of small group decision-making under conditions of
stress. The term has since been abused, its meaning stretched to include all situations in which any group
of individuals fail to survey alternative possibilities and become locked into a mindset. The connection
between groupthink and politicization may require stretching the definition even further if pressures on top
intelligence officials trickle down to the wider pool of analysts. In this case the effects of groupthink are
felt outside the small group that Janis described. Irving Janis, Groupthink, 2 nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin, 1982).
163 For signs of strain on the president, see Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War, pp. 180-182.
164 Meeting notes, August 24, 1967, LBJ Papers, Tom Johnson's Meeting Notes File.
180
It does not, however, show that he pressured his intelligence officials or other
advisors to change their findings in order to gain the comfort of consensus. If anything,
Johnson tended to vacillate on important decisions when he could not get his advisors to
agree. In addition, Vietnam caused anxiety for the president from the start. He revealed
a sense of hopelessness as early as May 1964, when he questioned McGeorge Bundy
about the purpose of the war. Recall his unanswered questions: "What the hell is
Vietnam worth to me? What is it worth to this country?" Finally, Johnson always
preferred that his advisors presented unified policy recommendations. This was simply
his management style. Helms later recalled the regular instruction that Johnson gave to
his aides: "Now, look, you fellows go off and talk about that and see if you can't get this
agreed and come back to me and tell me what to do." 165 If they managed to forge an
agreement, he would simply vote up or down on their recommendation. If not, he would
become frustrated and complain about their inability to compromise.
While the president sought affirmation before making decisions, this was not a
result of added stress as the war went on. His behavior in this regard did not change
between 1964 and 1967, and cannot explain why politicization occurred.
Summary
The oversell model explains why the Johnson administration politicized the order
of battle estimate, despite the fact that it had previously ignored contradictory
intelligence. In 1964 the president had carefully avoided making a clear commitment
about U.S. strategy in Vietnam, and no critical constituencies threatened to undermine his
policy agenda or political future. The administration hardly needed the Board of National
165 Helms, Oral History, p. 27. Johnson's management style is described in Barrett, Uncertain Warriors.
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Estimates to help justify policy as long as the president retained flexibility, especially
because so few were paying attention to the issue at hand. In 1967, however, the
president had publicly committed to an attrition strategy, and he faced a number of
groups that had the power to submarine his plans. Domestic politics gave the White
House strong incentives to force the CIA to accept the lower estimate of the enemy order
of battle. The president used intelligence to justify his strategy publicly, despite the fact
that CIA analyses did not support it.
The Johnson administration is unique in terms of intelligence-policy relations. No
administration has fluctuated so wildly in its relations with intelligence agencies,
alternately accepting, neglecting, and politicizing the CIA. In four years the
administration covered almost the entire spectrum of intelligence-policy relations, both
positive and negative. The oversell model sheds some light on what caused it to change,
showing how domestic politics raised the incentive to forge an official consensus to
justify administration policy. The next two chapters approach the topic from a different
direction. They explain how and why two very different administrations (Nixon and
Ford) both ended up politicizing intelligence on the Soviet strategic threat.
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Chapter 5
The Nixon Administration and the Soviet Strategic Threat
Richard Nixon had little use for the intelligence community. He was especially
dubious of the CIA, which he considered a bastion for northeastern liberals and detached
intellectuals. To Nixon, the epitome of the establishment intelligence officer was the
Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms. While Helms had earned a reputation
for professional integrity and nonpartisanship, Nixon's antipathy for the DCI was deep
and abiding. He made no attempt to forge a productive working relationship during the
transition, even declaring his intent to lock Helms out of NSC meetings. The president's
hostility towards intelligence was also the result of lingering suspicions from the 1960
presidential election, in which he accused the CIA of conspiring with John F. Kennedy.'
His conspiratorial tendencies were made him cynical about any intelligence product that
seemed to cast aspersions on his foreign policy preferences. Unsurprisingly, he was more
interested in covert action than political analysis. "Why not?" asked a senior CIA
analyst. "Covert action was an extension of administration policy, while analysis often
showed policy to be unwise." 2
Henry Kissinger shared some of these views, even though he did not carry a
personal grudge against the CIA. Kissinger also saw the old northeastern establishment
1 Nixon believed that the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, had given Kennedy false
information about Soviet capabilities. During the campaign Kennedy blamed the Eisenhower
administration for the so-called "missile gap," even though no such gap existed.
2 Quoted in Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American
Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 351. On Nixon's
preconceptions about intelligence, see Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, MA: Little, Brown &
Co., 1979), pp. 366-37; Russell Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency
(McClean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989), pp. 239-240; Richard M. Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, pp.
377, 382-383; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York:
Knopf, 1979), pp. 200-203; and Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Ddtente: The Right Attacks the CIA
(University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1998), pp. 73-78.
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in the modem intelligence community, and feared that the liberals he had debated as a
Harvard professor would resurface in the guise of intelligence analysts. More
specifically, Kissinger found intelligence to be congenitally risk-averse and prone to
bureaucratic self-protection. Far from the swashbuckling cowboys of Hollywood spy
movies, intelligence officials were loathe to deliver estimates that challenged the strategic
status quo or that supported bold U.S. actions. The sprawling community was a victim of
"bureaucratic immobilism," as he put it, and an obstacle in the way of efficient and
flexible diplomacy. 3 He was particularly displeased with National Intelligence Estimates
(NIEs), which he criticized as "Talmudic" documents that offered plenty of commentary
without much supporting data. Kissinger's feelings were well-known, and intelligence
analysts worried that the national security advisor put less stock into their estimates than
in the opinions of junior members of his staff.4
Nixon and Kissinger were determined to orchestrate foreign policy with minimal
input from outsiders. Both men were supremely confident about their ability to interpret
events and tailor the appropriate policy responses. Kissinger filtered most of the
intelligence products that made it to the White House, and was very selective about
which ones made it to the Oval Office. 5 Moreover, they shared the belief that success
depended on maintaining a tightly restricted decision-making process. The elaborate
series of diplomatic back-channels that characterized Nixon-era diplomacy required
equally elaborate secrecy measures, and career bureaucrats from the intelligence
community could not be trusted. Nixon and Kissinger were extremely close lipped about
3 Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 30 (Winter
1984), pp. 125-131, at 126.
4 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 36-38, 197; Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 353-354; and
Cahn, Killing Detente, pp. 75-76.
5 Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, p. 382.
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their efforts, and CIA analysts soon became frustrated. "How can we do our job," they
asked, "if we don't know what's going on?" 6
The White House also cultivated its own sources of information. Diplomatic back
channels provided private information which competed with the formal intelligence take.
In addition, the administration was just as likely to rely on technical analysis from the
Department of Defense as it was from the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology.
Kissinger organized the NSC to digest large amounts of information from various
sources, which he then distilled into a manageable product for the president. In this sense
the NSC replaced the CIA as a center for all-source intelligence analysis, and, as historian
Christopher Andrew observes, "It was Kissinger rather than the DCI who became the
president's main intelligence advisor." 7 The Office of National Estimates, meanwhile,
became increasingly irrelevant to the policy process. ONE drafted National Intelligence
Estimates and coordinated the finished version with input from across the intelligence
community. The White House was never satisfied with the product, however, and ONE
was dissolved early in Nixon's second term.
The politicization of intelligence during the Nixon administration is a hard case
for the oversell model, given the high variables attached to both variants of the proximity
hypothesis. The president's personal disdain for the intelligence community, as well as
the bureaucratic distance separating the CIA from the National Security Council, both
suggest that the administration should have ignored contrary intelligence estimates. The
6 The quote is from Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, p. 352. On the foreign policy process in the
Nixon administration, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 305-307 and 334-344;
Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 99, 107; Raymond L.Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation:
American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1985), p.
70; and Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 704-705, 718.
7 Andrew, For the President's Eye's Only, p. 351.
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Nixon administration was hostile to intelligence from the outset, and determined to keep
it out of the policy process. It harbored strong suspicions about the intelligence
community and developed alternative sources of information. For all of these reasons,
the Nixon White House commonly ignored intelligence. It was not a likely candidate for
politicization.
But this is precisely what happened in the first year of the administration. Inl969,
the White House repeatedly pressured intelligence officials to change their conclusions
on Soviet capabilities and intentions. The conflict initially revolved around different
interpretations of the warhead design of the heavy SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM). Later, administration officials tried to get the intelligence community to reverse
its conclusions on the fundamental purposes of the Soviet buildup. The first case was a
technical puzzle about Soviet engineering; the second was a question about Soviet
doctrine. In both instances administration officials tried to force intelligence to offer
estimates that supported to the policy line.
The oversell model explains the shift in administration behavior from neglect to
politicization, as well as the timing and type of pressure applied. The convergence of a
strong public commitment and the rise of two critical constituencies led to direct
politicization. Administration officials personally intervened to influence the annual
estimate of the Soviet Union, rather than opting for more subtle methods of manipulation.
In spring and summer 1969, the administration pushed very hard for congressional
approval of a new anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, which it justified by presenting
intelligence on developments in Soviet technology and doctrine. The administration
wanted the system not only as a defense against Soviet attack, but as a bargaining chip to
186
be used in future arms control negotiations. It further believed that arms control
agreements could be linked to other areas of potential cooperation, as a way of
encouraging and deepening detente. The emergence of serious opposition to ABM thus
threatened to undermine the long-term strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. When
opponents started highlighting apparent differences between White House statements and
intelligence findings, policymakers decided to intervene directly. The costs and risks of
dissent were high, and the administration did not have much time before Congress voted
on the president's plan. The risk of incurring significant political costs in the first year of
the new administration created large incentives to press intelligence officials for support.
Finally, the model explains why intelligence was so important to the official
consensus in support of missile defense. Policymakers grasped the persuasive power of
secret intelligence during the Safeguard controversy. Throughout the spring and summer
of 1969, the Nixon administration pointed to new intelligence on the strategic threat,
selectively declassifying information that described new Soviet capabilities and
intentions. By themselves, these revelations may not have been enough to overcome
congressional skepticism, but they suggested that information still classified was
sufficient to justify investing in missile defense.8
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section describes the evolution of the
Soviet threat and the American debate over missile defense, both of which set the stage of
the fight over the SS-9. The second section explains how domestic pressures led the
administration to politicize intelligence. The conclusion describes the lasting effects on
intelligence-policy relations as a result of the controversy.
8 The New York Times was suspicious of this tactic, noting in an editorial that the administration had
"repeatedly made use of intelligence data the country cannot examine and must take on faith."
"Intelligence Gap," New York Times, June 26, 1969, p. 40.
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The Soviet Buildup and the American Response
Soviet strategic forces were numerically and qualitatively inferior during the first
half of the 1960s. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, Moscow only maintained 300
weapons capable of reaching the United States. In contrast, the U.S. fielded 1,300
strategic bombers that could carry 3,000 weapons, 183 Atlas and Titan ICBMs, and 144
SLBMs on carried Polaris submarines. By 1964 the United States enjoyed close to a 4 to
1 advantage in ICBMs over the Soviet Union, and U.S. strategists meditated on the logic
of a counterforce doctrine against the small and vulnerable Soviet arsenal. 9 Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara often pointed out that the lead in the total number of delivery
vehicles ensured the reliability of the U.S. deterrent. The lead was so great, in fact, that
he authorized a reduction of the Minuteman force from 1200 to 1000 in 1965.10
Moscow sought to overcome this imbalance during the first half of the 1960s, but
the first generation of Soviet ICBMs was seriously flawed. Because they relied on liquid
fuel that required external storage, missiles took hours to prepare for launch and suffered
from extremely low levels of combat readiness. The SS-8, for example, could not stay on
alert for more than 24 hours. In addition, first generation ICBMs had to be deployed in
groups to accommodate the ancillary refueling equipment. These "group-start launch"
weapons were extremely vulnerable to attack, and Moscow was forced to adopt a launch-
9 David H. Dunn, The Politics of Threat: Minuteman Vulnerability in American National Security Policy
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), p. 13. On the U.S. counterforce debate, see Gregg Herken, Counsels
of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), pp. 150-170.
10 After the Soviet ICBM buildup began in earnest, McNamara changed the focus from the total number of
delivery vehicles to the total number of warheads. Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet
Strategic Threat, 2 nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 118-119. On McNamara's
sanguine perspective, see Dunn, Politics of Threat, pp. 15-16.
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on-warning doctrine in order to ensure their survivability." Meanwhile, as the Soviet
technology crept forward, the United States achieved important breakthroughs in the sea
and land-based systems. The development of Polaris submarines and Minuteman ICBMs
appeared to secure the American triad indefinitely.
Missile defense remained a low priority as long as the United States enjoyed a
large lead in ICBMs. The Army had been working on the Nike-Zeus and Nike-X ABM
programs since the late 1950s, but there had never been sustained pressure to deploy
either system.12 Interest in missile defense rose, however, after the Soviet Union
dramatically increased its production of ICBMs in 1965. Some U.S. officials hoped that
this development would have a stabilizing effect, reasoning that by adding more
launchers to its arsenal Moscow would achieve a secure second strike capability. Others
were less sanguine about the accelerated production of Soviet missiles, and two studies
were commissioned to reassess the issue of strategic vulnerability.13
Second generation Soviet ICBMs overcame some of the main technical issues that
had beset the early missiles.14 The mainstays of the late 1960s buildup, the SS-9 and the
lighter SS-11, used storable propellant, which largely solved the problems of
vulnerability and readiness. The group-start launch technique was abandoned in favor of
silo-basing, and the new ICBMs were maintained at a permanent level of high-readiness.
For these reasons the Soviets could sustain a reliable deterrent force without having to
rely on launch-on-warning.
"1 Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 126-
127.
12 Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1976), pp. 13-119.
13 Dunn, Politics of Threat, pp. 16-17.
14 The following discussion draws heavily from Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces.
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Moscow also inaugurated a counterforce program against Minuteman silos by
improving the accuracy and destructive power of its own ICBMs, and the heavy SS-9
was specifically designed for this purpose. 15 Several variants of the SS-9 were tested,
each adopting a different approach to the problem. The early variants (Mod 1 and 2)
were high-trajectory missiles that would damage or destroy Minuteman sites by
delivering weapons with enormous yields. Designers tried to combine modest
improvements in accuracy with large increases in destructive power. Even though
destroying hardened silos relied to a great extent on accuracy, they hoped that the SS-9
warhead would be powerful enough to provide some margin for error. Another approach
(the Mod 3) used a low-earth orbit missile that could attack through an unprotected
azimuth. The Mod 3 entered service in November 1968.
The single-warhead and orbital missiles were produced in relatively large
numbers, but they could not pose a serious threat to the U.S. ICBM force. Because
Minuteman launchers were not clustered together, individual missiles would be required
to destroy individual silos. This was technologically prohibitive, because a successful
first strike would require a near-perfect kill rate. In lieu of a comprehensive first strike,
the single warhead designs might have been effective if they could have disabled the
Minuteman command and control network. Given the relative inaccuracy of the early
SS-9s, however, this was also unlikely.
The last approach to counterforce caused the most of concern in Washington.
Instead of relying on single massive warheads or unconventional angles of attack, Soviet
15 U.S. intelligence first became aware of the SS-9 in 1964, but there was no consensus about the purpose
of such a large missile. Its large throw-weight made it a candidate for MRV or MIRV, but its poor
accuracy undermined the benefits of multiple warheads. In addition, some analysts believed that the size of
the missile was simply intended for propaganda value. John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence
Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 204-205.
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designers began to attach multiple warheads to the same missile. The introduction of
multiple reentry vehicles (MRV) did not initially make the SS-9 more accurate, because
the RVs were released in a random scattershot pattern. But by carefully timing the
release of each warhead, the SS-9 could achieve much higher levels of accuracy. A
missile equipped with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) would
greatly increase the lethality of the SS-9 against the Minuteman force, because the
landing pattern of incoming RVs could be programmed to match the distribution of
Minuteman launch sites. The success of MIRV would mean that a smaller number of
missiles would be needed to badly damage or even destroy the stockpile of U.S. land-
based ballistic missiles. By early 1969 some officials were convinced that the SS-9 was a
first strike weapon. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard argued that U.S.
technological superiority was tenuous. "We're in fairly good shape," he said at an NSC
meeting in February, "But (the) Soviets started with SS-9 and can destroy our silos. Yet
we can't destroy their silos. We don't have first strike capability." In the same meeting
Kissinger described the SS-9 as "a counterforce weapon, if they get enough." 16
In addition to the Soviet gains, interest in missile defense was renewed by China's
successful nuclear test in October 1964. Beijing's breakthrough complicated the
deterrence calculus and sparked fears of a regional arms race and proliferation to unstable
regimes. China was already pursuing an expansionary foreign policy, and some U.S.
officials feared that it would become more aggressive with a nuclear capability for cover.
Others worried that the communist regime was irrational, and that Mao had already
determined that nuclear war between East and West was inevitable. The fear of a nuclear
16 Notes on NSC Meeting, February 14, 1969; Digital National Security Archive (hereafter DNSA);
http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.
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China caused the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to contemplate preventive strikes
against Chinese facilities; they were so concerned that they even sought cooperation from
Moscow for potential military action. 17 After the immediate shock had passed, however,
the Johnson administration began to fundamentally reassess its policies on proliferation
and arms control. The president authorized a special committee to study the problem,
and it eventually presented a number of options on how to cope with the rise of nuclear-
armed small and medium powers. Notably, each option called for some kind of area
missile defense to protect against small-scale or accidental nuclear launches.18
Area defense. In late 1966 China successfully detonated its first hydrogen bomb
and flight tested a prototype ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The
following year McNamara announced the decision to procure the Sentinel ABM, a "thin"
area defense that was intended to protect against small-scale or accidental launches. The
White House cited the possibility of a Chinese attack as the main rationale for Sentinel,
even though China did not yet have a working ICBM. In reality, U.S. planners were
concerned about developments in Moscow as well as Beijing. The logic in favor of
Sentinel, according to a DOD memo written during the Nixon transition, included the
protection of Minuteman silos "against a possible, but much greater than likely, Soviet
17 Gordon H. Chiang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 228-252; William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson,
"Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-
1964," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000-2001), pp. 54-99; Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall:
Six Presidents and China (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), pp. 38-39; and Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on
the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W.
Norton & Co., 2006), pp. 153-156 and 162-163.
18 Francis J. Gavin, "Blasts from the Pasts: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s," International Security,
Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004-2005), pp. 100-135, especially 121-122; and Hal Brands, "Rethinking Non-
Proliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee, and U.S. National Security Policy," Journal of Cold War
History, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2006), pp. 83-113. On the U.S. reaction to the Chinese nuclear test, see Gavin,
"Blasts from the Past," pp. 103-107; and Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, pp. 162-170.
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first strike threat." 19 But the administration had good reasons to downplay the Soviet
rationale. Focusing on China assuaged domestic fears about what Dean Rusk called "a
billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons." 20 In addition, efforts to fend off the stray
Chinese missile were less destabilizing than the thick defenses that would be needed to
defeat a concerted Soviet attack. U.S. officials could reasonably claim that limited area
defenses did not undermine mutual deterrence.2 1
The Sentinel decision was acceptable to the military services, none of whom were
interested in an ABM system designed to protect missile silos while cities were left
undefended. Indeed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to put up a united front against
such proposals for "hardpoint" defense. The Army, whose existing Nike-X ABM was to
be the basis of Sentinel, preferred a thick defense that would protect urban areas from a
Soviet strike. The light defenses envisioned in Sentinel were not ideal, but they were
viewed as a stepping stone towards an expanded program. 22 The Navy supported the
Army's vision of a thick area defense, and had been developing parallel sea-based assets
for such a system. The Air Force rejected the idea of hardpoint defense because it did not
want its missiles protected by Army missile defenses. It also argued that Minutemen
would be better protected by investing in super-hardened "rock silos" or through more
flexible basing schemes.23
At first, Congress enthusiastically supported the Sentinel decision. It set aside
$366 million for Sentinel as part of an package of $485 million for ABM research and
19 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) to Laird, January 7, 1969; DNSA. See
also Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, pp. 125-126.
20 Tyler, A Great Wall, p. 39.
21 Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, pp. 125-126.
22 Anne Hessing Cahn, "Scientists and the ABM," (Ph.D. diss., MIT, 1971), p. 37.
23 Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, pp. 121-122.
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construction. In fact, Congress had long been ahead of the White House on missile
defense. The Senate had added $168 million to the 1966 defense authorization bill to
support pre-production of the Nike-X system, despite the fact that these funds had not
been requested by the White House. Republicans complained that the administration was
"lagging" on missile defense, and hawkish Democrats hoped that Sentinel would be the
start of a true area defense system.24 As a defense aide wrote later, "There was very great
pressure to make a commitment to a new strategic weapons system and, of the options
available, Sentinel seemed the choice most likely to deliver some value." 25
Given the pressure from Congress for missile defense, the Johnson administration
probably believed that Sentinel would be a political success. It seemed to offer
something for everyone. The decision to deploy a thin area defense assuaged public fears
of a nuclear China without destabilizing the strategic balance with the Soviet Union. It
also satisfied congressional demands while avoiding a showdown with the JCS. But the
grace period was short lived, and vocal opposition to Sentinel arose in 1968. City
residents were not keen on living side-by-side with missile batteries, fearing nuclear
accidents and declining property values. They also felt that Sentinel represented another
expensive and needless military investment at a time when support for defense spending
was at a low point.26 Prominent scientists began to scrutinize the technical feasibility of
area defense, and sensed an opportunity to intervene in the larger debate on deterrence
and arms control. By the end of the year they were regularly writing jeremiads against
the Sentinel decision, and participating in a host of forums designed to raise awareness of
24 Cahn, "Scientists and the ABM," pp. 242-243.
25 OASD(SA) to Laird, January 7, 1969.
26 Ironically, the Army had initially withheld information about the location of Sentinel batteries because it
worried about protests from citizens from other cities who were left off the list. Cahn, "ABM and the
Scientists," p. 50, and Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 94.
194
the issue and coordinate efforts to stop its deployment. Congressmen also started rallying
against city defenses. The combination of scientists, local activists, and national
politicians formed a powerful constituency opposed to missile defense. 27
Hardpoint defense. President Nixon entered office in a bind. He had run on a
campaign stressing the "security gap" with the Soviet Union, and did not want his first
major policy decision to involve cutting a major weapons system. He had also advocated
for Sentinel, arguing at the time that missile defense was needed at any cost. 28 But the
actual costs far exceeded the original projections, and Sentinel had become extremely
unpopular with the same groups that had previously favored a thin area defense:
Congress, the public, and the military.29 In order to mollify these groups without
appearing soft on defense, Nixon thought about introducing an ABM system designed to
protect Minuteman launch sites and preserve the U.S. land-based deterrent. The
president reasoned that this would ease the opposition that arose from city dwellers who
did not want to live in the shadow of Sentinel, while appeasing congressional hawks who
wanted to shore up the U.S. deterrent. In early February Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird suspended the Sentinel program, and ordered a review of alternatives.30
On March 14, 1969, the president declared that he was shifting emphasis from
area to hardpoint missile defense. Sentinel was scrapped in favor of the Safeguard ABM,
which was specifically designed to protect Minuteman silos instead of population centers.
27 Cahn, "ABM and the Scientists."
28 Cahn, "ABM and the Scientists," p. 243.
29 The original deployment cost of Sentinel, including research and development, was estimated to be $6.5
billion. By January 1969 the bill had grown to $8.9 billion, and because contractors had not provided unit
costs for the hardware components of the system, DOD officials believed the true cost of Sentinel was
higher still. OASD(SA) to Laird, January 7, 1969; DNSA.
30 The Joint Chiefs recommended moving ABM sites further away from large population centers and
enhancing the survivability of land-based ICBMs. Wheeler to Laird, "SENTINEL Program Review,"
February 26, 1969; DNSA.
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While President Johnson had used the threat of a Chinese strike to justify area defense,
Nixon spoke directly to the Soviet menace. He used intelligence data to argue that the
Soviet buildup put the Minuteman force at risk, especially because the SS-9 appeared to
be MIRVed.
The White House actually made two arguments about the SS-9 Mod 4. The first
was that it had achieved a true MIRV capability, meaning that the missile's final stage
(the warhead "bus") could be retargeted before releasing each RV on a predetermined
ballistic course. 31 Independently targeted warheads would have solved the accuracy
problem that bedeviled the earlier SS-9 variants. Telemetry data from Soviet missile tests
in April and May was inconclusive as to whether Moscow had mastered the MIRV,
however, and the White House had little hard evidence to support its case. On the other
hand, the same telemetry suggested the Soviet Union had achieved the "functional
equivalent" of a MIRV. By carefully timing the release of each warhead, it could control
the landing pattern even though the warhead bus could not maneuver in flight. The
footprints from SS-9 flight tests resembled the triangular distribution of some Minuteman
silos in Montana and North Dakota, a level of precision which suggested that the
difference between a true MIRV and the functional equivalent did not matter much.32
Policy preferences and Senate opposition. The administration believed that
investing in hardpoint defenses would undermine Soviet efforts to achieve a first strike
capability. It also believed that Safeguard might be a useful bargaining chip in future
31 The next major innovation was the maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV). In theory, each warhead in a
MARVed missile would have its own terminal guidance system. MARV technology was more than a
decade off in the United States, however, and has only recently appeared in Russian designs. For an
accessible overview of MIRV technology, see Ted Greenwood, Making the MIR V: A Study of Defense
Decision Making (New York: Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, 1988), pp. 1-3.
32 Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, pp. 137-144.
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arms control negotiations. Nixon suggested as much when he announced the Safeguard
decision, noting that annual program reviews would take into account "the diplomatic
context, including any talks on arms limitation." 33 In internal discussions throughout the
spring, White House officials held open the possibility of trading ABM for Soviet
concessions. Nixon stressed the need to be flexible, and argued that scaling back on
missile defense could be an "important gesture in (the) arms control problem. 34
Kissinger reminded Nixon of this in June, when he suggested that "unilateral restraint" on
ABM prior to any formal agreement might help move the process forward. He also
pointed out that the Soviet Union would not agree to substantial arms reductions if the
United States was determined to build a comprehensive hardpoint defense system. 35 In
preparations for SALT talks, Kissinger made it clear that the administration was willing
bargain away some of these capabilities.36
In the meantime, the White House believed that Moscow was more interested in
arms control than the United States, and the administration sought to elevate the U.S.
negotiating position by investing in new strategic programs. (It also wanted time to
review the US defense posture before entering into formal negotiations. 37) Soviet
enthusiasm for SALT created an opportunity to trade programs like Safeguard for
progress on other areas. Efforts to achieve this kind of linkage were central to Nixon's
vision of establishing a durable peace by expanding the range of cooperation between the
33 Garthoff, Ditente and Confrontation, p. 131.
34 Notes on NSC Meeting, February 19, 1969; DNSA. See also Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 26.
35 Kissinger to Nixon, "Preparations for Strategic Arms Talks - Forthcoming Operational Decisions," June
10, 1969; and Kissinger to Nixon, "NSSM 28, Substantive SALT Issues and NATO Aspects," June 10,
1969; both accessed through the Declassified Documents Retrieval System (hereafter DDRS).
36 Nixon to Rogers, Laird, and Smith, "Preparation for NATO Consultations on SALT," June 26, 1969; and
National Security Decision Memorandum 33, "Preliminary Strategic Arms Limitation Talks," November
12, 1969; both accessed through DDRS.
37 Notes on NSC Meeting, February 14, 1969; and Pederson to Farley, February 17, 1969; both accessed
through DNSA.
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United States and the Soviet Union. Kissinger reported that Moscow was "prepared to
move forward on a whole range of topics: Middle East, Central Europe, Vietnam, Arms
Control (strategic arms talks), cultural exchange. In other words, we have the 'linkage.'
Our problem is how to play it."38
Part of the problem had to do with domestic politics. The administration believed
that it could use new strategic programs like Safeguard as leverage with the Soviet
Union, but these programs required congressional approval. And in order to justify the
costs of missile defense, the administration had to inflate the Soviet threat, even though it
believed that the U.S. strategic position was basically secure. As a result, administration
officials were increasingly strident in public about the need for the Safeguard system. In
private, they mused about giving it away. 39
The domestic political problem intensified after Nixon made his announcement on
Safeguard. The decision did not placate critics of missile defense, as had been hoped.
Quite the opposite. Almost as soon as Nixon had declared his plans for hardpoint
defense, a coalition of anti-ABM Senators and scientists began to rally against it. They
argued that the costs of such a system were prohibitively high, especially for a system
that was unlikely to work. In order to accelerate Safeguard and keep costs down, the
Pentagon planned to cannibalize parts from area defense batteries, including radar
components which were not sufficiently hardened to withstand a direct attack. More
38 Kissinger to Nixon, "Analysis of Dobrynin Message," February 18, 1969; DNSA. On linkage, see
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 310-320. On U.S. and Soviet attitudes towards arms control in the
early Nixon administration, see Garthoff, Dtente and Confrontation, pp. 27, 31-32, 71-72, and 127-128.
39 Does this reduce the impact of Nixon's commitment on the politicization of intelligence? Does it matter
that the president was committing to something that he planned on giving away later? I argue that it does
not. First, Nixon was committed to investing in Safeguard. At a bare minimum, he needed something to
trade away in arms control negotiations. That he believed this necessary reveals his fear of Soviet
decisions in an environment of uncontrolled arms racing. Second, if detente failed and the Soviet buildup
continued unabated, then the president would have fall back on his earlier argument that ABM was needed
for deterrence.
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broadly, critics argued that the decision to fund missile defense was likely to provoke a
Soviet response, and potentially trigger another arms race with the Soviet Union.40
On March 20 Laird and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard appeared
before the Senate Armed Services Committee to answer questions about Safeguard. The
televised hearing provided an opportunity for defense officials to explain the logic of
Safeguard, and both cited intelligence on the growing threat posed by the SS-9. Packard
stressed the size and accuracy of heavy Soviet ICBMs, and warned the committee that
Soviet researchers were proceeding with work multiple warhead designs which "could be
a very effective and dangerous force against our own land-based missile capability."
Laird specifically mentioned intelligence on the SS-9 program, citing "firm and solid
information that the Soviet Union is continuing with the deployment of this large missile"
which could be modified to carry one large warhead or several smaller ones. 41 He also
released previously classified intelligence on the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs and other
signs of progress in Soviet offensive and defensive strategic systems.42 The next day
Laird appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was chaired by the
outspoken anti-ABM Senator J. William Fulbright. Laird described the characteristics of
the SS-9 in some detail, arguing that it was probably MIRVed. Late in the day he added
an explosive element to the debate when he declared that the Soviet Union intended to
achieve a first strike capability. "If they were going after our cities and not try to knock
40 For examples of the immediate skepticism surrounding Nixon's proposal, see John W. Finney, "Nixon
Chances of Getting Senate Approval in Doubt," New York Times, March 14, 1969, p. 1; and New York
Times, "The Useless 'Safeguard'," March 15, 1969, p. 32. For the technical arguments about the suitability
of Sentinel parts for Safeguard missile defenses, see Ralph E. Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of
Weapons Technology (New York: Cowles Book Co., 1970), pp. 77-80.
41 "Excerpts From Testimony on Antimissile System Before Senate Panel," New York Times, March 21,
1969, p. 20.
42 John W. Finney, "Sentinel Backed by Laird as Vital to Thwart Soviet," New York Times, March 21,
1969, p. 1.
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out our retaliatory capability," he explained, "they would not require weapons that have
such a large megatonnage." To Laird, there was "no question" about Soviet intentions.43
President Nixon later echoed this sentiment, pointing out that massive ICBMs only made
sense if they were meant to carry MIRVed warheads, and this only made sense if the
Soviets meant to put the U.S. arsenal at risk. For the remainder of the spring and summer
the debate over funding Safeguard revolved around three related questions: Was the
ABM technically and financially viable? Was the Soviet threat as large and looming as
the administration suggested? And, most important, did Moscow truly seek to achieve a
first strike capability?
The Senate was deeply divided on these issues, and by late spring it was clear that
the administration faced an extremely close vote on the future of Safeguard. (The
proposal was less controversial in the House, where funding was ultimately approved by
a vote of 219-105.) The administration tried to persuade Senators by selectively
revealing intelligence that emphasized the growing Soviet threat, especially regarding the
capabilities of the SS-9. In Senate testimony Laird revealed that Moscow had already
deployed 200 SS-9s, and was planning to increase the total to 500 by the 1975. He also
cited evidence that the SS-9 was MIRVed and more accurate than was commonly
believed. All of these estimates had previously been secret. In making the case for
Safeguard, Laird explicitly called on "new intelligence" to make the case, sometimes
declassifying intelligence during open hearings.
Nixon also cited "new intelligence" that seemed to support his own conclusions
about Soviet capabilities and intentions. On April 18 he noted that "since the decision to
43 Kirsten Lundberg, "The SS-9 Controversy: Intelligence as Political Football," Case Program, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, 1989, pp. 1, 5-6; and Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, p. 132.
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deploy the ABM system called Sentinel in 1967, the intelligence estimates indicate that
the Soviet capability with regard to their SS-9s, their nuclear missiles, (is) sixty percent
higher than we thought then." 44 In June he went further to make the point that the MIRV
conclusion was based upon the latest intelligence. "In recommending Safeguard, I did so
based on intelligence information at that time," Nixon told a press conference. "Since
that time, new intelligence information with regard to the Soviet success in testing
multiple reentry vehicles...has convinced me that Safeguard is even more important."
The reason, he claimed, was new intelligence suggesting that the SS-9 was MIRVed:
"There isn't any question but that it is a multiple weapon and its footprints indicate that it
just happens to fall in somewhat the precise areas in which our Minuteman silos are
located."4 5
Intelligence dissents. Notwithstanding the references to new intelligence, the
president's primary sources of analysis were from outside the intelligence community.
An analysis of the telemetry data from the SS-9 flight tests by the TRW corporation
showed that the Mod 4 footprint did resemble some of the Minuteman launch sites. John
Foster, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), enthusiastically
embraced these results and presented them to the White House as further evidence that
the SS-9 was at least a MIRV equivalent, and that Moscow sought a first strike
capability. The intelligence community found these claims dubious. Its standing
estimate on Soviet strategic forces, NIE 11-8-68, argued that the SS-9 was a standard
MRV. The NIE also concluded that the Soviet Union was not trying to achieve a first
strike capability; ongoing improvements in the U.S. strategic force meant that the Soviet
44 Press Conference, April 18, 1969; Full text is available from the UC Santa Barbara American Presidency
Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu.
45 Press Conference, June 19, 1969; UCSB Presidency Project.
201
Union would struggle just to maintain the rough parity it had achieved in the late 1960s.
In short, the key intelligence document on the Soviet threat, the estimate that represented
the collective wisdom of the intelligence community, directly contradicted the official
rationale for Safeguard. 46
The CIA continued to dispute administration claims during the spring of 1969.
On April 24, NSC staffer Helmut Sonnenfeldt informed Kissinger about the divergence
between the CIA and official statements. "US national estimates," he wrote, "do not
altogether square with the statements that Secretary Laird has made about the SS-9 or
about the possibility of Soviet first strike capabilities. They may also seem inconsistent
with certain statements the President has made (e.g. to the NATO Ministers on April
11)." This posed a problem for the administration, which was laying the groundwork for
SALT talks while simultaneously urging Congress to approve Safeguard. The
appearance of disagreement in the executive would make it difficult to generate domestic
support for ABM and rally international support for arms control. Sonnenfeldt worried
that the CIA position threatened to undermine administration efforts on the Hill: "Helms
has briefed the Senate foreign Relations Committee and...Fulbright has already observed
that he had heard nothing to substantiate Laird's assessments of the Soviet strategic
forces." If the Senate required intelligence confirmation about Soviet capabilities before
funding Safeguard, then the CIA could put the whole initiative at risk.4 7
The administration quickly acted to pressure intelligence to change its views.
Kissinger ordered the creation of a MIRV panel, chaired by a member of the NSC staff,
in order to "clarify the differences" between the Defense Department and Agency views.
46 NIE 11-8-68, "Soviet Strategic Attack Forces," October 3, 1968, pp. 4-5, 11-12.
47 Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, "CIA Briefings on Soviet Military Capabilities: need for Coordination within
the Government," April 24, 1969; DDRS.
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The panel met for several contentious weeks, with neither side willing to give ground.
During this time Kissinger repeatedly met with several intelligence officers and told them
that they were undermining the president; the drumbeat of indirect pressure from the
National Security Advisor was unmistakable. The creation of the MIRV panel was
nominally intended to clarify the positions of the DOD and the CIA, but it also presented
an opportunity to reinforce the administration's preferences. CIA representatives
repeatedly complained that the NSC officials on the panel tried to influence their
judgments.4 8
Other attempts to politicize intelligence were more direct. According to a senior
CIA official, Kissinger "beat up" on Helms and the Chairman of the Board of National
Estimates after he learned that they were dissenting from the Pentagon's view. "Look,"
he warned, "the president of the United States and the secretary of defense have said the
following. Now, are you telling me that you're going to argue with them?" 49 Kissinger
repeatedly used his position with the president to remind intelligence officials that Nixon
was unhappy with their obstinacy. In June he told a group of senior intelligence officials
that his "'most important client' wanted the facts separated from the judgments and
identified as such." One witness recalled that Kissinger was "pretty unhappy" about the
CIA's conclusions about Soviet intentions: "He kept saying he didn't want to influence
our judgments-but!"50
48 The chair of the panel, Laurence Lynn, argued that the CIA representatives were overly sensitive to
critical questions. Lynn held that he was simply performing his duties to force each side to sharpen their
positions. Lundberg, "SS-9 Controversy," p. 12.
49 Lundbertg, "SS-9 Controversy," pp. 11-12.
50 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards ofLangley: Inside the CIA 's Directorate of Science and Technology
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), p. 150.
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The CIA's judgments, as one NSC staffer put it, were "highly inconvenient" to
the White House.5 1 The administration arranged a number of leaks that supported its
own view and accused the CIA of bias. 52 After Helms's testimony to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee revealed differences with the administration, word spread that
Kissinger was furious and on the verge of asking Nixon to fire him.53 Laird made sure
that Helms accompany him during a later visit to the committee, fully aware that the DCI
preferred to remain quiet rather than publicly dispute the Secretary of Defense. Helms
reasoned that he was protecting Agency analysts by facing the brunt of political pressure
at a time when "muscle was being applied." 54 According to the Deputy Director of ONE,
there was "no doubt that the White House was determined that there should be an
intelligence finding that the Soviets were engaged in MIRV testing." 55 Tellingly,
Kissinger later admitted to being persuaded by the CIA's position, but not until after the
Senate vote on Safeguard.56
Events came to a head in June, when the breakdown in consensus was revealed in
public. On June 12, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) approved a
Memorandum to Holders reiterating the conclusion in NIE 11-8-68 that the SS-9 was not
MIRVed. Kissinger met with Helms and Abbot Smith the next day, requesting
clarification of technical details from the memorandum. The CIA's Foreign Missile and
Space Analysis Center complied with Kissinger's request, but did not change its position
51 Powers, Man Who Kept the Secrets, p. 211.
52 Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, p. 386.
53 Powers, Man Who Kept the Secrets, p. 212.
54 Helms's testimony remains classified, although Laird repeatedly insisted that his conclusions were based
on intelligence. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, "Intelligence
and the ABM," June 23, 1969. Helms is quoted in Lundberg, "SS-9 Controversy," p. 17. See also
Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, pp. 132-133; and Richelson, Wizards ofLangley, p. 154.
55 John Huizenga, as quoted in Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 355-356.
56 Richelson, Wizards ofLangley, p. 152.
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on the SS-9. On June 18, the New York Times published a story on the USIB meeting.
Helms furiously tried to determine the source of the leak, anticipating the consequences
of a public dispute over contradictory intelligence. On June 19, President Nixon
attempted to downplay accusations that the administration was not being forthright, again
referring to Soviet missile tests that displayed the characteristic triangle footprint. ABM
skeptics were unconvinced. On June 25, Sen. Fulbright used a Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Hearing to emphasize the apparent gap between administration statements
and intelligence on the SS-9. Laird subsequently wrote a letter to Fulbright, describing a
scenario in which a volley of 420 SS-9s could effectively destroy the Minuteman force.
As criticism of Safeguard intensified, so did the administration's commitment to ABM.
The intelligence community found itself stuck in the middle.57
On August 6 the Senate approved initial funding for Safeguard after the vice
president broke a 50-50 deadlock. The administration's arguments about the SS-9 were
convincing enough to avoid defeat, but the Senate only agreed to fund the first phase of
Safeguard. The program as envisioned would place anti-missile batteries at twelve
Minutemen sites, but Phase I only allocated funding for two of them. The administration
still had to convince skeptical congressmen to support full deployment. To do so, it had
to continue to justify missile defense on the basis of the growing Soviet threat. Despite
the fact that Safeguard had passed its first major legislative hurdle, the SS-9 affair was far
from over.
57 Lundberg, "SS-9 Controversy," pp. 11-15. Laird mentioned the 420-missile scenario in his Senate
testimony on June 23. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, "Intelligence and the ABM," p. 14.
John Foster also described the scenario in a speech to the Aviation-Space Writers Association. "Dr. Foster
Sees a Lag in Missiles," New York Times, May 12, 1969, p. 1.
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Estimating Soviet intentions. While the Senate debated the merits of missile
defense, the intelligence community was working on the annual estimate on Soviet
strategic forces, NIE 11-8-69. Despite the Pentagon's conviction that the SS-9 was at
least functionally equivalent to a MIRV, the technical specialists in the CIA refused to
change the estimate. They insisted that the SS-9 was a traditional MRV, and that it did
not pose a genuine threat to Minuteman. Neither did the community change its basic
view of Soviet intentions. The draft NIE, which was slated for USIB approval in late
August, concluded:
We believe that the Soviets recognize the enormous difficulties of any
attempt to achieve strategic superiority of such order as to significantly
alter the strategic balance. Consequently, we consider it highly unlikely
that they will attempt within the period of this estimate to achieve a first
strike capability, i.e., a capability to launch a surprise attack against the
U.S. with assurance that the USSR would not itself receive damage it
would regard as unacceptable. For one thing, the Soviets would almost
certainly conclude that the costs of such an undertaking along with all
their other military commitments would be prohibitive. More important,
they almost certainly would consider it impossible to develop and deploy
the combination of offensive and defensive forces necessary to counter
successfully the various elements of U.S. strategic attack forces. Finally,
even if such a project were economically and technically feasible the
Soviets would almost certainly calculate that the U.S. would detect or
overmatch their efforts.58
None of the arguments made by the White House and Pentagon had persuaded the
intelligence community that the Soviet Union was on the road to achieving a first strike,
nor that it was interested in such a costly enterprise.
The Pentagon quickly ratcheted up the pressure on Helms to remove this passage
so that the NIE would support administration claims. At first the pressure was indirect.
Eugene Fabini, a member of the DIA's scientific advisory commission, urged a colleague
of Helms to persuade the DCI to delete the offending paragraph. Fabini argued that it
58 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 217.
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directly contradicted Laird's public statements and put Helms in a dangerous position.
Why pick a fight with Laird, a supremely talented bureaucratic infighter, over a
speculation about Soviet motives? 59 Still unsure about the fate of the estimate, Laird sent
an assistant to ask Helms to remove the paragraph because "it contradicted the public
position of the Secretary." 60 Finally, Laird personally demanded that Helms excise the
offending paragraph before the NIE was published. "Mel Laird was about to give a
speech outlining the administration's policy of first strikes and MIRVs," Helms wrote
later. "Where, he demanded, did CIA get off contradicting Nixon's policy?" 61
This constituted as clear an example of politicization as exists in the history of
intelligence-policy relations. Rarely do high-level officials so directly pressure
intelligence chiefs to bring their conclusions in line with policy preferences.
Policymakers have good reasons to act with more subtlety, not the least of which is the
public furor that arises when they are accused of doctoring intelligence. But time was
running out in this case, and policymakers actively intervened to manipulate the estimate.
The draft NIE was scheduled for review and approval at the United States Intelligence
Board on August 28, which was not enough time for indirect politicization to work.62
Sustained pressure from the White House and the Pentagon caused Helms to back
down. Despite opposition from CIA analysts, and despite his own suspicion that the
59 Powers, Man Who Kept the Secrets, p. 212.
60 Lundberg, "SS-9 Controversy," pp. 19-20; and Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, p. 133.
61 Helms, A Look over My Shoulder, p. 386.
62 The USIB was the council of agency heads from across the intelligence community. It had the right to
approve or reject finished NIEs, but its approval was virtually guaranteed. While NIEs represented the
wisdom of the whole intelligence community, the CIA traditionally dominated the process. ONE was
housed at CIA headquarters and ONE staffers were usually Agency veterans. Moreover, the head of the
CIA was also the nominal head of the entire intelligence community. Bearing ultimate responsibility for the
product, he had the authority to edit the NIE at his discretion. Agencies that strongly disagreed with the
final product had the right to log their dissent as a footnote to the main text. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence,
pp. 34-41; and Cahn, Killing Ddtente, pp. 86-93.
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White House position was "tainted" by its determination to push Safeguard through the
Senate, he removed the offending paragraph from the final version of NIE 11-8-69.63
The substance and tone of the estimate were dramatically changed. While the first draft
argued that the Soviet Union was not striving for a first strike capability, the final version
did not rule anything out:
We do not attempt to estimate how far the Soviets might carry a strategic
buildup over the next 10 years. In evaluating future US strategic
programs, they may conclude that a continuation of their efforts on the
current scale will be essential merely to avoid retrogressing from their
present relative position. But there are undoubtedly pressures in Moscow
for a strategic policy aimed not merely at parity but at superiority over the
US-it goes without saying that the marshals, and indeed the political
leaders as well, would like to have a substantial edge.64
The notion that Soviet leaders wanted a "substantial edge" did not represent the
prevailing view in the intelligence community. Nor did the scenario in the NIE which
outlined the pathway to strategic superiority and perhaps a first strike capability. The
Soviets might choose caution:
But they might either miscalculate or ignore the costs and risks involved in
an indefinite continuation of competitive arms buildups. In any case, it
seems likely that their programs will gradually cease to consist primarily
of additional launchers, and instead will emphasize developments such as
MIRVs, and qualitative improvements such as survivability, capacity to
penetrate defenses, and damage-limiting capabilities. 65
63 Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, p. 387.
64 National Intelligence Estimate 11-8-69, "Soviet Strategic Attack Forces," September 9, 1969, p. 8;
DNSA.
65 The estimate also provided slightly more ominous conclusions about missile accuracy. It repeated the
CEP prediction from the last NIE (0.5-0.75 nautical miles) but argued that the actual figure was probably
nearer to the "low side" of that range. It speculated that the Soviets might be able to reduce CEP to 0.40
nm, but would not be able to go any lower without innovating new guidance systems and new re-entry
vehicles. Such improvements were not likely to emerge before 1972. NIE 11-8-69, "Soviet Strategic
Attack Forces," pp. 8-9, and pp. 12-13.
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All of these improvements would support a first strike capability. The focus on MIRVed
missiles and damage-limitation both suggested that Moscow was seeking the means to
erode the U.S. Minuteman force and survive a counterattack.
Analysts were furious. Helms had bowed to pressure, even though he admitted
that "not one of our analysts or weapons specialists agreed with the Defense Department
position."66 The outgoing director of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR) inserted the original conclusions back into the NIE as a footnote, but
disgruntled analysts felt that footnotes did not carry the same weight as the main text.
The overall tenor of the estimate was much more ominous. 67 The SS-9 Mod 4 reached
initial operation capability in 1971, but debate over its accuracy and capabilities
continued between intelligence and military analysts. The Soviet Union did not
definitively field a MIRVed ICBM until 1975.68
What Caused Politicization?
Arguments about politicization usually degrade into historical disputes about
which side was right. When policymakers are accused of politicization, they usually
come off as stubborn or corrupt (or both). Unwilling to face reality, they manipulate
intelligence so that it delivers convenient products. When policymakers are asked to
respond, they accuse intelligence of ideological bias, subversive tendencies, and
analytical weakness.
66 Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, p. 387.
67 Cahn, Killing Ddtente, p. 88. Several sources confirm that Thomas Hughes was responsible for the
footnote, even though it was formally attributed to the acting director of INR, George Denney, Jr. NIE 11-
8-69, "Soviet Strategic Attack Forces," p. 9n.
68 Federation of American Scientists, "R-36/SS-9 SCARP," www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/icbm/r-36.htm
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In the case of the SS-9, however, the Defense Department and the Central
Intelligence Agency both made plausible arguments about Soviet capabilities. The
Pentagon correctly noted that Moscow was engaged in a long-term effort to overcome
both the quantitative and qualitative gaps in its missile program, and there was no doubt
that its strategic force was larger and more capable. A contemporaneous DIA report
estimated that by the mid-1970s the Soviet Union might be able to destroy 95% of the
land-based ICBM arsenal in the United States. This ominous conclusion was consistent
with the calculations of Albert Wohlstetter at the University of Chicago. These findings
may have influenced Laird to issue his stark warning about the Soviet first strike
capability in front of the Senate. 69 In addition, the rapid development of U.S. MIRV
technology suggested that the same rate of progress was likely to occur in the Soviet
Union. In the United States, the MIRV bus went from concept in 1962-1963 to successful
testing in 1969. 70 Given the level of Soviet investment, the emergence of MIRVed
missiles seemed to be only a matter of time. The SS-9 flight tests of April and May 1969
appeared to confirm these expectations, and independent analysis performed by TRW
suggested that the SS-9 footprint approximated the layout of Minuteman silos. From the
perspective of the White House, TRW probably looked like an independent arbiter of a
legitimate technical dispute. 7 1
The Agency, however, was not convinced. The SS-9 still had not achieved a level
of accuracy to seriously threaten the Minuteman force, and there was no reason to expect
a step change in accuracy anytime soon. Although Moscow had been working hard to
69 Herken, Counsels of War, pp. 270-271. See also Wohlstetter's letter to the editor, New York Times, June
15, 1969, p. E17.
70 Greenwood, Making the MIR V, pp. 5-10.
71 Lundberg, "SS-9 Controversy," pp. 13-14.
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achieve strategic parity with the United States, Soviet technology was comparatively
backwards when it began to build up its forces. U.S. designers had experienced serious
engineering difficulties in making the MIRV work, and there was every reason to believe
that Moscow would have the same problems. The guidance system needed to be able to
carry targeting information for each warhead in a small enough package to fit into the
third stage, and the bus needed to avoid oscillating after releasing successive RVs.
Indeed, slight atmospheric variations caused the U.S. Mark 12 reentry vehicle to perform
erratically during tests, adding almost two years of research and development to the
project. 7 The CIA believed felt that it was implausible that the Soviet Union could
overcome these hurdles and deploy a MIRV before the mid-1970s.
In terms of Soviet strategy, the Pentagon saw no reason to assume that Moscow
only sought nuclear parity with the United States; the scope and pace of its buildup
suggested more ambitious intentions. Defense officials pointed out that the CIA had
previously underestimated the scope and pace of the Soviet ICBM buildup that began in
1965, and warned against assuming benign behavior from Moscow. The intelligence
community, meanwhile, emphasized the technological implausibility of achieving a
reliable first strike capability. It also estimated that the costs ofMIRVing a whole
generation of ICBMs would be prohibitive, not to mention the costs of dealing with the
other two legs of the American triad. 73
72 Greenwood, Marking the MIR V, pp. 3, 8.
73 As with the Vietnam order of battle controversy, the technical puzzle and doctrinal mystery were closely
related. A conclusion that the Soviet Union had MIRVed the SS-9 naturally suggested that it was aiming
for a first strike capability. On the other hand, a finding that Moscow was satisfied with MRV suggested
that it was seeking nuclear parity and a more reliable deterrent. Complex and esoteric debates over Soviet
technology masked more fundamental disputes over Soviet strategy. Sen. Albert Gore, Sr., noted as much
during a Senate hearing on ABM. Regarding projections of future Soviet capabilities, Gore argued, "(I)f
you base your projection for future years upon a demonstrated capability rather than upon actual weapons
in being, it is inescapable that you apply a projection of an intention coupled with a capability." Senate
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The point here is not to argue that one side was obviously right and the other
obviously wrong. Both the Pentagon and the Agency made plausible a priori arguments
about Soviet capabilities and intentions. The relevant question is why the White House
tried so hard to force CIA to accept the alternative view. The administration could have
simply relied on the DOD analysis and ignored the CIA's dissent. The interesting
question is why it did not. Why, at the risk of poisoning relations with the intelligence
community, did the White House force the Agency to change its conclusions?
The Oversell Model and the SS-9. Here I argue that domestic political
considerations were crucial. The oversell model explains why politicization occurred
during the Safeguard controversy. It explains why the White House began to pay close
attention to intelligence on Soviet capabilities and intentions, and why it pressured
intelligence to reflect policy preferences. Both of the key variables in the model were
activated in the spring of 1969.
Public Commitment. The oversell model holds that public commitments make
politicization more likely because contrary intelligence can undermine policy goals and
embarrass policymakers. If intelligence findings dispute the logical or empirical
foundations of policy judgments, they can make policymakers appear disingenuous or
naYve. For this reason, policymakers are more receptive to divergent views before the
stake themselves to specific decisions. The model also predicts that very strong public
commitments are associated with direct politicization. Weak or conditional commitments
provide more wiggle room for policymakers. In these instances they can downplay
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Committee on Foreign Relations, "Intelligence and the ABM," p. 5. For a similar argument, see Kissinger,
Diplomacy, p. 716.
differences of opinion from the national security establishment, or accommodate them by
adjusting policy objectives.
President Nixon was somewhat agnostic about ABM at the outset of his
administration. He had long been a supporter of area defenses, and he celebrated the
decision to fund Sentinel in 1967. Nixon was less interested in hardpoint defense, but
likely saw it as a stepping stone that would pave the way for a more ambitious ABM
later. But he was well aware of the public outcry over Sentinel, and did not want to
alienate the public and Congress in his first few months in office. For this reason, he
avoided making a firm commitment one way or the other, and ordered Laird to shelve the
system pending the results of a study on other options. During this time the president and
his advisors had very little contact with the intelligence community. It quickly became
apparent to intelligence officials that the new president was likely to ignore them.
Nixon's attempt to delay a decision on missile defense did not succeed.
Administration officials hoped that the decision to put Sentinel on hold would make the
president look judicious, especially given his past support for the system. Instead, it
encouraged critics to call for a comprehensive end to ABM research. Ironically, the
delaying tactic only added fuel to the missile defense debate, and forced the president to
take a firmer stand.74 This had significant consequences for intelligence-policy relations.
After Nixon declared his intention to deploy the Safeguard system, he made
extraordinary claims about the imminent vulnerability of the Minuteman force,
specifically citing intelligence on advances in Soviet missile technology. The most
important rationale for Safeguard was the defense of land-based missiles, which were
threatened by recent Soviet developments, including "the deployment of very large
74 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 205.
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missiles with warheads capable of destroying our hardened Minuteman forces." 75 To
make the threat seem more vivid, and to simplify an esoteric argument about missile
telemetry, the administration contrived the metaphor of a footprint to describe the landing
pattern of SS-9 reentry vehicles. The president pointed out to the press that the footprint
seemed to match the distribution of Minuteman launch sites. Given the massive yields of
SS-9 warheads and the apparent increases in accuracy, one had to conclude that the
Soviet Union sought a first strike capability. 76
Nixon further committed himself to Safeguard by explicitly ruling out other
options, such as hardening silos or increasing the inventory of ICBMs. Indeed, the ABM
was portrayed as the only way to ensure that "our nuclear deterrent remain secure beyond
any possible doubt."77 Improved silos were not sufficient against the massive yields of
the SS-9, nor was deterrence reliable against an adversary that seemed determined to
outpace the United States in ballistic missile capabilities. In addition to Soviet
breakthroughs in warhead design, the president pointed out that the rate of SS-9
production was high and rising. This implied that U.S. deterrent was rapidly eroding, and
the Soviets would soon have the ability to undermine the strategic balance. 78
The administration backed these claims by repeatedly pointing to intelligence.
On the day he announced the Safeguard decision, for example, President Nixon described
the annual review process that would guide any necessary changes in development. The
first criteria was "what our intelligence shows us with regard to the magnitude of the
75 Richard Nixon, Statement on Deployment of the Antiballistic Missile System, March 14, 1969; UCSB
Presidency Project.
76 Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, pp. 138-139.
77 Nixon, Statement on Deployment of the Antiballistic Missile System, March 14, 1969; UCSB Presidency
Project; emphasis added.
78 Press Conference, April 18, 1969; UCSB Presidency Project.
214
threat." 79 Later, after a New York Times revealed that CIA had doubts about Soviet
intentions, Nixon divulged telemetry data on the recent SS-9 tests and emphasized that
his decisions on missile defense were based on "new intelligence." 80 Defense officials
followed Nixon's announcement by waging a "battle of the charts" with Senate critics,
selectively leaking intelligence on Soviet capabilities with the hopes of persuading a
sufficient number of congressmen to support ABM.81 On June 23 Laird insisted that
Helms accompany him to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to create the symbolic
image of a united front. During the hearing Sen. Fulbright repeatedly tried to force Laird
to admit that his statements about Soviet first strike capabilities were not supported by
intelligence findings. The Secretary, with Helms at his side, insisted that his judgments
were based on intelligence:
The urgency we attach to implementing the President's Safeguard
proposal is based on our judgment as policymakers that the intelligence
available up to this time clearly shows that the Soviet Union is
constructing and deploying forces of a type and character inconsistent with
mere deterrence.... (This judgment) was based on a finding of the
Intelligence Board that the Soviet Union would continue to deploy the SS-
9, which has the characteristics of a first strike weapon rather than just a
second strike or retaliatory weapon. 82
John Foster also tried to present an image of consensus support for his opinions about the
SS-9 and for the necessity of hardpoint defense, explicitly downplaying the efforts by
anti-ABM Senators to portray a fissure between the administration and the CIA. "I
would like to say," he declared to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "that I have no
disagreements with the Central Intelligence Agency, nor has (Under) Secretary Packard
79 Press Conference, March 14, 1969; UCSB Presidency Project.So "US Intelligence Doubts Soviet First Strike Goal"; and Freedman, U.S. Intelligence, pp. 138-139.
81 See, for example, John W. Finney, "Packard Disputed at Missile Inquiry," New York Times, March 27,
1969, p. 1.82 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Intelligence and the ABM," pp. 8-9. Laird sparred with Fulbright
throughout the hearing about whether or not intelligence actually supported his assessments. See pp. 7-9,
11-12, and 17-18.
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or Secretary Laird." 83 This was patently false, but the administration was desperate to
look united in the face of eroding support for Safeguard.
The president deepened his commitment to missile defense as the Senate fight
intensified. On April 19 Nixon vowed to fight for Safeguard "as hard as I can...because I
believe that it is absolutely essential for the security of the country." 84 The
administration tried to justify its commitment through Senate hearings and a series of
carefully orchestrated press briefings, all of which attempted to present an image of
consensus backing for Safeguard. When it became clear that intelligence did not support
these statements, the administration began to apply pressure on intelligence officials.
Upon hearing of the CIA's dissent, Sonnenfeldt reminded Kissinger that the "problem of
presenting consistent threat assessments is an endemic one in the Government. Needless
to say, under present circumstances, it is more important than ever that the
Administration's credibility not be subject to plausible challenge." 85
Critical Constituencies. Public commitments only lead to politicization if
policymakers face serious opposition to their decisions. In the absence of criticism, they
can tolerate dissent without fear of political backlash. The emergence of critical
constituencies, however, creates incentives for policymakers to forge an image of
consensus support for their decisions. But just as the image of consensus helps to mollify
domestic critics, the appearance of dissensus has the opposite effect. When consensus
breaks down, critical constituencies become more aggressive about defeating policy
83 Lundberg, "SS-9 Controversy," pp. 10-12.
84 The White House also vowed to reject compromise plans that would have limited ABM deployment.
Robert B. Semple, Jr., "President Vows to Fight for ABM 'As Hard as I Can'," New York Times, April 18,
1969, p. 1; and Semple, "Nixon's Aides Insist They Will Not Compromise on Safeguard," New York Times,
April 27, 1969, p. 2.
85 Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, April 24, 1969; DDRS.
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initiatives. In the long term, they can also undermine broader policy programs and
threaten the political future of the policymaker.
Nixon might have hoped that his decision to support Safeguard would subdue
domestic critics of missile defense, even though he was aware of congressional
opposition to ABM. The main criticism of Sentinel, after all, was that it required placing
missile batteries in or around major metropolitan areas. Critics argued that large missile
batteries were inappropriate uses of limited public space. They also worried about falling
property values and were uneasy about recognizing the idea that that urban areas were
Soviet targets. Moreover, the scientists who had questioned Sentinel argued that it was
not technologically feasible. It was difficult to intercept even one incoming ballistic
missile, and virtually impossible to stop a concerted countervalue attack.
But skeptical scientists, including prominent figures like Hans Bethe and George
Rathjens, were not at all satisfied with the decision to switch to Safeguard. The
supposedly new system was actually built from parts cannibalized from the Sentinel
ABM, which itself was built from Nike-X components. Hardware meant for area defense
was not necessarily appropriate for protecting Minuteman fields. The large missile
control radars were extremely vulnerable to disruption from a concerted Soviet attack.
Unlike the missiles themselves, they could not be put underground. In addition, the
Pentagon was putting its faith in a generation of new short-range interceptors that were
largely untested. Finally, Safeguard could be confused by decoys or defeated by
saturation. Even if it managed to stop one or two incoming warheads, it would be
overwhelmed by a larger volley.86
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86 Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt, p. 77.
Nor were the scientists convinced that the SS-9 was a MIRV or the functional
equivalent of a MIRV. The flight tests performed in April and May revealed a triangular
pattern that resembled some of the Minuteman launch sites, but not others. In addition,
the administration assumed that SS-9 warheads would achieve an accuracy of 0.25
nautical miles CEP by the time production leveled off in 1974-1975. This figure had not
been demonstrated on any of the SS-9 single warhead variants, and it was not clear that a
multiple warhead design would fare better. (The standing NIE on Soviet strategic forces
estimated the CEP for the SS-9 at 0.5- 0.75 nm, depending on whether its warheads were
controlled by radio or inertial guidance. 87 The administration's CEP figure actually came
from the performance characteristics of the advanced Minuteman III, which was then
being tested.) Foster and Laird failed to answer some basic questions about their
accuracy projections. For example, how would a reentry vehicle with a low ballistic
coefficient stay on course through high winds without the benefit of terminal guidance? 88
The implications of the scientists' critique were clear. Neither Safeguard nor the
SS-9 were as capable as the Pentagon claimed. Hardpoint defense was destined to fail,
but so was any Soviet first strike. The worst case scenarios described by Laird and Foster
would probably destroy the anti-ballistic missile system, but not the Minutemen in their
silos. Despite Soviet efforts to improve accuracy and reduce the failure rate of the SS-9,
these problems had not disappeared. As a result, investing in Safeguard was both
87 NIE 11-8-68, "Soviet Strategic Attack Forces," pp. 8-9. Both the DOD and the intelligence community
overestimated the accuracy of the SS-9. Later analyses estimated the CEP range as 0.72-1.06 nautical
miles. See Global Security online; www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/r-36.htm.
88 Projectiles with higher ballistic coefficients are more accurate because they suffer less drag. Warhead
design characteristics (e.g. the shape of the nose) partly determine the size of the coefficient. Freedman,
U.S. Intelligence, pp. 141-142; and Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt, p. 71.
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unnecessary and futile. The money would be better spent on hardening silos and
improving the survivability of command and control links between launch sites.
The scientists also generally noted that deterrence did not rest solely on land-
based missiles. Even if the SS-9 was completely effective against the Minuteman, it was
useless against Polaris submarines and bombers on airborne alert. Continuing efforts to
shore up the bomber and submarine fleet would secure the deterrent force indefinitely.
The administration's reply was speculative and unconvincing: if the Soviets were able to
manufacture effective weapons against the Minuteman silos, perhaps they could do the
same against he other two components of the triad. Such extraordinary assumptions were
no way to make decisions about multi-billion dollar defense systems, especially given the
availability of lower cost alternatives. 89
By coordinating with civic leaders, congressmen, and opinion makers in the
media, the scientists forged a surprisingly powerful constituency. Prominent scientists
sloughed off their previous reluctance to get involved in public disputes over defense
spending. 90 The cumulative impact of the Vietnam War inspired some scientists to
become politically active. Others felt betrayed by policymakers who previously misused
or misrepresented their counsel. 91 Instead of continuing to offer private advice, they
decided to make the case in public. The ABM debate was an entry point into more
fundamental questions about arms control and deterrence, and the highly technical debate
over missile characteristics provided an opportunity to comment on critical issues of
89 Sen. Edward Kennedy commissioned a group of scientists to assess Pentagon claims about the strategic
logic of missile defense and the technical feasibility of Safeguard. The study was published as Jerome B.
Weisner and Abram Chayes, eds., ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile
System (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
90 Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt, pp. 91-115.
91 On the scientists various motives, see Cahn, "Scientists and the ABM," pp. 34-44.
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national security. 92 Whatever their reasons, the intervention of prominent scientists was
a serious problem for the administration. The scientists helped educate anti-ABM
Senators about the technical arcana of missile technology and missile defense so that
arguments about Safeguard could be challenged directly. Said one congressional aide,
"The scientists gave confidence to the Congress to take positions on this issue as a matter
of national responsibility. They convinced them that the technical side of it could be
learned. The great contribution of the scientists was to take emotion and scare tactics out
of the discussion." 93 The administration was clearly concerned about the effect they
were having on the Safeguard debate. Kissinger recognized the power of their testimony
about the technical problems associated with ABM. He also worried about their claims
that Safeguard would be easy to defeat. "Carried away with enthusiasm for this line of
reasoning," he wrote later, "Professor Bethe in a public session outlined five scientific
methods to defeat our ABM system." 94 Such arguments not only threatened Senate
support for Safeguard, but potentially undermined the value of ABM as a bargaining chip
in future arms control talks.
The scientists added prestige to the ABM opposition, but the Senate was the most
important critical constituency in 1969. The Senate posed the most immediate threat to
92 Not all scientists opposed Safeguard. Even though the majority came out in opposition, the
administration relied on testimony from its own coterie of specialists. The Hudson Institute, for example,
published a volume of essays in support of Safeguard in June 1969. See Johan J. Holst & William
Schneider, eds., Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy (New York: Pergamon Press,
1969). Albert Wohlstetter of the University of Chicago also published a 22 page report for the Senate
Armed Services Committee in defense of ABM, and engaged in a highly public debate with MIT's George
Rathjens over the nature of the Soviet threat and the logic of missile defense. Wohlstetter argued that
Rathjens and other critics downplayed recent intelligence on the SS-9, and offered his own calculations of
the effects of a counterforce attack employing 500 MIRVed SS-9s. William Beecher, "Scientist Rebuts
Criticism of the ABM," New York Times, May 26, 1969, p. 13; Albert Wohlstetter, Letters to the Editor,
New York Times, June 15 and 29, 1969; and George W. Rathjens, Letters to the Editor, New York Times,
June 15 and 22, 1969. For a detailed discussion of the scientists involved in the public controversy over
ABM, see Cahn, "Scientists and the ABM," pp. 108-179.
93 William Miller, aide to John Sherman Cooper (R-KY), quoted in Lundberg, "SS-9 Controversy," p. 3.
94 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 206.
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the administration's policy goals because it could kill Safeguard by voting down funding
in August. And even if the vote passed, it could limit the deployment of anti-missile
batteries by forestalling Phase II. More broadly, the frontal assault on new defense
spending threatened the Nixon administration's strategy for dealing with the Soviet
Union. The White House sought to pursue detente with Moscow, but did not want to
start from a position of weakness. Investing in new defense systems was useful because
it signaled that the United States was not permanently weakened by the trauma of
Vietnam. At the same time, new systems could be used later in arms control
negotiations, and could be linked to other issues. Concessions on arms control, for
example, could be predicated on political reform in the Soviet Union. The parallel
strategies of detente and linkage demanded a great deal of diplomatic flexibility. Senate
activism added another wrinkle to an already complicated task.
During the Safeguard debate the Senate Foreign Relations Committee convened a
contentious and highly public debate, turning scientists into temporary celebrities and
exposing fissures in the administration. In April, for instance, Sen. Albert Gore, Sr.
pointed out that the existing NIE on Soviet strategic forces did not support the testimony
of Laird or Foster. Fulbright repeatedly highlighted differences between intelligence
estimates and administration claims. Fighting against the administration's attempt to
present an image of unanimous support for Safeguard, he wrote to Laird that the "fact of
the matter is that there have been disagreements within the intelligence community." 95
Anti-ABM Senators also leaked information to the press about the CIA's dissent, noting
95 Lundberg, "SS-9 Controversy," p. 16. See also "Administration Critics Say 'Intelligence Gap' Clouds
ABM Issue," New York Times, June 1, 1969, p. 2.
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basic discrepancies on the specifications and purposes of the SS-9. 96 By highlighting
these differences, the Foreign Relations Committee undermined the White House effort
to present an image of consensus support for Safeguard. "Since the Administration has
apparently chosen to pitch much of its case for the missile defense system on the rising
Soviet threat," the New York Times reported, "the differing assessment within the
Administration on the nature of the threat could well undermine its case." 97
Nixon soon found that could not count on support from Senate Republicans on
ABM. One of the leading critics of Safeguard was John Sherman Cooper (R-KY), who
complained about the tenuous assumptions about Soviet capabilities that the
administration used to justify ABM. Cooper doubted the supposed vulnerability of the
Minuteman force, and argued that the Soviet Union could not coordinate an effective
attack against all three legs of the U.S. triad. He decried what he saw as an "inexorable
arms race" that was built on flimsy strategic logic. Other prominent Republican
opponents included Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME), who sponsored a Senate resolution
that would have sharply restricted research and development spending on missile defense,
and George Aiken (R-VT), the senior Republican in the Senate. Meanwhile a bloc of
freshmen GOP Senators used the Safeguard debate as a way of declaring their
independence from the administration. Party loyalty alone was not enough to fend off the
congressional challenge. 98
96 On the leaks, see Lundberg, "SS-9 Controversy," pp. 9-11. For examples, see "SS-9 Helps
Administration Score Points in Missile Debate," New York Times, March 24, 1969, p. 30; "Doubts Soviets
Will Order Missile Strike," Chicago Tribune, March 24, 1969, p. 1; and "Soviet Missile Deployment
Puzzles Top US Analysts," New York Times, April 14, 1969, p. 1.
97 "Soviet Missile Deployment Puzzles Top US Analysts."
98 Cooper quoted in John W. Finney, "Jackson and Cooper in Dispute Over Delay in Missile Defense," New
York Times, April 26, 1969, p. 17. See also Finney, "Politics of ABM: A Tough Struggle That Cuts Across
Party Lines," New York Times, July 13, 1969, p. El.
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Pressure from anti-ABM Senators almost killed Safeguard in 1969. The narrow
victory for Phase I funding was a partial triumph for the administration. Kissinger was
able to use ABM during the SALT I negotiations, and Washington and Moscow agreed to
limit their ABM deployments to two sites as part of the agreement. 99 But funds for Phase
II had never materialized, and Congress had only agreed to deploy anti-missile batteries
to three Minuteman sites instead of the original twelve. The Ford Administration
unilaterally gave up on hardpoint defense in 1975.
The Aftermath
Richard Helms defended his acquiescence to White House pressure by stating that
he did not want to ruin intelligence-policy relations for the remainder of the Nixon
administration. He reasoned that prolonging the fight over the SS-9 would undermine
any hope of restoring the CIA's role in the policy process. Drawing a line in the sand
would only make the administration more cynical about the Agency's real intentions.
Other controversies were sure to arise, and intelligence needed to retain a modicum of
objectivity and political independence if it was to play a positive role. As he wrote later,
"I was not prepared to stake the Agency's entire position on this one issue-in an average
year CIA was making some sixty estimates, very few of which ever reached the
President's level of concern. I was convinced we would have lost the argument with the
99 Raymond Garthoff speculates that the intensity of the Senate debate might have convinced the White
House that there was no real long-term possibility of sustaining an missile defense system. It had all the
more reason to use ABM in arms control negotiations. Garthoff, Ddtente and Confrontation, p. 131.
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Nixon administration, and that in the process the Agency would have been permanently
damaged."' 00
He was probably too late. Efforts to politicize intelligence reinforced existing
suspicions about the White House. Senior officials and working level analysts concluded
that the Nixon Administration was inherently hostile to the intelligence community and
completely allergic to bad news.
The dispute also reinforced White House stereotypes about the intelligence
community. It seemed totally averse to making bold estimates, and analysts were
unreceptive to any questioning from policymakers. According to Laurence Lynn, the
NSC staff member who headed the MIRV working group, analysts "reacted as if their
professional integrity had been questioned, and as if close questioning by non-experts is
improper."' 0' Policymakers increasingly came to the conclusion that intelligence
agencies were basically useless, despite their intellectual pretensions. Their estimates
were bland and predictable, and they instinctively rejected constructive criticism. It was
no coincidence that Kissinger accelerated the transformation of the NSC staff into a
center for all-source analysis during the SS-9 controversy. His decision was a signal that
"the CIA was no longer viewed as an independent voice, reporting to the president as an
objective observer." According to the Deputy DCI, "We had been relegated to the outer
ring of partisans, holding to views antithetical to the Nixon administration." 02 Laird's
complaint that the intelligence community was not on the team reflected a widely held
view, one that lasted for the duration of the administration.
100 Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, p. 388.
101 Lundberg, "SS-9 Controversy," p. 12.
102 Smith, Unknown CIA, pp. 244-245.
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The SS-9 affair convinced other important observers that the intelligence
community routinely underestimated estimates of Soviet strength. Hawks from both
parties were astonished that the CIA would continue to publish modest estimates of
Soviet capabilities and intentions, especially in the wake of a major strategic buildup.
Influential scholars also adopted this view, and began to pressure policymakers to shake
up the intelligence community. This set the stage for the Team B episode, which is the
subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
The Ford Administration and the Team B Affair
In May 1976, the Ford administration authorized an experiment in competitive
analysis, in which a panel of outside experts was brought in to evaluate classified
intelligence on the Soviet Union and compare its results against the annual National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The competition turned ugly, however, when the so-called
"Team B" panel turned its attention away from the Soviet Union and leveled a blistering
attack on the NIE process itself. The Team B report chastised the intelligence
community for a host of analytical errors which caused it to underestimate Soviet
capabilities and misunderstand Soviet intentions. Intelligence officials were angry about
what they perceived as untoward pressure, believing that it was motivated by an
ideologically extreme view of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the NIE that emerged from
the competition was strongly influenced by Team B.
Few episodes in the history of intelligence-policy relations have received as much
attention as the Team B affair. Some commentators have treated it as a particularly
egregious example of politicization, in which the intelligence community was forced to
accept the views of a few hardliners in order to undermine detente and justify higher
defense spending.' Others argue that it was a watershed for the intelligence community,
The most critical and in-depth examination is Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the
CIA (College Station, PA: Penn State Press, 1998). See also the separate views of Sen. Gary Hart, in
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Collection, Production, & Quality, "The
National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability & Objectives,"
(1978); www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/Team%20B.htm; Anne Hessing Cahn and John Prados, "Team
B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 24-
27; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities," in Gerald K. Haines
and Robert E. Leggett, eds., Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA 's Analysis of the Soviet Union
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003), pp. 135-184, at 159-163; Raymond L.
Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington, DC:
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which was finally forced to come to grips with the implications of the Soviet buildup in
strategic forces during the 1960s and 1970s. According to this view, the community had
produced estimates for years which never took seriously the fundamental differences
between U.S. and Soviet strategy. The quality of analysis was unlikely to improve as
long as analysts were spared from accountability, because intelligence agencies had large
bureaucratic incentives to ignore their past mistakes. 2 A third view is that the Team B
exercise was a good idea in theory but poorly executed, leading to a long period of
acrimonious intelligence-policy relations. Both sides in the dispute ended up accusing
the other of bias. Politicization may have occurred, but it was not a one-sided affair.3
This chapter demonstrates that the Team B episode was a case of indirect
politicization. When the White House allowed a group of well-known hawks to
challenge intelligence, it created the expectation that the next NIE would move to the
right. Administration officials were repeatedly warned about the underlying purposes of
the exercise, but made no attempt to ensure that the proceedings would remain politically
neutral. For that reason, Team B became an opportunity for hardliners to cudgel the
intelligence community and change the substance of the Soviet estimate.
Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 328-334; John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence
Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces, 2 nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 248-
257; Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, 2 nd ed. (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 196-198; David H. Dunn, The Politics of Threat: Minuteman
Vulnerability in American National Security Policy (London: MacMillan Press, 1997), pp. 73-78; and
Kevin P. Stack, "A Negative View of Competitive Analysis," International Journal ofIntelligence and
Counterintelligence, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 456-464.
2 Richard Pipes, "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth," Commentary, Vol. 82, No. 4 (October 1986), pp.
25-40. See also Stephen Peter Rosen, comments on Garthoff, "Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and
Capabilities," p. 186; Paul H. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima to
Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New York: Grove Weidenfield, 1989); and the separate views of Sen.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Sen. Malcolm Wallup, in "National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team
Episode."
3 Richard Betts calls the Team B episode a case of "balanced politicization." Richard K. Betts,
"Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits," in Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds., Paradoxes of
Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor ofMichael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 59-79, at 67-
69.
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Unlike the members of Team B, however, Ford's own policy preferences were in
flux. He had recently adopted a more confrontational posture towards the Soviet Union,
shelving arms control talks and ratcheting up the public rhetoric towards Moscow. At the
time it was unclear that his sudden departure from detente was a genuine policy shift, or
whether it was a temporary expedient designed to fend off the challenge from the right
wing of his own party. In hindsight it is clear that the White House authorized Team B as
a gesture to conservatives. It did not want to move the estimate too far to the right,
because it harbored hopes of reviving arms control talks after the election. Accordingly,
neither the president nor his top advisors applied direct pressure on intelligence officials
to sway their judgment.
A comparison of the SS-9 and Team B cases provides an opportunity to assess the
explanatory power of the organizational proximity and organizational dependence
hypotheses. The organizational proximity hypothesis predicts that politicization should
have been more direct in the later case because the estimative process had been
reconfigured to increase policymaker input. In 1973 the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) replaced the Office of National Estimates as the organization responsible for
drafting and assembling national estimates. Because ONE was largely staffed with senior
analysts from the CIA, the reorganization reduced the Agency's control over NIEs. In
addition, the NIC was composed of issue-specific National Intelligence Officers (NIOs)
who were specifically chosen for their ability to bridge the gap between intelligence and
policy. The ideal NIO would be equally comfortable in both worlds, and NIOs were
expected to interact closely with senior policymakers so that they could respond quickly
to policy requests. The cumulative effect of the reorganization was to reduce the distance
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between the intelligence and policy communities. If the organizational proximity
hypothesis is correct, then politicization should have been more intense after the creation
of the NIC.4
The organizational dependence hypothesis also predicts that politicization should
have been more direct in the case of Team B because the intelligence community had
become more vulnerable in the interim. The intelligence community was under severe
scrutiny from Congress during the mid-1970s, and it badly needed support from the
White House in order to ride out the wave of criticism. Televised Senate hearings
presented lurid details of domestic spying and foreign covert action. Sen. Frank Church
famously described the CIA as a "rogue elephant" operating outside the control of elected
officials, and accused it of a number of illegal and unethical activities. Never before had
intelligence been subject to such prolonged criticism, and the administration had a unique
opportunity to exploit the community's weak bureaucratic position in order to manipulate
the content of its estimates.
Nonetheless, the politicization of intelligence during the Team B episode was
indirect and less intense than in the earlier case. Nixon administration officials
personally intervened during the SS-9 affair to force intelligence officials to change their
views. The National Security Advisor and the Secretary of Defense both pressured the
DCI and members of the Board of National Estimates to alter their conclusions about
Soviet capabilities and intentions. The decision to authorize Team B, on the other hand,
was a curiously roundabout way of manipulating the Soviet estimate. President Ford
4 On the creation of the NIC, see John Prados, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William
Colby (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 275-276. On the NIO system, see Gregory F.
Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000), pp.
101-102, and 206-207.
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allowed Soviet hardliners to participate in the NIE drafting process, which made it likely
that the estimate would become more hawkish. But neither the president nor any senior
administration official followed up to make sure that the NIE was taking a turn to the
right. Having authorized the competition, the White House took its hands off the
production of the Soviet estimate. This behavior is contrary to the predictions generated
by the organizational proximity and organizational dependence hypotheses.
Moreover, explanations derived from organization theory cannot account for the
timing of politicization in the case of Team B. The height of public and congressional
scrutiny came during the televised Senate hearings in September-October 1975. The
community had reason to fear that Congress would sharply clamp down on its activities,
reducing funding and increasing oversight. As historian John Ranelagh concludes,
William Colby was trying "to save the CIA from disbandment or emasculation from
Congress." 5 This was the perfect moment for the administration to play on the
intelligence community's bureaucratic weakness, and Colby had large incentives to back
down over the issue of the Soviet threat. But the administration had no interest in
manipulating estimates, and intelligence-policy relations at the time were generally
productive. In November the White House heeded Colby's warnings about the Team B
proposal and did not force the exercise on the community. The DCI knew that the
Agency was in a tenuous position, but this did not factor into his judgment about the
proposed competition. Even though Colby shared some of the hardliners' concerns about
Soviet power - he joined the hawkish Committee on the Present Danger after leaving the
CIA - he did not want to bias the NIE process.
5 John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp.
594-595.
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The oversell model does a better job of explaining the causes of politicization. It
describes the motives of the Team B advocates, who were frustrated that intelligence was
contributing to public and congressional support for a what they believed was a
fundamentally misguided foreign policy. Hardliners recognized the persuasive power of
intelligence, and felt that changing the tone of the NIE on Soviet strategic forces would
make it harder to justify detente. The model also shows how movement on the key
independent variables affected the decision to authorize Team B. Ford only agreed to the
exercise after the rise of a critical constituency that threatened his political future, and
only after his revised public position on U.S.-Soviet relations put him at odds with
intelligence. The oversell model, however, does not fully explain the behavior of the
president or his advisors. Usually policymakers try to influence intelligence to bring their
estimates in line with policy preferences. In this case, however, the Ford administration
set in motion a process that moved intelligence in the opposite direction. The oversell
model explains a great deal about the Team B affair, but the case also illustrates the limits
of the model.
The first half of this chapter describes the intelligence-policy context in 1974-
1975, when the president eagerly pursued detente and expanded arms control agreements.
The absence of a critical constituency made it possible for the president to fend off
demands for changes to the NIE process. In addition, Ford's preferences at this time
were broadly supported by intelligence, meaning that he had no reason to manipulate
intelligence. Major changes in domestic politics affected intelligence-policy relations in
early 1976 and set the stage for politicization. The right wing of the Republican Party
became a critical constituency after Ronald Reagan emerged as a serious challenger
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during the primary season. Reagan galvanized the opposition to detente, causing the
president to revise his public statements on foreign policy. These statements suddenly
put him at odds with the standing intelligence estimate on the Soviet Union, and gave
Ford a reason to politicize the NIE. The second half of this chapter evaluates the null
hypothesis and a more idiosyncratic explanation based on individual-level characteristics.
The conclusion describes of the immediate fallout from Team B, as well as the
implications of the case for intelligence-policy theory.
The Intelligence-Policy Context, 1974-1975
President Ford was eager to continue pursuing detente with the Soviet Union
when he took office in August 1974. In his first National Security Council meeting he
praised Nixon's foreign and military policy, declaring, "No Administration in my lifetime
ever did better in those fields." 6 He also praised Nixon in person: "You have given us
the finest foreign policy this country has ever had. A super job, and the people appreciate
it. Let me assure you that I expect to continue to support the Administration's foreign
policy." 7 Ford promised Henry Kissinger, who remained as Secretary of State, that he
intended to continue arms control negotiations with Moscow. The president was
optimistic about concluding a second SALT agreement, especially after Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko suggested that the Kremlin would be willing to make
additional concessions.8
6 National Security Council Meeting, August 10, 1974, available online through the Digital National
Security Archive (DNSA); www.nsa.gwu.edu.
7 Quoted in Cahn, Killing Ddtente, pp. 45-46.
8 "Anything that would bring the arms race under control," Ford told Kissinger, "would be a plus for the
entire world." Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 33. See also Cahn,
Killing Detente, p. 46.
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Intelligence generally supported the prospects for further cooperation with the
Soviet Union. The standing estimate when Ford took office recognized Soviet gains as a
result of its strategic buildup beginning in the mid-1960s, but concluded that future
production would depend on the outcome of arms control negotiations. The United
States could influence the Soviets by "persuading them that they cannot have both
substantially improving strategic capabilities and the benefits of detente; that unrestrained
pursuit of present programs will provoke offsetting US reactions which could jeopardize
their competitive position; and that restraint on their part would be reciprocated." 9 The
next year's estimate was more circumspect about Soviet intentions, but the bottom line
remained the same. It described the Soviet arsenal as a "counterbalance" to NATO and
China, concluding that its research efforts were "hedges against future US force
improvements and possible deterioration of US-Soviet relations." According to the NIE,
Moscow wanted to reduce the technology gap with the United States, but it did not see
any logical contradiction between this goal and the "broad outlines of detente."' 0
None of this is to say that detente was guaranteed to work, nor that Washington
and Moscow were moving inexorably down the path of arms control. Soviet intervention
in Ethiopia (1974) and Angola (1975) caused concern that it was not willing to sacrifice
its revolutionary principles in favor of strategic stability. The fall of Saigon shortly
thereafter rekindled the belief that non-communist governments were at risk without
robust U.S. support. A new group of left-wing leaders in NATO ally Portugal were
contemplating giving port and airfield access to the Soviet military, a decision which
would cast doubt upon Western solidarity. Finally, Moscow was negotiating with the
9 NIE 11-8-73, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack," January 25, 1974, pp. 4-5; DNSA.
10 NIE 11-3/8-74, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through 1985," November 11, 1974, pp. 3-4;
DNSA.
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United States over the details of the Helsinki Final Act, which promised de facto
recognition of Soviet domination over the Baltic states. These events led a disparate
collection of U.S. individuals and groups to speak out against detente. Labor leaders,
various ethnic groups, prominent anti-Soviet dissidents, and some congressmen railed
against cooperation with Moscow and demanded a stronger U.S. response.
Still, the public broadly supported detente, and was sympathetic with Ford's
foreign policy preferences. In December 1974, 77% of those surveyed in a Harris poll
favored substantial mutual reductions in strategic weapons, and 68% supported expanded
trade deals." At the same time, the public was mostly ambivalent on the details of the
U.S.-Soviet relationship. During the transition to the Ford White House, for example,
less than a quarter of Americans said that they paid close attention to arms control
negotiations. The basic belief in detente and mutual deterrence allowed Americans to
focus on other issues. Crime, drug abuse, race relations, economic issues, and the energy
crisis consistently ranked higher than relations with Moscow in public opinion polls. 12
"The general mood in the United States," concludes Anne Hessing Cahn, "was positive
and upbeat concerning our relations with the Soviet Union. We didn't worry too much
about nuclear war and thought the two countries were about equally strong."' 3 The
combination of support and apathy created a very permissive environment for the
president to pursue a continuation of detente.
11 Survey by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Louis Harris & Associates, December 6-14, 1974.
Retrieved November 4, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank University of Connecticut;
www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/poll.html. All subsequent references to survey data are drawn from the Roper
Center databank, except as noted.
12 The decline in public attentiveness to nuclear strategy began long before Ford took office. See Robert
Paarlberg, "Forgetting About the Unthinkable," Foreign Policy, No. 10 (Spring 1973), pp. 132-140; and the
CBS News/New York Times survey, April 10-15, 1976.
13 Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 7.
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Opponents of the administration's foreign policy had not coalesced into a critical
constituency, and the permissive domestic political environment made it easier for the
president to expand relations with the Soviet Union. In November 1974 he signed the
Vladivostok Accord, a follow-on agreement to SALT, which placed limitations on both
states' bomber and ICBM fleets, and capped the number of ICBMs that could be
MIRVed. The agreement was derided by arms control critics who argued that it would
actually allow the Soviet Union to increase its total inventory of MIRVed missiles. But
Ford viewed Vladivostok as a success and a stepping stone for a more comprehensive
future deal. He later defended the Soviet Union against accusations that they were
cheating on existing arms control agreement, and infuriated domestic critics by
completing the Helsinki Final Act in July 1975. Indeed, even as late as December the
president believed that a new SALT agreement was good for the strategic balance and for
his chances in the next year's election.14
In 1974-1975 the White House was inclined to accept intelligence estimates.
Ford was innately receptive to the intelligence community, which he described as a
"think tank for the President to get independent judgment." 15 Open to debate and face to
face discussions, he encouraged analysts to offer professional judgments instead of
simply providing facts. But while the president was receptive to intelligence, he had a
detached relationship with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), William Colby. In
the late 1960s and early 1970s the intelligence community came under criticism for a host
of activities, including assassination attempts on foreign leaders and spying on American
14 On Ford's attitudes towards the Vladivostok agreement and the prospects for arms control in 1974-1975,
see Ford, Time to Heal, pp. 215-219, and 345. For more on his critics, see Cahn, Killing Ddtente, pp. 17-
69.
15 Quoted in Stansfield Turner, Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence
(New York: Hyperion, 2005), p. 141.
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citizens. The crisis culminated in two high-profile congressional investigations in 1975.
The White House encouraged Colby to cooperate with investigators, but administration
officials were surprised with the amount of information he disclosed to Congress.16 The
president later described Colby's actions as honorable, but at the time he was persona non
grata at the White House.17
Kissinger was still suspicious of the intelligence community, never having given
up the belief that it was a refuge for erstwhile liberal academics. During the Nixon
administration he complained that NIEs were brief, vague, and inconclusive. Partly as a
result of these complaints, Colby dissolved the Board of National Estimates and replaced
it with the National Intelligence Council in 1973. The reorganization brought
intelligence officers closer to the policy process and reduced the influence of the CIA on
the final product.' 8 Despite these changes in the estimative process, however, Kissinger
still complained that NIEs were unwilling to come to firm conclusions. He also preferred
that they include more raw data so that he and his staff could make independent
judgments. 19
Intelligence-policy relations in 1974-1975 were mixed, ranging from acceptance
to neglect. Ford was a far more receptive consumer than Nixon, and the permissive
political climate meant that he did not need to use intelligence to win public support. On
the other hand, the administration had a detached relationship with the DCI, and
16 Kissinger was furious. He called Colby's decision a "disgrace," and worried that Congress would
emasculate the CIA's covert action capability. Ford also worried about the effects on intelligence, but was
not personally hostile to the DCI. Memorandum of Conversation, Henry Kissinger, Gerald Ford, and Brent
Scowcroft, January 4, 1975; DNSA. On Ford's feelings towards Colby, see Ford, Time to Heal, pp. 324-
325.
17 Colby, for instance, had an assistant deliver the President's Daily Brief each morning. Turner, Burn
Before Reading, p. 141.
18 On the influence of the CIA on the NIE process, see Freedman, US Intelligence, pp. 30-41.
19 Cahn, Killing Ddtente, pp. 75-76, and 88.
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Kissinger's staff continued to operate as a self-contained analysis center outside the
formal intelligence community. In any case, the standing NIE on Soviet strategic forces
generally supported detente. Absent a change in the direction of policy or the rise of a
critical constituency, politicization would remain highly unlikely.
Criticism of the NIE. Intense criticism of the NIE process was brewing outside
the administration. The leading critic was Albert Wohlstetter, a professor at the
University of Chicago and longtime analyst at the RAND corporation. For years
Wohlstetter had emphasized the threat posed by Soviet nuclear capabilities, and had
warned that the U.S. position was fragile. The relaxation of Cold War tensions and the
advent of detente did little to assuage his concerns. Rather, Wohlstetter feared that U.S.
policymakers put too much stock in arms control and too much faith in the intentions of
Soviet leaders. Wohlstetter illustrated his concerns in a 1974 Foreign Policy article that
took aim at arms race theorists who believed that Soviet decisions to invest in new
weapons systems were automatic responses to U.S. defense spending. 20 His analysis
showed something quite different: Soviet production had dramatically increased despite
the long-term decline in U.S. spending, and had not slowed down in the years of
sustained arms control efforts that began in the late 1960s.
The article also represented a frontal attack on U.S. intelligence. Wohlstetter
analyzed a decade's worth of recently declassified posture statements from the Secretary
of Defense, and demonstrated that they consistently underestimated the scope and pace of
Soviet missile production. Because the posture statements were based on NIEs, the
obvious conclusion was that intelligence analysts had failed to predict the massive Soviet
20 Albert Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" Foreign Policy, No. 15 (Summer 1974), pp. 3-20.
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weapons buildup. 21 Worse, they had apparently failed to learn from previous
underestimates, making no effort to reconsider their assumptions about Soviet behavior.
The estimates which provided the basis for the Secretary's posture statements, which in
turn provided the logical impetus for U.S. strategic decision-making, were inaccurate and
misleading.
Richard Pipes, who went on to lead Team B, explained the apparent failure of
intelligence in a 1986 journal article.22 The fundamental problem, Pipes argued, was the
assumption that Soviet leaders conformed to the same strategic logic that dominated U.S.
thinking. Analysts took for granted that the Soviets understood the reality of mutually
assured destruction (MAD), and would not build weapons or develop new doctrines that
would destabilize the balance. But Moscow had far exceeded the number of sufficient
missiles that would be necessary to sustain nuclear parity, and had aggressively sought
new technologies (missile defense, MIRV) that could be used to achieve a first strike
capability. These developments only made sense if analysts took a more expansive view
of the sources of Soviet strategy. According to Pipes, however, intelligence analysts
tended to "belittle the influence of cultural factors on human behavior," preferring instead
a familiar set of assumptions about rationality based on positivist social science. 23
Analysts who had been thoroughly indoctrinated into the tenets of MAD found it
impossible to believe that Soviet strategists could misunderstand the logic of deterrence,
or that they were interested in using nuclear weapons to win wars rather than just prevent
21 Each posture statement offered a range of future Soviet deployments of ICBMs, SLBMs, and medium
and heavy bombers. Of the fifty-one total estimates went into the posture statements between 1962-1972,
the low end of the range never exceeded actual deployments. Medium predictions exceeded the actual
deployments twice, and high end predictions exceeded the actual deployments in nine cases. Wohlstetter,
"Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" p. 16.
22 Richard Pipes, "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth," Commentary, Vol. 82, No. 4 (October 1986),
pp. 25-40.
23 Pipes, "Team B," p. 29. For Pipes's critique of positivism and its influence on estimates, see pp. 26-30.
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them. Because of this kind of mirror-imaging, they failed to appreciate the meaning of
the Soviet buildup.
In addition to these epistemological concerns, critics offered a few more prosaic
reasons why the estimates were flawed. Paul Nitze, for example, believed that analysts
underestimated the buildup because of a sense of guilt. Inaccurate estimates in the late
1950s had famously led to the "missile gap" and caused the United States to embark on a
rapid and destabilizing MIRV competition. Nobody wanted to be responsible for another
arms race; as a result, analysts tended to err on the low side rather than accidentally
exaggerate Soviet capabilities.24
Finally, critics argued that intelligence analysts let their own personal beliefs
affect their professional judgment. NIEs synthesized large amounts of disparate
intelligence on the Soviet Union in order to establish the size and composition of Soviet
strategic forces. They also projected trends in technological and quantitative growth in
the Soviet arsenal. Critics like Pipes argued that the purpose of the NIE was "simply to
inform the decision-maker: as best as we can determine, the Soviet Union is developing
such and such strategic capabilities; it is up to you to decide what these developments
portend for U.S. security and how to respond to them." 25 Analysts, however, injected
their own interpretation of the data, and NIEs usually were as much political estimates
they were ledger sheets. And because they were steeped in positivist thinking, their
interpretations fell victim to mirror-imaging and minimized the Soviet threat. As long as
Soviet strategists held the same beliefs about the utility of nuclear weapons, the numbers
would inevitably lead to sanguine conclusions about deterrence and detente.
24 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp. 351-352.
25 Pipes, "Team B," p. 29.
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The criticism of the NIE sparked by Wohlstetter quickly gained steam among the
opponents of detente, especially conservative Republicans uncomfortable with the
direction of foreign policy under Nixon and Ford. If the basis of cooperation and arms
control was flawed intelligence estimates, then the policy itself was dubious.26
On June 6, 1975 Kissinger told Ford that the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB) was unhappy with the conclusions of the Soviet estimate.
Kissinger asked PFIAB to prepare a memo outlining their complaints before meeting
with Ford, but the bottom line was already clear. "The NIEs," it said, "are too
optimistic." 27 Following Wohlstetter's lead, the Board argued that the estimates were
dovish and nonchalant about the looming threat, and its parallel assessments offered a far
more ominous interpretation of Soviet intentions.28 In addition to outside critics, PFIAB
was influenced by disgruntled intelligence officers who disagreed with the majority view
of the community. 29
On August 8 the Board outlined its concerns in a letter to Ford. It criticized the
standing NIE for underestimating Soviet capabilities, especially regarding missile
26 On Wohlstetter's impact, see Strobe Talbott, Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1988), p. 146; and Cahn, Killing Ddtente, pp. 15-16. Wohlstetter's article
sparked a furious debate in the pages of Foreign Policy and elsewhere. See, for example, Morton H.
Halperin and Jeremy J. Stone, in "Rivals, but no 'Race'," Foreign Policy No. 16 (Autumn 1974), pp. 88-
92; and Michael L. Nacht, "The Delicate Balance of Error," Foreign Policy No. 19 (Summer 1975), pp.
163-177. Wohlstetter replied to his critics in "Optimal Ways to Confuse Ourselves," Foreign Policy, No.
20 (Autumn 1975), pp. 17 0 -19 8 .
27 Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, and Brent Scowcroft, June 6, 1975;
DNSA.
28 A PFIAB analysis from June argued that all three legs of the U.S. strategic triad were at risk. Soviet
gains in missile accuracy and ASW threatened the land and sea-based deterrent forces. The estimate
concluded that "by 1977 all three elements of our retaliatory triad may have lost credibility." Substantial
military investment was needed to head off the danger. "An Alternative NIE," June 18, 1975, available
online through the Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS); www.ddrs.gov. Quoted at p. 8.
29 Gen. George Keegan, the head of Air Force intelligence, told the Board that the Soviets were not
satisfied with current capabilities, and would invest in exotic weapons designed to break the strategic
stalemate. Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, the deputy director for estimates at the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), was a particularly adamant critic of the NIE's judgment that the Soviet Union did not seek strategic
superiority and a first-strike capability. Dunn, Politics of Threat, p. 75; and Cahn, Killing Ddtente, pp. 84-
85, and 111.
240
accuracy, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and low-altitude air defense. It also
complained that the NIE was too confident about its conclusions, despite large gaps in the
intelligence picture. The Board speculated that bureaucratic inertia in the intelligence
community led it to recycle old conclusions, despite the fact that available information
was limited and ambiguous. To break the cycle, PFIAB recommended a competitive
estimative process in which "alternative views" would be presented to the President and
other high-level consumers of intelligence. The Board also suggested that an
independent group perform a thorough net assessment of the U.S.-Soviet balance, on the
grounds that NIE "gives the appearance of a net assessment...when in substance it is
not." 30 A week later the Board sent a draft National Security Decision Memorandum
(NSDM) that would authorize the exercise in the hopes of "resolving observed
deficiencies" in the standing NIE before the next estimate was complete. 31
The proposal was received with some suspicion. Two of Kissinger's aides wrote
a highly critical review, calling it "alarmist" and "extreme." In their estimation, the
proposal simply pushed a very conservative viewpoint on the intelligence community,
30 PFIAB to Ford, August 8, 1975; DDRS. The surreptitious inclusion of net assessments was particularly
grating to critics, because the champions of net assessment argued that it could not be performed without a
deep understanding of each side's history, politics, culture, and bureaucracy. The phrase itself implies an
analysis of the totality of the balance, not just a chalkboard exercise comparing relative conventional and
nuclear capabilities. Economic models of the strategic balance were in vogue after World War II, when
analysts sought to lend theoretical precision to dynamics of the Cold War. Early attempts to understand the
nature of nuclear deterrence were built on abstract models; advocates of rational deterrence believed that
basic principles of mutual threat and vulnerability would hold because each side shared the same basic
values (survival) and the same basic way of calculating actions (cost/benefit analysis). These models were
seen as incomplete to critics, however, because history was littered with examples of states acting against
their own rational interest. For overviews of net assessment, see A.W. Marshall, "Problems of Estimating
Military Power," meetings of the American Political Science Association, September 6-9, 1966; and Paul
Bracken, "Net Assessment: A Practical Guide," Parameters, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 90-100.
Debating the merits of net assessment are Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the
European Conventional Balance," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 50-89; and
John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, and Eliot A. Cohen, "Correspondence: Reassessing Net
Assessment," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 128-179.
31 PFIAB, "Draft National Security Decision Memorandum," August 15, 1975; DDRS.
241
and they saw no reason to "hopelessly tie up major analytical assets with minimal
prospects for producing a coherent final document." Noting that PFIAB had not
consulted with Colby before proposing the exercise, they suggested getting his input
before proceeding. Ford set aside the draft NSDM, and Kissinger queried the DCI. 32
Colby shared some of the Board's concerns about the Soviet Union, and had
previously tried to accommodate its demand for a more competitive analytical process.
He brought in members of PFIAB to brief senior analysts on areas of specific concern,
and established debates between member of various agencies on such topics as Soviet
missile accuracy and the bomber capabilities. 33 He stopped short of opening the NIE to
outsiders, however, because such a process would allow foreign policy activists to
manipulate intelligence for their own purposes. Colby did not want the annual NIE to
become a "pen-and-paper war," and tried to put off the PFIAB proposal.34 Howard
Stoertz, the NIO for the Soviet Union, supported Colby by arguing that a parallel NIE
would distort the final product by putting undue pressure on regular analysts. 35 Writing
to Ford in November, Colby implied the dangers of politicization: "It is hard for me to
envisage how and ad hoc 'independent' group of government and non-government
analysts could prepare a more thorough, comprehensive assessment of Soviet strategic
capabilities...than the Intelligence Community can prepare." Colby suggested another
review of the standing estimate, and then another round of meetings between PFIAB and
32 Jan M. Lodal and Richard Ober to Kissinger, "PFIAB Critique of NIE 11-3/8-74 and the NIE Process,"
September 4, 1975, DDRS; and Kissinger to Colby, "Possible Revisions in the NIE Process," September 8,
1975, DDRS.
33 Cahn, Killing Ddtente, pp. 110-111.
34 Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 276.
35 Thomas Powers, "Choosing a Strategy for World War III," The Atlantic Monthly, November 1982, pp.
82-110, at 101.
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the NSC to discuss ways of improving analysis. Ford agreed, and the Team B exercise
was put on hold indefinitely. 36
Domestic politics in 1975 made it easy for the president to deflect the calls for a
competitive estimate. Ford's basic approach to U.S.-Soviet relations was popular and
consistent with intelligence on Soviet intentions and capabilities. The criticisms of the
Soviet estimate were well known by the time PFIAB approached the president, but the
critics could not affect the NIE process because they lacked sufficiently powerful
political patrons or public support. The permissive political environment enabled
tolerable intelligence-policy relations, even during a period of intense congressional and
public scrutiny of the intelligence community.
The Rise of the Right
New political circumstances changed the character of intelligence-policy relations
in 1976. Both of the independent variables in the oversell model were activated early in
the year. The right wing of the GOP emerged as a critical constituency, threatening the
administration's policy program and political goals. In response, the president reversed
his foreign policy commitments, setting him at odds with the intelligence community.
The following discussion details these changes.
Ford assumed that he would not face a serious challenge from within his own
party, and devoted little attention to the Republican primary campaign. He began the
election year with limited funds and organization, which was not unusual for a an
incumbent president. But this provided an opening for Ronald Reagan, who launched a
well-financed effort to unseat the president. Reagan made inroads in several early
36 Cahn, Killing Detente, pp. 119-120.
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primary states while Ford's political advisors scrambled to organize his re-election
drive. 37 As Reagan gained steam in early 1976, the right wing of the Republican Party
emerged as a serious threat to the president. The disparate opposition to detente and arms
control began to consolidate around the conservative former governor of California.
Reagan's personal charisma stood in contrast to Ford, who came off as dull and
pedantic. He was a better orator than the president, and his full-throated attacks on
d6tente struck an emotional chord with conservatives. His stump speeches warned of the
perils of falling behind the Soviet Union, and he accused Ford of refusing to tell "the
truth about our military status." Reagan also suggested that the president deferred to
Kissinger in foreign affairs, and railed against the "Ford-Kissinger" policies that had put
the United States in such a precarious position. The president soon became aware that he
was losing ground because of detente. He complained that Reagan's attacks on detente
were simplistic and misleading, but admitted that they were emotionally compelling.
"Under Kissinger and Ford," Reagan declared at a rally in Florida, "this nation has
become Number Two in a world where it is dangerous-if not fatal-to be second best. All
I can see is what other nations the world over see: collapse of the American and the
retreat of American power. There is little doubt in my mind that the Soviet Union will
not stop taking advantage of detente until it sees that the American people have elected a
new President and appointed a new Secretary of State." 38
Ford had no way to respond. Reagan's charisma, as well as his emotional appeals
to bring back morality to foreign policy and restore American strength, made him the
perfect champion for the critics of detente. Indeed, "it was impossible to move far
37 Ford, Time to Heal, pp. 343-345.
38 Reagan, quoted in Ford, Time to Heal, pp. 373-374.
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enough to the right," recalled Deputy National Security Advisor William Hyland.
"Reagan's stump speech on foreign policy was a collection of right-wing cliches that
seemed unanswerable." 39
By early 1976 the Republican Party had become a critical constituency,
threatening the president's foreign policy goals and his own political future. In February
Ford narrowly defeated Reagan in the New Hampshire primary. The narrow margin of
victory convinced the president that the attacks on his foreign policy were working, and
that he faced a serious challenge to hold onto the party nomination. He also began to
worry about the long-term future of the GOP, fearing that the intra-party foreign policy
debate was undoing Republican unity. As Hyland put it, the president desperately
wanted to avoid a "lacerating contest" with Reagan that would tear apart the party. 40
Finally, losing the nomination would undermine hopes of improving US-Soviet relations.
In his second term, Ford hoped to extend the original SALT agreement and broaden the
base of detente. The irony was that in order to achieve these long-term goals, he had to
publicly shun them.
To prevent conservative Republicans from defecting to the Reagan campaign,
Ford downplayed detente and adopted a more confrontational posture towards Moscow.
The decision to authorize the Team B exercise was part of the shift. At first, Ford did not
want to change course. In January 1976 he told an interviewer, "I think it would be
unwise for a president - me or anyone else - to abandon detente. It is in the best interest
245
39 Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 164.
40 Hyland, Mortal Rivals, pp. 166-167.
of this country. It is in the best interest of world stability, world peace." 41 That month
Kissinger traveled to the Soviet Union to propose a set of guidelines for concluding a
follow-on SALT agreement. His proposal was criticized by Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who argued that it represented too
much of a concession to the Soviet Union. Knowing that he would need the support of
the Pentagon to win Senate ratification for SALT, Ford watered down the offer, and
Moscow rejected the deal. Ford and Kissinger realized that election year politics would
make it "impossible to discuss complex issues like SALT in a rational way," and decided
to shelve SALT for the remainder of the year.42
The decision to postpone arms control negotiations occurred just before the first
Republican primary in New Hampshire, where Ford defeated Reagan by one percentage
point. The outcome appeared to legitimate Reagan's candidacy, and he stepped up his
attacks on the administration's foreign policy. Reagan derided detente as a "one-way
street," capitalizing on fears that Moscow was using the apparent improvement in
relations as cover for an ambitious plan to gain strategic superiority and put U.S. interests
at risk. Reagan argued that recent events demonstrated that detente was basically a ruse,
and that the Soviet Union continued to harbor aspirations for global dominance. The
apparent communist victories in Vietnam, Angola, and Portugal were proof positive that
Moscow had hoodwinked U.S. leaders about its true intentions. Moreover, Reagan
argued that detente sacrificed moral values in the name of cooperation. The Helsinki
41 Cahn, Killing Dgtente, p. 46. For more on Ford's preferences in early 1976, see Raymond L.Garthoff,
Ddtente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 1985), p. 548.
42 Kissinger even offered to resign in order to deflect criticism from hawks. Ford, Time to Heal, pp. 353-
354; Cahn, Killing Ddtente, pp. 46-47; and Hyland, Mortal Rivals, pp. 162-164. Underscoring the
domestic and bureaucratic impediments to arms control is Steven E. Miller, "Politics over Promise:
Domestic Impediments to Arms Control," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 67-90.
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Final Act, which legitimated Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe, was a regular target
for Reagan on the campaign trail.43
Ford responded to this attack by retreating from his foreign policy preferences.
"We are going to forget the use of the word detente," he told an interviewer in early
March.44 He also distanced himself from arms control talks and other visible attempts at
U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Even successful negotiations became dangerous for the
president in terms of his primary prospects. For example, White House staffers
convinced Ford to postpone a public signing ceremony for the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosives Treaty that was to be held at the Rose Garden. The treaty marked an
important milestone for arms controllers, because the Soviets had agreed to place a series
of monitoring devices at the test sites. 45 But Ford's political advisors feared a backlash
from conservatives, and worried about anything that might make the him look soft on the
Soviets. In mid-March The Washington Post noted a "serious stiffening in the United
States' attitude toward the Soviet Union." 46
Reagan's assault on detente and arms control continued nonetheless, and on
March 23 he won the North Carolina primary. This was only the third time in history that
an incumbent had lost to a member of his own party in a state primary. Reagan went on
to win in Texas, Alabama, Georgia, and Indiana. In mid-May, just before the
administration authorized the Team B exercise, Reagan enjoyed a lead in committed
delegates, 468-318.
43 For a representative example, see David S. Broder, "Kissinger Derided," Washington Post, February 11,
1976, p. Al. Following his strong showing in the New Hampshire primary, Reagan announced that he
would replace Kissinger if elected. Richard Bergholz, "Reagan Says He'd Replace Kissinger, Criticizes
Ford's Choice of Levi, Usery," Los Angeles Times, February 29, 1976, p. A6.
44 Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 163.
45 Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 165; and Cahn, Killing Ddtente, p. 47.
46 Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 165.
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"Let Her Fly": Team B is Authorized
By late spring all of the conditions for politicization were in place. Ford had
committed to a more hawkish foreign policy, creating a gap between his public position
and the more sanguine conclusions in the standing intelligence estimate. In addition, the
critics of intelligence and opponents of detente rallied behind Ronald Reagan, forming a
critical constituency that threatened the president's long-term policy goals and his
immediate political future. Colby had been replaced as DCI by George H.W. Bush, an
intelligence neophyte but a veteran of domestic politics. 47 The former chair of the
Republican National Convention, Bush certainly understood the fissures in the party and
the criticisms from the right.
In response to Colby's recommendation for further study from the previous
winter, three current and former intelligence officers evaluated a decade's worth of NIEs
on the Soviet Union. The results of the "track record" study, which focused on how well
the community had tracked Soviet capabilities, were generally favorable to intelligence.
The NIEs had "a good record of detecting and determining major characteristics and
missions of new weapons systems soon after test begins and usually well before IOC"
(initial operational capability). 48 The record of predicting new weapons deployments
was mixed. Intelligence had accurately predicted the Soviets' technological problems
47 Colby's departure had nothing to do with the Team B affair. The DCI was asked to resign partly because
Ford and Kissinger felt that he had been too forthcoming with the congressional investigations of
intelligence. In the end, however, the cumulative pressure from Congress made his departure inevitable.
Prados, Lost Crusader, pp. 297-326; and William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1978), pp. 443-444.
48 Robert L. Hewitt, John Ashton, and John H. Milligan, "The Track Record in Strategic Estimating: An
Evaluation of the Strategic National Intelligence Estimates, 1966-1975," February 6, 1976, reprinted in
CIA 's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence,
2001), pp. 278-287.
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with anti-submarine warfare and anti-ballistic missile defenses, for instance, even though
it overestimated the pace at which Moscow would deploy ABM. The biggest
shortcoming was the failure to predict the massive increase in the total number of Soviet
ICBMs. As the study concluded, NIEs from the mid- and late-1960s "failed to convey
an adequate sense of the determination of the Soviets to build up sizable force and
warfighting capabilities, however long it took." 49 But analysts were conscious of this
failure, and recent NIEs "included expanded and more explicit treatments of the evidence
and analysis underlying key judgments and more on the organizational aspects and
operational implications of the capabilities being built up." 50 Contra Wohlstetter, the
national estimators had learned from previous efforts and had taken steps to improve the
quality of the product. Nonetheless, critics of intelligence latched on to the finding about
the ICBM buildup, ignoring the generally positive nature of the review. Lionel Olmer,
the executive secretary of PFIAB, argued that the track record study was so
"condemnatory" of the NIEs that there was "little room for argument that something
ought to be done." PFIAB continued to make the case for a competitive exercise to the
Director of Central Intelligence.5
While Bush was hearing from the Board, he was also warned about the dangers of
politicization. Deputy Director George Carver told Bush that the track record study
demolished the claim that the NIEs systematically underestimated Soviet capabilities.
More to the point, Carver warned that hardliners on the Board "believe intelligence
officers should deliberately try to shape policy by calling attention to the worst things the
Soviets could do in order to stimulate appropriate countermeasure responses by the U.S.
49 Hewitt, et al., "Track Record," p. vii.
50 Hewitt, et al., "Track Record," p. ix.
51 Cahn, Killing Ddtente, pp. 128-130; and Pipes, "Team B,' pp. 29-30.
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Government. This, they believe, is the path of prudence; but it is not the view of
intelligence held by your predecessors." 52 The message appeared to get through to Bush,
who told a congressional committee in May that "we have done administratively what is
essential to see that estimates are protected from policy bias." 53
On May 26, however, Bush authorized the competition. He scribbled his
approval to a deputy: "(L)et her fly. OK. GB."54 Ford and Kissinger made no attempt to
intervene to stop the competition, nor did they exert any control over the proceedings.
Both were aware of the Board's conclusions about the NIE, and its deep disdain for arms
control. The exercise, moreover, was specifically designed so that the results could be
reflected in the upcoming NIE on the Soviet Union. By tacitly approving of Team B, the
White House quietly allowed the hardliners to manipulate intelligence.55 While the
existence of Team B was not leaked publicly until October, the exercise was well known
among the leading critics of detente. Albert Wohlstetter played an important role "behind
the scenes," as did other individuals who were not officially members of Team B. 56 The
same critics who were providing intellectual leverage for Reagan's rhetorical attacks
knew that the Ford administration had acquiesced to their demands that the intelligence
community take a harder look at Soviet intentions and capabilities.
52 Carver to Bush, April 24, 1976, quoted in Cahn, Killing Ditente, p. 130.
53 Prados, Soviet Estimate, p. 251.
54 Cahn, Killing Ddtente, p. 139.
55 Bush's reasons for authorizing the exercising are unclear. Anne Hessing Cahn and John Prados argue
that he was trying to help the administration deflect criticism from the right during the height of the
primary season. Gregg Herken believes that Bush simply agreed with the critics of the NIE. William
Hyland, the Deputy National Security Advisor who worked with the CIA during the exercise, thought that
the exercise would alleviate pressure on intelligence by letting the Agency take on its critics. Hyland later
regretted his reasoning when he realized that Team B was "a license for an attack on Ford's own
administration - a case of self-inflicted damage." Cahn and Prados, "Team B"; Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p.
85; and Herken, Counsels of War, p. 277.
56 Cahn, Killing Detente, pp. 151-152.
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Was Team B a Case of Politicization?
The null hypothesis in this study is that policymakers are unfairly accused of
politicization. It holds that policymakers should be active consumers of intelligence, and
rightfully challenge what they believe are incorrect or incomplete assessments. It also
suggests that accusations of politicization usually come from overly sensitive intelligence
analysts who cannot bear constructive criticism. In this case the null hypothesis is
plausible for two reasons. First, Wohlstetter's critique of the NIEs from the late 1960s
was correct in some aspects. The intelligence community had failed to comprehend the
size and speed of the Soviet buildup, and had repeatedly underestimated the Soviet
inventory of ICBMs. Policymakers had good reason to question intelligence on the size
and purposes of the buildup, especially given that U.S. strategy was premised on the
assumption that Moscow had limited aims and was willing to pursue arms control as a
way of managing superpower competition. Second, the logic of competitive estimates
was intuitive and compelling, and policymakers may have believed that the Team B
exercise would improve the accuracy and usefulness of the NIE.
Although the null hypothesis is plausible, it does not stand up to scrutiny.
Policymakers were repeatedly warned about the dangers of politicization before signing
off on the exercise. Had they believed that competition was a good way to sharpen the
Soviet estimate, they could have taken steps to ensure that it was carried out objectively.
The design of the competition, however, vitiated the theoretical benefits of competitive
analysis. Just as important, the performance of Team B demonstrated that its goal was to
push intelligence in a specific direction, not to improve analytical rigor. The following
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discussion fleshes out the null hypothesis in detail and explains why it is wrong in this
case. 57
In theory, competition leads to better analysis because it forces analysts to be
explicit about their assumptions and methods. Structured competition is similar to
academic debate, giving each side an opportunity to point out logical or evidentiary
weaknesses in the other's work. Individuals and bureaucracies are notoriously bad at
self-evaluation, and hard-pressed to admit to their own errors. Competition is a way of
auditing intelligence so that it does not escape needed criticism. In addition, putting fresh
eyes on analytical problems may lead to new interpretations and inject creativity into the
estimative process, so that estimates do not become repetitive because of intellectual
sclerosis or bureaucratic inertia. Faulty conclusions may persist for years because
analysts do not have any incentive to revisit their assumptions or methods, and because
existing estimates carry more weight than new ideas. A standing NIE, for instance,
conveys the collected wisdom of the intelligence community. It is difficult for analysts to
critically evaluate their own work; it is even more difficult for them to challenge the
whole of the intelligence establishment. 58
The advocates of competitive analysis used these arguments to push for Team B.
They complained that estimators were unwilling to revisit longstanding assumptions
about Soviet strategic objectives, despite a rapid acceleration in Soviet weapons
production. They also argued that NIEs were too deferential to past conclusions.
57 Michael Handel suggests a more cynical process by which leaders mask the appearance of politicization by
providing a forum for multiple advocacy. This presents the facade of rational decision making while ensuring
that policymakers have at least one source of support from within the intelligence community. Michael
Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence," in Handel, ed., Leaders and Intelligence (London, Frank Cass, 1989), pp.
3-39, at 5. See also Stack, "A Negative View of Competitive Analysis."
58 Stephen Rosen, comments on Raymond Garthoff, "Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and
Capabilities," p. 186.
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Estimators failed to learn from past mistakes not only because they did not reassess their
basic assumptions, but because it was easier simply to restate last year's findings rather
than face the discomfiting idea that last year's estimate was wrong. Because standing
estimates were a priori correct until proven otherwise, critics of the NIE process churned
out wholly predictable products and failed to register important changes in the strategic
balance.
Two of the more outspoken advocates for competitive analysis were John Foster
and Edward Teller, both members of PFIAB. Foster, the former Pentagon official who
had been instrumental in the SS-9 controversy, wanted to establish a parallel estimative
organization that would compete directly with the estimators from the NIC and the CIA.
Foster argued that regulated rivalry had been the font of innovation in the military, and
there was no reason that intelligence could not also improve if subject to a similar kind of
competition. Edward Teller added that intelligence analysts were, by their nature, more
likely to compromise than fight. While policymakers were comfortable with
competition, "intelligence was not adept in the adversary process." As a result, estimates
provided watered down conclusions that failed to take a firm stand on important issues. 59
These arguments, however, ignored the changes that had been made in previous
NIEs, as well as the fact that there was already substantial competition in the estimative
process. In 1973 Colby replaced the Board of National Estimates with the NIC in
response to complaints that the insular Board was allergic to criticism from its
consumers. The NIC was meant to bring intelligence officers closer to the policy
community while eroding the sense of corporatism among analysts. As described in the
track record study, the NIC had subsequently expanded the scope of the estimates and
59 Cahn, Killing Ditente, pp. 114-115.
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forced analysts to be explicit about their assumptions and logic. In addition, all of the
members of the intelligence community collaborated in producing the NIEs on Soviet
intentions and capabilities, and dissenting views were not hidden from policymakers. It
was certainly no secret that the DIA and Air Force intelligence disagreed with the
conclusion of NIE 11-3/8-74 that the Soviet Union sought "rough parity" with the United
States. Nor was it secret that these agencies viewed Soviet diplomatic overtures
skeptically, because the rhetoric of arms control was inconsistent with Moscow's massive
investment in re-entry vehicles and new technology. On top of the formal NIE process,
Colby had already established regular forums for debate among representatives from
throughout the community, and PFIAB itself issued an annual alternative assessment that
sharply challenged the findings in the regular estimate. There were already many eyes on
the problem, and many opportunities for competition.
The composition of the Team B panel made it seem that the exercise was
designed to move intelligence to the right. Although the CIA had some input in the
selection process, Bush assured the chairman of PFIAB that "the composition of the 'B'
teams will conform closely to the Board members' suggestions. '" 60 All of the outside
experts were known hawks with strong beliefs about Soviet behavior. Several had
recently published their views on the Soviet threat and the dubious logic of detente. 6 1
Other members were longstanding critics of the NIE process, especially Air Force Lt.
Gen. Daniel Graham, who was once described as "the most pungent and persistent critic
60 Cahn, Killing Ddtente, p. 151,
61 Examples include Daniel Graham, "The Soviet Military Budget Controversy," Air Force Magazine (May
1976); Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of D6tente, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2
Foreign Affairs (January 1976), pp. 207-233; and Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience: Its Impact on
U.S. and Soviet Strategic Policy and Decisionmaking (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1975). Several members
of Team B went on to join the revived Committee on the Present Defense, which argued for military
buildup similar to the investment called for in NSC-68 during the Truman administration. See Talbott,
Master of the Game, p. 147.
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of the CIA's estimating-analyzing hierarchy." 62 Because Team B was composed of
individuals with similar views, the outcome of the exercise was entirely predictable. 63
Finally, the conduct of Team B was inconsistent with the logic of analytical
competition. The stated purpose of the exercise was to let outside experts draw
independent conclusions based on the same classified data available to analysts. Rather
than restricting itself to an analysis of Soviet objectives based on all available evidence,
however, Team B decided to review a decade's worth of NIEs. As a result, its report was
as much a critique of the U.S. intelligence community as it was an analysis of the Soviet
Union. And while the normal draft of the NIE produced a heavily footnoted assessment,
as was the norm, Team B produced a unified polemic. 64 The exercise was billed as an
experiment in competitive analysis, but very little real competition occurred. As
Lawrence Freedman put it, "The two estimates did not engage." 65
Richard Lehman, the NIO for Warning, saw the benefits of competition but
concluded that the exercise was a farce. Some of the technical debate was useful,
especially regarding Soviet air defenses. But he derided the Team B panel on Soviet
objectives as "a team of howling right-wingers" that was determined to browbeat the
62 Joseph Alsop, quoted in Cahn, Killing Ddtente, p. 83.63 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode." Also
making this argument are Raymond L. Garthoff, A Journal through the Cold War: A Memoir of
Containment and Coexistence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 328-334; Garthoff,
"Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities," p. 162; Prados, Soviet Estimate, pp. 250-251;
Dunn, Politics of Threat, p. 77; and Harry Howe Ransom, "The Politicization of Intelligence," in Stephen J.
Cimbala, ed., Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (Dobbs Ferry, NY:
Transnational, 1987), pp. 25-46.
64 The exercise was unbalanced for another reason. While the members of Team B shared basic beliefs, the
regular drafters of the NIE included long-time critics of d6tente like Gen. Keegan, who became a "de-facto
Team B member firmly ensconced in Team A." Christopher Preble, "The Uses of Threat Assessment in
Historical Perspective: Perception, Misperception, and Political Will," ms., Cato Institute, June 16, 2005,
pp. 19-20; www.wws.princeton.edu/ppsn/papers/Preble.pdf.
65 Freedman, "CIA and the Soviet Threat," p. 136. Raymond Garthoff regrets that the exercise did not lead
to a more serious discussion about improving the estimative process. Garthoff, "Estimating Soviet Military
Intentions and Capabilities," p. 160n.
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intelligence community rather than engage in substantive debate. During the November
5 meeting, for instance, Richard Pipes made the case for Team B. Lehman recalled later
that Pipes was a gifted speaker, and his presentation was "full of things which were full
of nonsense but which sounded good." After Pipes finished his presentation, one
member of Team B leapt out of his seat and exclaimed, "Now, that's what we've been
waiting to hear!" Lehman recalled the episode as personally embarrassing, but concedes
that "the right wing had their triumph." 66
Team B also defeated the purpose of the exercise by relying on open source
publications rather than classified intelligence. Although the panelists were cleared to
evaluate the same data that went into the NIE, the Team B report contained very few
references to intelligence.67
Team B began work in August and delivered its findings in late October, leaving
enough time to incorporate them into the upcoming NIE. Its final report was a broadside
on the intelligence community. Echoing the criticisms the PFIAB, it castigated past
estimates for underestimating Soviet capabilities and misunderstanding Soviet intentions.
The main reason was that the estimators assumed that, like their American counterparts,
the Soviets had a rational respect for nuclear deterrence. This mirror-imaging biased the
estimates because it closed off alternative interpretations for Soviet behavior. The
intelligence community relied almost exclusively on "hard data" about capabilities, and
imputed typically American strategic assumptions onto Soviet strategic decisions. 68
66 Lehman, quoted in Richard Kovar, "Mr. Current Intelligence: An Interview with Richard Lehman,"
Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 9 (Summer 2000), pp. 51-63;
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/summer00O/artO5.html.
67 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, p. 352; and Dunn, Politics of Threat, pp. 76-77.
68 Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis, Report of Team "B", Soviet Strategic
Objectives: An Alternative View, December 1976, pp. 1-10;
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB/NSAEBB139/nitze 10.pdf.
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Team B also argued that analysts were prone to reflect the biases of arms-control
advocates, and were self-conscious about the danger of delivering estimates that would
undermine detente or trigger an arms race. CIA analysts felt it was their responsibility to
hold the line against more pessimistic military assessments. 69 According to Team B, this
belief was based on naive liberal idealism that took for granted the benefits of increasing
trade and cooperation.70
The report also judged that past NIEs did not understand the connection between
Soviet military investment and grand strategy. Team B argued that Soviet Union was
preoccupied with the idea of the "correlation of forces." Rather than thinking about the
balance in terms of raw nuclear numbers, Soviet strategists measured the sum total of
military, economic, psychological, and social factors that contributed to great power
strength. When the Soviet Union perceived a negative balance in the correlation of
forces, it would "confuse the enemy" by feigning friendship. When the situation
improved, it would act aggressively. Seen in this light, Moscow's posturing during the
1973 Arab-Israeli War and greater activity in the third world were ominous harbingers of
things to come.7'
Team B's assumed the worst about Soviet intentions, speculating that it might
satisfy hegemonic objectives by provoking a direct military confrontation with the United
States by 1985.72 In the meantime, the report concluded, the Soviets viewed d6tente as
an mechanism for penetrating the West while strengthening control over socialist
countries. Greater cooperation allowed Moscow to reduce anti-communist sentiment, all
69 "Report of Team 'B'," p. 4.
70 "Report of Team 'B'," p. 10.
71 "Report of Team 'B'," pp. 3-4.
72 Garthoff, Journey Through the Cold War, p. 333; and Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 85.
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the while reaping the gains of new access to technology and finance. 73 Arms control
talks were seen as an opportunity to pursue an "intense military buildup" while the
United States shackled itself to the SALT restraints. Soviet overtures were part of a
grand deception, because the Soviet Union still clung to the original goal of exporting the
revolution and dominating the West. The assumption of Soviet duplicity guaranteed that
Team B would see the threat in stark terms. There was literally nothing that Moscow
could do to change its conclusions. The strategic buildup in the late 1960s and early
1970s was evidence of offensive intent. On the other hand, Soviet gestures in the
direction of arms control were simply part of a plan to lull the United States into
submission. 74
Team B came to startling conclusions about Soviet capabilities, which it assumed
would grow in qualitative and quantitative terms. In fact, the report grossly
overestimated the size of the future threat. Team B predicted that Moscow would
produce about 500 Backfire bombers by early 1984, but the total number turned out to be
235. 75 It predicted that the Soviets would develop mobile ABM in concert with advanced
surface to air missiles, but Moscow was never able to marry these systems.76 It
73 A 1974 CIA analysis concluded that the economic benefits of d6tente did not affect overall economic
growth in the Soviet Union, even though access to specific technologies might help it develop more
effective strategic weapons. The Soviets' ability to exploit its newfound access to U.S. technology
depended on the details of export contracts. "In this regard, the guidelines set and administered by the US
Government will be influential in determining private attitudes and decisive in limiting the transfer of
military related technology." "Soviet Economic and Technological Benefits from D6tente," February 1974,
reprinted in Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA 's Analysis of the Soviet Union, pp. 197-199.
74 "Report of Team 'B'," pp. 5, 41-47.
75 The higher range estimate of the Backfire bomber made subsequent SALT talks difficult, because the
Soviet Union knew that it was not a long-range bomber and resisted its inclusion in a strategic weapons
arms control package. Garthoff, Journey Through the Cold War, p. 329. For a more detailed discussion of
the Backfire controversy, see Prados, Soviet Estimate, pp. 257-268.
76 The mobile versions of the Soviet SA-10 and SA-12 surface to air missiles had some ABM capabilities, a
point used by critics of the ABM Treaty to argue that Moscow had violated its treaty obligations. But the
SA-10 and SA-12 were developed to combat cruise missile and low-altitude bomber attacks. Moreover, as
with first generation Patriot systems, it was of limited use against ballistic reentry vehicles. For differing
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overestimated the accuracy of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, wrongly predicted that the
Soviet Union would extend the range of the SS-20 IRBM, and criticized the NIE for
arguing that the SS-16 mobile ICBM program would remain modest. (None were ever
deployed.) Team B also spoke in ominous language about laser and charged particle
beam weapons for missile defense, concluding that the "Soviets have mountedABM
efforts in both areas of a magnitude that is difficult to overestimate."77 The supposed site
of testing for nuclear-powered beam weapons, however, was test site for nuclear-powered
rocket engines. 78
The assumption that Moscow was determined to achieve strategic dominance
colored Team B's evaluation of Soviet capabilities. For example, it speculated that the
Soviet Union had deployed non-acoustic ASW systems, even though there was no
evidence of such a program. To Team B the lack of evidence itself was disquieting:
Given this extensive commitment of resources and the incomplete
appreciation in the U.S. of the full implications of many of the
technologies involved, the absence of a deployed system by this time is
difficult to understand. The implication could be that the Soviets have, in
fact, deployed some operational non-acoustic systems and will deploy
more in the next few years. 79
The actual intelligence picture was irrelevant. Team B simply assumed that Moscow was
actively seeking any technology that would allow it to gain a decisive strategic
advantage. 80
appraisals, see William T. Lee, "The ABM Treaty was Dead on Arrival," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 19,
No. 2 (April-June 2000), pp. 145-165, at 151; and Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 407-408.
77 Report of "Team B," p. 34; italics in original. Team B's conclusions about Soviet capabilities are
summarized on pp. 19-37.
78 The best critique of Team B's military analysis is Garthoff, "Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and
Capabilities," pp. 160-163. See also Cahn and Prados, "Team B."
79 Report of "Team B," p. 32.
80 The members of Team B tended to view Soviet capabilities as inherently aggressive while assuming the
same capabilities in American hands were benign. Paul Nitze, for example, argued that the United States
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The Team B exercise corrupted the estimative process in ways that were wholly
predictable in advance. The theoretical benefits of competition were lost because the
composition of Team B was lopsided, because the panel spent as much time criticizing
the intelligence community as it did evaluating the Soviet threat, and because the outside
group relied on open sources. The administration was warned of these problems in
advance but did not intervene to insulate the NIE process from political bias. On the
contrary, it allowed the exercise to proceed in order to satisfy domestic political
imperatives.
Was Politicization a Result of Personality?
As discussed in the introduction, organizational factors do not explain the
occurrence of politicization in 1976. A more idiosyncratic explanation is based on
personality. Rather than focusing on the precarious bureaucratic position of the
intelligence community, it emphasizes differences in how Colby and Bush approached
their job as Director of Central Intelligence. In short, the claim is that President Ford
politicized intelligence only after a more pliant DCI had been appointed to lead the
intelligence community. Colby was a career intelligence official who was committed to
preserving the independence and objectivity of analysis from policy bias. DCI George
H.W. Bush, who took over in January 1976, was a savvy political operator and
Republican Partisan. As former chair of the RNC, he had a vested interest in maintaining
Republican unity, and he might have been just as concerned about the health of the party
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should expand its civil defense program as a way of shoring up its deterrent force. Soviet attempts at civil
defense, on the other hand, were seen as part of a program aimed at achieving a war-winning capability in
the event of a nuclear confrontation. Talbott, Master of the Game, p. 145.
as he was about the integrity of the intelligence product.8 As a result, he understood that
allowing the Team B exercise to proceed would placate Republican hawks who were
leaning towards Reagan and fracturing the party. Bush may also have been more
enthusiastic about promoting the exercise to the White House because he had no
professional background in intelligence, and was not particularly sensitive to
politicization. If this argument is correct, then the White House would not have signed
off on Team B if Colby had continued as DCI.
Counterfactual hypotheses are inherently difficult to test, and there is no perfect
way of assessing this claim. In some ways the outcome was overdetermined. Colby,
who was sensitive to political bias, served the Ford administration before it came under
serious political pressure to abandon detente. The fact that no critical constituency had
emerged made it easy for Colby to deflect the Team B proposal. Likewise, the politically
savvy Bush came into office when the administration had strong incentives to adopt a
more hawkish position. The new DCI could satisfy his partisan instincts because the
president was fledgling in the primary campaign and needed to shore up support from the
right. The explanatory power of personality would have been easier to measure if Bush
had served as DCI when political pressures were manageable, and Colby had served
when they were not. The absence of a straightforward natural experiment in this case
makes it impossible to totally discount first-image factors.
Nonetheless, there are problems with this explanation. As noted above, Colby
sympathized with the policy views of members of Team B, participating with several of
them on the Committee on the Present Danger, which advocated higher defense spending
and a more confrontational posture towards the Soviet Union. Had he supported the
81 Dunn, Politics of Threat, p. 75; and Freedman, "CIA and the Soviet Threat," pp. 136-137.
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exercise from the outset, it would be possible to conclude that he let his personal views
dictate his management of the NIE process. Similarly, Bush was at least aware of the
problem of politicization, even if he did not fully understand its consequences. Bush
testified in May that he had made sure that intelligence analysts were protected from
policy bias:
(O)ur estimates should come forward without regard for any existing
budgets or programs. And I made this clear in my first comments to a
group at CIA, the largest group that we could get to assemble. I have
reiterated this at our staff meeting over and over again, and I am confident
that the CIA analysts not only have the message but had it loud and clear
before I came here. 82
Bush was also committed to restoring confidence to a demoralized intelligence
community. CIA veterans appreciated his efforts to bolster morale, despite the fact that
he came in as an outsider.83 Had Bush blocked the Team B exercise, historians could
have pointed to this commitment as well as his bureaucratic skill at seeing it through.
Personalities are varied and complex. In this case they are indeterminate.
Team B and the Limits of the Oversell Model
The Team B affair has been treated as a classic case of politicized intelligence,
but in many ways it was unique. Policymakers usually try to manipulate intelligence in
order to boost public and congressional support for their plans. In this case, the White
House allowed intelligence to be manipulated as a temporary political expedient, not as a
means to achieve a specific policy objective.
82 Quoted in Prados, Soviet Estimate, p. 251.
83 Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington, DC: Acropolis
Press, 1976), p. 241; and Ranelagh, The Agency, p. 632.
262
The oversell model of politicization illustrates the motives of PFIAB and the
members of Team B, who recognized the persuasive power of intelligence. Stripping
control of the NIE process from the CIA would make it possible to generate estimates
that justified higher defense spending and undermined the rationale for d6tente.8 4 The
model also shows why politicization did not occur in 1975, but became likely after the
rise of a critical constituency and a change in the president's public commitments in early
1976. Clearly domestic politics had an affect on intelligence-policy relations.
The Team B episode, however, also illustrates the limits of the oversell model.
The high levels on both of the independent variables suggest that the administration
should have directly politicized intelligence in 1976. In fact, the White House did not
directly intervene to change the content of the NIE on Soviet strategic forces. Rather, it
created the possibility that the estimate would take on a more ominous tone by exposing
the process to a panel of influential hawks. It played no role in the exercise itself after
the authorizing decision was made, and there is no evidence that it pressured intelligence
officials to adopt the conclusions of Team B in the NIE.8 5 At the same time, the
administration did not attempt protect intelligence from bias, despite the fact that it was
suspicious of PFIAB's purpose in sponsoring the competition. The whole affair was an
unusual example of politicization as a sin of omission. 86
84 One of the members of Team B, Gen. John Vogt, later explained that the exercise effectively reduced the
influence of the CIA on the Soviet estimate: "The Team B report was gaining a great deal of credibility in
the Defense Intelligence Agency, Air Force Intelligence, etc. I worked with them daily. They thought,
great-here's an opportunity to even up some score with the CIA. Sock it to them!" Cahn, Killing Dtente,
p. 177.
85 David Callahan reports on the rumors that Bush compelled the NIC to change its findings, but none of
these rumors have been substantiated. David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold
War (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), p. 380.
86 Team B was just one of several gestures to the right in 1976. In terms of the primary fight, it was less
important than the decision to expunge the word d6tente from the foreign policy vocabulary, the decision to
shelve arms control negotiations, and the increasingly confrontational rhetoric towards the Soviet Union.
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Why does the oversell model provide an incomplete explanation? First, it focuses
entirely on the effects of public commitments on intelligence-policy relations.
Policymakers who declare strong positions have strong incentives to make sure that
intelligence agencies support their views. In this case, however, Ford's increasingly
hawkish rhetoric was in contrast to his private preferences for detente and arms control.
His turn towards to a more belligerent posture towards Moscow was driven by near-term
electoral politics, not by a deep seated desire to confront the Soviets. Indeed, the
president's comments during the lame duck period suggest that he would have
resuscitated detente had he won a second term in office. Ford's last major foreign policy
statement in January 1977 brought foreign policy full circle:
It is equally important to our security that we make a genuine effort in
arms control negotiations on both the strategic and regional levels, seeking
a more stable balance through a series of agreements. Such agreements on
an equitable and verifiable basis could provide a reduction in the demand
on defense resources, with no diminution in national security, while
enhancing overall stability and advancing world peace. 8 7
Ford also offered a sanguine view of the Soviet buildup, a view that was directly at odds
with the conclusions of Team B. "The Soviet buildup is not a sudden surge," he told an
interviewer. "It has been a long-range problem. I don't necessarily think that the buildup
is for adventures around the world. It is my feeling that they are doing it because they
All of these were highly public efforts to placate hard line critics of the administration. The ultimate
concession came at the GOP convention in August, when Ford agreed to a "morality in foreign policy"
plank in the party platform. Among other things, it criticized the Helsinki Accords for "taking from those
who do not have freedom the hope of one day getting it." Ford bristled at what he called a "slick
denunciation of Administration foreign policy," but accepted the plank rather than waging rhetorical battle
with Reagan before the nomination was guaranteed. The president was uncomfortable with making such a
concession, but he feared alienating conservatives. If Ford managed to secure the nomination with a
fractured party, it "wouldn't be worth a damn." Ford, A Time To Heal, pp. 385-390.
87 National Security Decision Memorandum 348, "U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture," January 20,
1977; Ford Library online, www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm348a.htm.
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feel it necessary for their own security." s Any attempts to revive detente would have
been complicated by more ominous NIEs on the Soviet strategic threat, and for this
reason Ford's private preferences probably made him reluctant to push intelligence too
far. But private preferences, as opposed to public commitments, lie outside the scope of
the model.
This is not a major shortcoming, because policymakers usually ignore intelligence
that conflicts with their personal preferences. In the effort to maintain cognitive
consistency, individuals with strongly held beliefs tend to reject contrary information, or
interpret it so that it reconciles with their preexisting views. Because leaders are under no
obligation to incorporate formal estimates into their decision-making process, they can
usually disregard intelligence without penalty. On occasion, personal beliefs may affect
the quality of intelligence-policy relations in ways that are more complicated than simple
neglect, as the Team B episode shows. However, such cases are uncommon.
The Team B episode also suggests a different motive for politicization. Instead of
using intelligence to justify a policy position, policymakers may try to manipulate
intelligence as a way of demonstrating their own resolve. Putting pressure on intelligence
may be a way of showing that they will not be hampered by a slow-moving or
obstructionist agencies. Policymakers' often talk about "getting tough" with the
bureaucracy, and like to portray themselves as outsiders who are determined to overcome
entrenched organizational interests. In the case of Team B, the decision to open the NIE
process to hardliners may have been a way of demonstrating that the president was not
letting cautious intelligence analysts limit his foreign policy program.
88 Quoted in Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 187.
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Critics of intelligence had long complained that the intelligence community was
slow-moving and risk-averse. As described in the last chapter, Henry Kissinger
complained that it suffered from "bureaucratic immobilism." Wohlstetter similarly
criticized the community for failing to learn from past estimative mistakes, and Pipes
contended that analysts were covering their own knowledge gaps by falling back on false
assumptions about Soviet rationale. 89 Complaining about the intelligence community,
however, is not the same as politicizing intelligence. Leaders have other ways to
demonstrate their commitment to certain policies, not the least of which is staking
themselves to strong public positions. It is much easier to ignore intelligence as a way of
demonstrating that they are not constrained by a risk-averse bureaucracy. Indeed, there
appear to be no comparable cases in the history of intelligence-policy relations. President
Ford responded to a peculiar set of political circumstances with an equally peculiar kind
of politicization. When he first took office he pledged continuity in foreign policy,
repeatedly praising Nixon's approach to detente and arms control. His early efforts to
deepen U.S.-Soviet relations made it difficult for him to convince conservatives that his
newfound hawkishness was genuine. He could not satisfy the Reagan right by words
89 The intelligence community has more recently been accused of bureaucratic inertia. Some critics blamed
it for failing to adapt to changing international circumstances since the end of the Cold War. Halting reform
efforts failed to resolve issues of poor coordination and may have contributed to the failure to prevent the
September 11 attacks. See especially Amy B. Zegart, "September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S.
Intelligence Agencies," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 78-111. In addition,
critics like Robert Baer and Reuel Marc Gerecht have slammed the community for limiting espionage
activities. Frightened by the possibility of public and congressional scrutiny, it became much less
aggressive about collecting information in troubled parts of Central America and the Middle East. All of
these criticisms are based on the shared belief that intelligence agencies have increasingly come to
resemble ordinary bureaucracies whose primary concern is satisfying organizational incentives. Robert
Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism (New York: Crown
Publishers, 2002); and Reuel Marc Gerecht, "A New Clandestine Service: The Case for Creative
Destruction," in Peter Berkowitz, ed., The Future ofAmerican Intelligence (Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 2005), pp. 103-138.
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alone, and Ford needed to demonstrate that his shift from detente was real. Team B was
one step in this direction.
Consequences for Policy and Intelligence-Policy Relations
Although Team B's conclusions were based on dubious evidence, it had a
dramatic impact on the NIE in 1976. As in previous years, the estimate doubted that the
Soviet Union could achieve a first-strike capability. In this case, however, it pondered at
length the reasons why Moscow had continued to build up its strategic arsenal to levels
far beyond what was necessary for mutually assured deterrence. The estimate concluded
that Soviet planners sought to acquire a war-winning capability, freedom from Western
coercion, and "more latitude than they have had in the past for the vigorous pursuit of
foreign policy objectives." 90 The format of the estimate also changed so that footnotes
were placed in the main text along side the key judgments. Because there were no
apparent space restrictions, it became difficult to disentangle the NIE's conclusions from
dissenting opinions. For example, the dissent on Soviet objectives in the introduction
was nearly double the length of the official view. The effect on the tone of the estimate
was dramatic. As one scholar concluded, NIE 11-3/8-76 was "the most conservative and
somber estimate that the agency produced in more than a decade." 91
90 NIE 11-3/8-76, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the Mid-1980s," (December 1976),
pp. 1-3; available through the National Security Archive; www.nsa.gwu.edu.
91 Dunn, Politics of Threat, p. 76. For other arguments on the effects of Team B on NIE 11-3/8-76, see
David Binder "New C.I.A. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms," New York Times, December
26. 1976, p. 1; Joseph C. Harsch, "A fiasco in intelligence," Christian Science Monitor, January 11, 1977,
p. 23; Freedman, US Intelligence, p. 197; Pipes, "Team B," p. 34; and Robert C. Reich, "Re-examining the
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The dissenting opinions, mostly from the DIA and the military intelligence
agencies, closely followed the conclusions in the Team B report. Echoing the
conclusions about long-term consequences, one section of the NIE concluded that the
"buildup of intercontinental nuclear capabilities is integral to a programmed Soviet effort
to achieve the ultimate goal of a dominant position in the world. While it cannot be said
with confidence when the Soviets believe they will achieve this goal, they expect to move
closer to it over the next 10 years." 92 Detente and arms control agreements were
contributing to the shift in the strategic balance because they slowed down U.S. military
investment while providing Moscow access to Western technology. The goods and
services that flowed to the Soviet Union as part of detente helped subsidize the inefficient
Soviet economy, and extensive loans meant that Western banks were becoming hostage
to Moscow. The dissent criticized the NIE for failing to appreciate the danger:
(The estimate) falls far short of grasping the essential realities of Soviet
conflict purpose and evolving capability, the latter clearly constituting the
most extensive peacetime war preparations in recorded history- a situation
not unlike that of the mid-1930s, when the entire Free World failed to
appreciate the true nature of Nazi Germany's readily discernible
preparations for war and conflict. 93
The Nazi analogy indicated the seriousness of the threat. It implied that the intelligence
community was playing the role of naive appeaser, and tacitly urged policymakers to
undertake a large military buildup in order to deter Soviet aggression.
As a result of the Team B exercise, subsequent annual estimates began to
overstate Soviet capabilities. Every NIE between 1978 and 1985, for example,
substantially overestimated the total number of Soviet reentry vehicles in its ICBM
Team A-Team B Exercise," International Journal ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 3, No. 3
(Fall 1989), pp. 390-391.
92 NIE 11-3/8-76, "Soviet Forces," pp. 4-5.
93 NIE 11-3/8-76, "Soviet Forces," p. 5.
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arsenal. In each estimate, the lower bound of the predicted range of the Soviet inventory
actually exceeded the total stockpile. 94
Team B had little immediate effect on American foreign policy. President Carter
largely ignored the report, except for its conclusions on Soviet air defense. 95 On the
other hand, the Team B exercise complicated efforts to rekindle detente. Moscow
responded angrily after the news of Team B leaked in late 1976. Leonid Brezhnev called
the accusation that Moscow sought a first-strike capability "absurd and totally
unfounded." 96 The Team B episode also set the stage for large increases in defense
spending by moving the hawkish position into the mainstream. In the words of Sen.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it, the exercise helped "from heresy to respectability, if not
orthodoxy." 97 Team B made it easier to justify a defense buildup, and harder to
reinvigorate the SALT process.
The effects of Team B on intelligence-policy relations were not immediately
clear. And as part of his broader plan to reorganize the intelligence community, President
Carter closed down PFIAB in March 1977. The new administration was not impressed
with the findings of Team B, and was not interested in institutionalizing competitive
94 Garthoff, "Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities," p. 160.
95 There are two different interpretations for Carter's attention to Soviet air defense. The first is that this
was the one area in which the Team B exercise contributed to improvements in the intelligence picture on
Soviet capabilities. Even critics of Team B acknowledged as much. See, for instance, the comments of
Richard Lehman in Kovar, "Mr. Current Intelligence." The second interpretation is that Carter needed
evidence of a strong Soviet air defense apparatus to justify his efforts to scale back investment in the B-1
bomber. If Moscow had become technically saavy in this area, then the B-1 would be vulnerable and not
worth the cost. See Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 144; and Jim Klurfield, "A New View on Nuclear War,"
Newsday, June 15, 1981, p. 6.
96 Reich, "Re-examining the Team A-Team B Exercise," p. 397.
97 Separate Views of Moynihan, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode. Raymond
Garthoff argues that Team B generally undermined public confidence in the Soviet Union. Garthoff,
Journey Through the Cold War, p. 330. See also Freedman, US Intelligence, pp. 196-198.
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analysis by outside experts. 98 But the episode created lasting antipathy between
policymakers and intelligence officers. Unsurprisingly, analysts widely perceived it as a
case of politicization. George Carver, who warned Bush about the political overtones of
PFIAB's proposal, concluded that the "real reason why some members of the Board are
pushing for 'the competitive estimate'... is that they want to be sure that the total
package includes all the worst case possibilities laid before them." 99 The elevation of
worst case possibilities would give policymakers a reason to hedge against any
possibility, justifying higher defense spending and new weapons programs. CIA analyst
Hans Heymann argued that his colleagues were suspicious of the purposes of the
exercise. "Most of us were opposed to it because we saw it as an ideological, political
foray, not an intellectual exercise. We knew the people who were pleading for it." 100
When Ronald Reagan won the presidency in 1980, he reconstituted PFIAB and
brought several members of Team B into the administration. Analysts suspected that
they would be expected to exaggerate the Soviet threat, and some of them accused top
intelligence officials of bending to the will of the White House. They also became
increasingly reluctant to offer judgments on contentious policy debates, even when the
issue did not involve the Soviet estimate. 101 Analysts had fallen victim to what Sherman
98 David Dunn notes the initial disinterest in the Carter White House, but notes that Team B established a
clear "voice of dissent" in government. The critics of d6tente had moved from the fringe to the mainstream
of the debate over US-Soviet relations. Dunn, Politics of Threat, pp. 78-79. See also Prados, Soviet
Estimate, pp. 252-255.
99 Carver to Henry Knoche, May 5, 1976, quoted in Cahn, Killing Ddtente, p. 131.
100 Cahn, Killing Ddtente, p. 138.
101 In the early 1980s, for example, intelligence officials failed to register their doubts about the prospects
for a mutual Syrian and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. State Department envoy Philip Habib argued
that if one country began a withdrawal, the other would follow. The intelligence consensus was that Syria
would stay in Lebanon regardless of Israeli actions, but analysts were worried about being caught between
Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, who was wary of Habib's
proposition. Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, "Introduction: Seven Tenets," in May and Zelikow,
eds., Dealing with Dictators: Dilemmas of U.S. Diplomacy and Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 8-9.
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Kent called the "sickness of irresponsibility," and intelligence-policy relations
deteriorated in an atmosphere of deepening mutual hostility. More than thirty years have
passed since the Team B episode, but according to one observer, "the Agency has never
recovered." 102
102 Lawrence Korb, quoted in Alterman, "Think Again: Team B." See also Stack, "A Negative View of
Competitive Analysis." On the poison atmosphere in the early 1980s, see John A. Gentry, "Intelligence
Analyst/Manager Relations at the CIA," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (October 1995),
pp. 133-146.
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Chapter 7
Intelligence-Policy Relations and the War in Iraq
"Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam's is one of the
most secretive and dictatorial regimes in the world. So I believe people
will understand why the Agencies cannot be specific about the sources
which have formed the judgments in this document, and why we cannot
publish everything we know...What I believe the assessed intelligence has
established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce
chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to
develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of
his ballistic missile programme."
Tony Blair, September 24, 2002
"Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous
dictator...If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today - and
we do - does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he
grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?"
George W. Bush, October 7, 2002
In 2002-2003, intelligence agencies in the United States and the United Kingdom
estimated that Iraq had accumulated stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and
that it was actively working towards a nuclear weapons program. Policymakers in
Washington and London used these findings to publicly justify their decision to go to
war. However, inspectors found no such weapons of mass destruction (WMD) after the
fall the Ba'ath government. The gap between prewar estimates and postwar findings led
1 "Weapons of mass destruction" is shorthand for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The phrase is
inaccurate and misleading, because not all of these weapons are capable of causing mass destruction.
Nonetheless, prewar estimates and postwar investigations both refer to WMD. I use it in this chapter to
avoid confusion.
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to severe criticism of intelligence methods. In the United States, the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence argued that analysts were strongly biased in favor of the
argument that Saddam Hussein had WMD, despite the paucity of reporting from sources
in Iraq. Shoddy management also led to "layering", the phenomenon in which analysts
unwittingly treat multiple reports from the same source as corroboration. 2 The
president's WMD commission was more blunt: "We conclude that the Intelligence
Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction." Like the Senate investigation, the commission found that the errors
resulted from poor collection and poor analysis. Espionage efforts could not penetrate the
Ba'ath regime, meaning that analysts had to rely on technical collection assets like
imagery satellites. Given the slow trickle of useful information, analysts should have
been cautious about making bold predictions about Iraqi WMD, but they believed that the
lack of data was simply proof of an elaborate concealment program. On top of all this,
intelligence officials failed to inform policymakers that intelligence on Iraq was limited
and ambiguous. Because they would not admit how little they knew, policymakers were
left with a misleading picture of the Iraqi threat. The commission ultimately absolved
policymakers of mishandling intelligence or pressuring intelligence agencies to conform
to a predetermined viewpoint.4
2 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 7, 2004.
3 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005. The quote is from the cover
letter to the president.
4 WMD Report, pp. 3, 175-177. For other critiques of pre-war intelligence, see Richard L. Russell,
Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets it Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get it Right
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 76-85; and Robert Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and
Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 2006), pp.
3-52.
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British postwar inquiries came to similar conclusions, even though they were less
acerbic in their criticisms of intelligence. 5 The Butler Review found that the Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6) had not been able to cultivate many sources in Iraq,
and the few existing agents were only able to provide hearsay on key issues. In the
absence of current information, intelligence agencies tended towards worst-case
scenarios. Analysts were mindful of the fact that they had underestimated Iraqi
capabilities before the first Gulf War, and they erred on the side of incaution. Butler
concluded that these were intelligence failures; policymakers did not try to manipulate
the findings. 6 Separate inquiries by Lord Hutton, the parliamentary Intelligence and
Security Committee, and the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, all agreed with
this basic point. Whatever errors were present in the government's declassified
intelligence on Iraq were not the result of conscious politicization. 7
Others were less forgiving. Critics of the Bush administration argued that it
manipulated intelligence to oversell the Iraqi threat.8 Angry intelligence officials also
lashed out at what they saw as gross politicization of their work. They complained that
policymakers pressured them to come to certain findings, and that intelligence chiefs
buckled under pressure instead of protecting analysts from policy bias. "Never have I
5 For an excellent review, see Richard Aldrich, "Whitehall and the Iraq War: The UK's Four Intelligence
Enquiries," Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 16 (2005), pp. 73-88.
6 Report of a Committee of Privy Counselors, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction
(London: The Stationary Office, 2004), pp. 44-46, 112, 150-153.
7 Lord Hutton, Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death ofDr. David Kelly
C.M.G. (London: The Stationary Office, 2004), chapter 12; House of Commons Intelligence and Security
Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction - Intelligence and Assessments (London: The Stationary
Office, 2003); and House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision to Go to War in Iraq
(London: The Stationary Office, 2003).
8 Examples include John Prados, Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War (New
York: New Press, 2004); John Prados, "Iraq: A Necessary War?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 59,
No. 3 (May-June 2003), pp. 23-33; Michael Fitzgerald and Richard Ned Lebow, "Iraq: The Mother of All
Intelligence Failures," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 21, No. 5 (October 2005), pp. 884-909; and
Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq
War," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 5-48.
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seen the manipulation of intelligence that has played out since the second President Bush
took office," wrote Tyler Drumheller, the European division chief at the CIA before the
war. "I watched my staff being shot down in flames as they tried to put forward their
view that Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction." 9 Anonymous analysts
claimed that policymakers pushed them to exaggerate Saddam Hussein's WMD
capabilities as well as his connections to terrorist groups like al Qaeda.' 0 When they
wrote about the lack of information on current Iraqi programs, their supervisors warned
them, "This is not what the administration is looking for. You've got to find WMD's,
which are out there."' ' Intelligence officials also complained about indirect pressure
from the administration. Policymakers repeatedly asked them the same question until
they received the right answer, creating a "chill factor" in the intelligence community that
discouraged any kind of skepticism. 12 Analysts soon noticed that their more hawkish
peers were given preferential access to policymakers. 13
9 Tyler Drumheller, with Elaine Monaghan, On the Brink: An Insider's Account ofHow the White House
Compromised American Intelligence (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2006).
10 Greg Miller and Bob Drogin, "CIA Feels Heat on Iraq Data," Los Angeles Times, October 11, 2002;
Spencer Ackerman and John B. Judis, "The First Casualty," The New Republic, June 23, 2003, pp. 14-25;
James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse ofAmerica's Intelligence Agencies (New
York: Doubleday, 2004), pp. 333-338; Bryan Burrough, Evgenia Peretz, David Rose, and David Wise,
"The Path to War," Vanity Fair (May 2004), pp. 228-245, 281-294; John Aloysius Farrell, "Cheney's
Intelligence Role Scrutinized," Denver Post, July 23, 2003, p. Al; Seymour Hersh, "The Stovepipe," The
New Yorker, October 27, 2003, p. 77; Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, "Some Iraq Analysts Felt Pressure
from Cheney Visits," Washington Post, June 5, 2003, p. Al; and Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris:
The Inside Story ofSpin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War (New York, Crown Publishers, 2006),
pp. 135-140.
1 Quoted in Burrough, et al., "The Path to War."
12 Robert Dreyfuss, "The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA," The American Prospect, December 16, 2002;
www.prospect.org/cs/articlesarticlelD=6636. See also Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in
Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March/April 2006), pp. 15-27.
13 One CIA analyst was particularly strident in his belief that Iraq's attempt to procure high-strength
aluminum tubes was evidence that it sought a uranium enrichment capability. Although this finding was
hotly disputed by nuclear experts at the Department of Energy, the relatively obscure analyst soon found
himself briefing senior administration officials, as well as skeptical Europeans in Geneva. David Barstow,
William J. Broad, and Jeff Gerth, "How White House Embraced Suspect Iraq Arms Intelligence, New York
Times, October 3, 2004, p. 1.
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Critics of the Blair government have blamed it for corrupting the intelligence
process by spinning limited information into fearful threat assessments for public
consumption. Rather than using intelligence to inform the decision-making process, it
used intelligence to rally support for its increasingly aggressive policy on Iraq. The prime
minister's staff participated directly in editing the government's 2002 dossier on Iraq,
which was based on Joint Intelligence Council (JIC) assessments. By allowing political
operatives to participate in the assessment process, the language of the dossier became
less objective and more propagandistic. Although Iraqi military power had eroded as a
result of longstanding international sanctions, the public presentation of intelligence
made it appear that Iraq could soon threaten core British interests. The Blair
administration, in short, manipulated intelligence to ensure that it supported the case for
more aggressive action on Iraq.14 In addition, the process of enlisting top intelligence
officials to join the policy consensus on Iraq meant that skeptical analysts were
marginalized. In the words of a former JIC chairman, intelligence chiefs failed to protect
the objectivity of the intelligence process after they "entered the prime minister's magic
circle." 15
Some critics blame intelligence for its poor performance before the war; others
blame policymakers for cooking the books. But the story is not simply about
14 Anthony Glees and Philip H.J. Davies, Spinning the Spies: Intelligence, Open Government, and the
Hutton Inquiry (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2004); David Coates and Joel Krieger, Blair's War
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004), pp. 60-61, 127; Ian Davis and Andreas Persbo, "After the Butler Report:
Time to Take on the Group Think in Washington and London," BASIC Papers: Occasional Papers in
International Security, No. 46 (July 2004); Philip H.J. Davies, "Discredited or Betrayed?: British
Intelligence, Iraq, and Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Graham F. Walker, ed., The Search for WMD:
Non-Proliferation, Intelligence and Pre-emption in the New Security Environment (Halifax, Nova Scotia:
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2006), pp. 151-172; John Hughes-Wilson, "Pre-War Intelligence and
Iraq's WMD Threat: Intelligence Blundering or Intelligence Laundering?" RUSIJournal, Vol. 149, No. 1
(February 2004), pp. 10-13; and Nigel West, "The UK's Not Quite So Secret Service," International
Journal oflntelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2005), pp. 23-30.
15 Rodric Braithwaite, "Defending British Spies: The Uses and Abuses of Intelligence," The World Today,
Vol. 60, No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 13-16, at 15.
276
incompetent intelligence officials or mendacious policymakers. Instead, the mistakes in
the pre-war estimates were the result of a total collapse in intelligence-policy relations.
Intelligence analysts' began with incorrect assumptions about Iraqi intentions. Mindful
of Saddam's history of producing and using WMD, they assumed that his weapons
programs must have accelerated after UN inspectors left the country in 1998. They also
assumed that renewed inspections were unreliable because Saddam had never been
forthright with the UN. These assumptions led to threat inflation in British and American
pre-war estimates. Policymakers compounded these errors by favoring analyses that
supported the case for military action against Iraq and rejecting those that did not. They
sent a continuous stream of indirect signals to intelligence agencies about what findings
they expected to receive. They also directly politicized intelligence in critical moments
by pressuring intelligence chiefs to publicly join the policy consensus. As a result,
intelligence estimates became increasingly ominous in the late summer of 2002. They
overstated the certainty of knowledge about Iraqi programs, obscuring the fact that
information from Iraq was patchy and sporadic. Published intelligence estimates went
out of their way to remove any indications of doubt from intelligence agencies. Caveats
and qualifiers disappeared in declassified assessments. What was left was a picture of an
grave and growing threat to American and British security which demanded an
aggressive policy response.
This chapter explains the evolution of intelligence-policy relations in the United
States and the United Kingdom before the war. It makes three central claims. First, the
oversell model of politicization explains the basic pattern in each case. Despite
fundamental differences in organization and culture, the politicization of intelligence was
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a response to domestic politics. When policymakers made controversial public
commitments, they pressured intelligence agencies to join the consensus on the nature of
the Iraqi threat and the need for military action. Second, policymakers used intelligence
to oversell policy decisions by invoking the aura of secrecy. They pretended that there
was broad agreement in the intelligence community about the magnitude of the threat,
and suggested that weaknesses in the public case against Iraq were the result of necessary
classification rules. Third, the politicization of intelligence prevented any serious
reassessment of standing estimates, even after a new round of international inspections
failed to discover any evidence of WMD in the months before the war.
I begin by outlining the basic differences between the intelligence communities in
the United States and the United Kingdom. The organizational proximity hypothesis
suggest that the pattern of intelligence-policy relations should have been much different
because British intelligence is much closer to the policy process. The second section
evaluates each case in turn, and demonstrates that the variables in the oversell model
outperform the proximity hypothesis in explaining policy responses to new intelligence
estimates. The third section describes how policymakers exploited the persuasive power
of secret intelligence to oversell the case for war. The conclusion explains why
politicization led to a state of analytical sclerosis that prevented intelligence agencies in
both countries from reassessing their basic conclusions.
The Machinery of American and British Intelligence
At first glance, the American and British intelligence communities appear quite
similar. Both are composed of single-source collection agencies and "all-source"
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analysis centers. In the United States, the CIA has primary responsibility for espionage,
while agencies like the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency (NGA) collect and interpret electronic signals, overhead imagery,
and other kinds of technical data. The CIA and the State Department Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) provide all-source analysis by combining various kinds
of intelligence in their reports on foreign activities. The most comprehensive analyses are
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), which are supposed to represent the collective
wisdom of the entire intelligence community. NIEs include input from each agency and
are drafted by the National Intelligence Council (NIC).
The British intelligence community also divides agencies according to different
collection disciplines. For example, SIS focuses on espionage, while the Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) intercepts and processes signals intelligence.
These organizations, as well as ministerial agencies like the Defense Intelligence Service
(DIS), provide their own analyses of raw data. In addition, the Joint Intelligence Council
(JIC) provides a forum for representatives of different agencies to reach consensus on
relevant policy concerns.' 6 JIC products are the epitome of all-source analysis.
But two fundamental differences lie just beneath the surface. The first has to do
with the relative distance between the intelligence and policy communities. U.S.
intelligence agencies are purposefully removed from the policy process. Although they
work for policymakers, they enjoy a number of institutional and symbolic buffers that are
16 The best reference guide for the organization of American intelligence is Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S.
Intelligence Community, 5 th ed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008). On the estimative process, see
Harold P. Ford, Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems ofNational Intelligence Estimating,
revised ed. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993). For and official overview of the British
intelligence community, see National Intelligence Machinery (London: The Stationary Office, 2006).
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meant to protect them from bias. The terms of reference for National Intelligence
Estimates are written by the NIC and distribution is limited to intelligence officials. The
NIE drafting process also occurs without policy input. The NIC tries to ensure that
intelligence products are policy relevant by employing National Intelligence Officers
(NIOs) as senior level go-betweens, but policymakers ultimately have no formal role in
the drafting of estimates. Intelligence agencies maintain an ethos of independence from
the policy process, and they are symbolically removed from the policy circles. For
example, the CIA's headquarters is in Langley, Virginia, rather than in the capital itself.17
This kind of separation is nonexistent in the United Kingdom, where government
ministers have more input in the estimative process. Members of the JIC include
ministerial representatives as well as intelligence chiefs, meaning that in practice the line
between analysts and policymakers is fuzzy at best. As Michael Herman emphasizes, the
JIC "brings together all relevant government knowledge and interpretation - not just
intelligence - in a forum of mixed intelligence chiefs and senior policy people."' 8
Moreover, raw data routinely flows to cabinet ministers without being filtered through
the many layers of intelligence bureaucracy that exist in the United States. In many cases
there is no clear line delineating intelligence analysis form policymaking. Policymakers,
diplomats, and intelligence officers are all responsible for analysis. One former official
17 Stephen Marrin, "At Arm's Length or At the Elbow? Explaining the Distance between Analysis and
Decisionmakers," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2007), pp.
401-414, at 402-403. See also L. Keith Gardiner, "Dealing with Intelligence-Policy Disconnects," in Inside
CIA 's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford
Westerfield (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 344-346, at 355-356; and Gregory
Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), p. 218.
18 Michael Herman, "Intelligence and the Iraqi Threat: British Joint Intelligence after Butler," Journal of
the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 149, No. 4 (August 2004), pp. 18-24, at 22.
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even described the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as "a huge assessment
machine." 19
The second important difference has to do with the concept of competitive
analysis. National estimates in the United States are the product of debate between
different agencies. While NIEs attempt to resolve differences of opinion and the goal is to
present a single position for policymakers, dissent is inevitable given the number of
agencies involved. Disagreements that cannot be solved in coordination meetings are
usually registered as footnotes, although they sometimes appear in the main text. The
process stresses the importance of vigorous debate in order to force participants to
sharpen their analyses. In the United Kingdom, however, collegiality is far more
important than competition. The JIC exists to iron out differences of interpretation, and
JIC assessments do not contain footnotes or other indications of disagreement. This is
consistent with broader norms of British government, where ministers and civil servants
typically seek "consensus for the sake of consensus." 20
These differences suggest that politicization should be more common in the
United Kingdom. The close proximity of policymakers to the estimative process gives
them a regular opportunity to shape the content of analysis. In addition, because British
intelligence strives for consensus, policymakers have large incentives to make sure they
19 Reginald Hibbert, "Intelligence and Policy," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (October
1995), pp. 110-127, at 113. See also Philip H.J. Davies, "Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National
Concepts and Institutions," Harvard International Review, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 62-66; Philip
H.J. Davies, M6 and the Machinery of Spying (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 10-16; Marrin, "At Arm's
Length or At the Elbow?"; Michael Herman, "Threat Assessment and the Legitimation of Policy,"
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 174-178; and Michael Herman,
"Assessment Machinery: British and American Models," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 10, No. 4
(October 1995), pp. 13-33.
20 Philip H.J. Davies, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States,"
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (October 2004), pp. 495-520, at 498. See also
Lawrence J. Lamanna, "Documenting the Differences Between American and British Intelligence
Reports," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Winter 2007), pp.
602-628, at 635-625.
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deliver the single conclusion that is most favorable to policy goals. On the other hand,
the greater distance between American policymakers and intelligence analysts should
reduce their opportunity to manipulate estimates. Moreover, because dissent is expected,
policymakers in the United States should find it easier to cherry-pick for supporting
analyses rather than trying to pressure the sprawling and fractious intelligence
community to reach agreement. Alternately, they can create ad hoc analysis groups and
bypass the community entirely. 2 1 Policymakers should only try to pressure intelligence
when they have a reasonable chance of succeeding.
Comparing the British and American cases provides an opportunity to test the
oversell model of politicization against the organizational proximity hypothesis. Because
both cases revolve around the same issue during the same time period, we can control for
a host of extraneous factors. The oversell model predicts that politicization should occur
in response to domestic political pressures, regardless of the organizational structure of
the intelligence community. If the model is correct, then policymakers in both cases
should try to bring intelligence into the policy consensus in order to justify controversial
public commitments in the face of hostile constituencies. On the other hand, the
proximity hypothesis predicts direct politicization in the United Kingdom but not in the
United States. Instead of quixotically trying to pressure the divided intelligence
community to deliver a single favorable assessment of the threat, U.S. policymakers
should have simply cherry-picked for support.
The following analysis of intelligence-policy relations before the war is consistent
with the oversell model, which predicts both the outcome as well as the specific process
of politicization. It shows that U.S. and British policymakers exhibited very similar
21 Davies, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure."
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behavior, and that they consciously acted in response to domestic political pressures. The
Bush and Blair administrations both used a combination of indirect and direct
politicization to enlist the support of intelligence officials in selling the case for military
action against Iraq. Moreover, politicization became more intense at the moment when
both independent variables were activated. In the United Kingdom, this occurred when
the government strengthened its commitment to regime change. In the United States,
direct politicization began when Senate Democrats began to vocally question the logic of
war and demand firmer evidence that the WMD threat was real. The oversell model
provides a more satisfying explanation for the emergence of politicization in each case.
American Estimates and the Policy Response
Intelligence-policy relations in the United States fell roughly into three phases
before the war. In the first phase, intelligence provided cautious estimates about Iraqi
capabilities, noting the thinness and unreliability of information. Policymakers tended to
ignore intelligence estimates because they were skeptical about the quality of intelligence
and were confident in their own beliefs. The second phase began after the September 11
attacks and continued through mid-2002. During this period policymakers encouraged
intelligence to explore possible links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden.
When they received unsatisfying answers, they went back to ignoring intelligence. The
third phase began during the summer, when the Senate requested firmer evidence about
Iraqi capabilities, causing policymakers to worry that intelligence estimates were going to
play an important role in the public debate. At this point the White House stopped
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ignoring intelligence and started pressuring it to join the policy consensus on the need for
military action.
August 1998-September 2001. Intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
had three defining characteristics before September 11. First, it was limited by a paucity
of information. UN weapons inspectors had provided the bulk of information on Iraq, but
they left the country in 1998 on the eve of a four-day bombing campaign over Baghdad
and other suspected WMD sites. Afterwards, analysts only had sporadic access to human
sources inside the country, and were forced to rely on overhead imagery and signals
intelligence. Iraqi defectors offered lurid descriptions of Saddam's burgeoning WMD
infrastructure, but these reports were treated cautiously. Defectors lacked current
knowledge of Iraqi activities and were motivated to exaggerate the extent of the danger.
Second, the evolving intelligence picture was largely based on circumstantial
information. Lacking first hand knowledge, analysts tried to piece together a picture of
Iraqi capabilities by looking at its procurement efforts. This task was especially difficult
because Iraq regularly imported dual-use materials that could be used for commercial or
military applications. Finally, there was intense disagreement within the intelligence
community over basic issues relating to Iraq's biological and nuclear weapons programs.
After the exit of the weapons inspectors from the UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM), intelligence estimates characterized the WMD threat in cautious language.
Analysts generally agreed that Saddam Hussein sought to rebuild Iraq's WMD programs,
but they did not believe that Iraq could achieve the industrial scale production of banned
weapons, especially as long as international sanctions remained in place. The few
sources that managed to report on Iraqi activities after the departure of UNSCOM gave
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differing accounts; for example, some reported that the regime had continued with "low-
level theoretical research" into chemical and biological weapons while others were
convinced that the program was completely "halted." 22
Assessments of chemical weapons (CW) between 1998-2001 shared two basic
assumptions. First, they agreed that Iraq retained some amount of pre-Gulf War chemical
agent and precursor material. Accounting gaps in prior Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM,
as well as Saddam's belligerent attitude towards weapons inspectors, convinced U.S.
analysts that Iraq maintained a small CW stockpile. Second, they assumed that Iraq
could convert the existing civilian chemical industry for military purposes on relatively
short notice. In June 1998, inspectors found traces of degraded VX on fragments of an
al-Hussein missile, confirming that Iraq had mastered some fairly complex
weaponization techniques before the Gulf War. One month later the UN unearthed the
so-called "Air Force Documents," a group of records showing that Iraq had expended
fewer CW munitions in the Iran-Iraq war than previously believed. This reinforced the
belief that Saddam Hussein was not being forthright about the total number of remaining
munitions, and fueled the assumption of a lingering CW capability.23
A community assessment in late 2000 warned that the expansion of Iraq's civilian
chemical industry could provide cover for an offensive CW program. Although there
was no sign of industrial-scale CW production, it did not rule out the existence of a
smaller ongoing effort, noting Iraq's increased procurement of dual-use materials and
equipment. The assessment concluded that Iraq had up to 100 tons of chemical agent and
22 National Intelligence Council (NIC), Current Iraqi WMD Capabilities, October 1998; quoted in WMD
Report, p. 55.23 CIA, Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program: Status and Prospects, August 1998. See WMD Report, pp. 114-
115; and SSCI Report, p. 210.
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precursor in bulk storage and in munitions. It assumed that most of the stockpile was
mustard, with smaller quantities of sarin and VX. 24
Biological weapons estimates focused mainly on Saddam's intentions and the
dual-use dilemma. As with assessments of CW, the lack of reliable information from
within Iraq made point predictions impossible. A February 1999 community assessment
judged that Iraq had some biological stockpiles, as well as personnel and equipment that
could be used to revive an offensive BW program. 25 In May, the National Intelligence
Council reported that there were some indications that Iraq was restarting BW activities,
but could not come to a firm conclusion. Instead, it offered the hedging judgment that
Iraq was "probably continuing work to develop and produce BW agents." 26 A National
Intelligence Estimate later that year came to the same conclusion. 27 The assumptions
about Iraqi intentions led analysts to fear a revived BW effort, but the dearth of HUMINT
prevented more definitive judgments. Analysts relied on technical collection assets like
overhead imagery, which could not penetrate the Ba'ath regime or offer many insights
into Iraqi intentions. The NIC also noted that imagery was of little use in identifying
dual-use materials that were being diverted for military purposes. Analysts had no way
of knowing the purposes behind increased activity at possible BW facilities like
pharmaceutical plants and medical research institutes.28
The amount of HUMINT appeared to increase in 2000, when a new source
reporting on Iraqi efforts to deploy mobile BW facilities. This source, code named
24 Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000; cited
in SSCI Report, pp. 144-145 and 196-197.
25 Iraq: WMD and Delivery Capabilities After Operation Desert Fox; in SSCI Report, p. 143.26 NIC, Worldwide BWPrograms: Trends and Prospects; in WMD Report, p. 82.
27 NIE 2000-12HCX: Worldwide B WPrograms: Trends and Prospects, October 1999; in SSCI Report, p.
143
28 NIC Memorandum, Iraq: Post-Desert Fox Activities and Estimated Status of WMD Programs, July
1999; in SSCI Report, p. 143.
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CURVEBALL, reported to German intelligence, who forwarded his information to U.S.
representatives. Although U.S. intelligence officials lacked access to CURVEBALL, the
information he provided began making its ways into formal estimates. The DIA
circulated more than 100 papers on his reporting in 2000-2001, and the cumulative
weight of this new information led to more general fears of Iraqi progress. 29 In
December, an updated NIE on worldwide BW proliferation concluded:
Despite a decade-long international effort to disarm Iraq, new information
suggests that Baghdad has continued and expanded its offensive BW
program by establishing a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent
production capability. We judge that Iraq maintains the capability to
produce previously declared agents and probably is pursuing development
of additional bacterial and toxin agents. Moreover, we judge that Iraq has
BW delivery systems available that could be used to threaten US and
Allied forces in the Persian Gulf Region. 30
Accompanying reports reiterated that the NIE relied on a single source, but judged that he
was credible. CURVEBALL raised concerns that Iraq's covert BW production effort
could eventually yield several hundred tons unconcentrated biological agent.3'
On the other hand, some CIA officials were suspicious about the quality of his
information, partly because the Germans were reluctant to let U.S. officials speak with
him. Only one American intelligence officer was able to interview CURVEBALL, who
was apparently hung over during their meeting. 32 In addition, the community was unable
to corroborate his information on mobile BW facilities from other sources. For this
reason, senior intelligence officials were careful about the analysis they brought to the
29 Drumheller, On the Brink, p. 78. For a comprehensive treatment, see Bob Drogin, Curveball: Spies,
Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War (New York: Random House, 2007).
3o NIE 2000-12HCX, Worldwide BWPrograms: Trends and Prospects Update, December 2000; quoted in
SSCI report, p. 144.
31 WMD Report, p. 82; and SSCI Report, pp. 144-155.
32 German intelligence had a history of difficult relations with the CIA, which was one likely reason that it
was reluctant to give U.S. officials access to its source. Drogin, Curveball, pp. 14-36. See also
Drumheller, On the Brink, p. 78.
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White House. According to Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, who witnessed
intelligence-policy interaction at NSC meetings in the first year of the Bush
administration, DCI George Tenet was candid about intelligence shortcomings during the
summer of 2001. "Everything Tenet sent up to Bush and Cheney about Iraq was very
judicious and precisely qualified," he recalled later. "The President was clearly very
interested in weapons or weapons programs - and frustrated about our weak intelligence
capability - but Tenet was clearly being careful to say here's the little that we know and
the great deal that we don't."33
Intelligence on Iraq's nuclear program was also thin and circumstantial. In June
1999, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee stated that the departure of UN
inspectors might give Saddam Hussein an opportunity to reconstitute his nuclear weapons
program, but acknowledged that there was no evidence that had had done so. 34 A
community-wide assessment in December 2000 came to the same basic conclusions.
Although Saddam still had nuclear aspirations, no current information suggested a
revived nuclear program. 35
The intelligence picture changed in April 2001, when the CIA learned that Iraq
had sought to procure 60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes from Hong Kong. The
Agency determined that the tubes were probably intended for use as uranium enrichment
centrifuges, even though it noted that the use of aluminum rather than more advanced
materials represented a step backwards for Iraqi nuclear designers.36 Centrifuge
33 Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul
O'Neill (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 160-161.
34 The JAEIC is a community-wide forum on all aspects of nuclear intelligence. See Richelson, US
Intelligence Community, pp. 260-261.
35 WMD Report, p. 55.
36 A full-fuel cycle requires mining uranium ore, converting it into gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UH6),
and enriching it to weapons-grade quality. Centrifuges spin UH6 at high speeds to separate differently
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engineers at the Department of Energy (DOE) immediately disputed the CIA findings,
arguing that the specifications of the tubes were not consistent with known centrifuge
designs. On the other hand, the dimensions were precisely the same as the motor casings
in Italian 81mm artillery rockets, and Iraq had previously declared its intention to
manufacture similar rockets at the Nasser metal fabrication plant in Baghdad. DOE and
INR analysts also argued that the aluminum was unlikely to withstand the stress of the
enrichment process, in which tubes were spun continuously at extremely high speeds.
Finally, they noted that Iraq had specifically requested tubes with an anodized surface.
This was useful to prevent corrosion against the elements, but not for enrichment
cascades that were maintained indoors in clean environments. (British analysts separately
pointed out that the chemical used to anodize the tubes would react poorly with UH6 and
would have to be stripped before the tubes could be put to use.) The CIA and DOE
circulated competing assessments throughout the summer. 37
In sum, the intelligence community generally agreed that Iraq wanted to rebuild
its chemical and biological weapons programs, and that it could hide many of its
activities through dual use procurement. On the other hand, there was no reason to
believe that Iraq was close to achieving an industrial-scale production capability, and
there was no indication that Iraq maintained significant quantities of weaponized toxins
weighted isotopes. Sending the gas through several centrifuge cascades produces a high concentration of
the isotope U235, which is usable for nuclear weapons.
37 Senior Executive Intelligence Briefing, April 10, 2001; DOE, Daily Intelligence Highlight, "High-
Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement," April 11, 2001; DOE, Daily Intelligence Highlight, May 9, 2001;
CIA, Senior Publish When Ready, June 14, 2001; and DOE, Technical Intelligence Note, "Iraq's Gas
Centrifuge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway?" August 17, 2001. Discussions of these analyses are in
SSCI Report, pp. 88-92; WMD Report, pp. 56 and 200, note 37; and Barstow, et al., "How the White
House Embraced Suspect Iraq Arms Intelligence."
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or pathogens. Most had been destroyed after the first Gulf War in 1991.38 The
community was also divided over Iraq's nuclear efforts. The CIA feared that Iraq was
trying to import specialized equipment for uranium enrichment, but this was fiercely
disputed by analysts in DOE and INR. Analysts were generally suspicious about Saddam
Hussein, given his WMD activities in the 1980s and his obstinate behavior towards UN
weapons inspectors in the 1990s. But even the worst-case estimates did not argue that he
was not on the verge of acquiring a significant chemical, biological, or nuclear capability.
The greater concern was the rise of transnational terrorist groups like al Qaeda. In
the 1990s the CIA became increasingly concerned about al Qaeda's capabilities and
intentions, and Tenet emphasized the danger with increasing intensity through the
summer of 2001. The Bush administration, however, did not take these warnings
seriously. In fact, it generally ignored intelligence before the September 11 attacks.
Senior policymakers had long been suspicious of the intelligence community; the
controversy over the Soviet estimate in the 1970s had not healed, and many of the
hawkish critics of the CIA in the 1970s were either in the Bush administration or were
close to the White House. Neoconservatives held the CIA in particularly low esteem.
Richard Perle, the head of the Defense Science Board and an associate of Rumsfeld and
Wolfowitz, later said that the CIA's analysis "isn't worth the paper it's printed on." 39 In
addition, White House priorities in the summer of 2001 centered around domestic
policies like the president's proposed tax cuts. As a result, while the intelligence
38 Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews, and George Perkovich, with Alexis Orton, WMD in Iraq:
Evidence and Implications (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), p. 16.
39 Spencer Ackerman and John B. Judis, "The First Casualty," The New Republic, June 23, 2003, pp. 14-25,
at 17.
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community grew more concerned about a terrorist attack, its warnings fell on deaf ears. 40
According to Ron Suskind, the president assumed that CIA warnings about possible
attacks were simply efforts to insulate the intelligence community from future criticism.
In August, the CIA sent a group of analysts to brief the president on the spike in ominous
intelligence suggesting an al Qaeda attack. "Alright," Bush told them afterwards,
"you've covered your ass now." 41
September 2001-June 2002. Intelligence-policy relations became more productive
after September 11. Intelligence officials had more reliable access to senior
administration officials who were sensitive to any indication that al Qaeda was preparing
another attack. The White House was also impressed by the CIA's plans to aggressively
track and destroy al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan. 42 The CIA quickly established
positions in Afghanistan, exploiting longstanding relationships with anti-Taliban groups
and laying the groundwork for the insertion of U.S. forces. Its performance helped blunt
criticism of the intelligence community for its apparent failure to prevent the September
11 attacks. The White House was also desperate for information about possible future
attacks, giving the Agency a seat at the table.
Neoconservatives in the administration had long been intrigued by the notion that
Saddam Hussein played a role in the first bombing of the World Trade Center, and
40 Joshua Rovner, "Why Intelligence Isn't To Blame for September 11," MIT Center for International
Studies, Audits of the Conventional Wisdom, No. 05-13 (November 2005). See also Joshua Rovner and
Austin Long, "Correspondence: How Intelligent is Intelligence Reform?" International Security, Vol. 30,
No. 4 (Spring 2006), pp. 196-203; and Bob Woodward, Plan ofAttack (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2004), pp. 12, 24.
41 Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of ts Enemies Since 9/11 (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 1-2.
42 The chief of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, Cofer Black, promised the president that the terrorists
would "have flies walking across their eyeballs." Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, p. 15. See also
Woodward, Plan ofAttack, pp. 67-68.
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wanted to know if he was connected in any way to 9/11. 43 The intelligence community
had previously assessed this claim, but never found evidence of Iraqi complicity in the
first attack. Instead, it argued that Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein treated each
other as enemies, mainly because of al Qaeda's belief that the Muslim world was
undermined by apostate regimes like the Ba'athist government. Immediately after
September 11, policymakers asked intelligence officials to revisit the question. Pentagon
officials seemed fixated on Iraq, despite the early indications al Qaeda alone was
responsible.44 The CIA found no indication that Iraq had anything to do with the attacks.
It briefed the president on September 21, restating its assessment that al Qaeda and Iraq
were rivals.4 5
Policymakers were not satisfied with this assessment, especially neoconservatives
in the Department of Defense. But they made no effort to pressure the intelligence to
change its view. Instead, the Pentagon created a new analytical unit to revisit the
question of Iraq's relationship with al Qaeda. This outfit, the Policy Counterterrorism
Evaluation Group (PCTEG), began assembling information that suggested an operational
link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. While the CIA discounted such a
link, the new office provided a mechanism for producing information that would be used
later to justify military action against Iraq.46 It culled vast amounts of intelligence data in
43 Laurie Mylroie, Study ofRevenge: Saddam Hussein 's Unfinished War against America (Washington,
DC: AEI Press, 2000). For a discussion of the neoconservative infatuation with Mylroie's theory and a
trenchant critique of the book, see Peter Bergen, "Armchair Provocateur," The Washington Monthly
(December 2003); www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0312.bergen.html.
44 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004),
pp. 30-31; and Bamford, Pretext for War, p. 285.
45 Murray Waas, "Key Bush Intelligence Briefing Kept from Hill Panel," National Journal, November 22,
2005.
46 PCTEG was later referred to as the Office of Special Plans (OSP). OSP became shorthand for all the
activities in the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy before the war. Department of Defense
Inspector General, Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
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an effort to find connections between Iraq and the September 11 attackers. It also relied
on information provided by Iraqi exiles who were eager to overthrow Saddam Hussein,
and provided some of its reports to the media to keep alive the idea that Iraq was allied
with al Qaeda. PCTEG was used for public relations, but it was not initially an
instrument of politicization. Indeed, there is no indication that the administration tried to
manipulate intelligence before summer 2002. Instead, it relied on ad hoc analysis shops,
Iraqi dissidents, and friendly journalists to make the case against Saddam Hussein. It was
perfectly willing to tolerate dissent from the intelligence community.47
Nor did it try to politicize estimates on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, despite
the fact that intelligence continued to offer ambiguous findings about Iraqi activities.
Analysts remained concerned about Saddam Hussein's potential for acquiring chemical
weapons, but they generally agreed that the international sanctions had effectively
constrained his efforts, and that existing CW stockpiles were militarily insignificant. In
the absence of reliable human intelligence, different agencies could not agree on whether
increased activity at chemical plants was cause for concern. INR worried that Iraq was
restarting activity at a facility that was suspected of producing precursors, and suggested
that it was filling munitions with chemical agent at the al Musayyib facility southwest of
Baghdad. DIA analysts were more cautious, noting that they had no reliable information
for Policy, February 9, 2007; and James Risen, "Terror Acts by Baghdad Have Waned, U.S. Aides Say,"
New York Times, February 6, 2002, p. 10.
47 Robert Dreyfus and James Bamford have argued that the alternative analysis centers in the Pentagon
were created to pressure the intelligence community into taking a harder line. This was not the case in the
first half of 2002. In fact, Pentagon briefers did not share their analyses with the CIA until mid-August.
See Bamford, Pretext for War, pp. 287-290 and 317-318; and Dreyfuss, "The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA."
For other accounts, see Eric Schmitt, "Aide Denies Shaping Data to Justify War," New York Times, June 5,
2003, p. A20; and Seymour M. Hersh, "Selective Intelligence," The New Yorker, May 12, 2003. For a
description of the August meeting with Pentagon representatives, see George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At
the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), pp. 347-349.
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on current production efforts, and no way of knowing whether Saddam Hussein was
ready to restart the CW program.48
Estimates of Iraqi BW were becoming more ominous, but analysts had serious
reservations about the reliability of their sources. In October 2001, the CIA asserted that
Iraq "continued to produce" at least three biological agents and maintained delivery
systems that were more capable then in the pre-Gulf War era.49 A December assessment
calculated a 40-60% probability that smallpox was part of Iraq's offensive BW program.
As with most BW estimates, however, it included significant caveats about the quality of
information, warning that "credible evidence is limited" and the "quality of information
is poor."50 The DIA concurred with the assessment that parts of the BW program were
larger and more sophisticated than they had been in the 1980s, and judged that Iraq was
capable of weaponizing BW on a "moderate range of delivery systems.""5 But it was
also concerned about the reliability of its sources. In February, for instance, the Iraqi
National Congress provided a defector who supposedly corroborated intelligence on
mobile BW facilities. The Defense HUMINT Service was skeptical, as it was clear that
he had been coached. The Pentagon cut off contact after a couple of months because he
was embellishing his reports in ways that seemed incredible, and the DIA issued a
fabricator notice in May. 52
Estimates of nuclear weapons were much the same: worrying indicators of Iraqi
progress were mixed with serious concerns about the reliability of new intelligence
48 For estimates during this period, see SSCI Report, pp. 197, 209-211.
49 CIA, Iraq: Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Capability, October 21, 2001; in WMD
Commission Report, p. 83.
50 Intelligence Community Report ICB 2001-34HC, Smallpox: How Extensive a Threat?, December 20011
in SSCI Report, p. 145.
51 Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile
Programs: Post-l1 September, January 2002; in SSCI Report, pp. 185-186, 210.
52 SSCI Report, pp. 160-161.
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sources. Late in 2001 the CIA learned that a foreign intelligence service was concerned
that Iraq was trying to acquire uranium ore ("yellowcake") from Niger.53 The Agency
was initially skeptical about this development, partly because Iraq did not have the
domestic facilities to reprocess the yellowcake. The U.S. Embassy in Niger subsequently
discounted the report because the French consortium that operated the mines observed
strict security requirements and cooperated closely with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). Analysts at the State Department roundly rejected the theory. A senior
analyst warned the Secretary of State that the intelligence was not credible, and INR
circulated its dissent on March 1.54 George Tenet was not concerned enough to include
the details in his annual threat briefing to Congress.55
Other agencies were more concerned. The Directorate of Operations (DO) in the
CIA issued two more reports on Iraq's suspected attempts to acquire yellowcake from
Africa in 2002. On February 5 it provided a more detailed account, again based on
foreign intelligence reporting, which included the text of a suspected agreement between
Niger and Iraq. A subsequent assessment said that the agreement would have included
the transfer of 500 tons of yellowcake each year. 56 Although no uranium was ever
transferred, this was taken as an ominous sign of Saddam's commitment to reconstituting
his nuclear program. The DIA wrote a parallel assessment on the basis of this reporting,
53 For an extended treatment of the yellowcake controversy, see Peter Eisner and Knut Royce, The Italian
Letter: How the Bush Administration Used a Fake Letter to Build the Case for War in Iraq (New York:
Rodale, 2007).
54 INR Assessment, Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq is Unlikely, March 1, 2002; in SSCI Report, p. 42. On
INR's warning, see Bamford, Pretext for War, p. 305.
55 The closest he came to mentioning the controversy was his comment that the "Intelligence Community
remains concerned that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its
nuclear weapons program." Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction andAdvanced Conventional
Munitions, January 2002; www.fas.org/irp/threat/bianjan_2002.htm56 SSCI Report, pp. 37-38, 47.
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which caught the attention of the White House. 5 7 Vice President Cheney received a
briefing on the Niger claim in mid-February, and asked for the CIA's view. Agency
representatives told Cheney that the foreign intelligence service was reliable, but that it
"lacked crucial details" and contradicted the opinion of the U.S. embassy. 58
During the first half of 2002, the White House was slowly beginning to build the
case that Saddam Hussein was actively reconstituting his weapons of mass destruction
program. Policymakers were interested in intelligence that supported these views, and
frustrated by intelligence judgments that reflected uncertainty and doubt. As one critic
put it, "The collective output that CIA puts out is usually pretty mush. I think its fair to
say that the civilian leadership isn't terribly cracked up about the intelligence they receive
from CIA." 59 In fact, the intelligence picture was mushy, and the lack of consensus
within the intelligence community spoke to the fundamental ambiguity of the data.
Nonetheless, its conflicting and conditional conclusions reinforced the stereotype that
intelligence agencies were feckless and risk-averse. Instead of trying to pressure
intelligence to change its conclusions, the administration created ad hoc analysis centers
like PCTEG, and turned to dissident groups like the INC for damning information on
Saddam Hussein.
June-December 2002. Although information remained scarce, the tone and
substance of estimates became more ominous in the second half of 2002. Senior
intelligence officials subdued their own doubts and signed off on firmer estimates of the
Iraqi threat. Dissenters remained vocal within the community, but their views were
57 DIA Report, "Niamey signed an agreement to sell 500 tons of uranium a year to Baghdad," National
Military Joint Intelligence Center, Vol. 028-02, February 12, 2002. See also SSCI Report, pp. 38-39.
58 SSCI Report, p. 43.
59 Reuel Marc Gerecht, quoted in Dreyfuss, "The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA."
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increasingly marginalized. Different interpretations were downplayed in the National
Intelligence Estimate sent to Congress in October 2002, and completely excised from the
declassified version of that document that was published shortly thereafter. This shift
was the result of a basic change in the character of intelligence-policy relations. Before
the summer policymakers had been perfectly willing to ignore contrary views. Now they
began to pressure intelligence to join the policy consensus on Iraq.
The first attempts to politicize intelligence were indirect. During the summer
policymakers sent tacit signals to the intelligence community that encouraged to indulge
certain assumptions about Saddam's intentions. Public comments from the White House
left little doubt that Saddam Hussein had an active WMD program, and were vague
enough to suggest that he was somehow associated with al Qaeda. The administration
claimed with increasing frequency that the intelligence was damning and irrefutable.
Vice President Cheney stated that Iraq was "clearly pursuing these deadly capabilities";
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that there was "no question" that Iraq was
reconstituting its weapons of mass destruction; and Secretary of State Colin Powell
claimed that Iraq was diverting oil revenues to develop new chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons. 60 The president also previewed a new military doctrine that aimed to
prevent "unbalanced dictators" from supplying weapons of destructions to terrorists.6
None of this was not lost on the CIA, where officials were rapidly becoming convinced
60 Vice President's Address to the National Association of Home builders, June 6, 2002;
www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020606.html. Powell is quoted in a CTV
interview, June 13, 2002; www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/11104.htm. Rumsfeld is
quoted in Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, "Al Qaeda Active, Rumsfeld Says," The Washington Post,
June 4, 2002, p. Al.
61 Joseph Curl, "Bush Promises to Preempt Terrorist Plans," The Washington Times, June 2, 2002, p. 1.
See also The National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica, September 2002;
www.whitehouse.gove/nsc/nss.pdf.
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that war was inevitable. 62 By issuing definite statements about Iraq capabilities,
policymakers encouraged analysts who shared the assumption that Iraq had weapons of
mass destruction. They also changed the terms of debate, forcing dissenters to prove the
negative.
Indirect politicization took the form of repeated questioning. Policymakers
started asking intelligence analysts to revisit the same questions until they received
answers that reflected their own beliefs. The process sent clear signals to the intelligence
community about policy preferences, and analysts found themselves under pressure to
deliver certain conclusions. Former CIA official Vincent Cannistraro notes that "analysts
are human, and some of them are also ambitious...If people are ignoring your
intelligence, and the Pentagon and NSC keep telling you, 'What about this? What about
this? Keep looking!' - well, then you start focusing on one thing instead of the other
thing, because you know that's what your political masters want to hear." 63 Paul Pillar,
who served as National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East until 2005, said that this
kind of politicization was routine before the war, especially regarding the question of
Iraq's connection to al Qaeda. Top-down pressure caused analysts to draw inferences
that were not supported by the underlying intelligence, turning assumptions about
Saddam Hussein's motives into firm conclusions about his behavior. "When
policymakers repeatedly urge the intelligence community to turn over only certain
rocks," Pillar later concluded, "the process becomes biased." 64
62 Drumheller, On the Brink, p. 75; James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush
Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 113-115; and Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in
Iraq."
63 Quoted in Dreyfuss, "The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA."
64 Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq." See also James Risen, "C.I.A. Aides Feel Pressure in
Preparing Iraqi Reports," New York Times, March 22, 2003, p. B 10.
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In June, the vice president and his chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, began
making regular visits to CIA headquarters in Langley. Some analysts believed that these
visits were intended to signal the administration's displeasure with the content of
analysis. One official said the visits created a "chill factor" that discouraged anything
that ran counter to the administration's public rhetoric. 65 Another sensed that the vice
president was indirectly politicizing intelligence by sending "signals, intended or
otherwise, that a certain output was desired." 66 Cheney never tried to force analysts to
produce propaganda, but his regular presence "had the effect of underscoring his
unblinking conviction and unshakeable commitment to the idea that Iraq was an
immediate threat." 67 Cheney and Libby were particularly interested in any intelligence
that tied Iraq to al Qaeda. According to a participant at later meeting, the discussions
turned into something like a courtroom prosecution:
Scooter Libby approached it like an artful attorney. An analyst would
make a point and Libby would say, okay this is what you say. But there
are these other things happening. So if this were true, would it change
your judgment? And the analysts would say, well if that was true, it
might. And Libby would say, well if that's true, what about this? And six
'if that were trues' later, I finally had to stop him and say, 'Yes, there are
other bits and pieces out there. We've looked at these bits and pieces in
terms of the whole. And the whole just does not take us as far as you
believe.' 68
Nonetheless, the Agency took the argument further than ever. Since the previous year,
the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and the Near East and South Asia office (NESA) had
both been working on the problem of state-sponsored terrorism. CTC aggressively
looked for connections in order to discover useful information for ongoing
65 Spencer Ackerman and John B. Judis, "The Operator," The New Republic, September 15, 2003.
66 Pincus and Priest, "Some Iraq Analysts Felt Pressure from Cheney Visits."67 Drumheller, On the Brink, p. 43. See also Farrell, "Cheney's Intelligence Role Scrutinized"; and Prados,
Hoodwinked, p. 34.
68 Quoted in Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 344.
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counterterrorist operations, while NESA took a more conservative approach, "confirming
intelligence with multiple sources and making assessments only based on strongly
sourced reporting." 69 On June 21 the agency published a lengthy assessment, Iraq and al
Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, based on the CTC approach. In the preface it
explicitly stated that its approach was "purposefully aggressive in seeking to draw
connections, on the assumptions that any indication of a relationship between these two
hostile elements could carry grave dangers to the United States." NESA analysts
complained that the assessment represented a one-sided view. 70
Other intelligence assessments began to change to accommodate political and
practical realities. While internal assessments continued to reflect the ambiguity of the
underlying data, the intelligence community began offering policymakers less equivocal
judgments about Iraqi capabilities. A classified DIA paper on CW flatly stated, "There is
no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons,
or where Iraq has-or will-establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities." 71 A
DIA "contingency product" published later in the summer, which was unlikely to have
circulated among policymakers, was similarly careful about making firm judgments
without better data. 72 But estimates for policymakers were less cautious, as Tenet
69 SSCI Report, p. 305.
70 Quoted in SSCI Report, p. 305. The Senate intelligence committee concluded that the visits were not
inappropriate, and that policymakers did not try to exert influence over estimates of Iraqi-al Qaeda ties (pp.
361-363). Senior intelligence officials have changed their views about whether or not the meetings
constituted politicization. The head of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, Jami Miscik, initially
expressed concern that policymakers were pushing analysts towards a predetermined conclusion. Later,
however, she attributed their complaints to "hurt feelings" in NESA because the Murky Relationship paper
adopted the CTC methodology. SSCI Report, p. 361. See also Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 342-
350.
71 Ackerman and Judis, "First Casualty," p. 15.
72 DIA Contingency Product, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities: An Operational Support Study; in SSCI Report,
p. 209. See also DIA Information Paper, Iraqi Interest In Smallpox as a Biological Warfare (BW) Agent; in
SSCI Report, p. 186.
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admitted later. 73 On August 1, for example, the CIA delivered a comprehensive estimate
of the aluminum tubes issue for senior administration officials entitled, Iraq: Expanding
WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat. Although it had not gathered any additional
evidence that the tubes were part of an enrichment program, the agency confidently
declared it to be the case. The secrecy surrounding the project, as well as the design
specifications in the procurement order, convinced some Agency analysts that the tubes
were part of a covert nuclear effort. 74
The CIA also revisited its conclusions about Iraq and al Qaeda. The Murky
Relationship paper published in June had accommodated the White House, but had also
contained caveats about the limits of available intelligence, warning that "Our knowledge
of Iraqi links to al-Qa'ida still contains many critical gaps." 75 On August 15,
representatives from the DOD's Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group briefed the
CIA on its findings, and criticized the Agency for not connecting the dots between al
Qaeda and Iraq. Although briefing infuriated Tenet and other intelligence officials, the
CIA began to downplay the lack of information and offer more support for the
administration's claims. 76 Tenet later argued that evolving assessments were based on
fresh intelligence, including information on the movement of al Qaeda operatives in to
Baghdad and the establishment of an al Qaeda affiliate in northeastern Iraq. 77 But some
officials with access to the assessments were unimpressed. According to one
73 Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 370.
74 SSCI Report, p. 93; and Risen, State of War, p. 87.
75 SSCI Report, p. 306.
76 One of the briefers has refuted Tenet's highly critical account of the meeting. According to Christina
Shelton, a DIA analyst seconded to Feith's office, her briefing simply "summarized a body of mostly CIA
reporting...that reflected a pattern of Iraqi support for al-Qaeda." See Christina Shelton, "Iraq, al-Qaeda
and Tenet's Equivocation," The Washington Post, June 30, 2007, p. A21. See also Tenet, At the Center of
the Storm, pp. 346-348.
77 Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 349-355.
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congressional staffer, the agency "didn't do analysis. What they did was they just
amassed everything they could that said anything bad about Iraq and put it into a
document." 78
As with written estimates, the tenor of intelligence briefings to White House
officials also changed. Briefings became more certain about Iraqi capabilities and
intentions, despite continuing doubts among analysts. Accompanying materials,
including the President's Daily Brief lacked the caveats about ambiguous and limited
information that were present in other estimates. 79
Because the intelligence community sensed that war was coming, analysts felt an
obligation to provide worst-case analyses to military planners, who feared that invading
troops would be exposed to chemical or biological attack. The intelligence exposed how
little was actually known. For example, the expansive "weapons of mass destruction
master list" contained 964 sites, but it was based on a potpourri of old HUMINT reports,
imagery, and blueprints. Military planners had no obvious way to determine which sites
needed to be preserved in order to conclusively demonstrate Iraq's possession of banned
weapons, and which sites needed to be destroyed in order to prevent the regime from
transferring WMD to terrorists. They eventually decided to attach the highest priority to
locations that happened to be on the invasion route.8 0 One officer provided his own blunt
78 Ackerman and Judis, "First Casualty," p. 18.
79 Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas, Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq:
Issues for the Intelligence Community, July 29, 2004, p. 11; online at the National Security Archive:
www.gwu.edu/nsa. The Kerr report was an internal CIA investigation of pre-war analysis. See also Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm, pp. 369-370; and SSCI Report, p. 14.
so Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of
Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), pp. 80-81.
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appraisal of the intelligence: "It was crap." Planners had seen a great deal of imagery of
suspect buildings, but "What was inside the structure was another matter."8'
The key intelligence document before the war was the National Intelligence
Estimate delivered to Congress on October 1, Iraq 's Continuing Programs for Weapons
of Mass Destruction. The NIE arrived just over a week before Congress voted to
authorize the use of force against Iraq. The estimate began with a clear statement of the
problem:
We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has
chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess
of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear
weapon during this decade.82
The estimate fleshed out these statements in some detail, emphasizing issues that were
particularly worrisome. For example, it claimed that advances in unmanned aerial
vehicles made it possible that Iraq could threaten its "neighbors, US forces in the Persian
Gulf, and if brought close to, or into, the United States, the US Homeland' (italics in
original). Because UAVs were intended to deliver chemical and biological weapons, the
estimate served to heighten the sense of an imminent WMD threat against the United
States.
The NIE judged that all the elements of Iraq's supposed WMD program were
growing. Despite the lack of reliable information from Iraq, the estimate confidently
declared that Iraq was actively producing chemical weapons and possessed 100-500 tons
of agent, including mustard, sarin gas, cyclosarin, and VX. This was a significant jump
81 Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 143.
82 NIE 2002-16HC, Iraq 's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, p. 5. A
redacted version was declassified in April 2004: www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd-nie.pdf. The
following quotations are all from the "Key Judgments" section, pp. 5-9.
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from previous estimates, none of which had claimed that Iraq had more than 100 tons in
storage. Intelligence officials later admitted that the revision was mostly based on
suspicious activity around chemical plants, including imagery of decontamination
vehicles around military barracks at al Mussayib. This was a very thin reed. As one
dissenting analyst from INR pointed out, "Some of the same hazards exist with
conventional munitions as they do for CW munitions, so you need a fire safety truck."
Indeed, the intelligence community was never able to distinguish the civilian chemical
industry from the suspected CW program, mush less determine whether activity at
military bases was related to conventional or unconventional weapons. Ultimately, the
decision to set the upper bound at 500 tons was based on the size of the pre-Gulf War
stockpile. The fact that such an important conclusion was based on such a tenuous
proposition reflected the increasing bias towards the inevitability of WMD in Iraq, a bias
encouraged by months of policy pressure. 83
The NIE judged that Iraq had managed to build a sprawling clandestine biological
weapons infrastructure, and could evade detection by using mobile production facilities.
Iraq possessed "lethal and incapacitating" BW agents, including anthrax and possibly
smallpox, and had mastered the ability to produce dried agent, which was easier to
disseminate and had a longer shelf-life. This was the first time an estimate stated that
Iraq had an actual stockpile of BW. Earlier estimates, including the DIA contingency
products that were published while the NIE was being drafted, would not support such a
conclusion without more information from reliable sources.84 The NIE also judged that
83 SSCI Report, pp. 195-204. INR analyst quoted at pp. 199-200.
84 The SSCI Report notes that the main text of the estimate included some caveats about the lack of
information about the production output at certain facilities. Most of the estimate remains classified. SSCI
Report, pp. 162-166.
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the regime was probably incorporating genetically modified pathogens into its offensive
BW arsenal. When it decided to use BW, it could choose from an array of delivery
vehicles, including "bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives." Despite the
certainty of the language in the estimate, none of these conclusions were based on
corroborated information. The judgment that Iraq had the indigenous capacity to produce
biological weapons was based on two sources: CURVEBALL and an article from a
scientific journal arguing that Iraq had the inherent industrial capacity to support an
offensive BW program. 85
The NIE's judgment of Iraq's nuclear trajectory included the worrisome
discussion of the erosion of the UN sanctions regime. The estimate concluded that
international controls were not enough to prevent Iraq from acquiring a nuclear capability
sometime before 2010. Iraq's attempts to procure high-strength tubes and other
machinery demonstrated a clear interest in uranium enrichment, even though the regime
faced significant technological obstacles in the way of an indigenous full-fuel cycle. If
Iraq was able to surreptitiously acquire weapons-grade fissile material from abroad,
which was not unrealistic given the apparent breakdown in the sanctions regime, then the
timeline would be much shorter. Iraq could plausibly go nuclear "in months to a year."
As with the sections on chemical and biological warfare, this estimate was primarily
based on worst-case assumptions about Iraqi intentions: "Although we assess that
85 The conclusion that Iraq had mastered the ability to produce dried agent was also based on flimsy
intelligence. Intelligence officials relied on fourteen human source reports on Iraq's attempts to import
drying and milling equipment, but only one of these sources - again, CURVEBALL - tied these attempts
to a BW program. SSCI Report, pp. 178-182, and 148-152.
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Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains
intent on acquiring them." 86
While assessments for policymakers were becoming less equivocal about the Iraqi
threat, assessments for public consumption left no doubt at all. On October 4, the CIA
published a declassified white paper based on the NIE.87 The paper had the feel of a
brochure, complete with color photos of Gulf War-era chemical munitions and satellite
imagery of suspected BW production facilities. Qualifying phrases in the NIE (e.g. "we
judge" and "we assess") were stripped from the public version, which obscured the
genuine ambiguity of the intelligence picture. The white paper also played down the
deep divisions in the community on important issues. For example, it stated that "most
intelligence specialists" agreed that the high-strength aluminum tubes were intended for
nuclear use, while "some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional
weapons programs." 88 The tone suggested that the opposition consisted of a few
disgruntled skeptics. In reality, most qualified centrifuge engineers thought that the tubes
were wholly unsuited for enrichment. Portraying the dissent as a disagreement among
individuals also obscured the fact that whole agencies rejected key judgments in the NIE.
Finally, the white paper suggested that the underlying intelligence was abundant and
conclusive, and that any gaps were the result of Iraqi deception and denial. 89
Prior to the publication of the lopsided NIE, the administration had mostly used
indirect politicization to move intelligence towards its position. Throughout the summer
86 NIE 2002-16HC, Iraq 's Continuing Programs, p. 1, italics in original.
87 Director of Central Intelligence, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (October 2002);
www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/Iraq_Oct_2002.pdf.88 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 5.
89 For an analysis of the white paper, see Prados, Hoodwinked, pp. 49-110. See also Jessica Tuchman
Matthews and Jeff Miller, "A Tale of Two Intelligence Estimates," Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, March 25, 2004; www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfn?fa=view&id= 15179.
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the administration increasingly leaned on the intelligence community to inflate the Iraqi
threat by making the most of limited data on Iraqi capabilities. Events after the
publication of the NIE, however, caused the administration to apply direct pressure to
intelligence officials to join the policy consensus. Skeptical congressmen noticed some
apparent differences between classified intelligence judgments and the declassified white
paper. Sens. Bob Graham (D-FL) and Carl Levin (D-MI) requested the release of certain
sections of the NIE that were left out of the white paper. These passages concluded that
Saddam Hussein was unlikely to sponsor a terrorist attack on the continental United
States for fear of inviting retaliation, and that he would only join with Islamic extremists
to exact revenge for a U.S. invasion. Tenet complied three days later, declassifying brief
passages from the NIE as well as accompanying testimony provided by intelligence
officials in closed congressional hearings. In a letter to Graham, deputy director of
central intelligence John McLaughlin tried to explain that the passages did not undermine
the basic conclusion that Iraq was building a formidable WMD arsenal. He also added
some unsolicited information about "senior-level contacts going back almost a decade"
between Iraq and al Qaeda. 90
Notwithstanding McLaughlin's cover letter, the declassified passages did seem to
undercut the administration's claims of an imminent threat, and the White House took
notice. The declassification of portions of the NIE led to news reports of a split between
the administration and the intelligence community, and policymakers scrambled to
preserve the image of consensus. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer argued that
90 Bob Graham, with Jeff Nussbaum, Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure
ofAmerica's War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 183-189; Alison Mitchell and Carl
Hulse, "C.I.A. Sees Terror After Iraq Action," New York Times, October 8, 2002, p. 1; Isikoff and Corn,
Hubris, p. 142; Ackerman and Judis, "First Casualty," p. 18; and Bamford, Pretext for War, pp. 317-318.
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there was broad agreement about the dangers of an alliance between Iraq and terrorist
groups. 9 1 The articles also prompted a "frantic call" from National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, who urged Tenet to "clarify the issue" with reporters. Rice's actions
forced the DCI to publicly pledge that the intelligence community supported the
president, when in fact there was some distance between President Bush's unequivocal
position on the Iraqi threat and the intelligence community's divided stance. Tenet
contacted a New York Times reporter and told him "there was no inconsistency in the
views in the letter and those of the president." The DCI later regretted his decision to
speak with the Times reporter, acknowledging that it "gave the impression that I was
becoming a partisan player." 92
To ensure continued support from the intelligence community, the administration
directly politicized intelligence again during a White House briefing on December 21.
Tenet attended the meeting, along with Bush, Cheney, Rice, and chief of staff Andrew
Card. McLaughlin led off with a methodical and dry overview of the current intelligence
picture on Iraq. The president was unhappy. "Nice try," he said to McLaughlin. "I don't
think this is quite - it's not something that Joe Public would understand or gain a lot of
confidence from." Tenet stepped in to support his deputy, assuring Bush that the
intelligence was solid and that he would help create a more compelling presentation for
the White House. According to Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, Tenet told the
president that the case against Iraq was a "slam dunk." The DCI vehemently denied
using the phrase, but acknowledged later that he agreed to declassify pieces of raw
91 See, for example, Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Aides Split on Assessment of Iraq's Plans," New York
Times, October 10, 2002, p. 1.
92 Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 335-336.
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intelligence, including imagery and intercepted communications, that would add drama to
public presentations. 93
The "slam dunk" meeting has been the source of considerable confusion. In
addition to the heated dispute between Woodward and Tenet, defenders of the
administration have used it as evidence that the president acted against Iraq on the basis
of the best possible intelligence. 94 Appearing on Meet the Press in 2006, Cheney
suggested that the briefing was critical:
...George Tenet sat in the Oval Office and the president of the United
States asked him directly, he said, 'George, how good is the case against
Saddam on weapons of mass destruction?', (and) the director of the CIA
said, 'It's a slam dunk, Mr. President, it's a slam dunk.' That was the
intelligence that was provided to us at the time, and based upon which we
made a choice. 95
In reality, the session at the White House was nothing more than a "marketing meeting,"
as Tenet candidly admitted. 96 The administration had privately decided on regime
change long before December 2002. Over a year had passed since the president directed
the military to begin planning for a conventional assault. 97 British intelligence officials
who traveled to Washington months earlier left with the impression that the president
"wanted to remove Saddam through military action," and that "the intelligence and facts
were being fixed around the policy."98 Operational planning intensified during the
93 Woodward, Plan ofAttack, pp. 247-250; and Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 359-363. See also
Jeffrey Goldberg, "Woodward vs. Tenet," The New Yorker, May 21, 2007.
94 See, for example, Rich Lowry, "George Tenet's Slam Dunk," National Review Online, May 1, 2007.
95 Transcript of NBC Television, Meet the Press, September 10, 2006; www.msnbc.com/id/14720480/.
96 Tenet defended his participation by arguing that "intelligence was going to be used in a public
presentation and it was our responsibility to ensure that the script was faithful to what we believed to be
true." Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 362.
97 On the early military preparations, see Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, pp. 17-23; and Thomas E. Ricks,
Fiasco: The American Military Misadventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 32-34.98 Michael Smith, "Blair planned Iraq war from start," The Sunday Times (London), May 1, 2005.
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summer and fall, convincing Army officers that war was inevitable.99 The notion that
bad intelligence was foisted upon an unwitting administration is ludicrous. Intelligence
had little influence on the president's judgment by December 2002; it was simply part of
the ongoing public relations campaign to rally support for the coming war.
Pressure on intelligence had three major consequences. First, it caused the DCI to
publicly support the president's policy. The transformation of George Tenet into a public
policy advocate began after the publication of the NIE in October, when Rice urged him
to downplay the differences between intelligence findings and the president's policy
preferences. The process culminated in February, when Tenet sat behind Powell during
his presentation to the United Nations on the Iraqi threat. Second, policy pressure caused
the intelligence community to exaggerate the amount and quality of information on Iraqi
WMD. After the White House ordered the publication of intelligence in October,
estimates became less cautious and more certain, even though analysts continued to work
with partial and ambiguous data. Finally, politicization removed the incentives for
intelligence officials to reassess their conclusions in the months leading up to the war.
Once it became clear that the DCI had abandoned any pretense to objectivity and
independence from the White House, other intelligence managers resigned themselves to
the inevitability of war. They did not attempt to revisit their starting assumptions, even
though information from UN and IAEA inspectors threw doubt on the belief that Saddam
Hussein had a growing WMD arsenal. I discuss this in more detail in the conclusion of
this chapter.
Explaining Politicization. Intelligence-policy relations proceeded from neglect in
early 2002, to indirect politicization in the summer, and finally to direct politicization in
99 Ricks, Fiasco, pp.76-83.
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the fall. The administration changed its attitude towards intelligence in response to the
domestic political pressures described by the oversell model of politicization. The model
holds that politicization is likely when leaders make public commitments in the presence
of at least one critical constituency, defined as any group that has the power to undermine
their policy goals or political prospects. The Bush administration began to commit to
regime change, by force if necessary, a full year before the invasion. It also began
sending signals to the intelligence community that encouraged it exaggerate its
assessment of the Iraqi threat. But no critical constituency emerged until the late summer
of 2002, meaning that there was little need to apply direct pressure. The rise of public
and congressional criticism created incentives to manipulate intelligence so that it
reflected administration preferences.
Public commitment. The Bush administration made no public commitment
towards regime change in Iraq in 2001. Internally there was some debate about whether
to pursue a more aggressive strategy. Although Bush had criticized any military actions
that might require nation-building during the presidential campaign, neoconservatives in
the administration managed to place Iraq on the agenda at early NSC meetings. Treasury
Secretary Paul O'Neill argued later that the White House was always committed to
overthrowing Saddam Hussein. "From the start," he recalled, "we were building the case
against Hussein and looking at how we could take him out and change Iraq into a new
country...It was all about finding a way to do it." 0oo Other observers disagreed. Patrick
Clawson, a Middle East expert friendly with administration neoconservatives, believed
that the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was the only advisor pushing for
100 Quoted in Suskind, Price ofLoyalty, pp. 72-75, 82-86, at p. 86. Italics in original.
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regime change before the September 11 attacks.101 Whatever the level of private
commitment, the administration was not ready to go public.
Wolfowitz continued to argue for a strike in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
Although Bush opted to focus on the Taliban, the administration started thinking more
seriously about regime change in Iraq. The subject was front and center at a meeting of
the Defense Science Board on September 19, attended by INC chairman Ahmed
Chalabi. 10 2 In November the president signed a memorandum of notification authorizing
covert action for the purpose of regime change, and directed the military to begin revising
its war plan for Iraq. Later that month the Pentagon created PCTEG in the office of the
undersecretary of defense for policy. As discussed above, PCTEG was an ad hoc
analysis center that mined the intelligence data for links between the al Qaeda and the
Ba'ath regime in Iraq. It generated a stream of suggestive findings, but did not share
these with the intelligence community until late the next summer. As long as the
administration kept its plans to itself, there was no reason to manipulate intelligence.
The White House used the State of the Union Address in January 2002 to begin
making the case for regime change as the next logical step in the war on terrorism.
President Bush included Iraq in the "axis of evil," and declared that he would not "permit
the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive
weapons." The speech led to some public debate about U.S. intentions, but it was not
immediately clear that Iraq was in the administration's crosshairs. Bush and Powell were
oblique about how the themes in the State of the Union might translate into actual policy
decisions. Powell told Congress that "regime change would be in the best interests of the
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101 Ricks, Fiasco, pp. 27-28.
102 Bamford, Pretext for War, p. 287.
region (and) the best interests of the Iraqi people," but would only say that the president
was "exploring a range of options" about how to deal with Iraq. Bush echoed these
comments. "I will reserve whatever options I have," he said in mid-February. "I'll keep
them close to my vest." 103 At about the same time, Cheney began to make the case that
Iraq constituted a growing WMD threat. He claimed that Saddam Hussein "is actively
pursuing nuclear weapons," specifically citing evidence that he was pursuing a uranium
enrichment program. 04 During a February 19 speech, Cheney insisted that Iraq harbored
terrorists, and promised that the administration would never allow "terrorist states" to
threaten the United States.os05 This was the closest that White House officials would
come to publicly committing to war against Iraq for several months.
In July, leaks about the evolving invasion plan led to public questions about the
possibility of war. The White House fed the controversy by increasing its commitment to
regime change. Rumsfeld suggested that a ground invasion would be needed to eliminate
the threat of Iraqi WMD, because many of its facilities were underground. He also raised
the specter of biological weapons by referring publicly to Iraq's efforts to develop mobile
production facilities.' 06 On August 15, Rice told British reporters that the threat of Iraqi
WMD was unacceptable. "We certainly do not have the option to do nothing," she
said. 107 Cheney took the argument further on August 26, painting the threat in vivid
language. He began by announcing that Saddam Hussein was actively seeking nuclear
weapons in violation of UN sanctions. Cheney also suggested a link between Iraq and al
103 Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 12.
104 Barstow, et al., "How the White House Embraced Suspect Intelligence."
105 Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 9.
106 Eric Schmitt and James Dao, "Air Power Alone Can't Defeat Iraq, Rumsfeld Asserts," New York Times,
July 31, 2002, p. 1.
107 Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 20.
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Qaeda, warning that "weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network or a
murderous dictator or the two working together constitutes as grave a threat as can be
imagined. The risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of action."'1 8 Because of
the vice president's unusual influence, the speech was a signal that the White House was
publicly committing to regime change. As neoconservative pundit William Kristol told
the New York Times, "When Cheney talks, it's Bush. I think the debate in the
administration is over, and this is the serious public campaign."' 09
The campaign was orchestrated by the White House Information Group (WHIG),
which was created by chief of staff Andrew Card and chaired by Bush's chief political
advisor, Karl Rove. The group included policy advisors (Rice and Libby) alongside
members of the communications staff and the administration's congressional liaison.
Meeting weekly in the White House situation room, it coordinated public statements on
policy and distributed white papers on the need for aggressive action against Saddam
Hussein. It produced its first paper at the end of the month, "A Grave and Gathering
Danger: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Nuclear Weapons."'"0 The working group was
similar to the Vietnam Information Group that helped to sell President Johnson's attrition
strategy in 1967 (see chapter 4). The major difference was that it did not include any
representatives from the intelligence community. While the Vietnam group browbeat
CIA officers to support the president, the Bush administration was not yet compelled to
formally bring intelligence into the policy consensus.
108 Vice President's remarks to the Veterans of Foreign War, 10 3 rd Convention, August 26, 2002;
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html.
109 Quoted in Suskind, Price ofLoyalty, p. 280. For a similar interpretation of the speech, see Michael
Massing, "Now They Tell Us," New York Review ofBooks, January 29, 2004.
110 Barton Gellman and Walter Pincus, "Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence," The
Washington Post, August 10, 2003, p. Al; and Prados, Hoodwinked, pp. 12-14, 23.
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The public commitment intensified in the first week of September. "It's the stated
policy of this government to have regime change," Bush said, "And it hasn't changed.
And we'll use all the tools at our disposal to do so.' "' Interestingly, the president did
not cite U.S. intelligence, despite the fact that he was ratcheting up the rhetoric towards
Iraq. Instead, he referred to an IAEA report citing new construction at a facility formerly
associated with nuclear weapons. "I don't know what more evidence we need," he
said.112
The administration's media strategy became clearer on September 8. Instead of
pressuring intelligence to publicly hype the threat, the administration leaked news of the
Iraq's attempt to import aluminum tubes as part of a clandestine uranium enrichment
program. White House officials immediately used the story to illustrate Iraq's nuclear
ambitions. Appearing on television news shows over the weekend, they argued that they
would not normally talk about classified information, but the fact that it had been printed
in the New York Times made secrecy a moot point. In this way, the administration was
able to use intelligence to justify its increasing public commitment without directly
politicizing formal intelligence estimates. Instead, it leaked suggestive information to
credulous reporters and allowed the story to metastasize. James Bamford aptly
summarized the procedure: "First OSP supplies false or exaggerated intelligence; then
members of the WHIG leak it to friendly reporters, complete with prepackaged vivid
n1 Bamford, Pretext for War, p. 322.
112 The IAEA denied that its report implied a reconstituted nuclear program. As an IAEA spokesperson
noted, "Construction of a building is one thing. Restarting a nuclear program is another." See Prados,
Hoodwinked, p. 25.
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imagery; finally, when the story breaks, senior officials point to it as proof and parrot the
unnamed quotes they or their colleagues previously supplied."' 1 3
On the other hand, indirect politicization was well underway, and it was already
paying dividends. The process of repeated questioning from policymakers, which
encouraged analysts to dig harder for evidence of Iraqi misbehavior, had a cumulative
effect on the content and tone of estimates. As estimates became more ominous in the
late summer, the administration increasingly citied intelligence to justify its commitment
to regime change in Iraq. And because analysts had already succumbed to worst-case
assumptions about Iraqi capabilities, President Bush did not need to invent claims out of
whole cloth or willfully misrepresent intelligence. In a high-profile speech to the UN on
September 12, for example, Bush cited estimates that with Iraq would be able to "build a
weapon within a year" if he was able to acquire fissile material from abroad. This claim
was highly dubious, but it was not inconsistent with contemporaneous CIA assessments.
According to John Prados, head speechwriter Michael Gerson said that the speech created
"the impression of inevitability justified by evidence."" 4 A week later the president
requested a congressional authorization to use force against Iraq, and Rumsfeld offered a
litany of "facts" about Iraq's determination to acquire weapons of mass destruction to the
Senate Armed Services Committee. Rumsfeld stated that Iraq had "amassed large,
clandestine stockpiles" of chemical and biological weapons and possessed at least two
workable designs for nuclear warheads. He also emphasized the variety of delivery
113 Bamford, Pretext for War, p. 325. For criticism of the media during this period, see Massing, "Now
They Tell Us"; and Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold: The Decline and Fall of Truth from 9/11 to
Katrina (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).
114 Remarks to the United Nations, September 12, 2002, text available at the UCSB Presidency Project;
www.presidency.ucsb.edu. Gerson quoted in Prados, Hoodwinked, pp. 26-27.
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vehicles available to Iraq, including UAVs specially designed for CW and BW
dispersal. 115
The administration deepened its commitment in the last quarter of 2002, locking
itself into a strategy of regime change. In October, the president asked, "If we know
Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today - and we do - does it make any sense for
the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more
dangerous weapons?" ' 16 By putting the problem in such stark terms, the administration
gave itself little room to accept a compromise. In November, Bush further restricted his
freedom of action by announcing that the "outcome of the current crisis is already
determined: the full disarmament of Iraq will occur." 1 17 Because he declared that
Saddam's appetite for WMD was insatiable, only regime change could guarantee full
disarmament.
Critical constituencies. The emergence of two critical constituencies gave the
administration added reason to pressure intelligence to join the policy consensus on the
need for regime change. The administration was aware of the controversies in the
intelligence community over assessments of Iraq's WMD and possible links to al Qaeda.
Fears that these differences would undermine administration claims about the Iraqi threat
gave policymakers incentives to ensure that intelligence officials would toe the policy
line. The combination of a strong public commitment and the rise of critical
constituencies made politicization likely.
115 Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 98.
116 Remarks by the President on Iraq, Cincinnati Museum Center, October 7, 2002;
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/20/20021007-8.html.
117 Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 142.
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The Senate, led by the Democratic Party, was the first critical constituency to
emerge in 2002. As long as Democrats remained in control, they could convene hearings
that publicly threw doubt on the administration's portrayal of the Iraqi threat. The Senate
could also make life difficult for the administration by forcing it to win congressional
approval for its plans. Although Democrats were worried about appearing "soft" on
security issues in the wake of the September 11 attacks, events in mid-summer prompted
skeptics to take a more vocal stance against the rush to war. On July 5 the New York
Times received word of an extensive and detailed war plan that had been evolving for
months. The plan, which envisioned a combination of air strikes, a land invasion on three
fronts, and CIA or special forces attacks on suspected WMD sites, appeared to contradict
the president's repeated claim that he had no "fine-grained" plan on his desk."18 Other
leaks began to shed light on the administration's strategic thinking, as well as revealing
splits within the administration over the appropriate course.119 Talks between Iraq and
the UN over the resumption of WMD inspections broke down shortly thereafter,
increasing concerns that the United States and Iraq were heading towards a
confrontation. 120
The leaked war plans led to a highly public debate on the wisdom of war in Iraq.
Democrats were bolstered by high-profile skeptics like Brent Scowcroft, the National
Security Advisor in the first Bush administration and now the chairman of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, who argued that a war on Iraq would destabilize the
118 Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Plan for Iraq is Said to Include Attack on Three Sides," New York Times, July 5,
2002, p. 1.
119 Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Considers Wary Jordan As Base for an Attack on Iraq," New York Times, July 9,
2002, p. 1; and John Diamond, "Planners raise bar for Iraqi invasion," USA Today, July 11, 2002, p. Al.
On policymakers' anger over the leaks, see David Stout, "Pentagon Pursues Leak of Anti-Iraq Plan," New
York Times, July 20, 2002, p. 3.
120 Carola Hoyos, "Iraq Rejects UN Weapons Inspectors," Financial Times, July 6, 2002, p. 1.
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Middle East and could "destroy the war on terrorism." In a series of television interviews
and a widely discussed op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, Scowcroft reasoned that an
invasion would divert attention from the war against al Qaeda and turn public opinion in
the region against the United States.' 2 1 In addition, a few Republican congressmen who
were concerned about the direction of policy provided political cover for Democrats who
wanted to challenge the administration without appearing weak on national security.122
Senate Democrats were reluctant to break with the White House before news of
the war planning leaked. 123 Now they moved quickly to register their concerns. Joseph
Biden (D-DE), the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced that he
intended to publicly question administration officials on their plans for Iraq. 124 On July
30, Diane Feinstein (D-CA) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced a resolution opposing
military action without congressional approval. The Foreign Relations Committee held
public hearings on Iraq for the next two days, the first formal debate in Congress over the
nature of the threat and the appropriate response. 12 5 Other Senators began to question the
intelligence underlying administration policy. Carl Levin (D-MI) argued that an invasion
might provoke a WMD attack, and advocated a return of UN inspectors. He also took
aim at the administration's carefully-worded innuendo that Saddam Hussein was
affiliated with the September 11 attackers. "He is not a suicide bomber," Levin stated,
121 Prados, Hoodwinked, pp. 1-3; and Brent Scowcroft, "Don't Attack Iraq," The Wall Street Journal,
August 15, 2002.
122 Roland Watson, "Former allies urge Bush to be cautious," The Times (London), August 8, 2002, p. 14.
123 Democrats were more willing to support covert action, which seemed to carry less risk. See, for
example, Richard Wolffe, "Bush wins backing for possible action over Iraq," Financial Times, June 17,
2002, p. 9.
124 Roland Watson, "American elections dictate timing of an attack," The Times (London), July 11, 2002, p.
15.
125 Robert Schlesinger, "Senate Hearings Begin on Iraq War Scenarios," The Boston Globe, August 1,
2002, p. Al.
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"the question is how do you contain him?" 126 Biden and Graham, the chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, suggested that the administration's case was
based on old stories from defectors rather than current intelligence. "There's an
important role for the Iraqi opposition," Biden stated at the end of the month, "but we
should be doing more than simply trying to confirm its stories." 127
While the administration was using intelligence to build the case against Iraq,
Senate Democrats were using gaps in the intelligence picture as the basis of their
opposition. Their arguments gained steam in August, causing congressional Republicans
to urge the White House to do a better job presenting intelligence. 128 Events came to a
head in September, when Democrats called for a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq,
and the president requested a congressional vote authorizing the use of force. At this
point the conditions were ripe for direct politicization. Policymakers had made a clear
public commitment to regime change and sought approval to use the military if
necessary. Meanwhile, the Senate had emerged as a critical constituency that threatened
to deny its request. And because both sides were using intelligence in public, the
administration had clear incentives to pressure the intelligence community to ensure that
the NIE supported its position. It also saw an opportunity to use intelligence as a public
relations vehicle in order to provide cover for Democrats who might not otherwise have
voted for the authorization. The declassified white paper served this purpose. Paul Pillar
126 Duncan Campbell, "Both US parties back away from Iraq war," The Guardian (London), August 13,
2002, p. 10.
127 Toby Warrick, "In Assessing Iraq's Arsenal, the 'Reality is Uncertainty'," The Washington Post, July
31, 2002, p. Al.
128 Michael Evans, "Dig deeper for evidence, senator says," The Times (London), August 22, 2002, p. 13.
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later regretted the Agency's willingness to comply. "In retrospect, we really shouldn't
have done that white paper at all," he said. "It was policy advocacy." 2 9
The origin of the NIE and the white paper offers a useful window into the state of
intelligence-policy relations at the time. Indirect policy pressure was already
encouraging intelligence to indulge in worst-case assumptions about Iraqi capabilities,
but the administration was not compelled to use intelligence as a public relations vehicle.
The calculus changed on September 5, when Tenet gave closed-door testimony to the
Senate intelligence committee on Iraq's WMD programs. Committee members were
surprised that no national estimate had been prepared on Iraq, given the increasingly
heated rhetoric from the White House. Within a week they formally requested an NIE,
asking for an assessment of Iraqi capabilities but also a prediction about the possible
consequences of a U.S. invasion. Tenet complied with the first half of the request, but
argued that assessments of U.S. policy options were outside the remit of the intelligence
community. The NIC produced the estimate in haste in order to deliver it to Congress in
time for the vote to authorize the use of force. A typical NIE takes at least six months;
this one took three weeks. Shortly after the publication of the declassified white paper,
Rice urged Tenet to publicly affirm that there was no difference between intelligence
estimates and administration statements. Policymakers were struggling to preserve the
image of consensus during a moment of peak political controversy. The same
administration that previously ignored intelligence now cared intensely about the content
of intelligence products.
Along with the NIE and the white paper, intelligence officials gave closed
testimony to congressional committees, and participated in private briefings for
129 Quoted in Isikoff and Corn, Hubris, p. 139.
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congressmen. Tenet and McLaughlin gave testimony at a closed hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, emphasizing the point that Iraq was the growing threat to
the continental United States. According to Biden, the testimony on Iraq's UAV program
left the impression that drones "could be put on oil tankers and fly into Philadelphia or
Charleston carrying chemical or biological weapons and hit with devastating effect."
Biden asked for imagery or other technical data to support this claim. Tenet demurred,
but assured him that the human intelligence was reliable. 130 Special briefings also gave
congressmen without regular access to classified material the chance to view intelligence
first hand. Ben Nelson (D-FL) later said that he voted for the resolution in part because
of a meeting with Cheney and Tenet, who told him that Iraq weapons of mass destruction
presented an imminent threat. "It was in a highly classified setting in a secure room," he
recalled.131
Most Senators were convinced by the combination of the finished estimates and
the private briefings. Despite some skepticism, Diane Feinstein (D-CA) explained her
yes vote by referring to the "great danger" of a nuclear Iraq. John Kerry (D-MA) referred
specifically to the white paper in explaining his decision. John Edwards (D-NC), who sat
on the Senate intelligence committee, voted for the authorization because "We know that
(Saddam Hussein) is doing everything he can to build nuclear weapons."' 32 On October
11, the Senate passed the authorization, 77-23. Republicans gained control during the
130 Isikoff and Corn, Hubris, pp. 117-192; and Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 192.
131 Bamford, Pretext for War, pp. 330-331.
132 Feinstein, Kerry, and Edwards are all quoted in Barstow, et al., "How the White House Embraced
Suspect Iraq Arms Intelligence."
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midterm elections in November, meaning that the Senate was no longer a significant
obstacle to the administration's plans. 33
Public support was another matter. Throughout 2002, Americans generally
agreed that Iraq possessed some weapons of mass destruction, and that it intended to
accelerate its WMD production capabilities (see Figure 1). They also consistently
supported regime change. But support wavered in the months leading up to the war, as
the idea of a large land invasion became less of an abstraction and more of an
inevitability. In January 2002, 77% of Americans supported military action against Iraq.
In January 2003, only 53% still believed it was worth fighting over.134 Policymakers
responded to this downward trend by citing specific intelligence on Iraqi capabilities.
The selective declassification of raw data, including imagery and intercepted
communications, was especially useful in painting a vivid picture of the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein. In addition, the manipulation of intelligence helped the administration
blur the distinction between the Iraqi regime and the September 11 attackers. A month
before the war began, 76% Americans believed that Saddam Hussein was currently
providing assistance to al Qaeda. 135
133 House Democrats were also impressed. Bob Filner (D-San Diego) said that the White House created a
sense of genuine consensus in the national security establishment. "They had all these military people
standing around. It gave the thing an aura of authority. You'd feel stupid challenging them." But he also
noticed the basic thinness of the intelligence picture. "Here were Tenet, Rumsfeld, Powell, various
undersecretaries. They would never get into the nitty-gritty of the reliability of sources." Isikoff and Corn,
Hubris, pp. 125-127.
134 Gallup/CNN/USA Today surveys, January 11-14, 2002, and January 3-5, 2003.
135 Time/CNN/Harris Interactive survey, February 6, 2003.
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Figure 1. Continuing belief in Iraq's possession of WMD, 2002
February 95% of Americans believe Iraq currently possess or is trying to develop WMD.
August 84% believe that Iraq currently possesses or is trying to develop WMD.
83% believe Saddam Hussein would use those weapons against the United
States.
September 79% believe that Iraq currently possesses weapons of mass destruction.
November 93% believe that Iraq possesses or is trying to develop WMD.
December 90% believe that Iraq possesses or is trying to develop WMD.
Sources: Gallup/CNN/USA Today surveys, February 8, August 19-21, and November
22-24; CBS News/New York Times survey, September 2-5; and Los Angeles Times
survey, December 12-15. All polling information retrieved from iPOLL Databank, The
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut;
www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/poll.html.
When large numbers of troops started deploying to the Middle East, however,
large numbers of Americans started demanding "proof' to support their instincts about
Saddam Hussein. It was one thing to believe that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
destruction, but quite another to support a war without confirming evidence. A survey in
December showed that a majority of Americans would support a ground invasion of Iraq
if the administration presented "proof that Iraq is producing weapons of mass
destruction." Only 27% said that they would support an invasion if it did not. 136 The
administration tried to offer evidence of Saddam's WMD arsenal in the declassified white
paper, and in Secretary Powell's presentation to the United Nations in February 2003. In
both cases it called on intelligence to publicly join the policy consensus.
136 Time/CNN/Harris survey, December 17-18, 2002.
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The administration had enjoyed a permissive political environment for most of the
year. The brief revolt of Senate Democrats ended with the vote to authorize military
action, and the Republican victory in the midterm removed what seemed like the only
serious obstacle in the way of the administration's foreign policy program. Nonetheless,
the White House recognized the turn in public opinion late in the year and acted quickly
to retain support. The infamous "slam dunk" meeting in December 2002 was convened
to formulate a more compelling case for war. The intelligence picture at the time was
based mostly on defector reports and assumptions about Iraqi intentions; the data was
ambiguous. Bush complained that "Joe Public" needed something more dramatic, and
enlisted the DCI in the White House Information Group's ongoing public relations
campaign.
The effort culminated on February 5, when Powell presented a briefing on Iraq to
the United Nations. Powell referred to intelligence two dozen times that day, sprinkling
the presentation with declassified imagery, video, and audio clips from intercepted Iraqi
military communications. In one clip, an officer from the Republican Guard headquarters
ordered one of his subordinates to prepare for the return of UN weapons inspectors:
"...clean out all the areas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is
nothing there. Remember the message: evacuate it." 137 Declassifying raw intercepts like
this added drama to the presentation, and gave the impression that the United States had
smoking gun information that proved the case against Saddam Hussein. Powell
consciously linked U.S. policy with U.S. intelligence, and Tenet sat behind him to
reinforce the image of consensus. The symbolism had powerful effects on public
137 Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, "Iraq: Failing to Disarm," February 5, 2003;
www.state.gov/p/nea/disarm/
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opinion. The Gallup organization registered an immediate 7% rise in support for a
ground invasion of Iraq, regardless of whether the United States gained international
approval. 138 In a separate poll, 60% of respondents said they would support an invasion
"if U.N. inspectors do not find evidence that Iraq has chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons, but the Bush Administration says its intelligence reports indicate that Iraq does
have such weapons."' 39
The White House had restored its credibility by bringing intelligence into the
policy consensus, and had exploited the persuasive power of intelligence to overcome
congressional and public doubts about the need for war. The British experience was
much the same.
British Estimates and the Policy Response
As in the United States, British estimates on Iraq were premised on the
assumption that Saddam Hussein was dedicated to achieving a sustainable weapons of
mass destruction capability. This was not an unrealistic assumption, given his previous
enthusiasm for WMD in the 1980s, and his belligerent attitude towards UN inspectors in
the 1990s. From 1998 onwards JIC assessments suspected that Iraq had managed to hide
small quantities of chemical and biological agent from UNSCOM, and that it was
importing dual-use materials to reconstitute the production capabilities lost after the first
Gulf War. JIC assessments also believed that Iraq was attempting to achieve an
independent nuclear weapons capability, even though it faced significant obstacles in the
way of a full-fuel cycle. In retrospect it is clear that the estimates were based on flawed
138 Gallup/CNN/USA Today survey, February 5, 2003.
139 Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek survey, February 6-7, 2003.
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assumptions about Saddam's intentions. Nonetheless, assessments before the summer of
2002 recognized the large gaps in available data, and the JIC moderated its conclusions
accordingly.
In early 1998 the JIC was confident that UNSCOM had succeeded in "destroying
or controlling the vast majority of Saddam's 1991 weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capability."1 40 Nonetheless, it worried that he retained some chemical precursors, as well
as small quantities of agent, and that he could probably regenerate a chemical warfare
capability in the absence of international inspections and sanctions. This was consistent
with earlier assessments that downplayed the importance of current stockpiles. The JIC
had previously emphasized that Saddam would enjoy a latent CW threat as long as Iraq
maintained a civilian chemical industry. 141 The amount of chemical precursors or agent
at any given moment was unimportant if Saddam was determined to revive his CW
program in the future. This assumption appears to underlie JIC's assessment of the
chemical threat throughout the pre-war period. In April 2000 the JIC noted the lack of
solid information on Iraqi CW activities since the departure of UNSCOM, but concluded
that some of its 1980s era stockpile had not been destroyed by UN personnel. As a result,
Iraq could have hidden dual use precursor chemicals, and production
equipment, since the Gulf War. Using these we continue to assess that,
even with UNMOVIC and other UN controls, Iraq could produce mustard
agent within weeks of a decision to do so. Iraq could produce limited
quantities of nerve agent within months of such a decision.142
The following May it repeated the judgment that Iraq could pursue chemical weapons
with dual-use equipment and materials, and speculated that Iraq was pursuing some
research and development activities. SIS had cultivated sources that attested to a three-
140 JIC Assessment, February 4, 1998; quoted in Butler Report, p. 47.
141 JIC Assessment, September 8, 1994, in Butler Report, pp. 46-47.
142 JIC Assessment, April 19, 2000, in Butler Report, p. 57.
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year old program to fill artillery shells with the nerve agent VX, and had discovered
activity an Iraqi facility that formerly produced chemical precursors. Beyond that,
intelligence on Iraqi capabilities was based on inferences about Iraq's intentions. 143
Intelligence on biological weapons also focused on the dual-use problem. JIC
assessments between 1994 and 1998 concluded that Iraq probably retained small
quantities of pathogens, even though most had been destroyed. As with CW, however,
the more relevant problem was that Iraq could convert its medical industry for the
purpose of an offensive biological warfare. 144 This concern was heightened in April
2000, when the JIC assessed that Iraq could restart agent production within weeks if
sanctions were lifted. The new assessment stemmed from a report from an allied
intelligence service who had information that Iraq had begun small-scale production in
mobile BW facilities. The liaison service passed along information that Iraq had
completed one rail-based and six road-based BW trailers, which were producing at least
five different strains of pathogen. One of these facilities had apparently produced 20-30
tons of material in four months. 145 British intelligence never had direct access to the
source, but the JIC had faith in the liaison service. Indeed, based on more information
about Iraq's mobile facilities, the JIC later revised the timeline for renewed "significant"
BW production from weeks to days' 46 , and concluded that "Iraq currently has available,
either from pre-Gulf war stocks or more recent production, anthrax spores, botulinum
toxin, aflatoxin and possibly plague." 147
143 JIC Assessment, May 10, 2001; in Butler Report, pp. 57-58.
144 JIC Assessments, September 8, 1994 and September 24, 1994; in Butler Report, pp. 46-49.
145 JIC Assessment, April 19, 2000; in Butler Report, pp. 127-128.
146 JIC Assessment, February 27, 2002; in Butler Report, pp. 59-60.
147 JIC Assessment, March 15, 2002; in Butler Report, p. 136. The JIC was unsure about the presence of
plague in Iraq's nascent BW arsenal, and removed it from later assessments. See Butler Report, pp. 134-
136.
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The JIC was fairly sanguine about Iraq's nuclear prospects until 2001. British
intelligence was surprised at the progress Iraq had made towards a nuclear weapon after
the first Gulf War, but was satisfied with the efforts of UNSCOM and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 1998 it concluded that international agencies had
destroyed the pre-war nuclear infrastructure, and estimated that Iraq would need at least
five years to re-acquire a nuclear weapons capability in the absence of sanctions and
other international controls. 14 8 However, the departure of UN inspectors led to fears that
Iraq would exploit dual-use imports for nuclear purposes. The lack of on-site inspections
would make it impossible to determine whether Iraqi procurement efforts were for
civilian use, conventional military programs, or nuclear weapons. Thus the JIC was
particularly alarmed by the seizure of a shipment of high-strength aluminum tubes bound
for Iraq in spring 2001. It eventually estimated that Iraq sought as many as 100,000
tubes, which would be useful for uranium enrichment because their specifications were
"similar to those that can be used for a first generation centrifuge." 149 British intelligence
also described "unconfirmed" information that Iraq was seeking to import uranium ore
from Africa, which could theoretically be converted to gas and enriched to weapons
grade material. 150
JIC assessments were cautious about inferring too much about Iraq's nuclear
activities from partial and second-hand data. Although they generally supported the view
that the aluminum tubes were part of a uranium enrichment effort, they also noted that
Iraq would need to substantially re-engineer the tubes to achieve the desired result. The
puzzle was that Iraq had demanded extremely tight design tolerances. If it wanted to use
148 JIC Assessments, August 24, 1995, and February 4, 1998; in Butler Report, pp. 44-45.
149 JIC Assessment, May 10, 2001; in Butler Report, p. 131.
150 JIC Assessment, December 1, 2000; in Butler Report, p. 55.
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the tubes in a centrifuge enrichment program, why ask for strict specifications that would
need to be changed later? This question led the JIC to consider the possibility that the
tubes were not intended for enrichment but instead would be used for conventional
military purposes. Although it leaned towards the nuclear explanation, it held open other
possibilities, noting that there was "no definitive intelligence" one way or the other. 151
This was characteristic of JIC assessments up to mid-2002. Although British
intelligence believed that Saddam Hussein wanted weapons of mass destruction, it was
consistently forthright about the lack of information on all aspects of the Iraqi WMD
infrastructure. "We have an unclear picture of the current status of Iraq's nuclear
program," the JIC admitted in May 2001.152 Similarly, concerns about Iraqi BW were
based on Iraq's intransigent attitude towards the UN, not on any current intelligence
suggesting a renewed production capacity.' 53 In April 2000 the JIC prefaced its
judgment of Iraqi chemical and biological warfare activities by stating, "Our picture is
limited."154 The situation did not improve the next year, when the JIC admitted, "Our
intelligence picture of Iraq's BW programme is unclear."' 55 While intelligence officials
believed that Iraq was interested in banned weapons, they conceded that there was "no
clear intelligence" to support this judgment.' 56 In August 2002, a month before the
British government published its dossier on the Iraqi threat, the JIC stated bluntly that
151 JIC Assessment, March 15, 2002. For a fuller discussion of the tubes issue, see Butler Report, pp. 130-
134.
152 JIC Assessment, May 10, 2001; in Butler Report, p. 86.
153 Butler Report, p. 48.
154 JIC Assessment, April 19, 2000; in Butler Report, p. 59.
155 JIC Assessment, May 10, 2001; in Butler Report, p. 60.
156 JIC Assessment, May 12, 2001; in Butler Report, p. 55.
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"we have little intelligence on Iraq's CBW doctrine, and know little about Iraq's CBW
work since late 1998."' 157
A JIC assessment in March 2002 summarized intelligence judgments on Iraqi
WMD since the departure of UN inspectors in 1998. Although it concluded that Iraq was
eager to reconstitute its nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities, it was
extremely candid about the limits of intelligence. On nuclear weapons: "there is very
little intelligence (but) we continue to judge that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons
program." On chemical weapons: "there is very little intelligence relating to it." On
biological weapons: "there is no intelligence on any BW agent production facilities, but
one source indicates that Iraq may have developed mobile production facilities." ' 58 In
sum, the thrust of JIC assessments during this period was based not on existing
information but on an assessment of Saddam Hussein's past behavior. It did not
exaggerate the quality or amount of intelligence on Iraqi activities.
Policymakers appear to have accepted these judgments through the first half of
2002. During this period Prime Minister Blair treated Iraq as a secondary problem.
Although he was aware of the Bush administration's desire for a stronger policy towards
Iraq, he believed that terrorism and the Arab-Israeli peace process were far more
pressing. He also argued that these issues were connected, because success in
counterterrorism required forging an alliance with Arab states, and that reviving the
peace process was necessary to gain their support. 159 At one point Blair declared that he
was "completely seized of the need to push forward" with the process.160
157 JIC Assessment, August 12, 2002; in Butler Report, p. 81.
158 JIC Assessment, March 15, 2002; in Butler Report, pp. 67-69.
159Alastair Campbell, The Blair Years: The Alastair Campbell Diaries (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007),
p. 570. See also Rupert Cornwell, "Blair Says Middle East Peace is Key to Winning the War on
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Blair outlined the government's strategy towards Iraq in a March 2002 message to
cabinet ministers. The message was wholly consistent with the parallel JIC assessment
that month, and Blair seemed to be comfortable with the fact that intelligence on Iraq was
ambiguous and uncertain. The strategy relied on containment, which Blair presented as
the least-worst option for dealing with Iraq. The prime minister accurately summarized
the general thrust of intelligence over the past several years, and argued that efforts to
contain Iraq had largely succeeded. International efforts had "frozen Iraq's nuclear
program... (and) prevented from rebuilding its chemical arsenal to pre-Gulf War levels.
Biological warfare programs had also "been hindered...(and) Saddam has not succeeded
in seriously threatening his neighbors." The prime minister believed that Iraq was
continuing to seek weapons of mass destruction, but he admitted that "our intelligence is
poor." He did not suggest that Saddam Hussein had any strategic plans to threaten Great
Britain with WMD, concluding that he would only use such weapons "if his regime were
threatened."' 6 1
The documentary record does not yet allow us to fully examine the nature of
intelligence-policy relations during this time, but there is nothing to suggest tension
between policymakers, the JIC, and the individual intelligence agencies. The recently
published diaries of Alastair Campbell, the communications director for the prime
minister, describe general policy satisfaction with intelligence after the September 11
attacks. On the day itself, Campbell described briefings given to Blair by JIC Chairman
John Scarlett and Director General Stephen Lander of M15. "Scarlett and Lander were
Terrorism," The Independent, October 12, 2001; George Jones and Inigo Gilmore, "Blair Backs Call for
Palestinian State," Daily Telegraph, October 16, 2001; and Lydia Adetunji, et al., "Blair Ties Iraq to Fresh
Effort on Mideast," Financial Times, August 3, 2002, p. 1.
160 David Hirst, "The Palestine Question is Central," Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 2001.
161 Butler Report, pp. 65-67.
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both pretty impressive," Campbell wrote. "(They) didn't mess about, thought about what
they said, and said what they thought."' 62 The next day he praised Lander and the head
of SIS, Sir Richard Dearlove, as "very good on big picture and detail." Blair was also
satisfied by the intelligence officials' "meticulous presentations." 163 There is no
indication that intelligence officers were unhappy with policymakers.
Intelligence-policy relations began to change in April 2002. Although Blair had
told the cabinet that British strategy towards Iraq was based on containment, he knew that
the United States was moving towards a more aggressive posture, and he did not want to
damage US-UK relations by publicly breaking with the Bush administration. Blair also
felt that by aligning with the White House he could influence its behavior. Complicating
matters was the fact that President Bush was deeply unpopular in the United Kingdom,
and Blair did not want to risk domestic isolation by aligning too closely with US foreign
policy. 164 His solution was to pledge a policy of containment while simultaneously
arguing that Saddam Hussein's WMD ambitions were intolerable. On February 28, he
appeared on ABC news in the United States to voice strong support for the White House,
but on the same day he told his cabinet that any change in policy towards Iraq was "a
long way off."' 65 Blair finessed the apparent contradiction again in April, trying to
assuage growing domestic concerns about a war in Iraq while offering rhetorical support
to the Bush administration:
As for Iraq, I know some fear precipitate action. They needn't. We will proceed,
as we did after September 11, in a calm, measured, sensible but firm way. But
162 Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 560-561.
163 Quoted in Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 563. See also pp. 567, 571, 574-575, 578, and 587. See also
Times of London editorial, "Evidence of Saddam's Menace Far from Clear," July 17, 2002, p. 4.
164 Coates and Krieger, Blair's War, pp. 44-45, 110-112. Blair called this "the usual conundrum - do I
support totally in public and help deliver our strategy, or do I put distance between us and lose influence?"
Campbell, Blair Years, p. 612.
165 Campbell, Blair Years, p. 607.
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leaving Iraq to develop weapons of mass destruction, in flagrant breach of no less
than nine separate UN Security council resolutions, refusing still to allow
weapons inspectors back to do their work properly, is not an option.' 66
This statement seemed to offer a middle-ground between the status quo and a military
confrontation. Blair believed that sufficient pressure would force Saddam Hussein to
allow inspectors back into Iraq and that a reinvigorated inspections regime would control
his WMD aspirations indefinitely. He also believed that Saddam would not accept
inspectors without facing a credible threat of force. 167
The long-term problem with this strategy was that it underestimated the Bush
administration's determination to topple the regime. By providing rhetorical support to
administration, Blair was helping it lay the groundwork for war. The short-term problem
was that the British public and the ruling Labour Party were not convinced of the need to
do anything against Iraq. The present threat was al Qaeda, which was currently under
siege in Afghanistan. In order to overcome domestic opposition, the government needed
to present the case that Iraq's growing WMD aspirations represented a growing threat to
British interests.
Conscious of these domestic political realities, the Blair administration enlisted
the JIC to help it build the case against Iraq. On April 23 Campbell met with Scarlett,
Thomas McKane from the cabinet office, and Martin Howard from the Ministry of
Defense (MOD). The goal of the meeting, according to Campbell's notes, was "to go
through what we needed to do communications-wise to set the scene for Iraq, e.g. a
166 Coates and Krieger, Blair's War, pp. 50-51.
167 For a similar argument about the impact of the US-UK alliance on Blair's foreign policy, see Tim
Dunne, "'When the Shooting Starts': Atlanticism in British Security Strategy," International Affairs, Vol.
80, No. 5 (October 2004), pp. 898-909. Other observers believe that Blair decided on regime change based
on a reasonable assessment of the threat at the time, and that alliance concerns were secondary. See
Christoph Bluth, "The British Road to War: Blair, Bush and the Decision to Invade Iraq," International
Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5 (October 2004), pp. 871-892; and Paul D. Williams, British Foreign Policy Under
New Labour, 1997-2004 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
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WMD paper and other papers about Saddam." The meeting set in motion the
government dossier on Iraq, which was published in September. Scarlett apparently had
no compunction about the use of intelligence for the purposes of public advocacy, or the
effects on the objectivity of JIC assessments. Campbell thought Scarlett was a "very
good bloke."' 68
The first draft of the dossier, "British Government Briefing Papers on Iraq," was
circulated on June 20.169 Despite the innocuous title, the draft was far less equivocal
about Saddam's current WMD capabilities as other assessments. The JIC prepared a
cover letter for ministers to sign declaring that "Saddam Hussain (sic) has dangerous
chemical weapons and is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons," and that "he will be
prepared to use these weapons...against his neighbours and our friends and allies." The
main text declared that Saddam not only had stockpiles of chemical and biological
weapons, but that the military "maintains the capability to use these weapons, with
command, control and logistical arrangements in place." It did not point out the large
intelligence gaps in the intelligence picture on Iraq. On the contrary, it suggested that the
intelligence was reliable and abundant, but explained that the government could not
reveal all the details due to concerns over the safety of sources. The draft did not
mention the lack of information on Iraqi nuclear activities disclosed in the JIC's
comprehensive March 15 assessment. It turned the lack of intelligence on CW and BW
into an accusation that Saddam was withholding the location of pre-Gulf War stockpiles.
Inconsistent reporting to the UN during the 1990s led to large accounting gaps, and the
168 Campbell, Blair's War, p. 618.
169 CAB/33/0005, "British Government Briefing Papers on Iraq," in Hutton Inquiry appendix. The
document was actually a compilation of three papers. The first was on Iraqi WMD, the second on the
history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq, and the third on human rights abuses by the Ba'athist regime.
Versions of these papers were released separately between September 2002 - January 2003.
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regime had offered "no convincing proof' that they had been destroyed. As a result, the
draft concluded that Saddam had an active and covert chemical and biological warfare
program. 170
Finally, the paper adopted more menacing language than had previously been the
case. This was unsurprising, given its purposes. The JIC was no longer in the business
of producing neutral assessments for policymakers; it was coordinating with the prime
minister's communications staff to create an effective advocacy piece. Parts of the draft
were purely intended to evoke an emotional response, including passages on the physical
effects of chemical and biological agents like botulinum toxin ("paralysis leads to death
by suffocation") and anthrax ("death is common"). 17 1 The point of the document was to
convince readers, as it said in the cover letter, that "Doing nothing is not an option."
Policymakers began to take Saddam's possession of WMD as a given. In mid-
July, Blair said that it was "clear that Saddam Hussein is still trying to develop weapons
of mass destruction."' 72 Although he tried to keep his policy options open, the prime
minister operated under the assumption of Iraqi WMD, and he created public
expectations that he would declassify intelligence to support a more aggressive policy
against Saddam Hussein. "Be in no doubt at all that he is certainly trying to acquire
weapons of mass destruction, in particular a nuclear capability," he said. "If the time
comes for action, people will have the evidence presented to them." 73 Ratcheting up the
rhetoric was part of Blair's attempt to bring pressure to bear on Iraq, but it had the effect
of constraining intelligence analysis. Indeed, the steady drumbeat of public accusations
170 "Briefing Papers," pp. 9-13.
171 "Briefing Papers on Iraq," p. 11.
172 "This Threat is Growing Not Diminishing," Times ofLondon, July 17, 2002.
173 Peter Riddell, "Danger of Saddam Still in Doubt," Times ofLondon, July 25, 2002, p. 11.
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about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction also represented a steady stream of signals to
the intelligence community about what policymakers expected to hear. The policy
climate during the summer produced "immense indirect pressure to provide intelligence
to please," according to the Butler report, and JIC assessments began to tend towards
worst-case scenarios.174 An assessment in late August "reflected more firmly the premise
that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and would use them in a war," even
though the JIC acknowledged that it had little intelligence on Iraq's CBW doctrine. 175
Although the JIC had been working on the dossier since April, the government
did not order a declassified version until September 3. Scarlett and Campbell met two
days later to discuss the editing process. Although Campbell insisted that the document
should be based on intelligence, he also told Scarlett that it had to be "revelatory and we
needed to show that it was new and informative and part of a bigger case." 76 Such
policy direction ensured that the product would not reflect the existing intelligence
picture, gaps and all, because the inclusion of headline-grabbing revelations would
inevitably dominate the public reaction. Indeed, the decision to enlist intelligence in the
process of policy advocacy by definition ruled out the possibility of a neutral assessment.
Nonetheless, this contradiction appeared again during a second coordination meeting, in
which he told Scarlett that the dossier must have the appearance of objectivity. "The
drier the better," he said, "cut the rhetoric." At the same time, Campbell thought that his
174 Davis and Persbo, "After the Butler Report."
175 Butler Report, p. 72.
176 Campbell was mainly concerned about the possible public perception that the dossier represented
government spin instead of impartial intelligence. He does not seem to have been concerned that policy
input would actually bias the product. Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 634, 637-638. The foreign office raised
similar concerns. See Mark Sedwill to Charles Gray, Edward Chaplin, Ed Owen, David Manning,
Matthew Rycroft, and Alistair Campbell, "COF: Dossier 10/9 Version - Comments," September 11, 2002,
in Hutton Inquiry appendix. All of the correspondence cited below is taken from the Hutton Inquiry
appendix, unless otherwise noted.
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office could help lend rhetorical punch to the final product. His editorial board would
review evolving drafts and comment on the style and presentation of the dossier. "JS to
own," he concluded, "AC to help." 177
The JIC turned around the government's request quickly, updating the dossier
with two recent assessments of Iraqi diplomatic options and WMD doctrine. 17 8 The
revised draft was circulated around the government for two weeks before the final dossier
was released. Campbell's staff in the communications office took a direct role in editing
intelligence during this period, sending comments on various iterations of the dossier, and
encouraging Scarlett to change the language of the dossier to emphasize that the
cumulative impact of intelligence was an incontrovertible case against the Ba'ath regime.
One staffer, Daniel Pruce, stressed the basic purpose of the dossier: "Our aim... (is to)
convey the impression that things have not been staid in Iraq but that over the past decade
he has been aggressively and relentlessly pursuing WMD...the dossier gets close to this
but some drafting changes could bring this out more." 7 9 Campbell argued that it should
appeal to the general public and steer clear of technical arcana. 180 To that end Pruce
suggested replacing all references to Iraq with Saddam Hussein in order to "personalize
the dossier" and create a villain for public consumption.' 8' Other aides suggested
177 Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 636-637. Campbell also wrote to Scarlett, "It goes without saying that there
should be nothing published that you and (your colleagues) are not 100% happy with." Campbell to
Scarlett, September 9, 2002.
178 JIC Assessments, "Saddam's Diplomatic and Military Options," August 21, 2002, and "Iraqi Use of
Chemical and Biological Weapons - Possible Scenarios," September 9, 2002. See Butler Report, p. 72.
179 Daniel Pruce to Campbell, Matthew Rycroft, Philip Bassett, and Godric Smith, "Draft Dossier (J
Scarlett Version of 10 Sept)," September 11, 2002.
180 Campbell, for instance, asked for comments of one of his colleagues who was not familiar with
intelligence and defense matters. She recommended that the dossier should avoid passages that "only made
sense to Jane's Weekly." Ed Owen to Scarlett, Campbell, Sedwill, Pruce, Kelly, Edward Chaplin, Richard
Stagg, William Ehrman, Charles Gray, Stephen Pattison, Tim Dowse, Mark Matthews, Andrew Patrick,
Julian Miller, and eight others (redacted), "Iraq - Dossier," September 17, 2002.
181 Pruce to Mark Matthews, Rycroft, Paul Hamill, Smith, and Campbell, "Dossier," September 10, 2002.
See also Campbell to Scarlett and Miller, "Another dossier memo!" September 18, 2002. One FCO
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releasing raw intelligence, however heavily redacted, to demonstrate that the government
had secret information that went beyond open-source estimates. 182
The communications staff was particularly disappointed with the section on Iraq's
nuclear activities, where intelligence was particularly ambiguous. "Sorry to bombard you
on this point," Campbell wrote to Scarlett on September 18, "but I do worry that the
nuclear section will become the main focus and as currently drafted, is not in great
shape." 183 The standing estimate held that Iraq would find it very difficult to achieve a
full fuel cycle as long as sanctions remained in place. Moreover, the first draft of the
dossier concluded that it would take at least five years to produce a nuclear weapon after
sanctions were lifted.' 84 This seemed to reduce the sense of an imminent threat, and
Campbell suggested adding that Iraq could possess nuclear weapons in as little as one
year if it was able to acquire fissile material from overseas.' 85 The final draft of the
dossier stressed Saddam's procurement efforts and his obvious interest in reviving the
nuclear program. Nonetheless, the staff was disappointed that they could not make a
more compelling case. One of them complained about "our inability to say that he could
pull the nuclear trigger any time soon."' 86
Cabinet ministers also commented on the dossier, increasing the pressure on the
JIC to deliver a more damning assessment. The Defense Secretary complained to Scarlett
officials opposed this recommendation, suggesting the use of "the regime" instead. The final version used
"Iraq," "Saddam," and "the regime" interchangeably. Sedwill to Gray, et al., "COF: Dossier 10/9 Version -
Comments," September 11, 2002.
182 The government was particularly keen to distinguish the dossier from a recent report from the
International Institute of Strategic Studies. See Bassett to Smith, Pruce, and Campbell, "Draft Dossier (J
Scarlett Version of 10 Sept),"September 11, 2002; Smith to Pruce, Campbell, Rycroft, and Bennett,
September 11, 2002; and Campbell, Blair Years, p. 637.
183 Campbell to Scarlett and Miller, "Another dossier memo!" September 18, 2002.
184 "Briefing Papers on Iraq," p. 10.
185 Campbell to Scarlett, Manning, Powell, and Miller, "Nuclear Section," September 19, 2002.
186 Tom Kelly to Campbell, Smith, and Pruce, "Tuesday core script," September 19,. 2002; and Pruce to
Kelly, Campbell, Smith, and Tanya Joseph, "Dossier - 16 September draft," September 17, 2002.
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that it was "insufficiently dramatic."1 87 The Foreign Secretary wanted a "killer para on
Saddam's defiance of the UN."188 Of course, there was nothing untoward about
ministers commenting on JIC assessments, as they regularly participated in JIC meetings.
But their recommendations show that they were less interested in helping to improve the
quality of analysis. Rather, they were trying to push the product in a direction that would
reflect the government's foreign policy preferences. In the meantime, Tony Blair
continued to speak in ominous language about the growing threat of WMD in Iraq. He
warned that Iraq was "coming to the point" of a nuclear weapons capability and referred
to the "real and unique threat" posed by Saddam.' 89
The communications office worked closely with the JIC as the publication date
approached. Campbell wanted to focus attention on the dossier on the eve of a
parliamentary debate on the government's Iraq policy, and was concerned that early press
leaks would dilute its impact. "We have to be disciplined in holding the line until
publication," he reminded all involved in the editing process. 190 The complexity of the
case, which combined technical intelligence on various weapons programs as well as
assessments of Iraqi military doctrine and strategic intentions, meant that the media could
choose among many possible story lines in its coverage. Therefore last minute edits dealt
with emphasizing the points that were most likely to generate media attention. As one
press aide put it in a memo to Campbell and Scarlett, "What will be the headline in the
Standard on the day of publication? What do we want it to be?"' 91
187 Davies and Glees, Spinning the Spies, p. 42.
188 Sedwill to Charles Gray, Manning, Rycroft, Campbell, Chaplin, Owen, Miller, Scarlett, and Pruce,
"URGENT: Iraq Dossier 10/9 Version - Foreign Secretary's Comments," September 11, 2002.
189 Paul Waugh, "Blair: It is Our Duty to Support US Over Iraq," The Independent, September 4, 2002, p. 1190 Campell to Scarlett, et al., September 9, 2002.
191 The actual headline, "45 Minutes from Attack," was a reference to the dossier's claim that the Iraqi
military was ready to launch a WMD volley within 45 minutes of the order from Saddam Hussein. Powell
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Politicization worked. Weeks of pressure on the JIC led to a final draft that went
far beyond the actual content of intelligence. The published dossier differed from earlier
JIC assessments in tone and substance. It presented judgments with no uncertainty.
Caveats about intelligence gaps which has appeared only weeks before disappeared. For
instance, the September 9 assessment, which was part of the basis for the dossier,
included an important disclaimer about intelligence on Iraqi CBW: "Intelligence remains
limited and Saddam's own unpredictability complicates judgments about Iraqi use of
these weapons. Much of this paper is necessarily based on judgment and assessment."
The JIC had made this point in several classified assessments in 2001-2002, but removed
it from the declassified dossier. 192 Other changes served to downplay doubts about the
meaning of partial information. The section on aluminum tubes included no reference to
possible conventional military applications, even though it admitted that "there is no
definitive intelligence that (they) are destined for a nuclear program." Following
Campbell's recommendation, the dossier included the judgment that Iraq could acquire
nuclear weapons in 1-2 years if it acquired fissile material and enrichment-related
equipment from abroad. It also emphasized Iraq's procurement efforts, including its
attempt to import "significant quantities of uranium from Africa." Put together, these
details made the original five year estimate look like wishful thinking. 193
The most noteworthy revelation had to do with Iraqi readiness for launching
WMD attacks. The dossier claimed that military officers could launch a chemical or
to Campbell, and Scarlett, September 19, 2002; and Alex Danchev, "The Reckoning: Official Enquiries and
the Iraq War," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), p. 446.
192 Iraq 's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, September 24, 2002,
pp. 17-24; http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2002/09/24/dossier.pdf. See also
Davies and Glees, Spinning the Spies, p. 47; Davies, "A Critical Look," pp. 49-52; and Butler Report, pp.
73-75.
193 Iraq's Weapons ofMass Destruction, pp. 24-26.
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biological attack within 45 minutes of receiving the order to do so. This conclusion was
highlighted in the Prime Minister's forward and three times in the main text, in order to
emphasize the imminent threat to British security. But the dossier obfuscated the fact
that the intelligence had to do with battlefield weapons, not long range missiles. The JIC
assessments staff believed it would take no more than 45 minutes to move CW or BW
shells from forward depots to pre-designated military units.' 94 This interpretation was
not included in the dossier. Instead, it implied that the short timeline was related to
strategic weapons:
Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but
against his own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the
building up of his WMD capability, and the belief overseas that he would
use these weapons, as vital to his strategic interests. And the document
discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be
ready within 45 minutes of the order to use them. 195
This was a substantial sin of omission. Worse, the judgment was based on a piece of new
intelligence that was not properly vetted. On August 30, SIS reported that a senior Iraqi
military official had revealed that the maximum response time to prepare CBW munitions
was 45 minutes. 196 Normally, raw intelligence on munitions would normally be sent to
specialists in the Defense Intelligence Service, but in this case they were bypassed for
unspecified security reasons. The failure to analyze the information was a crucial error;
postwar investigations discovered that the source was relying on a subagent who had
fabricated the claim from a Soviet-era military manual. 197 Nonetheless, on September 9
the JIC assessed that "chemical and biological munitions could be with military units and
194 Butler Report, pp. 126-128; and Intelligence and Security Committee Report, pp. 26-27.
195 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 3-4. None of the other references to the 45-minute claim fill in
the appropriate context. See pp. 5, 17, 19.
196 Gill, "Intelligence Oversight," p. 10; and Intelligence and Security Committee report, paragraphs 49-51.
197 Davies, "Critical Look," p. 51.
342
ready for firing within 20-45 minutes." 198 Three days later the director of SIS briefed the
prime minister on the new intelligence, which was quickly added to the dossier. 199 In a
matter of weeks a piece of raw, uncorroborated hearsay was published by the government
to justify a major shift in policy.
The dossier also included background information designed to raise fears about
weapons of mass destruction. It went further than the earlier drafts in describing the
physical effects of chemical and biological weapons. VX could cause "rapid death";
exposure to aflatoxins could lead to "stillborn babies and children born with mutations";
and ricin could "cause multiple organ failure leading to death within one or two days." 200
To drive the point home it included picture of Kurds who were killed in a CW attack in
1988, with the caption: "Among the corpses at Halabja, children were found dead where
they had been playing outside their homes. In places, streets were piled with corpses." 2 01
The dossier also included some crude calculations about the effects of a 20-kiloton
nuclear explosion over an urban center. These passages had nothing to do with current
intelligence on Iraq. They were included solely for the purpose of rousing public and
parliamentary concern about Iraq. The dossier was public relations vehicle, and the JIC
had become a policy advocate.
The character of intelligence-policy relations fundamentally changed during the
summer and early autumn of 2002. Before, the government had accepted the content of
"98 Gill, "Intelligence Oversight," p. 10.
199 Butler Report, p. 139. Philip Davies has argued that the failure to properly review the intelligence also
reflected a fundamental breakdown in British vetting procedures. He argues that the exclusion of DIS
analysts stemmed from the long-term weakening of the requirements section in SIS, which was
traditionally responsible for processing raw intelligence. Although the decline of the requirements section
is cause for concern, the DIS analysts were still regularly employed to assess new information on foreign
military activities. Moreover, this was a critical piece of intelligence, and it is unlikely that it would have
fallen through the cracks as a result of a long-term institutional trend. Davies, "Critical Look," pp. 47-48.
200 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 11-12.
201 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 15.
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intelligence on Iraqi weapons programs, along with the caveats about the lack of
information about current activities. Policymakers did not intervene in the assessment
process, and they had no interest in changing the content or tone of assessments. Nor did
10 Downing have any interest in using the JIC as a policy advocate. Its decision to do so,
as the Butler Report concluded, was unprecedented:
The dossier broke new ground in three ways: the JIC had never previously
produced a public document; no Government case for any international
action had previously been made to the British public through explicitly
drawing on a JIC publication; and the authority of the British intelligence
community, and the JIC in particular, had never been used in such a public
way.2 °2
Because the dossier was meant to justify a shift in policy rather than to provide an
objective assessment, it contained unambiguous conclusions that were not supported by
the available intelligence, and used language that overstated the certainty of the case.
Explaining Politicization. The oversell model predicts that politicization will
occur when public commitments are opposed by at least one critical constituency. In
both the United States and the United Kingdom, these conditions attained in summer
2002. Moreover, direct politicization became likely in September, when public
commitments and more domestic controversy intensified.
The independent variables were reversed in the two cases. In the United States, a
strong public commitment to regime change was tempered by moderate domestic
opposition, and no critical constituency emerged until the late summer 2002. In the
United Kingdom, the government made a weak commitment to regime change in the face
202 Butler Report, p. 153. In some ways the open use of intelligence was the culmination of a decade-long
governmental effort to make the intelligence community more transparent. Before the 1992 the
government did not formally acknowledge the existence of SIS, much less use its product in public. See
Len Scott, "Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence: A British View," Intelligence and National
Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April 2007), pp. 185-205; and West, "The UK's Not Quite So Secret Service."
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of very strident domestic opposition. When it began to strengthen its commitment, it
began leaning on intelligence to sell the case.
The Bush administration made a stronger and earlier commitment to regime
change by force in Iraq. It staked itself to this position by invoking potential audience
costs; the administration was unlikely to accept any diplomatic compromise after
declaring that the crisis would only end with Iraq's full disarmament and that it would not
tolerate the continued existence of "terrorist states" like Saddam's Iraq. On the other
hand, no critical constituencies emerged until the late summer, and domestic opposition
to military action was generally mild. In the wake of September 11, the public was
inclined towards an aggressive strategy in the Middle East, even if the link between Iraq
and al Qaeda was unclear. Save for a brief period in September-October 2002,
Congressional skeptics were reluctant to criticize the administration too harshly lest they
appear soft on national security issues. And the antiwar movement in the United States
began late and never gathered the same momentum as did similar movements in Europe
in Asia.
In the United Kingdom these conditions were reversed. Prime Minister Blair did
not raise the possibility of military action until the late summer of 2002, and he did not
firmly commit until shortly before the war. Blair sought to stand "shoulder to shoulder"
with the Bush administration, but preferred that any action against Iraq go through the
United Nations. 20 3 He was slower to threaten military action, and appeared to prefer
military threats only as a way of compelling Saddam Hussein to cooperate with
international organizations. At the same time, British domestic political pressures were
much more intense. The public was never enthusiastic about a war in Iraq, especially
203 Coates and Krieger, Blair's War, p. 44.
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without a specific UN mandate. Blair also risked fracturing his own party over the war.
Indeed, a number of ministers resigned in protest of the invasion.
Commitment. British statements on Iraq during the winter of 2001-2002 were
notably opaque. The fall of the Taliban left the government without any obvious strategy
for the next phase in the war on terrorism. While the Bush administration focused public
attention on the nexus between terrorist groups and state sponsors, Blair spoke vaguely
about expanding counterterrorism operations, and he revealed little about the
government's preferences or intentions. He was clear about his commitment to the US-
UK alliance, but less clear about how far he would go to accommodate Washington.
"We have concentrated on achieving our objectives in Afghanistan," Blair said in
December 2001. "Of course, the battle against international terrorism does not end there,
but we will proceed by way of deliberation and consideration with key strategic partners
and allies; and of course Brian stands willing to play its part in that." 20 4 The following
spring he tried assuage public fears of a possible war in Iraq while simultaneously
supporting the White House. On the one hand, Saddam Hussein was a reprehensible
character and the status quo was unacceptable. But the solution need not involve military
action. The thrust of British policy, as described in a March statement to the cabinet, was
to strengthen containment by forcing Iraq to readmit weapons inspectors into the country.
Blair's rhetorical balancing act was difficult to sustain as the Bush administration
became more belligerent towards Iraq. During a joint press conference in April,
President Bush declared that "to allow WMD to be developed by a state like Iraq...would
be grossly to ignore the lessons of September 11, and we will not do it." This was not
exactly a declaration of war, but connecting the WMD issue with the "lessons of
204 Quoted in Coates and Kreiger, Blair's War, p. 47.
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September 11" clearly signaled the president's willingness to use force against Iraq.
When a reporter asked if Blair was persuaded that military action was necessary, the
prime minister equivocated. He agreed that regime change would be the best outcome
for all involved, but "how we approach this... is a matter for discussion." Blair used the
same formula on the question of weapons mass destruction. The threat was real, he said,
but the appropriate response was up for debate. 20 5
Blair committed more firmly in September, when he started to express doubt
about the possibility of an international solution. During a press conference on the first
of the month, he suggested that multilateral attempts at disarming Iraq had ended in
stagnation. Saddam had successfully hidden his CW and BW capabilities from UN
inspectors, and was actively pursuing nuclear weapons. The logical consequence was
that meaningful action would only occur outside the UN framework. Iraq was "an issue
for the whole of the international community. But it is an issue we have to deal
with...the policy of inaction, doing nothing about it, is not something we can responsibly
adhere to." 206 On the same day, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw raised the possibility of
using force:
No other country but Iraq has the same appetite for developing and using
weapons of mass destruction...It would be wildly irresponsible to argue
that patience with Iraq should be unlimited, or that military action should
not be an option. Until the international community faces up to the threat
represented by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, we place at risk the
lives of civilians in the region and beyond... 207
205 Transcript of a press conference from Crawford, TX, April 6, 2002, online at the UCSB Presidency
Project; www.presidency.ucsb.edu.
206 Transcript of a press conference from Camp David, September 1, 2002; UCSB Presidency Project.
207 Quoted in Coates and Krieger, Blair's War, p. 53.
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Straw's comments threw doubt on the possibility of a settlement mediated by the United
Nations, because it was already clear that the security council did not see the threat in the
same terms.
The new commitment to action was laced with unequivocal statements about Iraqi
capabilities. The government recognized that skeptics at home would not take the
argument on faith, and that it needed to present evidence to back its claims. As Campbell
wrote in his diary on September 3, "It was not going to be at all easy to sell the policy in
the next few months, especially because (Bush) was so unpopular in the UK...The
toughest question was what new evidence was there?" 20 8 Not coincidentally, the direct
politicization of intelligence began two days later, when Blair ordered the JIC to begin
work on the Iraq dossier.
Despite growing domestic opposition to the war, the government plowed ahead.
On October 15, Straw warned that Iraq "should be left under no illusion of the
consequences of non-compliance or the depth of our resolve." On November 8, Blair
issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein during a speech to Parliament: "My message to
him is this: disarm or you will face force. There must be no more games, no more
deceit, no more prevarication, obstruction or defiance." 20 9 One consequence of the
deepening commitment was a feedback loop between British threat assessment and the
government's public rhetoric. The more the government bound itself to action, the more
it felt obligated to issue unambiguous statements about Iraqi capabilities. Those
statements in turn justified new commitments, and the cycle was repeated. This process
caused some anxiety in 10 Downing as the war approached. If Blair had any doubts
208 Campbell, Blair Years, p. 633.
209 Coates and Kreiger, Blair's War, pp. 53, 56-57.
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about the credibility of intelligence, he could not express them publicly or he would
undermine the basis of his own foreign policy. But questions lingered. Said one member
of his entourage, "We hoped we were right.., we felt we were right." 210
Critical constituencies. The government faced intense public and parliamentary
opposition throughout the prewar period. The combination of domestic pressure and an
increasingly firm commitment to military action created strong incentives to politicize
intelligence.
Blair's support for the Bush administration was serious liability in terms of public
opinion. Bush had never been popular in Great Britain, and the prime minister risked
being tagged as the president's "poodle" as long as he publicly backed the White
House. 2 11 Bush's position on Iraq was especially unpopular; only 18% described his
handling of the Iraq problem as good or excellent in a July survey. 2 12 The British public
saw Bush's aggressive posture as mindless swaggering and believed it represented a
dangerous form of unilateralism. The public also held the UN in high esteem, demanding
a UN mandate for any military action against Iraq. For example, only 37% said that they
would support a war without UN approval, even if Iraq was shown to be allied with al
Qaeda.213 The public agreed in principle about the threat of WMD proliferation, but it
was unenthusiastic about joining the United States in a Middle Eastern conflict.
210 Lawrence Freedman, "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat," Survival, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 7-
50, at 32. Italics in original.
211 The tabloid press used the tag regularly, especially after pop singer George Michael lambasted Blair as a
poodle in a June single. Blair was also mocked as the "Right Honorable Member for Texas North" by an
audience member during a public BBC interview in early 2003. George Jones and Michael Smith, "Third
of RAF is ordered to the Gulf," Daily Telegraph, February 7, 2003.
212 Chicago Council of Foreign Relations survey, July 5-6, 2002.
213 Chicago Council of Foreign Relations survey, July 5-6, 2002.
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The prime minister was aware that he would have a difficult time rallying support,
as he acknowledged during a Cabinet meeting in early April.2 14 Public opposition
remained high as attention turned from Afghanistan to Iraq in the summer of 2002. More
than two thirds of the voting public opposed the war by mid-August. 2 5 Worse, Blair was
losing public confidence, and Alastair Campbell warned him that his trust ratings had
"really dipped." 21 6 During the first week of September the prime minister's
communications staff launched a coordinated PR effort to reverse the tide of opinion.
But the results were lackluster: a September 9 poll showed that only 36% supported
British participation in a ground invasion. 217
Not surprisingly, the emotional impact of the al Qaeda attacks was stronger in the
United States than in Great Britain. The majority of Americans were ready to give the
president flexibility to prosecute the war on terrorism as he saw fit, even if that involved
military action against enemies not directly responsible for 9/11. Not so for the British,
who viewed the WMD issue as far more important in determining their views on Iraq. 218
The problem for the British government is that it had built the case against Iraq on
statements about Saddam Hussein's intentions without providing evidence that he
actually possessed weapons of mass destruction. As the controversy over Iraq intensified
during the summer of 2002, critics increasingly called for proof that the threat was as
great as the government suggested. The Times of London editorialized that the prime
214 Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 612-613.
215 Benedict Brogan and Anthony King, "Attack on Iraq rejected by 2 in 3 voters," Daily Telegraph, August
12, 2002, p. 1. See also Anthony King, "Blair is failing to recruit the public to support him in a war on
Saddam," Daily Telegraph, August 12, 2002, p. 4.
216 Campbell, Blair Years, p. 628.
217 Gallup/CNN/USA Today survey, September 9, 2002.
218 Freedman, "War in Iraq," pp. 20-21.
350
minister's holding position on Iraq could not last forever. "We must have answers,"
declared The Independent.219
The use of intelligence for policy advocacy paid immediate dividends. The
government's dossier was enough to allay public opposition, at least temporarily. The
specific details of Iraq's WMD programs, under the imprimatur of the Joint Intelligence
Council, were the answers that many critics were looking for. An Ipsos-MORI survey
taken the day of publication found that in light of the dossier, 71% of respondents would
support a war as the government was able to receive a UN mandate. More than half
agreed that Saddam Hussein was a threat to international peace. 220
Public opposition rose again during the winter, as it became clear that the return
of UN inspectors to Iraq would not be enough to resolve the crisis. In an op-ed on
December 16, Blair wrote that he had always preferred going through the UN instead of
unilateral action. But he warned that because of Saddam's "record of lies, concealment
and aggression, we must be skeptical that he will willingly give up his weapons of mass
destruction, let alone that he already has." 221 Until this point the prime minister had
argued that Iraq would only admit inspectors back into the country under the threat of
military action. Now that the inspectors were back, Blair seemed to be moving the
goalposts so that a peaceful solution would be logically impossible. The renewed threat
219 "Banging the drum: Blair will soon have to make the public case on Iraq," The Times (London), August
17, 2002, p. 23; and "We must have answers before a war on Iraq," The Independent on Sunday, August 4,
2002, p. 22.
220 Ipsos-MORI survey, September 24, 2002. Retrieved from the Polling the Nations database;
http://poll.orspub.com.
221 Tony Blair, "Engaging with Syria to undermine Iraq," Financial Times, December 16, 2002, p. 21.
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of war led to more public anxiety, and Blair worried aloud that his failure to rally public
opinion might bring down the government.222
Once again, policymakers had strong incentives to use intelligence to backstop
their public commitments in the face of domestic opposition. However, the
communications office erred badly in late January by releasing a second dossier, Iraq: Its
Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception, and Intimidation. The document was rushed
and sloppy. Instead of circulating multiple drafts and streamlining the message, staffers
simply lifted material from open sources and published it under the government's seal. 223
Worse, the preface to the dossier claimed that it was based partly on intelligence material.
The plagiarism was quickly exposed, however, and intelligence immediately lost
credibility. Despite the need to overcome mounting domestic opposition, the government
knew that calling on intelligence again would be counterproductive. The incident was a
"bad own goal," as Campbell wrote in his diary. "Definitely no more dossiers for
awhile." 224
Party opposition. The other critical constituency before the war was the British
Labour Party. Labour back-benchers were critical of Blair's Iraq policy long before he
committed to military action. Over fifty Labour MPs voiced their opposition in a
parliamentary vote in September 2001, and prominent cabinet officials publicly
expressed concern over Blair's move to support the United States unequivocally after the
222 Campbell was struck by a poll at the end of January showing that only 2% of the British public believed
war against Iraq would make the world safer. Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 657-658, 660.
223 The dossier was commissioned by Campbell and produced in the Coalition Information Centre, an office
somewhat akin to the White House Iraq Group. It lifted significant passages from Ibrahim al-Marashi,
"Iraq's Security & Intelligence Network: A Guide & Analysis," Middle East Review ofInternational
Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Sep. 2002).
224 Campbell, Blair Years, p. 664. See also Aldrich, "Whitehall and the Iraq War," p. 78.
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al Qaeda attacks. 225 Dissent lingered throughout 2002-2003, both among party leaders
and the rank-and-file. If he was unable to regain their support, Blair would be put in the
awkward position of relying on the opposition Conservatives to pursue the war in Iraq. A
party revolt could also lead to his political downfall if rebels were able to capture
sufficient backing for a vote of no-confidence. Finally, it could have an operational
impact on the course of the war. Blair warned Bush on the eve of the invasion that the
failure to win parliamentary approval would mean that no British troops would
participate in the invasion.226
The government was acutely aware of these problems by the spring of 2002.
Charles Clarke, the party chairman, assured Blair that said Labour would support his
plans "provided the case was real and properly made." But Robin Cook, the leader of the
House of Commons, warned him in March that a war would lead to British diplomatic
isolation in Europe. Cook's opinion carried a great deal of weight in the party. The
foreign minister from 1997-2001, Cook was a passionate advocate of the aggressive
humanitarianism that dominated Blair's foreign policy in his first term, and in his current
position he served as a bellwether for parliamentary opinion. Cook's warning clearly
registered with the prime minister. Blair privately admitted that he would need to do
more to guarantee the support of the party.227
Controversy over Iraq exacerbated the existing fissures among the party
leadership. Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott already accused Blair of "bypassing
the party" on issues relating to domestic political strategy; now it appeared that he was
225 Tom Baldwin, "Labour rebels demand debate on US response," The Times (London), September 21,
2001. See also Coates and Krieger, Blair's War, pp. 59-60.
226 Campbell, Blair Years, p. 672.
227 Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 608-610.
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bypassing the party by lashing British foreign policy to the whims of the White House. 228
Indeed, more than half of Labour voters opposed supporting the U.S. on Iraq, and party
officials echoed their discontent. 229 Peter Mandelson, one of Blair's closest political
allies, now spoke out against the Bush administration's tendency towards unilateralism.
Gerald Kaufman, an influential Labour MP and a former shadow foreign secretary,
described the government's problem in The Spectator magazine: "There is substantial
resistance in the parliamentary Labour Party against war on Iraq, not just from the usual
suspects bur from many mainstream MPs." 230 Resistance peaked when Blair deepened
his public commitment to military action late in the summer. In September, Cook warned
Blair that he risked total isolation from Parliament. He also warned that a war in Iraq
"would be the end of the government." 231
The publication of the dossier helped the government manage party opposition.
Clarke's advice seemed to be correct: the party was willing to believe that the threat was
real as long as the government took the time to make the case. Only thirty-two Labour
MPs voted against its Iraq policy in November, a sharp drop from the previous year, and
the party dissidents were unable to rally more broad-based opposition.232 As with public
opinion, however, the government only enjoyed temporary relief, and opposition surged
after it became clear that sanctions and renewed UN inspections were not enough to
resolve the issue. Blair worried that he could not maintain party unity and support
228 For a particularly dramatic confrontation between Prescott and Blair, see Campbell, Blair Years, pp.
624-625.
229 Alan Travis and Nicholas Watt, "Blair faces defeat on Iraq," The Guardian, August 28, 2002, p. 1.
230 Sarah Lyall, "Iraq Stance Puts Blair at Odds With Party," New York Times, August 30, 2002, p.8 .
231 Campbell, Blair Years, pp. 636-637.
232 Christopher Adams, "Blair relieved that attacks stay limited to Labour's usual suspects in the House,"
Financial Times, September 25, 2002, p. 4. Antiwar activists were disappointed at the party's lackluster
opposition to the government's position on Iraq. "Labour letdown: They missed their moment on Iraq,"
The Guardian, October 1, 2002, p. 21.
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without a second UN resolution, but that seemed unlikely because UN inspectors had
failed to turn up evidence of WMD in Iraq. The government tried to downplay the
importance of these early findings, and hurriedly published the second dossier on
Saddam's history of deception and concealment. The scramble to maintain party
cohesion almost collapsed after the plagiarism was revealed; 121 Labour MPs expressed
their opposition to the government's Iraq policy in a February vote.233
The Labour rebellion became more intense as the war approached, but the
government knew that it could not simply publish intelligence to help make the case. The
second dossier had embarrassed the government and energized the antiwar movement in
Parliament, and the prime minister recognized that the luster was off of intelligence.
Blair adopted an moral and emotional argument instead. Where previously he had used
the JIC to provide specific details on the Iraqi threat, now he argued that inaction was
morally reprehensible. Blair argued that Saddam was responsible for at least a half
million dead in Iraq, and warned that there would be a "price in blood" if Saddam
remained in power. He also used fear to rally support for the war, suggesting that Iraq
might yet join with al Qaeda because the Iraqi regime had no respect for international
norms.234 These arguments succeeded in quelling enough opposition to prevent a vote
against the war. The day before British soldiers entered the war, Parliament voted 412-
149 in support of the government's policy. More than one hundred Labour MPs
supported an opposition motion calling for restraint, but they could not muster a majority.
233 On Labour dissent, see Philip Webster, Lewis Smith, and Tom Baldwin, "Labour warns Blair on war
against Iraq," The Times (London), January 15, 2003, p. 1; Lewis Smith, "Labour chiefs have their say on
war with Iraq," The Times (London), January 15, 2003, p. 12; and Coates and Krieger, Blair's War, pp. 59-
60. On Blair's reaction, see Campbell, Blair Years, p. 658.
234 Tony Blair, "The price of my conviction," The Observer, February 16, 2003, p. 20.
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Intelligence as Policy Oversell
The U.S. and British cases reveal similar motives for politicization. They also
demonstrate the use of intelligence as an effective form of policy oversell. By publicly
bringing intelligence into the policy consensus, both governments were able to overcome
significant domestic opposition. This was no small task, given that preventive wars are
typically unpopular in democracies. 235 Policymakers misrepresented intelligence in four
ways. First, they downplayed dissent among analysts and obscured the genuine
ambiguity of existing information. Second, they exaggerated the certainty of future
threats. Third, they exploited on the aura of secrecy that surrounds intelligence agencies
by partially releasing information on Iraqi WMD, and by suggesting that additional
classified information was even more compelling. Fourth, they argued that policy
options were self-evident in the face of such overwhelming intelligence.
Downplaying dissent and ambiguity. The White House oversold policy by
obfuscating controversies in the intelligence community about the quality of information
and the reliability of its sources. It suggested that there were ties between al Qaeda and
Iraq, despite serious doubts among analysts that there was any operational relationship.2 36
It increased the estimate of the Iraqi chemical weapons stockpile, despite a near total lack
of intelligence on the location or amount of mustard, sarin, and VX. 237 It repeatedly used
information from defectors on Iraqi mobile BW facilities, even though some of them had
235 Randall Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World
Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), pp. 235-269.
236 See especially the president's press conference, March 6, 2003; UCSB Presidency Project.
237 It also exaggerated the destructive potential of Saddam's supposed arsenal. For a concise discussion of
the military difficulties associated with using chemical weapons, see John Mueller, Overblown. How
Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New
York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 18-20.
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been revealed as fabricators. 238 The administration also downplayed dissent over
estimates of Iraq's nuclear program in order to preserve the image of consensus. After
the New York Times reported the internal dispute over the aluminum tubes, a White
House official stated that the "best technical experts and nuclear scientists at laboratories
like Oak Ridge supported the CIA assessments." 239 In fact, DOE experts had disputed
the claim for over a year.
The most egregious examples occurred at moments of intense domestic
controversy. The rise of the Senate as a critical constituency in September 2002 led the
administration to badly overstate the quality of the information on Iraqi WMD. Donald
Rumsfeld provided a list of "facts" about Iraq to the Senate, including intelligence that
the Ba'ath regime was "determined to acquire the means to strike the U.S., its friends and
allies with weapons of mass destruction." 240 Condoleezza Rice told the PBS Newshour
that Iraq was providing chemical weapons training to al Qaeda. 241 Most importantly, the
administration authorized the release of the CIA white paper on the eve of the
congressional vote on the use of force. As described above, the white paper removed
dissents that were present in the classified NIE, as well as estimative language that
suggested ambiguity or uncertainty. The paper also included maps of Iraq, complete with
radiation symbols marking the location of suspected nuclear facilities. Sen. Graham
called it a "vivid and terrifying case for war." 242
238 SSCI Report, pp. 160-161. See also Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 29.
239 SSCI Report, p. 94.240 Prados, Hoodwinked, p. 98.
241 PBS, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, September 25, 2002;
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec02/rice_9-25.html.
242 Quoted in Isikoff and Corn, Hubris, p. 138. See also Graham, Intelligence Matters, pp. 181-183.
357
The Blair government also used intelligence in public without mentioning the
flimsiness of the underlying information. The September dossier included ominous
intelligence on all aspects of its supposed weapons of mass destruction programs. It also
declared that Iraq could launch a WMD attack within 45 minutes of the order being
given, despite the fact that this intelligence was brand new and had not been properly
vetted by analysts in the Defense Intelligence Service. Nonetheless, the government used
the story to suggest that Saddam Hussein presented an imminent threat to British national
security interests. Speaking to the House of Commons on the day of publication, the
prime minister declared that the intelligence picture was "extensive, detailed, and
authoritative." 243
Exaggerating the future threat. Policymakers justified military action on both
preemptive and preventive grounds, using intelligence to exaggerate the future threat if
the Ba'ath regime was allowed to stay in power. American officials used terrifying
metaphors to emphasize the danger. "There will always be some uncertainty about how
quickly (Saddam Hussein) can acquire nuclear weapons," Rice told CNN, "but we don't
want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud." The accumulated intelligence seemed
to be overwhelming. Cheney admitted that "what we know is just bits and pieces
gathered through the intelligence system... (but) we do know, with absolute certainty,
that he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to
enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon." Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that all the Ba'athists needed was fissile material, and "they are, at this
243 Gill, "Intelligence Oversight," p. 10; and Butler report, p. 79.
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moment, seeking that material." According to administration officials, the intelligence on
Iraq's procurement activity was bulletproof.244
Prime Minister Blair also used the shadow of the future to emphasize the need for
action, and used current intelligence to envision worst-case scenarios. In a November
2002 speech, for instance, he massaged the distinction between Saddam Hussein and
Osama bin Laden by referring to WMD proliferation and terrorism as "linked dangers."
Blair asked a series of rhetorical questions to convince his audience that catastrophe
awaited if nothing was done against WMD proliferators: "Would al Qaeda buy WMD if
it could? Certainly. Do they have the financial resources? Probably. Would they use
them? Definitely." 245
The aura of secret intelligence. Policymakers oversold the threat of Iraq by
selectively releasing intelligence data, and by suggesting that even more damning
information was still classified. During a widely publicized speech in October 2002, for
instance, President Bush publicly claimed that Iraqi UAVs were specifically intended to
launch chemical and biological weapons attacks on the United States. He also publicly
accused Iraq of providing CW training to al Qaeda. Immediately following the speech,
the White House released satellite images of a suspected nuclear facility that was
extensively rebuilt after it was bombed in 1998. The use of actual intelligence data added
weight to the administration's familiar warnings about the Iraqi nuclear peril.246
Nonetheless, the case against Iraq remained largely circumstantial. The imagery
only showed buildings, and the public and Congress had no way of knowing what was
244 Cheney is quoted in Rich, Greatest Story, p. 59. Rice and Rumsfeld are quoted in Prados, Hoodwinked,
pp. 26, 29.
245 Address to the Lord Mayor's Ball, November 11, 2002; www.pm.gov.uk/output/page 1731.asp
246 David E. Sanger, "Bush Sees 'Urgent Duty' to Pre-empt Attack by Iraq," New York Times, October 8,
2002, p. 1.
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going on inside. The administration was able to preemptively deflect criticism by
invoking the aura of secret intelligence. The selective release of intelligence came with
the implication that more and better information on Iraqi activities remained classified.
Administration officials dismissed skeptics because, as Cheney put it, they had not "seen
all the intelligence that we have seen." 247 Colin Powell made the point again during his
UN presentation. "I cannot tell you everything that we know," he began, "but what I can
share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply
troubling." A week later George Tenet supported the secretary in his annual threat
assessment to Congress, declaring that the case against Iraq was "based on a solid
foundation of intelligence." In addition to providing judgments on Iraqi CW and BW,
Tenet suggested that the U.S. intelligence community had assembled a comprehensive
picture of Iraq's enrichment program. "Iraq has established a pattern of clandestine
procurements designed to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program," he said. "These
procurements include-but also go well beyond-the aluminum tubes that you have heard so
much about." 248
In London, the prime minister's office worked to ensure that the dossier on Iraqi
WMD would lead readers to conclude the worst. Staffers were aware of gaps in the
intelligence picture, and worried that the dossier would look like an argument by
assertion. They also worried that the dossier would resemble existing open source
analyses, such as the September 9 report prepared by the International Institute of
Strategic Studies. Their solution was to remind readers that the government had unique
access to secret intelligence. "In the public's mind the key difference between this text
247 Ricks, Fiasco, p. 51.
248 DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing, "The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex
World," February 11, 2003; http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/021103tenet.html.
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and the IISS text will be the access to intelligence material," said Daniel Pruce, who
recommended including details on the structure of the JIC to reinforce the point.249
Another argued for the selective release of raw intelligence, "with names, identifiers, etc.,
blacked out."250
Persuading skeptics to buy into a circumstantial argument also required invoking
the authority of official intelligence agencies. Pruce raised the issue when he asked,
"Who will issue the text? Us? The Cabinet Office? Why don't we issue it in the name of
the JIC? Makes it more interesting to the media." He also predicted that readers would
be drawn to the sections on new intelligence: "The draft already plays up the nature of
intelligence sourcing. I think we could play this up more. The more we advertise that
unsupported assertions...come from intelligence, the better." 251
The final version of the dossier emphasized the intelligence mystique. The
executive summary highlighted "significant additional information...available to the
Government" that set it apart from other publicly available estimates. The prime
minister's introduction went further, suggesting that any gaps in the dossier were
necessary to protect intelligence agents inside Iraq. Blair explained that the government
could not publish everything it new without risking sources and methods. 252 He invoked
the aura of secret intelligence again when he delivered the dossier to Parliament. He
reminded MPs that the JIC's work is "obviously secret," but that the seriousness of the
issue was enough to justify the extraordinary step of publishing its assessment. Readers
249 Pruce to Matthews, et al., September 10, 2002.
250 Bassett to Smith, et al., September 11, 2002.
251 Pruce to Campbell, et al, September 11, 2002. Campbell was especially concerned that the dossier look
like an intelligence product and not government propaganda. He had good reason to fear, according to
intelligence scholar Richard Aldrich, because "journalists trusts spies (more) than spin doctors." Campbell,
Blair Years, p. 638; and Aldrich, "Whitehall and the Iraq War," p. 79.252 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 6.
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were left to assume that the JIC assessment was the reasoned opinion of analysts with a
complete view of the classified intelligence. 253
Self-evident responses. Finally, policymakers argued that intelligence left them
with no choice but to pursue an aggressive strategy towards Iraq. President Bush used
intelligence to demonstrate that Iraq wanted to expand its WMD capability, and that it
would use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. As a result, U.S.
policy must be to disarm Iraq. Saddam's belligerence towards the United Nations and
history of duplicity meant that international sanctions and inspections were not reliable.
Regime change by force was the only option. The president had been building this
argument for months, and offered a summary in his address on the eve of the war:
Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that
the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal
weapons ever devised...The regime has a history of reckless aggression in
the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it
has aided, trained, and harbored terrorists, including operatives of Al
Qaida. The danger is clear: Using chemical, biological, or, one day,
nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill
their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of
innocent people in our country or any other...Instead of drifting along
towards tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of
horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed.254
Note that Bush's argument ultimately rested on the belief that intelligence was
irrefutable. Indeed, he stressed that intelligence left "no doubt" about Iraqi capabilities
and intentions. The use of intelligence helped the president argue that the danger was
real, and that only military action could solve the problem. To do anything else would be
to drift towards tragedy.
253 Prime Minister's Statement to Parliament, September 24, 2002; www.pm.gov.uk/output/Pagel727/asp.
254 President's Address to the Nation, March 17, 2002; UCSB Presidency Project.
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Prime Minister Blair likewise claimed that intelligence left him with only one
choice. During the preparation of the first dossier, one staffer argued that Blair should
portray his actions as the only responsible course of action. He suggested including a
passage along these lines: "Something like, 'I am today taking the exceptional step of
publishing the JIC's advice to me...When you have read this, I ask you to consider what
else a responsible (prime minister) could do than follow the course we have in the face of
this advice?" 255 Blair used this logic to push for a tougher inspections regime and
ultimately to justify the war. He invoked intelligence months after the invasion.
"Imagine you are PM," he said to a Labour Party conference, "and you receive this
intelligence. And not just about Iraq. But about the whole murky trade in WMD...And I
see the terrorism and the trade in WMD growing....So what do I do? Say, 'I've got the
intelligence but I've a hunch its wrong?"'
256
Politicization and Analytical Sclerosis
Despite differences in the organization and culture of American and British
intelligence, the pattern of intelligence-policy relations was the same in both cases. The
oversell model of politicization offers a straightforward explanation: policymakers
pressured intelligence to join the policy consensus after making public commitments in
the face of domestic opposition, using intelligence to oversell the need for military action.
The long-term consequences are still unclear, although scholars have noted that the
political use ofpre-war intelligence might make it more difficult to rally international
support for strategies requiring multilateral cooperation. For example, multilateral non-
proliferation regimes require faith in the quality of intelligence, but that faith has surely
255 Powell to Campbell and Manning, September 17, 2002.
256 Coates and Krieger, Blair's War, pp. 126-127.
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eroded.257 In addition, politicization has exacerbated mutual antipathy and mistrust
between policymakers and intelligence officials. Furious analysts have berated
policymakers for manipulating their work, and policymakers have come close to accusing
analysts of subversion. Richard Betts has recently concluded that the episode marks a
nadir in the history of U.S. intelligence. 258 The same is true in the United Kingdom,
where intelligence agencies have suffered through a series of painful inquiries into the
reasons for their collective failure.
But there were more immediate consequences. The process of politicization that
began in 2002 led to analytical sclerosis in 2003. By December, policy pressure had
encouraged analysts to take their assumptions about Iraq to logical extremes, and
estimates became increasingly ominous. Not only did they conclude that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction, but they also asserted that information gaps were the result
of Iraqi concealment and deception.259 Moreover, by publishing estimates, intelligence
agencies were disinclined from revisiting their conclusions. To do so would have
constituted a public admission that their earlier work was radically wrong. As a result,
neither British nor American intelligence seriously reconsidered their leading
assumptions, even after inspectors started sending back data for the first time since 1998.
257 For a more general argument about the effects of the Iraq war on intelligence, see Lawrence Freedman,
"Restoring Trust in Intelligence," in Walker, ed., Search for WMD, pp. 182-191.
258 Richard K. Betts, Enemies ofIntelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 91-98.
259 Tenet made this point in his annual threat assessment to Congress on February 11, 2003. It is unclear
whether rank-and-file analysts agreed with his conclusions about Iraqi deception or whether they were
simply resigned to the reality of the coming war. Policymakers reinforced this conclusion as well. See
Blair, "Engaging with Syria"; and Condoleezza Rice, "Why We Know Iraq Is Lying," New York Times,
January 23, 2003, p. 25. On Tenet's threat assessment, see Prados, Hoodwinked, pp. 257-258.
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The fact that the UN and IAEA reported no signs of a reconstituted WMD program had
no apparent impact on intelligence analysis.26
Dissenters faced policy pressure as well as institutional inertia. Richard Aldrich
notes that in the UK, most analysts developed "almost an ideological conviction...that all
militarist dictators wish to acquire WMD and that they are all working busily to do
so." 261 Analysts who let this conviction determine their conclusions were well received
by policymakers as well as their supervisors. Skeptics found it difficult to argue a
contrary position, despite the lack of information one way or the other. In the United
States, dissenters had trouble finding institutional backing to pursue alternative
hypotheses. Tyler Drumheller, the European division chief in the CIA, tried for months
to track down a well-placed source who claimed that Iraq did not have an active WMD
program. The source had reported through intermediaries that Iraq had no mobile BW
facilities, and that it would at least 18-24 months to build a crude atomic warhead after it
acquired fissile material. Finally, he said that Iraq had no relationship with al Qaeda, and
that Saddam still considered bin Laden to be an enemy of the regime. According to
Drumheller, agency officials had no interested in pursuing these leads because they were
convinced that war was inevitable. One of his subordinates was denied a meeting at CIA
headquarters to review the new information. "It's time you learn it's not about
intelligence anymore," he was told. "It's about regime change." 262
260 Hans Blix, Oral Introduction of the 12th Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC, March 7, 2003;
www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/SC7asdelivered.htm; and Mohamed ElBaradei, "The Status of Nuclear
Inspections in Iraq: An Update," March 7, 2003;
www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003nOO6.shtm.
261 Aldrich, "Whitehall and the Iraq War," p. 77.
262 Drumheller, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 91-98, quoted at 95. See also Isikoff and Corn, Hubris, pp.
200-201; and Walter Pincus, "CIA Learned in '02 That Bin Laden had No Iraq Ties, Report Says," The
Washington Post, Sept. 15, 2006, p. A14.
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Intelligence officials also stopped trying to restrain policymakers from using
dubious information in public. In October 2002, the White House wanted to include the
yellowcake story in a major speech on Iraq, even though the CIA was highly skeptical.263
While some agencies believed the intelligence was credible, CIA analysts noted that Iraq
already possessed 550 metric tons ofyellowcake and could not confirm reports about
additional procurement. The mines in question were operated by a French consortium
rather than the government of Niger, one of them was flooded, and the logistical realities
of transferring large amounts of uranium made it highly unlikely that such a deal could
take place covertly.2 64 Tenet persuaded the White House to remove the claim from the
speech.
Still, the idea that Iraq was on the verge of importing fissile material was an
irresistible selling point because the NIE had concluded that Iraq was only months away
from a nuclear capability if it was able to acquire nuclear fuel. Apparently forgetting the
earlier warnings about the flimsiness of the underlying intelligence, White House
speechwriters included the story in several early drafts of the State of Union Address in
January 2003. A senior staff member on the National Security Council called WINPAC
director Alan Foley to see whether the speech would pass muster. Despite deep divisions
in the community over the quality of the information, Foley agreed that it would be
technically correct to include the claim as long as it was not cited as U.S. intelligence. 265
Speechwriters changed the text accordingly. Tenet received a draft of the speech before
263 Prados, Hoodwinked, pp. 124-127.
264 Eisner and Royce, Italian Letter, PP.
265 WINPAC came closer than other analytic units in the agency to accepting the Niger story. Anonymous
officials later accused Foley of bending under the weight of policy pressure. WINPAC analysts told Senate
investigators that they took the reporting seriously because they had seen past indications that Iraq sought
to import fissile material from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Eisner and Royce, Italian
Letter, p. 119; and SSCI Report, pp. 57-66.
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delivery, but did not proofread it to ensure that the intelligence was reliable. Whether he
was unwilling to take on the administration or too tired to fight, the DCI inadvertently
allowed bogus intelligence into the State of the Union.266
The yellowcake debacle was a microcosm of the collapse in intelligence-policy
relations before the war. Intelligence agencies erred by clinging to the assumption that
Saddam Hussein was determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and took
seriously any information that seemed to confirm their existing beliefs. Analysts failed to
revisit their conclusions, even after the emergence of disconfirming information, and
dissenters operated without institutional support. Policymakers encouraged these errors
by openly favoring intelligence that supported the case for military action. They also
removed any incentives for self-criticism by enlisting intelligence agencies in the public
relations campaign before the war. The result, in both the United States and the United
Kingdom was a wildly inaccurate estimate of Iraqi capabilities.
266 David E. Sanger and James Risen, "C.I.A. Chief Takes Blame in Assertion on Iraqi Uranium," New
York Times, July 12, 2003, p. 1; and SSCI report, pp. 64-66.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The literature on intelligence-policy relations is strikingly atheoretical. Unlike
civil-military relations, there have been few attempts to describe the subject that go
beyond axioms and anecdotes. Even basic terms have no precise definition; for example,
"politicization" seems to apply whenever intelligence reports carry political overtones.
Most of the existing literature is contained in memoirs, where the tendency is towards
exhortation rather than analysis. Memoirs usually contain a narrative of the author's
professional experience, followed by a short summary of the author's beliefs about the
appropriate behavior of intelligence officials. This is useful as far as it goes, but it cannot
provide the basis for theory. And while there has been substantial research in related
subjects like surprise attack and the psychology of decision-making, there is no set of
hypotheses that explains why policymakers alternately accept, ignore, or manipulate
intelligence estimates.
This dissertation has taken several steps towards a theory of intelligence-policy
relations. It has described the ideal type, in which intelligence analysts are free to work
objectively and policymakers are free to challenge their work without being accused of
inappropriate meddling. It has also described the three major pathologies of intelligence-
policy relations: neglect, politicization, and excessive harmony. These pathologies serve
as dependent variables for continued research on intelligence-policy relations. Finally, it
has described a model of politicization based on domestic politics. Politicization is the
most consequential pathology because it compromises near-term threat assessment and
creates long-term hostility and mistrust between policymakers and intelligence officials.
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Episodes of politicization can poison intelligence-policy relations for years after the fact,
exacerbating mutual stereotypes and inhibiting efforts to improve the quality of
interaction.
By focusing on the domestic impediments to healthy intelligence-policy relations,
the dissertation also suggests worthwhile avenues of research on the broader question of
threat assessment in democracies. How do political pressures at home affect
democracies' ability to understand the international security environment? How do
nonpartisan intelligence agencies avoid being drawn into partisan political fights? How
can democracies ensure that intelligence analysis is objective and neutral when
policymakers have strong incentives to use intelligence as policy oversell? More
broadly, do democracies enjoy better intelligence-policy relations than non-democracies,
and are they better at threat assessment? Answers to these questions have significant
implications for international relations theory. If democracies are not obviously superior
at interpreting international signals and measuring international threats, and if they have
political reasons for skewing intelligence, then theories about democracies at war and
peace need to be reconsidered.
The dissertation explains important cases, shedding light not only on the role of
intelligence but on foreign policy history. Intelligence agencies have been intimately
involved in questions over U.S. strategy in Vietnam, the response to the Soviet strategic
buildup, and the decision to invade Iraq. Decision-makers used intelligence in all of
these cases to justify their actions, but politicization was not inevitable in any of them.
President Johnson alternately accepted and ignored intelligence on Vietnam before 1967,
when the antiwar movement coalesced. President Nixon ignored intelligence on Soviet
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missiles until he publicly campaigned for a missile defense system. President Ford
interacted well with the CIA until the primary season of 1976. And the Bush and Blair
administrations had mixed views on intelligence before they began to agitate for war in
Iraq. Understanding why intelligence-policy relations fell apart helps explain why threat
assessments went awry.
Finally, the dissertation offers a number of practical recommendations for
policymakers and intelligence officials. There is no solution to the problem of
politicization, but there are ways of managing intelligence-policy relations so that it
occurs less frequently and with less damaging consequences. I discuss these below.
The Primacy of Domestic Politics
By far the leading debate in the study of intelligence-policy relations is on the
question of the appropriate distance between intelligence officials and policymakers. In
the United States, this debate began in the formative years of the intelligence community.
Sherman Kent, the legendary director of the Office of National Estimates, stressed the
need for intelligence to be objective and free of policy bias. Kent's critics like Wilmoore
Kendall and Roger Hilsman argued that too much distance from policymakers would
make intelligence irrelevant to the policy process. According to this argument,
intelligence officials had to take the risk of politicization or else intelligence products
would have no positive influence on decision-making. The debate over relative
proximity continued for decades, even though it appeared to have been resolved in favor
of the Kendall/Hilsman position by the 1990s, when Robert Gates was appointed Director
of Central Intelligence. Gates advocated a close and continuing interaction between
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intelligence and policy officials, and his views were received favorably among scholars
of intelligence. Recent events, however, have rekindled interest in the debate. George
Tenet's conscious decision to provide clear judgments to policymakers on Iraq, despite
the ambiguity of the underlying data, led him to publicly advocate for the
administration's foreign policy, and caused long time intelligence observers to reassess
their views. Richard Betts wrote that Tenet "may have strayed too far from the Kent
model" in his dealings with the White House.' Arthur Hulnick similarly concluded,
"Kent may have been right all along." 2
Underlying the debate over proximity are hypotheses about organizational design
and professional judgment. If closeness leads to politicization, then intelligence agencies
with interlocking connections to policy offices should routinely provide intelligence-to-
please. If intelligence producers are bureaucratically beholden to intelligence consumers,
then policymakers should be able to shape estimates to reflect their preferences. On the
other hand, intelligence agencies that are bureaucratically insulated, as well as those that
cultivate very strong norms of objectivity and independence, should be less likely to let
political bias enter into their work. Finally, arguments at the individual level of analysis
hold that the quality of intelligence-policy relations depends on the professional judgment
of key officials. Policymakers should find it easier to politicize estimates when
intelligence leaders consciously decide to interact more frequently with them. Prominent
1 Richard K. Betts, Enemies oflntelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 102.
2 Arthur S. Hulnick, "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle," Intelligence and National Security, Vol.
21, No. 6 (December 2006), pp. 959-979, at 968.
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intelligence officials have all struggled with the question of the how closely they should
work with leaders, and many have offered advice to their successors.3
Both variants of the proximity hypothesis are unsatisfying, however, because they
cannot reconcile the variation in policy responses to similar estimates. For instance,
organizational design remained constant in the United States during the 1960s, but the
Johnson administration alternately ignored, accepted, and politicized intelligence. In
other cases, organizational differences had no effect on comparative intelligence-policy
relations. British intelligence is closer to Whitehall than American intelligence is to the
White House, but the pattern of politicization before the Iraq war was strikingly similar.
This outcome cannot be attributed to the relative organizational proximity between the
intelligence and policy communities. Scholars have long debated the appropriate amount
of distance between intelligence and policy, but this debate seems to miss the deeper
causes of politicization.
Politicization is inexorably rooted in domestic politics. The oversell model
described in this study identifies two key variables that combine to give policymakers
reason to manipulate intelligence. First, leaders have incentives to oversell their
decisions whenever one or more critical constituency challenges the direction of policy.
The emergence of significant opposition gives policymakers a reason to call on
intelligence for support. Intelligence is a particularly useful public relations vehicle
3 Examples include Richard Helms with William Hood, A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central
Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 295-298; William Colby and Peter Forbath,
Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), pp. 372-376; Stansfield Turner,
Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 278; Robert M.
Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Inside Story ofFive Presidents and How They Won the Cold War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 286; and George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the
Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 363. For foreign perspectives, see Percy
Craddock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John
Murray, 2002), pp. 296-297; and Shlomo Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-maker," in
Michael I. Handel, ed. Leaders andIntelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989), pp. 261-287
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because it carries the aura of secrecy, allowing policymakers to claim that they are acting
on the best possible information. Second, leaders who make strong public commitments
find it difficult to tolerate dissent from intelligence agencies. Policymakers justify
controversial positions by pointing to support from intelligence, and signs of dissent can
undermine efforts to overcome domestic opposition. Under these conditions,
policymakers will act to bring intelligence into the consensus and keep it there. The
nature of politicization depends on the values of each independent variable. Direct
politicization is likely when leaders make strong and specific policy commitments on
very divisive issues. Indirect politicization is likely when commitments are weaker, or
when domestic opposition is less intense. Politicization of any kind is unlikely unless
both variables attain.
Results of the Study
This dissertation has surveyed almost all of the prominent cases of politicization
in the United States and the United Kingdom over the last forty years.4 The oversell
model explains the causes of politicization in each case, and it explains the type of
politicization in all but one.
4 I exclude two other possible cases of politicization. The first is the suggestion, heard in conversation with
British scholars, that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher pressured the JIC to support her positions in the
early 1980s. The available record is thin, however, and I was not able to verify this claim. The second case
deals with accusations that the Reagan administration forced analysts to exaggerate the Soviet threat.
Several analysts accused the top CIA officials of trying to force them to deliver more ominous assessments
in order to satisfy the White House. Deputy Director Robert Gates was singled out for his close scrutiny of
analytical products, a practice that struck analysts as evidence of politicization. Gates argued the
intellectual climate at the Agency had become stultified, and that more rigorous criticism was needed to
sharpen the quality of estimates. I exclude this case because it is not clear whether politicization actually
occurred in the early 1980s, or whether acrimonious intelligence-policy relations at the time were the
manifestation of lingering hostility over the Team B affair. See above, pp. 65-66.
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In 1964 the Johnson administration ignored two intelligence estimates that
undermined the strategic rationale for U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The first
concluded that the domino effect was a myth and that the U.S. position in Asia was based
on its network of island bases. The second concluded that fissures in the communist
world were growing, meaning that the United States need not fight peripheral battles
against communist movements out of fear of Soviet expansion. Despite the implications
of these analyses, they aroused almost no attention when they circulated throughout the
White House. At this time, there were no critical constituencies that strongly opposed
Johnson's fence-sitting strategy in Vietnam. Johnson argued that U.S. support for South
Vietnam was necessary because communist expansion threatened U.S. interests. On the
other hand, he had not committed to escalating the war, and his apparently moderate
position was appealing in contrast to Barry Goldwater's bluster. In this permissive
domestic political environment, the administration was free to accept or ignore
intelligence estimates without consequence.
In 1967, changing domestic factors led the Johnson administration to take a much
more hostile view of intelligence. The antiwar movement had coalesced by the summer,
reflecting mounting dissatisfaction with the war. That summer the CIA drafted a new
order of battle estimate, calculating an enemy force perhaps twice the size of the existing
military estimate. The White House responded by pressuring agency officials to accept
the lower total, and subsequently used intelligence to support the claim of steady progress
in the war. The administration politicized the order of battle estimate because it feared
that a public split with intelligence would energize public and congressional opposition.
The combination of a strong public commitment and the emergence of several critical
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constituencies meant that policymakers could no longer simply ignore dissenting
estimates about the status quo in Vietnam.
The Nixon administration was inclined to ignore intelligence, but it turned to the
CIA to help it make the case for a new missile defense system. The White House argued
that the Soviet Union was close to achieving a first-strike capability because of the
unique capabilities of the SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile. CIA analysts doubted
that an SS-9 volley was capable of destroying the Minuteman ICBM fleet, however, and
they challenged the administration's contention that Moscow was truly committed to
achieving a first-strike. As congressional opposition to missile defense became more
intense, the administration pressured intelligence officials to alter the NIE on the Soviet
Union so that it reflected its own beliefs about the Soviet threat. It also cultivated the
symbolic image of consensus by having the DCI appear in public with the Secretary of
Defense and by repeatedly claiming that investment in missile defense was based on new
intelligence.
The Team B episode is partly explained by the oversell model. President Ford
enjoyed a good relationship with the intelligence community, whose analyses of the
Soviet Union were broadly consistent with his preferences for arms control and detente.
In early 1976, however, Ronald Reagan threatened to capture the Republican nomination
for the upcoming presidential election. Reagan represented the right wing of the party,
which believed that detente was built upon a naYve appraisal of Moscow's strategic goals,
and criticized the CIA for enabling the president's approach. Ford responded to the
challenge from the right by shifting to a more confrontational foreign policy towards the
Soviet Union. He also allowed a group of prominent hawks ("Team B") to compete with
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intelligence during the drafting of the annual NIE on the Soviet Union. The decision to
authorize Team B made it likely that the estimate would more closely reflect Ford's new
policy commitment.
The oversell model predicts direct politicization in this case, but Team B was an
indirect method of pressuring the intelligence community. Indeed, neither Ford nor any
other policymaker tried to coerce intelligence officials to change the NIE during the
drafting process. The reason was that the president intended to return to detente if he was
re-elected. Ford pandered to the right in order to give himself a chance in the primaries,
but he did not want to push intelligence so far that it would become impossible to
resuscitate arms control in 1977. His private preferences had a moderating effect on
politicization. Because the oversell model focuses only on the effects of public
commitments, however, it cannot provide a complete explanation for the president's
decision.
The last two cases describe the evolving U.S. and British reactions to intelligence
on Iraq before the war in 2003. Despite fundamental differences in the organizational
structure, the pattern of intelligence-policy relations was strikingly similar. Both the
Bush and Blair administrations pressured intelligence to inflate the estimate of Iraqi
capabilities, and both enlisted intelligence officials to help generate support for military
action. The intelligence picture was murky and incomplete, but policymakers used a
combination of indirect and direct pressure to compel intelligence agencies to provide
certain judgments that supported their commitment to regime change. Moreover, both
resorted to direct politicization after they recognized that critical constituencies
threatened their policy plans. In the United States, politicization was most intense on the
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eve of the congressional vote to authorize the use of military force, and when the
administration began to worry about flagging public support in late 2002. In the United
Kingdom, the government took the unprecedented step of publishing an intelligence
dossier on the Iraqi threat in order to overcome intense criticism from the public and the
Labour Party.
In every case, policymakers responded to domestic incentives by politicizing
intelligence. They coerced intelligence to join the policy consensus in order to deflect
domestic criticism, and used intelligence to oversell their policies. The results of this
study show that it is impossible to understand the content of intelligence estimates
without understanding the political context in which they are written.
Effects on Threat Assessment
Intelligence estimates are typically cautious and conditional because information
is often limited and ambiguous. Gaining reliable data on foreign capabilities is difficult,
especially because the targets of intelligence collection use elaborate concealment
techniques to hide state secrets from prying eyes. Gathering information on intentions is
harder still, and even when intelligence agencies are able to cultivate high-level sources
in foreign governments, they know that intentions are subject to change. For these
reasons, intelligence estimates attach caveats to their conclusions and loathe making point
predictions about future events.
Cautious and conditional estimates are of little use to policymakers, however,
who need to rally domestic support for their plans. Elected leaders cannot afford to be
forthright about gaps in the existing intelligence picture when they are trying to make a
convincing argument about the need for action. As a result, policymakers have large
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incentives to misrepresent intelligence in public. Intelligence works best as a public
relations vehicle when it is stripped of any indications of uncertainty or doubt, and
intelligence products are most persuasive when they appear to represent the collective
wisdom of the intelligence community. Signs of internal disagreement are
counterproductive, so they are also removed.
Successful politicization helps policymakers overcome domestic opposition, but it
also reduces the quality of threat assessment. The immediate effect is the creation of a
positive feedback loop between intelligence agencies and policymakers that inhibits self-
criticism and restricts the ability to update assessments as new information becomes
available. When policymakers openly signal their preference for certain findings,
intelligence estimates tend towards specific interpretations of the data in order to
accommodate their expectations. These new estimates reinforce and strengthen policy
beliefs, making it even less likely that intelligence agencies will revisit the basic
assumptions that underlie their work. At this point they are no longer learning
institutions. Instead, they become wedded to certain conclusions while filtering out new
information that would otherwise lead them to reassess their findings.
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of feedback on intelligence estimates and policy
beliefs, showing how politicization has corrosive effects on the analytical process. When
the intelligence community produces different interpretations of the same ambiguous
data, policymakers latch on to the analyses that confirm their beliefs and reject the rest.
After policymakers publicly commit to controversial positions, they have incentives to
pressure intelligence officials to support them. Having been enlisted in the public
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relations campaign, intelligence moves towards the policy position, and dissenting
analysts are increasingly marginalized.
Figure 1. Positive feedback leads to analytical sclerosis
Analytical
assumptions
influence policy
beliefs
Policy beliefs
become entrenched;
policymakers begin
public relations
Policy pressure
reinforces starting
assumptions;
inhibits
reassessment
In other cases, politicization can trigger a negative feedback loop which causes a
prolonged breakdown in intelligence-policy relations (see Chapter 2 for a fuller
discussion of this phenomenon). Episodes of politicization reinforce the latent hostility
between intelligence and policy. During periods of friction, analysts fear that
policymakers are trying to manipulate their work for political purposes, and policymakers
accuse analysts of trying to subvert them by producing contrary estimates. If both sides
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are already suspicious of the other, then negative feedback is likely. Policymakers will
doubt estimates that do not match their expectations, and push intelligence to provide the
"right" answer instead. Intelligence officials will respond by retreating behind
institutional walls to protect their work from being corrupted. The end result is that
policymakers will not use intelligence to inform their judgment, and intelligence officials
will become reluctant to participate in the policy process. Negative feedback causes
intelligence to become increasingly isolated, leading policymakers to rely on their own
sources of information and insight.
Negative feedback cycles have lasting effects on intelligence-policy relations,
because they reinforce pre-existing stereotypes and give both sides a reason to ignore the
other. For example, defense hawks in the Nixon and Ford administrations tried to force
the intelligence community to accept more ominous estimates of Soviet strategic
capabilities. They suspected that the CIA was ideologically predisposed to arms control
and detente, and was unwilling to recognize the scope and pace of the Soviet buildup
which began in the mid-1960s. This led to extraordinary acrimony during the 1980s,
when some of the earlier critics of the CIA took positions in the Reagan administration.
Intelligence analysts accused DCI William Casey, a charter member of the hawkish
Committee on the Present Danger, of trying to turn the intelligence community into a
propaganda mill for the administration. The mutual hostility that began during Cold War
battles over the Soviet estimate never completely disappeared.
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Figure 2. Negative feedback leads to intelligence isolation
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Despite the debacle over the estimates of Iraqi WMD, the temptation to use
intelligence remains strong. Ongoing battles over intelligence estimates speak to the
continuing public prestige afforded to official intelligence agencies. 5 Controversies over
the correct interpretation of estimates are only important because the intelligence
community still carries a unique reputation based on its control of secret information. If
5 In January 2007 the Director of National released a summary of a national intelligence estimate on Iraq,
"Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead." Critics of the Bush administration interpreted
the NIE as evidence of the failure of the counterinsurgency effort, noting the conclusion that the violence in
Iraq had evolved into a "self-sustaining inter-sectarian struggle." Supporters pointed to estimate's other
conclusion that the U.S. military was a stabilizing force, and that withdrawal would lead to a political
breakdown in Iraq. For various responses to the estimate, see Tom Vilsack, "Congress Must Act on Iraq,"
Washington Post, February 10, 2007, p. A17; and Bill Gertz, "Intelligence estimate warns on quick Iraq
pullout; cites likely creation of safe haven for al Qaeda terrorists," Washington Times, February 3, 2007, P.
A2. The recent publication of an NIE on Iranian nuclear activities led to a similar political battle. See
above, p. 70.
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not, major newspapers would not parse intelligence judgments on their front pages, and
politicians would not cite intelligence to support their public positions. The trend
towards intelligence transparency means that policymakers will be increasingly
compelled to manipulate the content of estimates. As the veil has fallen from
intelligence, Peter Gill writes, "governments have sought to maintain their information
control by compensatory measures of increasingly publicizing intelligence in order to
influence other 'actors' and thereby the public." The danger is that this will lead to "a
spiral of uncertainty, mistrust and paranoia." 6
Intelligence, Democracy, and War
Variation in the quality of intelligence-policy relations has important
consequences for international relations theory. For example, the relationship between
politicization and threat assessment speaks directly to arguments about democracies and
war-winning. Over the last two centuries democracies have fared better in war than non-
democracies. One recent study found that democracies prevailed in more than three-
quarters of their wars from 1815-2001, including an astonishing 93% of wars they
initiated. 7 According to Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, democracies have a higher
success rate partly because of a selection effect: they only choose weaker opponents.
Democratically elected leaders are more risk-averse than autocrats because they are
publicly accountable for their decisions. Voters punish losers and reward winners, giving
6 Peter Gill, "Intelligence Oversight Since 9/11: Information Control and the Invasion of Iraq," paper
presented at the "Making Intelligence Accountable" workshop in Oslo, Norway, September 19, 2003, p. 8;
www.dcaf.ch.
7 Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, Democracies at War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002),
p. 29.
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policymakers large incentives to wage wars only against weak and vulnerable enemies.
The more democratic the state, the less likely it is to initiate a conflict against a strong
enemy. "Highly democratic states," Reiter and Stam conclude, "appear to be quite
unwilling to initiate war except under the most propitious conditions." 9 Liberal
democracies also enjoy institutions like free media that ensure a healthy marketplace of
ideas and weed out foolish ideas before they are implemented. As a result, they are less
likely to succumb to dangerous nationalist impulses and wage disastrous wars of
expansion. 10
The democratic selection effect assumes that elected officials recognize the
political consequences of losing and strive to accurately assess the balance of power
before deciding on military action. An objective estimate of relative capabilities is
prerequisite to determining whether or not potential enemies are easy targets. The
democratic selection effect presupposes that democracies can accurately gauge the
likelihood of winning in any given conflict, and that they can reasonably anticipate the
duration and costs of fighting. Even victories can prove politically costly if states pay an
unexpectedly high price for winning. For these reasons, policymakers should try to
8 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional
Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 (December
1999), pp. 791-807; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 2 (June 1998), pp. 377-389; and Reiter and Stam,
Democracies at War. For a related argument on the vulnerability of democratically elected leaders, see
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A
Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," American Political Science Review,
Vol. 89, No. 4(December 1995), pp. 841-855. On the constraining influence of democratic institutions, see
Dan Reiter and Erik R. Tillman, "Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic
Initiation of Conflict," Journal ofPolitics, Vol. 64, No. 3 (August 2002), pp. 810-826.
9 Reiter and Stam, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," p. 387. See also Reiter and Stainm,
"Understanding Victory: Why Political Institutions Matter," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1
(Summer 2003), pp. 168-179, at 177-178.
10 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991); and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International
Security Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39.
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ensure that intelligence is insulated from political or bureaucratic pressures, in order to
prevent bias from seeping into its analysis. In short, elected officials should encourage
unvarnished intelligence so that they do not stumble into wars they cannot afford to fight.
Intelligence agencies are specifically designed to collect information about
foreign capabilities and intentions. They cultivate spies in foreign capitals and maintain a
variety of technical collection platforms that monitor foreign military activities. They
also train professional analysts to distill vast amounts of potentially important data in
order to provide digestible estimates for policymakers. All of this is useful for leaders
who are concerned about choosing enemies carefully. If the selection effect is real, then
democratic leaders should cultivate healthy relations with their intelligence services. If
democracies are good at identifying feeble enemies, they should also have a good record
of maintaining productive intelligence-policy relations. Indeed, Reiter and Stam argue
that military intelligence in autocratic states is flawed because military intelligence
officers are more often cronies than professionals. On the other hand, "the less
politicized bureaucracies of democratic governments are more likely to generate higher
quality, less biased information."'
The selection effects argument implies that intelligence-policy relations should
flourish in democracies; that politicization should be rare; and that elected leaders should
be protect the objectivity of intelligence before making decisions about the use of force.
The historical record, however, does not support any of these propositions. Democratic
leaders frequently politicize intelligence estimates on the relative balance of power and
pressure intelligence officials to change their conclusions on matters affecting the
decision to go to war. Moreover, this study has demonstrated that democratic politics
11 Reiter and Stam, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," pp. 378-379.
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actually increase the likelihood of politicization because leaders have strong incentives to
use intelligence as a promotional vehicle for their policy decisions. The Johnson
administration pressured the CIA to reduce its calculation of the enemy order of battle
because it was desperate to retain domestic support for the war in Vietnam. The Nixon
administration forced the intelligence community to exaggerate Soviet gains in strategic
technology in order to win congressional approval for missile defense. The Ford
administration allowed hardliners to manipulate annual estimate of the Soviet Union in
order to placate the right-wing of the Republican Party. The Bush administration
pressured intelligence officials to water down the ambiguities in Iraq's WMD program in
order to satisfy critics and ratchet up support for the war in 2002. The Blair cabinet also
forced British intelligence to exaggerate the danger of Iraq's arsenal and downplay the
genuine ambiguity in the data. Rather than leading to a more informed and rational
discussion of relative power, in all of these cases democratic pressures led to
politicization and flawed estimates.12
Of course, autocratic states are also prone to intelligence-policy breakdowns.
Dictators who cultivate sycophants are unlikely to receive much in the way of objective
analysis. In some cases intelligence officers may be unwilling to deliver bad news out of
concern for their career or their personal safety. 13 In other cases leaders may use
12 Michael C. Desch similarly argues that the causal mechanisms that drive the democratic selection effect
do not appear in many examples of wars initiated by democracies. See Desch, "Democracy and Victory:
Fair Fights or Food Fights?" International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 180-194, at 187-
192. See also Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," International Security,
Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 5-47.
13 Christopher Andrew, "Intelligence, International Relations, and 'Under-theorisation'," Intelligence and
National Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 170-184.
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intelligence agencies for psychological validation of their decisions. 14 While these
arguments are certainly plausible, we should not assume that is more common and
intense in autocratic regimes. In fact, politicization occurs in democracies with surprising
regularity. The historical record suggests that politicization occurs in both kinds of
regimes, but for different reasons. Dictators force intelligence officials to water down
their estimates through fear. Democratically-elected leaders force intelligence to toe the
line in order to satisfy their constituents. Whatever the reason, it is not clear that
intelligence-policy relations are more harmonious in democratic states, nor that
democracies are noticeably better at threat assessment. 15
Implications for Policy and International Security
Contemporary security issues are increasingly complex, and successfully
managing them requires more and better intelligence. Adapting to the rise of
transnational actors like terrorist groups, drug cartels, and proliferation networks requires
reliable information about their organization, interests, capabilities, and methods. The
large U.S. lead in conventional military power is not sufficient, especially in areas where
asymmetric forces can mitigate U.S. comparative advantages.16 In addition, intelligence
is necessary to guide policy decisions about which new threats require a substantial
response and which ones are not worth the effort. Absent this information, public fears
14 As Sen. Bob Graham puts it, "Dictatorships use intelligence to validate opinions. Democracies do not."
Bob Graham with Jeff Nussbaum, Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of
America's War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 183.15 For more on threat inflation in the United States, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure
of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer
2004), pp. 5-48; Jane Kellet Cramer, "National Security Panics: Overestimating Threats to National
Security," (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002); and Benjamin H. Friedman and
Harvey M. Sapolsky, "You Never Know(ism)," Breakthroughs, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 3-9.
16 Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,"
International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46, at 22-42.
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may spin out of control, and policy responses are likely to be wildly disproportionate to
the threat.17
Unfortunately, the long-term breakdown in intelligence-policy relations caused by
repeated episodes of politicization is going to make it more difficult for intelligence to
inform the policy process. In addition, intelligence agencies increasingly have to compete
with the media for the attention of policymakers seeking information on international
affairs. A growing industry in private sector analysis provides an alternative for
policymakers who are unsatisfied with the quality of formal intelligence estimates. The
problem for intelligence is thus twofold: not only will agencies struggle for analytical
traction on emerging threats, but they will also have a difficult time convincing
policymakers that their analysis is unique. Tackling the intelligence issues associated
with contemporary security problems requires a renewed focus on the intelligence-policy
process. The post-9/11 infusion of resources and personnel into the U.S. intelligence
community will be wasted if the community cannot restore its reputation with
policymakers.
Intelligence-policy breakdowns may also work against efforts to preserve
strategic alliances. Emerging transnational threats like proliferation and terrorism require
continuing multilateral cooperation, as well as faith among allies about the reliability of
intelligence. Given the current unpopularity of the United States, allies risk losing
domestic support if they are too closely aligned with the Washington. Finding coalition
partners for aggressive nonproliferation and counterproliferation initiatives will be
17 John Mueller argues that this process is well underway in terms of the response to terrorism and nuclear
proliferation. See Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National
Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006); and "Reactions and
Overreactions to Terrorism: The Atomic Obsession," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 31-September 3, 2007.
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particularly difficult, especially if such measures involve a visible U.S. military presence.
For this reason, potential allies have disincentives to cooperate on multilateral ventures
and may hesitate to enter into new intelligence liaison agreements." Diplomacy will
suffer if allies believe that U.S. intelligence has been manipulated for political purposes.
Improving Intelligence-Policy Relations
There is no solution to the problem of politicization, just as there is no way to
guarantee that intelligence will play a productive role in the policy process. As long as
policymakers believe in their own ability to perform analysis, they will be inclined to
ignore intelligence. And as long as policymakers need to rally support for their decisions,
they will be tempted to exploit the aura of secret information to help make the case.
There is no magic formula that will resolve the inherent problems in intelligence-policy
relations. However, there are ways to manage them.
First, intelligence-policy relations will benefit if policymakers and intelligence
officials re-establish the norm of secrecy regarding estimates. While a great deal of
intelligence material is needlessly classified, there is good reason to avoid publicizing
estimates. The expectation that intelligence will be part of the public debate over foreign
policy and military strategy creates incentives for policymakers to manipulate future
assessments. On the other hand, if intelligence agencies do not have to release their
work, then leaders will have less reason to pressure them to reach certain conclusions.
Policymakers should resist pressures to declassify current intelligence products, even if it
would be politically expedient to do so. Intelligence officials can also reduce the
18 On the costs and benefits of liaison agreements, see Jennifer E. Sims, "Foreign Intelligence Liaison:
Devils, Deals, and Details," International Journal ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 19, No. 2
(Summer 2006), pp. 195-207.
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incidence of politicization by taking steps to avoid leaks to the press, and by aggressively
pursuing and punishing leakers. A visible commitment to secrecy will help reassure
policymakers that intelligence agencies are not interested in undermining policy
decisions. 19
Of course, secrecy and democracy go together uneasily. Representative
government requires some degree of transparency so that policymakers can be held
accountable for their decisions. The public cannot judge the quality of foreign policy if
the underlying intelligence remains completely hidden. In addition, critics of intelligence
claim that secrecy is the only thing that saves the community from ridicule, and that
stringent classification rules operate mainly as bureaucratic cover for ineffective
bureaucrats. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it, "Secrecy is for losers." 20
There is truth in these arguments, but there is also a tradeoff. Efforts to reduce
secrecy may prevent policymakers and intelligence agencies from using classification to
protect their parochial interests. On the other hand, greater transparency increases the
likelihood of politicization and makes it less likely that published estimates will be
objective. Indeed, politicization occurred in every case in this study after intelligence
estimates became the subject of public debate. 21 The White House was willing to accept
discomfiting intelligence on Vietnam as late as 1966, but not after it began to publicly
19 Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell recently declared a moratorium on releasing
summaries of national intelligence estimates. However, the moratorium lasted just over a month before the
DNI released key judgments from the updated NIE on Iranian nuclear activities. Pamela Hess, "Spy Chief
to Restrict Intel Estimates," Washington Post, October 26, 2007.
20 Richard Gid Powers, "Introduction," in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy: The American Experience
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 1.
21 For related arguments about the relationship between transparency and politicization, see Philip H.J.
Davies and Anthony Glees, Spinning the Spies: Intelligence, Open Government and the Hutton Report
(London: Social Affairs Unit, 2004); Richard K. Betts, "Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits,"
in Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence (London: Frank Cass,
2003); and Joshua Rovner, "The Public Politics of Intelligence Reports," The Boston Globe, September 28,
2006, p. A9.
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defend its strategy by citing favorable intelligence on the course of the war. The
expectation that contrary intelligence would go public created incentives to manipulate
the product. The Nixon administration only started worrying about the SS-9 estimate
after press reports revealed the split between the White House and the intelligence
community. Finally, the Team B controversy arose because of public reports that
intelligence had grossly underestimated the scope and pace of the Soviet strategic
buildup. Had its estimates remained classified, the NIE would not have been political
fuel for opponents of detente.
The case of Iraq offers a perfect illustration of the dilemma. Critics in the United
States and the United Kingdom sought evidence that Iraq was a serous enough threat to
warrant a military response. In practice, this meant that policymakers would have to
disclose intelligence in public to explain why the international sanctions regime was
failing and why regime change was necessary. The problem, however, was that this
created enormous incentives to politicize intelligence. Domestic audiences wanted to be
sure that the threat was real before they would support military action. Perversely, those
same democratic pressures caused policymakers to manipulate estimates, ensuring that
the results were biased and inaccurate.
Advocates of greater transparency argue that the public will become more
informed if intelligence estimates are declassified. 22 However, policymakers have strong
incentives to ensure that public estimates support their decisions. Intelligence officials
may try to deflect policy pressure by watering down negative conclusions, or they may
simply toe the policy line. The public will not learn much in either case, and intelligence-
22 For a recent example, see Micah Zenko, "Share the Evidence on Iran," Washington Post, August 29,
2006, p. A15.
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policy relations will suffer. Re-establishing the norm of secrecy will reduce the incidence
of politicization without damaging the quality of the public debate.
Second, intelligence officials should strive to stay ahead of the policy curve,
anticipating policy requirements and directing analysts to focus on the issues that are
likely to attract policy attention. The expansion of private sector analysis has made it
increasingly difficult for intelligence agencies to distinguish themselves in the
marketplace of ideas. To convince policymakers that intelligence provides added value
without pandering to immediate policy needs, agencies should anticipate future problems
and take steps to help policymakers develop contingency plans. This kind of foresight
will also help policymakers set out tasks for the intelligence community, because they
may not know the right questions to ask if intelligence agencies are not thinking about
long term strategic trends. For example, the CIA was ahead of the curve regarding the
rise of the al Qaeda terrorist organization in the 1990s. The Agency was almost
completely alone in recognizing the possible scope of the threat, and in emphasizing the
danger to policymakers. While it did not succeed in convincing policymakers to take
significant preventive measures against al Qaeda, the Agency did develop of cadre of
terrorist specialists that were ready to fill in important details for policymakers in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Moreover, it cultivated and maintained contacts
with anti-Taliban tribal leaders in Afghanistan who became allies in Operation Enduring
Freedom.
A third way to improve the quality of intelligence-policy relations is to establish
personnel policies that strengthen the professional corps of intelligence analysts. The
loss of talented professionals will reinforce policy suspicions that the formal intelligence
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community offers little added value over private sector consultants and other sources of
analysis. The U.S. intelligence community is currently trying to deal with the problem of
"bidding-back," in which analysts are recruited by private consultancies before being sent
back to their original agencies under contract. Analysts are able to retain their security
clearances in the private sector, and they receive higher salaries as contractors than as
government employees.23 Although personnel figures are classified, the conventional
wisdom among intelligence observers is that turnover is rampant at the CIA and that the
average age of the workforce has significantly declined. Policymakers may justifiably
wonder about the value of estimates that are largely produced by young and
inexperienced analysts. Personnel policies that manage analytical turnover will
contribute to stronger professional norms, and will help restore the place of intelligence
in the policy process. 24
Such procedural reforms are useful, but they cannot fully solve the problem of
politicization. The temptation to manipulate estimates will exist as long as leaders have
incentives to use intelligence as policy oversell, and the trend towards transparency
means that intelligence will continue to play a role in the public debate over strategy and
foreign policy. Intelligence agencies, however, need not respond by distancing
themselves from the policy process. Instead, they can anticipate episodes of
politicization by paying closer attention to domestic politics, and prepare to deal with
policy pressure without resorting to self-isolation.
23 Patrick Radden Keefe, "Don't Privatize Our Spies," New York Times, June 25, 2007.
24 The Director of National Intelligence has apparently introduced an eighteen-month rule to deal with the
problem, meaning that analysts cannot return to the community for 18 months after leaving.
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Appendix A: Pathologies of Intelligence-Policy Relations
Type
Excessive Harmony
Ignore the Messenger
Self-Isolation
Direct Manipulation
Indirect Manipulation
Embedded Assumptions
Intelligence Subverts Policy
Intelligence Parochialism
Bureaucratic Parochialism
Partisan Intelligence
Intelligence as Scapegoat
DescriptionCategory
Excessive
Harmony
Neglect
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Mutual satisfaction leads to shared tunnel vision.
Intelligence and policy fail to challenge each others'
assumptions and beliefs, potentially leading to
disaster.
Policymakers ignore intelligence that undermines
their objectives. Instead, they cherry pick supporting
information or ignore intelligence altogether.
Intelligence self-consciously avoids contact with
policymakers.
Policymakers and staff pressure intelligence to
produce specific findings. Alternately, they appoint
malleable analysts.
Policymakers send tacit signals about acceptable and
unacceptable conclusions. Implicit threats and
promises accompany these signals.
Widely held strategic assumptions and social norms
constrain analysis.
Intelligence analysis publicly undermines policy
decisions. Alternately, policymakers ignore
intelligence because they fear subversion.
Analysts tailor findings for personal or professional
gain. This can cause intelligence to please or
subversion, depending on the analyst's goals.
Bureaucracies tailor intelligence findings to support
their own interests.
Political parties use intelligence issues for partisan
gain, usually by accusing rivals of mismanaging
intelligence.
Policymakers deride intelligence when it does not
support policy decisions. In addition, intelligence is
blamed for failure to predict events like surprise
attacks.
Politicization
Appendix B: Varieties of Politicization
The principal forms of politicization are discussed in the main text. These are several
other varieties.
Embedded Assumptions. Politicization is not only associated with controversies over
specific policy options. Analysts sometimes face basic doctrinal and social assumptions
that sharply confine the bounds of acceptable debate. Some ideas are pervasive and
sacrosanct. Going against the grain of policy shibboleths means losing credibility with
policymakers; such findings are likely to either be ignored or ridiculed. The analyst faces
this dilemma no matter how compelling the information has acquired. Thomas Hughes
calls this the "fate of facts in the world of ideas."'
For example, some officials in pre-war Japan were skeptical about the basic
assumption underlying the attack on Pearl Harbor: that the United States would negotiate
a settlement instead of fighting back. 2 "(We) should avoid anything like the Hawaiian
operation that would put Americans' back up too badly," urged one naval officer.3 The
skeptics understood that Japan was at a grave disadvantage in terms of industrial capacity
and emphasized the danger of provoking the world's most formidable economic power.
But despite their protests, they could not overcome wide anticipation of Japanese victory,
rooted as it was in religious faith in the emperor, unbridled nationalism, and general
ignorance about American history.4
Intelligence Parochialism. Intelligence officers have personal as well as patriotic
interests, and may try to improve their career prospects by tailoring intelligence to fit
policy needs. Such careerism is a variety of intelligence to please. Savvy analysts can
adjust to the preferred policy line without having to submit to direct orders. Analysts that
refuse to participate risk losing access to policymakers. In extreme cases intelligence
officials may resign in protest, but this is rare. 5
Careerism is often tied to bureaucratic incentives. This is especially the case for
military services that support their own intelligence services. Military intelligence
1 Hughes, Fate of Facts, p. 8.
2 Historians and political scientists continue to argue about Tokyo's motives in 1941. My point is not to enter
the debate, but only to note that pessimists faced more than the normal amount of political and bureaucratic
push back. For various explanations of Japanese behavior, see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 274; Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War,"
in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1984); Saburo lenaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945 (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1978); and Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: the Search for Economic Security,
1919-1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
3 Sagan, "Origins," p. 247. Sagan notes that the skeptics also faced institutional barriers, including strict
operational security requirements in the Navy that confined strategic discourse to a small number of officers.
4 John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books,
1986), pp. 27, 31, and 225-228. Dower and lenaga both stress the effectiveness of propagandists in spreading
myths of Japanese manifest destiny.
5 R.V. Jones, "Intelligence and Command," in Handel, ed. Leaders and Intelligence, pp. 288-298, at 290;
Handel, "Politics of Intelligence," pp. 23-25; Gates, "Guarding Against Politicization," p. 12; and Johnson
and Wirtz, eds., Strategic Intelligence, p. 169.
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analysts suffer a conflict of interest because their respective services stand to gain as a
result of intelligence findings. Superior officers send signals to analysts to communicate
the idea that career growth is tied to the content of their analyses. Individual and
bureaucratic interests are often indistinguishable, because career advancement usually
means supporting institutional goals.
Bureaucratic Parochialism. Bureaucracies use intelligence for bureaucratic gain, because
estimates affect budgets and other organizational goals. All intelligence agencies are
susceptible to this pathology; even intra-agency subdivisions battle for resources and
influence.6 It is especially likely when organizations support organic intelligence
services. Bureaucratic parochialism contributes to friction because it reduces the
credibility of intelligence, and policymakers are wary of estimates that mainly reflect
bureaucratic needs.
Limited resources sometimes lead bureaucracies into zero-sum competition with
one another. Under these conditions it is unsurprising that they try to marshal
intelligence that supports their respective positions.7 This partially explains the
budgetary battles between U.S. military services during the Cold War. During the 1950s,
for instance, planners worried that the Soviet Union would outpace the United States in
heavy bomber production. The Air Force used this so-called "bomber gap" to argue for
increased production of B-52s and more investment in the Strategic Air Command.
Army and Navy intelligence were deeply skeptical of Air Force claims.8
Partisan Intelligence. Political parties occasionally use intelligence issues to score points,
criticizing each other for misusing intelligence or abusing the community itself. This is
far from the traditional conception of politicization, but the process is likely to align
certain segments of the intelligence community with certain parties and politicians. Such
an alignment diverts intelligence work towards political ends, meaning that analyses will
reflect partisan preferences. 9
There are two ways in which partisanship causes intelligence-policy friction.
First, if a major party candidate criticizes his opponent for letting intelligence capabilities
atrophy, he risks alienating the community upon entering office. For example, during the
1980 presidential campaign the Reagan campaign accused congressional Democrats of
dismantling collection capabilities. Reagan's attack constituted an indirect attack on the
CIA itself, and many analysts were unenthusiastic about the new president when he took
6 Stafford T. Thomas, "CIA Functional Diversity and the National Security Process," in Cimbala, ed.,
Intelligence andIntelligence Policy, pp. 85-99. See also Robert Mandel, "Distortions in the Intelligence
Decision-Making Process," in Cimbala, ed. Intelligence andIntelligence Policy, pp. 69-83, at 73-74.
7 Handel, "Politics of Intelligence," p. 17.
8 Prados, Soviet Estimate, pp. 38-50; Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 21; and
Handel, "Politics of Intelligence," p. 16.
9 Some observers believe that this kind of politicization is a blessing in disguise. They argue that competition
between different intelligence agencies, tied to different political benefactors, will contribute to a functioning
marketplace of ideas. The problem is that when organizations tie themselves to specific intelligence agencies,
they have no reason to accept rival views. Such capitulation would mean admitting that their intelligence
services are inferior. See Handel, "Politics of Intelligence," pp. 11-13.
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office. 1 Second, intelligence officers will be more inclined to leak information in order
to undermine an unpopular administration, and will color their estimates accordingly.
The U.S. intelligence community was mostly spared from partisan battles during
its first quarter century. If anything, the appointment of the DCI was seen as an
opportunity to secure bipartisan support, as when President Kennedy appointed the
conservative John McCone to replace Allen Dulles after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. But the
combined effects of the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the public revelation of
questionable covert operations meant that by the mid-1970s intelligence was no longer
sacrosanct. Jimmy Carter capitalized on public discontent during the 1976 campaign, and
after his election asked then-DCI George H.W. Bush to step down. Bush had offered to
stay on so that the DCI could maintain an image of political independence, but Carter
demurred. U.S. intelligence never completely regained its apolitical character.
Intelligence as Scapegoat. Intelligence is often blamed when policies go awry. Despite
popular images of omniscient intelligence agencies, no organization can perfectly predict
events. Intelligence agencies are in the business of prying secrets from people who
desperately want them to remain hidden. Intelligence is also in the business of divining
intentions, a notoriously difficult task. Because unrealistic expectations are applied to
extraordinarily difficult tasks, intelligence is perpetually at risk of becoming scapegoat."
Moreover, intelligence officials cannot effectively respond to charges of intelligence
failure because they cannot reveal classified information. Finding it difficult to respond
to criticism, they become frustrated with policymakers who are not similarly constrained.
This may inspire reciprocal hostility, creating incentives to distort intelligence.
The fallout from the September 11 terrorist attacks illustrates this pathology. The
9/11 Commission blamed the intelligence community for failing to connect the data
points that might have led them to thwart the terrorist attacks. 12 While the community
certainly made errors, this critique smacks of hindsight bias. 13 Connections that look
obvious today were not clear at the time, especially considering extraordinary number of
data points involved. Moreover, even if the community had connected the dots, it is
likely that a flexible organization like al Qaeda would still have been able to pull off the
attack. 14
10 Reagan subsequently appointed his campaign manager William Casey as DCI. Casey proved an extremely
divisive figure. See Ransom, "Politicization of Intelligence," pp. 174-175; and Bob Woodward, Veil: The
Secrets Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987).
1 Hughes, Fate ofFacts, p. 6.
12 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2004). See chapter 8, "The System was Blinking Red."
13 Anthony Cordesman, "The 9/11 Commission Report: Strengths and Weaknesses," Center for Strategic and
International Studies, August 2, 2004, pp. 4-5; http://www.csis.org/features/91 lcommission.pdf ; Rovner,
"Why Intelligence Isn't to Blame for September 11"; Joshua Rovner and Austin Long, "The Perils of Shallow
Theory: Intelligence Reform and the 9/11 Commission," International Journal ofIntelligence and
Counterintelligence, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter 2005-2006), pp. 609-637; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "The 9/11
Commission Report: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004-2005), pp. 170-
190.
14 Jon R. Lindsay, "Intelligence Decision Making and the Disasters of September 11, 2001," MIT Security
Studies Program, ms., December 2003. For a discussion of al Qaeda's flexibility, see Jessica Stern, "The
Protean Enemy," Foreign Affairs Vol. 82, No. 4 (July/August 2003), pp. 27-40.
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